{ "id": 415339, "name": "BERNICE RATLEDGE, Widow of William L. Ratledge, Deceased, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Helle Hardwoods, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Ratledge v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "2000-02-25", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201499\u20140781WC", "first_page": "862", "last_page": "867", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 862" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 852", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3098795 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" }, { "page": "85" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "stating \"[t]he legislature apparently neglected to consider the consequences of the remarriage provision\" under these circumstances" }, { "page": "89", "parenthetical": "Goldenhersh, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "85", "parenthetical": "stating \"Interlake *** does not govern this case\"" }, { "page": "86", "parenthetical": "discussing its holding in Interlake and then stating that \"[i]n this case[,] it remains for us to decided ] *** what is to occur in the context of the facts presented here\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "86" }, { "page": "87", "parenthetical": "Ward, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179946 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "341-42" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "341-42" }, { "page": "342-43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 N.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112615 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0181-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 580, "char_count": 12478, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.015431015476191854 }, "sha256": "1627afc60c4a39da856716781923fdcf2c6e572a06824c932f84faa4b7a8aa66", "simhash": "1:e1f487dfb7c72ab3", "word_count": 1977 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:30:26.081874+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BERNICE RATLEDGE, Widow of William L. Ratledge, Deceased, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Helle Hardwoods, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn May 20, 1998, appellee, Helle Hardwoods (respondent), filed a motion before the Industrial Commission (Commission) to terminate lifetime benefits to appellant, Bernice Ratledge (claimant), under section 7(a) of the Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act (Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.7(a) (now section 7(a) of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/7(a) (West 1998))). On September 23, 1998, the Commission denied respondent\u2019s motion. On February 9, 1999, the circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission. On April 20, 1999, pursuant to claimant\u2019s motion, the circuit court reconsidered its February 1999 order and affirmed the Commission\u2019s denial of the petition to terminate. On June 9, 1999, the circuit court, pursuant to respondent\u2019s motion, issued a supplementary statement with respect to the April 20, 1999, opinion and order. Claimant appeals, arguing (1) the circuit court lacked authority to issue the supplementary order; and (2) the circuit court\u2019s supplementary order was contrary to the law. To the extent that the circuit court\u2019s decision modifies the Commission decision, we vacate the circuit court\u2019s decision and reinstate the Commission decision.\nOn January 16, 1976, decedent, William L. Ratledge, suffered fatal injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment with respondent. William Ratledge was survived by his wife, the claimant herein, and two minor children, Timothy (then age 5) and Kimberly (date of birth, September 24, 1974). On February 27, 1976, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim. On September 13, 1976, the arbitrator awarded claimant $105.33 per week in lifetime benefits pursuant to section 7(a) of the Act. Respondent did not dispute this award and it became the final order of the Commission as of September 28, 1976.\nOn August 18, 1991, claimant remarried. At the time of claimant\u2019s remarriage, Timothy had reached majority age but Kimberly had not.\nWith respect to its April 20, 1999, order, the circuit court disagreed with the Commission\u2019s reasoning and case analysis, but nevertheless confirmed the Commission\u2019s denial of respondent\u2019s motion to terminate benefits. As to respondent\u2019s May 7, 1999, motion to clarify, the circuit court\u2019s supplemental June 9 order restated its April 20, 1999, opinion and order. On July 6, 1999, claimant filed her notice of appeal.\nAlthough we disagree with the claimant\u2019s assertion that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction with respect to the May 7 motion, we agree with the Commission and claimant with respect to the precedent of Interlake, Inc. