{ "id": 411637, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN SMIT, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Smit", "decision_date": "2000-02-09", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 99 \u2014 1810", "first_page": "150", "last_page": "153", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 150" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 1339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307257 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 Ill. App. 3d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2615445 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/180/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Or. App. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 588199 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "shining a laser from the street into a home and onto the homeowners' foreheads could constitute the crime of menacing" }, { "page": "1043", "parenthetical": "shining a laser from the street into a home and onto the homeowners' foreheads could constitute the crime of menacing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/157/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Misc. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 850291 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/179/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 So. 2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7498243 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789", "parenthetical": "police officer testified \"that he has seen lasers used with firearms and that their use is common\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/601/0783-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 Or. App. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Or. App.", "case_ids": [ 91489 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182", "parenthetical": "police officer testified \"lasers are commonly attached to guns or rifles for accurate shooting\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/or-app/161/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159576 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 862", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222674 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0862-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780271 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 937", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257192 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1023" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/1017-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 515, "char_count": 7380, "ocr_confidence": 0.768, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.422749621539709e-08, "percentile": 0.39688819695665656 }, "sha256": "631090e8c923e4935cd954306f50a1a01f82db59b70e94704724fa892d2c727b", "simhash": "1:3ada50a6a75bddf7", "word_count": 1215 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN SMIT, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWhy would anyone aim a laser light at another person? More importantly, what does someone reasonably believe when a laser light is pointed into his home and onto his body?\nIn this case, the State charged the defendant with assault. The trial judge dismissed the charge. We reverse and remand.\nFACTS\nOn February 5, 1999, the prosecution filed an information charging Brian Smit (Smit) with assault. The prosecution alleged Smit \u201cKNOWINGLY POINTED A LAZER [sic] LIGHT INTO THE HOUSE, AND ONTO THE PERSON OF ANTHONY N[.] REGNIER, THEREBY PLACING ANTHONY N[.] REGNIER IN REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF RECEIVING A BATTERY.\u201d\nOn April 20, 1999, Smit filed a motion to dismiss his assault charge because \u201csuch conduct does not amount to an Assault.\u201d Smit contended, \u201cAs a matter of law, pointing a lazer [sic] light onto a person does not place an objectively resonable [szc] person in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nOn April 26, 1999, the trial court dismissed Smit\u2019s assault charge. The court said:\n\u201cOne of the elements of assault and battery, you have to have present ability. Isn\u2019t that fair to say?\n* * *\nSo that a light will never have the ability to cause a battery. That would be like a legless man trying to kick you in the head. Isn\u2019t it? At least that is the way I feel.\nSo, while the conduct is offensive, I don\u2019t think it is criminal. And your Motion to Dismiss is granted.\u201d\nThe prosecution now appeals.\nDECISION\nThe Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 provides a criminal charge must allege the offense committed by \u201c[sjetting forth the nature and elements of the offense charged.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/111 \u2014 3(a)(3) (West 1998); see People v. Alvarado, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1023, 704 N.E.2d 937 (1998). \u201c[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the alleged offense could be described with greater certainty, but whether there is sufficient particularity to enable the accused to prepare a proper defense.\u201d People v. Meyers, 158 Ill. 2d 46, 54, 630 N.E.2d 811 (1994). The trial court determines the sufficiency of a charging instrument as a matter of law, and our review of that determination is de novo. People v. Ellis, 296 Ill. App. 3d 862, 864, 696 N.E.2d 1 (1998); People v. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d 102, 104, 668 N.E.2d 1078 (1996).