{
  "id": 415376,
  "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD PETTY, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. Petty",
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  "provenance": {
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD PETTY, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BOWMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Richard Petty, was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 1998)) and failing to signal (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 804(a) (West 1998)). The State appeals the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. Before granting the motion, the court barred the arresting officer from testifying because the police inadvertently erased the requested audiotape recording of defendant\u2019s arrest. On appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it could have imposed a less oppressive discovery sanction. We reverse the trial court\u2019s order and remand the cause.\nOn February 8, 1998, an anonymous source reported that someone under the influence of alcohol was driving a vehicle matching the description of defendant\u2019s car. The Kane County sheriffs office informed Elburn police officer Michael Schoo of the tip. The record suggests that Officer Schoo stopped defendant after he observed defendant fail to signal before turning.\nThe State concedes that the anonymous tip and subsequent dispatch were recorded. Although defendant failed to subpoena the recordings, he moved for discovery of the audiotapes under Supreme Court Rule 237 (134 Ill. 2d R. 237) and the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 13 (West 1998)) and petitioned to rescind the statutory summary suspension of his driving privileges. The State responded that the tapes had been inadvertently erased after defendant moved for discovery. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s subsequent motion to quash the arrest and suppress all of Officer Schoo\u2019s testimony from further proceedings.\nOn appeal, the State argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sanctioned the State by barring the arresting officer from testifying. The State contends that we should excuse the inadvertent destruction of the audiotapes because (1) the trial court based its decision on a nonprecedential order, (2) the court could have limited the officer\u2019s testimony to matters not contained in the audiotapes, and (3) defendant failed to subpoena the tapes pursuant to the rules of misdemeanor discovery. Because we agree with the State\u2019s first two arguments, we do not address the third.\nBoth the parties and the trial court considered whether People v. Karl, No. 1 \u2014 96\u20143485 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23) applies to this case. The trial court found that Karl required the suppression of the arresting officer\u2019s testimony. However, it was improper for the trial court to rely on Karl and to permit the parties to cite that case as authority. See People v. Schambow, 305 Ill. App. 3d 763, 766 (1999). Supreme Court Rule 23(e) provides that an unpublished order of an appellate court \u201cis not precedential and may not be cited by any party.\u201d 166 Ill. 2d R. 23(e). Rule 23 orders have no precedential value and may be invoked only to support contentions such as double jeopardy, res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. Schambow, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 766. Therefore, we do not consider Karl and instead engage in an independent legal analysis of the issues. See Schambow, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 766.\nDefendant responds that, even if Karl does not govern this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it barred the officer from testifying. However, defendant cites no case with similar facts that supports his contention. The goals of discovery are to eliminate surprise and unfairness and to afford an opportunity to investigate. People v. Rubino, 305 Ill. App. 3d 85, 87 (1999). Discovery sanctions are designed to further these goals and to compel compliance rather than to punish. Rubino, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 87. However, harsh sanctions, such as the exclusion of evidence, may be warranted where the defendant is denied a full opportunity to prepare his defense and make tactical decisions with the aid of the information that was withheld. People v. Leon, 306 Ill. App. 3d 707, 713-14 (1999).\nIn Schambow, the defendant was charged with DUI, and the Secretary of State summarily suspended his driving privileges. The trial court rescinded the suspension as a discovery sanction after the State inadvertently destroyed a subpoenaed audiotape of radio communications between the arresting officer and the police headquarters. This court reversed the rescission, concluding that a less oppressive discovery sanction was available that would have permitted a hearing on the merits without prejudicing the defendant. Schambow, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 769.\nWe conclude that the court abused its discretion when it completely barred Officer Schoo from testifying at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash the arrest and suppress evidence. The Appellate Court, Third District, has held that the appropriate sanction for the State\u2019s failure to produce requested audiotapes is to preclude the arresting officer from testifying about matters that may have been included on the tapes. People v. Koutsakis, 255 Ill. App. 3d 306, 313-14 (1993). In this case, the trial court could have precluded the officer from testifying about his conversations with the dispatcher and limited the testimony to the officer\u2019s observations of defendant. Such a sanction would have been more proportional to the magnitude of the discovery violation. See Schambow, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 769.\nFor these reasons, the order of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed, and the cause is remanded.\nReversed and remanded.\nTHOMAS and GALASSO, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BOWMAN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "David R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.",
      "James R. Doerr, of Ramsell & Armamentos, of Wheaton, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD PETTY, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201498\u20141291\nOpinion filed February 10, 2000.\nDavid R. Akemann, State\u2019s Attorney, of St. Charles (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nJames R. Doerr, of Ramsell & Armamentos, of Wheaton, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0301-01",
  "first_page_order": 319,
  "last_page_order": 322
}