{ "id": 411712, "name": "UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (Warren Insurance Agency et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "United States Fire Insurance v. Hartford Insurance", "decision_date": "2000-02-23", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 99 \u2014 1847", "first_page": "153", "last_page": "157", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 153" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "91 Cal. Rptr. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "13 Cal. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4416397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-3d/13/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 614", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2527210 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 842", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198897 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 N.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" }, { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0115-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 500, "char_count": 8845, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.481345663926707e-07, "percentile": 0.8075389723493532 }, "sha256": "899f74410eb94a99847d2d5a0f9adc2fb08829ed691762b764dc5e282880393e", "simhash": "1:687ae45215f7f4d8", "word_count": 1398 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (Warren Insurance Agency et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue in this case is simple \u2014 whether a party is an insured under the terms of an insurance policy. But to answer the question we must examine policy language not previously interpreted by any Illinois court.\nFACTS\nOn May 1, 1994, R Carlson & Sons, Inc. (Carlson), the contractor for a project to install new machinery at Modern Drop Forge Company (Modem Drop), entered into an oral contract with Field Technologies (Field) whereby Field agreed to provide millwrights and equipment for the project. Carlson claimed Field also agreed to have Carlson named as an insured in Field\u2019s comprehensive general liability insurance policy and to provide Carlson with a certificate of insurance. Field denied insurance coverage was a part of the oral agreement.\nField provided no certificate of insurance to Carlson before May 21, 1994, when one of Field\u2019s employees, Warren Tomaska (Tomaska), was injured while working at Modern Drop. