{
  "id": 415336,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNELIUS HARPER, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Harper",
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    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNELIUS HARPER, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Cornelius Harper was charged by indictment with first-degree murder, aggravated battery with a firearm, armed violence, armed robbery, home invasion, aggravated discharge of a firearm, residential burglary, robbery and aggravated battery. The trial court subsequently granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress statements. The State appeals, contending that the court erred in granting the motion to suppress where defendant had not invoked his implied fifth amendment right to counsel and where his sixth amendment right to counsel had not yet attached with respect to the offenses for which he was subsequently charged. Defendant, as appellee, counters that his motion to suppress was properly granted because his fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizure was violated.\nOn March 29, 1995, Chicago Heights police detective Michael Brink and his partner met with Assistant State\u2019s Attorney John Dillon regarding a homicide investigation. During the course of their investigation, the detectives learned that a family member of the victim identified defendant as a participant in the crime and that defendant was in the Cook County jail on an unrelated charge of domestic battery. Dillon then gave the detectives a letter stating that defendant could be released from the Cook County jail into the detectives\u2019 custody for 24 hours. This \u201cjail letter\u201d also stated defendant\u2019s name, identification number, whether or not the case was related to the charge for which he was in custody, and the time defendant was released. Dillon also told the detectives the procedure for returning defendant to the jail and that a form would later go into the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s file in Markham, Illinois.\nThe detectives learned that defendant was in court, and they obtained letters from Dillon for the following two days after determining that the 24-hour period would not be sufficient. However, Detective Brink testified that they were only allowed to have defendant released to their custody for one 24-hour period. On March 30, 1995, Detective Brink took defendant into custody pursuant to the jail letter and questioned him at the Chicago Heights police station. After defendant incriminated himself in the homicide, the detectives returned defendant to the jail and later obtained a warrant for his arrest in the instant case.\nAt the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, Dillon testified that jail letters, such as the one used here, were not approved by a judge. He also stated that, if an inmate was to be placed in a lineup, the inmate\u2019s attorney would be contacted and a request would usually be made that he be dressed in civilian clothing. Dillon further testified that the State\u2019s Attorney did not have a policy or instructional memo on the use of jail letters.\nThe State contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion to suppress because no right to counsel was implicated under either the fifth or sixth amendment.\nWhere neither the facts nor the credibility of the witnesses is questioned, a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is subject to de novo review. People v. James, 163 Ill. 2d 302, 310, 645 N.E.2d 195 (1994). An accused\u2019s assertion of his fifth amendment protections under Miranda during a custodial interrogation \u201cwill preclude further police-initiated questioning, even on unrelated offenses, unless counsel is present.\u201d People v. Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d 116, 129, 592 N.E.2d 960 (1992), citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175-77, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158, 166-68, 111 S. Ct. 2204, 2207-08 (1991). A defendant\u2019s assertion of his sixth amendment right to counsel bars the police from initiating further questioning as to the charged offense, but does not prohibit questioning as to unrelated offenses. Maxwell, 148 Ill. 2d at 128-29.\nThe State argues that the recent decision in People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 695 N.E.2d 447 (1998), is controlling and requires reversal of the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motion to suppress. In Harris, the police were investigating a murder and used a jail letter to take the defendant from the Cook County jail where he was being held for violation of his probation, to a police station where he participated in a lineup and made statements. The next morning, the police returned the defendant to the jail. The trial court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, finding that none of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated by the jail letter procedure. On direct appeal from his capital conviction, the defendant argued that the procedure violated the Illinois Habeas Corpus Act (735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1994)) and the County Jail Act (730 ILCS 125/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)). The supreme court determined that, even if those statutes had been violated, the suppression of evidence would not be an appropriate remedy. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 149-50. The court also stated:\n\u201cIt should be noted that the defendant does not contend here that the questioning of him at [the police station] violated his fifth amendment right to counsel. The defendant\u2019s exercise of his sixth amendment right to counsel at the probation violation hearing did not extend to other, as yet uncharged, offenses and did not preclude, on fifth amendment grounds, questioning on unrelated offenses. [Citations.]\n*** Moreover, the police had legitimate reasons to transfer the defendant to [the police station], where the investigation was centered and where they could conduct a lineup.\u201d Harris, 182 Ill. 2d at 150.\nHere, like the defendant in Harris, defendant does not contend that he was questioned in violation of his right to counsel. Defendant does not claim that he was questioned in violation of his Miranda rights, and the record contains no references to defendant asserting his rights under the fifth amendment. Further, although defendant was represented by counsel, the representation was on an offense not related to the instant charges. Therefore, defendant\u2019s sixth amendment rights were not implicated in the instant case, and the police were permitted to question defendant regarding his involvement without the presence of counsel.\nWithout citing any cases on point, defendant generally asserts that the officers violated his fourth amendment right against unreasonable seizure by removing him to another location for questioning on an unrelated charge. However, defendant\u2019s freedom was already restricted because he was in custody on another charge. Instead of presenting reasoned legal argument as to why the procedure is constitutionally impermissible, defendant\u2019s brief mounts a generalized attack on the jail letter procedure. Defendant lists a series of alternative procedures, such as questioning defendant at the jail or asking defendant\u2019s attorney for permission to speak with him. Regardless of whether alternative procedures may have been available to the police, defendant has not persuaded us that his rights under the fourth amendment were violated. Under the circumstances presented, the State\u2019s use of a jail letter to temporarily release defendant into the custody of police investigating an unrelated case, merely to question him in another location, was not unreasonable.\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court of Cook County is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nCOUSINS, EJ, and McNULTY, J, concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Robert Berlin, William Toffenetti, and John M. Sheldon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.",
      "J. Scott Arthur, of Orland Park, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CORNELIUS HARPER, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20143998\nOpinion filed December 30, 1999,\nnunc pro tunc December 7, 1999.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Robert Berlin, William Toffenetti, and John M. Sheldon, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nJ. Scott Arthur, of Orland Park, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0104-01",
  "first_page_order": 122,
  "last_page_order": 125
}