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 95 Ill. 2d 181, 447 N.E.2d 339 (1983), and will not address claimant\u2019s first issue. We also note that, even if the circuit court lacked the authority to enter the June 9, 1999, supplemental order, the outcome would be the same. Despite claimant\u2019s assertions in her brief, the circuit court\u2019s supplemental order did not substantially differ from the April 20, 1999, opinion and order. Both orders provided that claimant was entitled to compensation until Kimberly turned 18, unless Kimberly enrolled in an accredited academic institution, in which case claimant was entitled to benefits until Kimberly reached age 25.\nSection 7(a) of the Act governs lifetime benefit awards and, at the time of decedent\u2019s death, provided substantially what it now provides in its current form:\n\u201c(a) If the employee leaves a surviving *** widow, widower, child or children, the applicable weekly compensation rate computed in accordance with subparagraph 2 of paragraph (b) of Section 8, shall be payable during the life of the widow or widower and if any surviving child or children shall not be physically or mentally incapacitated then until the death of the widow or widower or until the youngest child shall reach the age of 18, whichever shall come later; provided that if such child or children shall be enrolled as a full time student in any accredited educational institution, the payments shall continue until such child has attained the age of 25. In the event any surviving child or children shall be physically or mentally incapacitated, the payments shall continue for the duration of such incapacity.\n* * *\nIn the event of the remarriage of a widow or widower, where the decedent did not leave surviving any child or children who, at the time of such remarriage, are entitled to compensation benefits under this Act, the surviving spouse shall be paid a lump sum equal to 2 years compensation benefits and all further rights of such widow or widower shall be extinguished.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, eh. 48, par. 138.7(a) (now 820 ILCS 305/7(a) (West 1998)).\nTwo cases have addressed this section. First, in Interlake decedent died from work-related injuries, and decedent\u2019s widow remarried. At the time of her remarriage, two of decedent\u2019s surviving children were minors and therefore entitled to support. Our supreme court unanimously held:\n\u201cUnder the language of the section, *** decedent\u2019s widow[ ] is entitled to benefits until she dies, because she did not remarry at a time when none of the decedent\u2019s children were entitled to support. There simply is no provision in the statute for terminating a widow\u2019s benefits upon remarriage when there remain minor children entitled to support,\u201d (Emphasis added.) Interlake, 95 Ill. 2d at 191, 447 N.E.2d at 344.\nOur supreme court examined section 7(a) again in Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 504 N.E.2d 84 (1987). In Stewart, decedent died of work-related injuries. The arbitrator awarded death benefits to decedent\u2019s widow (decedent\u2019s second wife) and decedent\u2019s four children from a previous marriage who lived with their natural mother. Prior to the Commission\u2019s ruling on review, decedent\u2019s widow remarried. The Commission held that, under Interlake, her remarriage did not affect her right to continuing benefits. Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 339, 504 N.E.2d at 85. On appeal to the supreme court, decedent\u2019s widow argued that, under Interlake, she was entitled to benefits for life irrespective of her remarriage. The supreme court disagreed and distinguished Interlake, finding \u201cthe widow in Interlake was the natural mother of the decedent\u2019s children and was responsible for their care and support, whereas the widow in the present case is the decedent\u2019s second wife and is not responsible for the decedent\u2019s children.\u201d Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 340, 504 N.E.2d at 85.\nTurning to the case at bar, the Commission found that the instant case was \u201con all fours with Interlake. *** According to the law in Interlake, benefits to the widow continue as the remarriage occurred while [Kimberly] was a minor. The Commission notes Stewart did not overrule Interlake.\u201d\nIn response to respondent\u2019s May 7, 1999, motion for clarification, the circuit court\u2019s order of June 9, 1999, stated in part:\n\u201cThe Industrial Commission correctly noted that Stewart did not overrule Interlake, but it failed to observe that Stewart established that the purpose of [s]ection 7(a) was to provide against hardship for families who lose a primary wage earner. [Citation.] As a consequence, eligibility for benefits must terminate at some point; namely, when responsibility for the care and support of self or minor children is no longer the survivor\u2019s sole responsibility.\nIn the case at bar, as soon as Bernice\u2019s daughter Kimberly reached the age of majority, Bernice ceased to be responsible for the care and support of her daughter. As a consequence, Bernice\u2019s benefits *** expired as soon as Kimberly reached 18, or [alternatively at] age 25 if Kimberly was attending an accredited educational institution on afull[-]time basis.