\nThe prosecution contends its information sufficiently alleged the elements of an assault. Smit contends the prosecution\u2019s information failed to specify the facts constituting an assault. We agree with the prosecution.\nThe Illinois Criminal Code of 1961 provides: \u201cA person commits an assault when, without lawful authority, he engages in conduct which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 1(a) (West 1998). Under this statute, the prosecution\u2019s information sufficiently set forth the alleged assault: Smit pointed a laser into the victim\u2019s home and onto the victim\u2019s body, creating a reasonable apprehension of a battery. That is, Regnier could reasonably believe he was in someone\u2019s gunsight, like a hunter\u2019s prey.\nLaser-aimed weapons have become increasingly popular. See Oregon v. Cocke, 161 Or. App. 179, 182, 984 E2d 321, 323 (1999) (police officer testified \u201clasers are commonly attached to guns or rifles for accurate shooting\u201d); Louisiana v. Mayho, 601 So. 2d 783, 789 (La. App. 1992) (police officer testified \u201cthat he has seen lasers used with firearms and that their use is common\u201d).\nThe Illinois General Assembly recently recognized this trend. See \u201cAn Act in relation to laser devices,\u201d Pub. Act 91 \u2014 672, eff. January 1, 2000 (adding 720 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 10.2, 2 \u2014 10.3, and amending 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 2, 12 \u2014 4) (shining or flashing a laser gunsight near or on a person constitutes aggravated assault or aggravated battery); \u201cAn Act in relation to laser pointers,\u201d Pub. Act 91 \u2014 252, eff. January 1, 2000 (adding 720 ILCS 5/24.6 \u2014 20) (aiming a laser pointer at a police officer is a misdemeanor).\nNeither statute makes the question before us obsolete in future cases. The act of pointing a laser light that is not attached to a gun-sight at someone who is not a police officer is outside the new legislation. We also note lasers pose dangers apart from their use on firearms. The United States Food and Drug Administration has warned:\n\u201cThe light energy that laser pointers can aim into the eye can be more damaging than staring directly into the sun. Federal law requires a warning on the product label about this potential hazard to the eyes.\u201d U.S. Food & Drug Administration Press Release, \u201cFDA Issues Warning On Misuse of Laser Pointers\u201d (December 18, 1997).\nWhile no Illinois court has addressed the issue, a New York trial court has. In New York v. Brown, 179 Misc. 2d 218, 685 N.Y.S.2d 392 (1998), the defendant challenged an information as facially insufficient. The prosecution alleged the defendant committed the crime of menacing by shining a laser beam into the victim\u2019s eyes causing the victim to fear for his life. New York defines menacing as intentionally placing or attempting to place another person in reasonable fear of physical injury, serious physical injury, or death by displaying what could be a firearm.\nThe court upheld the information:\n\u201c[T]he use of a laser beam as alleged in the accusatory instrument could, if proven, constitute the crime of menacing. The shining of a laser beam onto a person where the source of the beam is not visible reasonably could be perceived by the intended victim as the display of a firearm.\u201d Brown, 179 Misc. 2d at_, 685 N.Y.S.2d at 393.\nSee Oregon v. Santacruz-Betancourt, 157 Or. App. 26, 31, 969 P2d 1040, 1043 (1998) (shining a laser from the street into a home and onto the homeowners\u2019 foreheads could constitute the crime of menacing).\nWhether fear of harm is reasonable is a fact question (In re C.L., 180 Ill. App. 3d 173, 181, 534 N.E.2d 1330 (1989)), inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage (People v. Sheehan, 168 Ill. 2d 298, 303, 659 N.E.2d 1339 (1995)). Any details regarding the color, brightness, and intensity of the laser allegedly used by Smit may inform this determination at trial.\nFinally, the trial court granted Smit\u2019s motion to dismiss because Smit, using the laser light, lacked the present ability to cause a battery. The defendant\u2019s \u201cpresent ability\u201d to cause a battery was an element of assault until the introduction of the 1961 Criminal Code. See 720 ILCS Ann. 5/12 \u2014 1, Committee Comments \u2014 1961, at 215 (SmithHurd 1993) (\u201cThe former law defined an assault in terms of \u2018an unlawful attempt,\u2019 coupled with \u2018a present ability\u2019 \u201d). Today, sensibly, we focus on the victim\u2019s \u201creasonable apprehension\u201d of a battery.\nCONCLUSION\nBecause the prosecution sufficiently alleged Smit committed an assault, we reverse the trial court\u2019s dismissal order and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nCAHILL, EJ., and CERDA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Jon J. Walters, and Katherine Blakey Cox, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Mark Floyd Pasterski, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN SMIT, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 99 \u2014 1810\nOpinion filed February 9, 2000.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Jon J. Walters, and Katherine Blakey Cox, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Mark Floyd Pasterski, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0150-01", "first_page_order": 170, "last_page_order": 173 }