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWe disagree with the circuit court\u2019s analysis of Interlake and Stewart. Interlake states that a widow in claimant\u2019s situation shall receive benefits for life. Interlake, 95 Ill. 2d at 191, 447 N.E.2d at 344. One cannot conclude, therefore, that Interlake is still good law while also concluding that claimant\u2019s benefits will terminate before her death. The pivotal issue, therefore, is whether Stewart impliedly overturned Interlake or merely created an exception to Interlake. Respondent contends that Stewart and Interlake are irreconcilable and Stewart, being the most recent, should control. Respondent further argues that the supreme court\u2019s aforementioned legislative intent analysis in Stewart indicates that once Kimberly reached majority age (or if she was a full-time student, age 25) her financial dependency upon claimant ceased and claimant\u2019s entitlement to benefits would have likewise ceased. See Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 341-42, 504 N.E.2d at 86. We disagree.\nStewart does not explicitly overrule Interlake. Nevertheless, respondent contends that the court\u2019s finding in Stewart that section 7(a) is ambiguous and its subsequent legislative intent analysis indicate that the supreme court impliedly intended to overrule Interlake. However, Stewart and Interlake can coexist. The ambiguity recognized in Stewart relates to the existence of second spouses and children in the care of their natural parents. See Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 341, 504 N.E.2d at 86 (stating \u201c[t]he legislature apparently neglected to consider the consequences of the remarriage provision\u201d under these circumstances). Therefore, Stewart may be regarded as an exception to Interlake. See Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 347, 504 N.E.2d at 89 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the majority\u2019s opinion creates an exception to section 7(a) that the legislature could have easily created had it so' intended).\nThe court in Stewart makes several remarks negating the conclusion that it intended to overrule Interlake. See, e.g., Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 340, 504 N.E.2d at 85 (stating \u201cInterlake *** does not govern this case\u201d); see also Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 341, 504 N.E.2d at 86 (discussing its holding in Interlake and then stating that \u201c[i]n this case[,] it remains for us to decided ] *** what is to occur in the context of the facts presented here\u201d (emphasis added)). Finally, we note that, after determining that the second spouse in Stewart was not entitled to lifetime benefits, the court appeared to impliedly reaffirm Interlake, stating:\n\u201cThe statute does not cut off benefits to the surviving spouse upon remarriage where there are minor, dependent children, however, undoubtedly because the children\u2019s care and support continues to be the surviving parent\u2019s, and not the step-parent\u2019s, responsibility. Only if the decedent\u2019s children have reached majority prior to a remarriage does the presumption of the surviving parent\u2019s dependency upon the decedent end in the event of remarriage.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 341-42, 504 N.E.2d at 86.\nWhatever one may think of section 7(a) (see Stewart, 115 Ill. 2d at 342-43, 504 N.E.2d at 87 (Ward, J., dissenting) (stating that \u201cthis court no fewer than four times has unsuccessfully sought to convince the legislature of the unwisdom\u201d of section 7(a))), the supreme court established in Interlake that claimant\u2019s benefits shall continue for life. Interlake, 95 Ill. 2d at 191, 447 N.E.2d at 344.\nAs the supreme court stated in Interlake:\n\u201cHere the language is clear. The legislature could have included a provision terminating a widow\u2019s benefits in a case where she remarries with children entitled to support, but it did not. It is, of course, not our place to state what course we consider the legislature should have taken. In re Griffin (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 48, 52[, 440 N.E.2d 852].\u201d Interlake, 95 Ill. 2d at 193, 447 N.E.2d at 345.\nMany years have passed since the supreme court decided Interlake in 1983. Widows\u2019 benefits pursuant to section 7(a) of the Act are a matter for the legislature.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we vacate the circuit court\u2019s judgment insofar as it modified the Commission decision, and we reinstate the Commission\u2019s decision.\nCircuit court judgment vacated in part; Commission decision reinstated.\nRAKOWSKI, COLWELL, HOLDRIDGE, and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul W Pasche, of Anesi, Ozmon, Rodin, Novak & Kohen, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Daniel J. Moriarty, of Hennessy & Roach, EC., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BERNICE RATLEDGE, Widow of William L. Ratledge, Deceased, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Helle Hardwoods, Appellee).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201499\u20140781WC\nOpinion filed February 25, 2000.\nRehearing denied April 4, 2000.\nPaul W Pasche, of Anesi, Ozmon, Rodin, Novak & Kohen, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nDaniel J. Moriarty, of Hennessy & Roach, EC., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0862-01", "first_page_order": 880, "last_page_order": 885 }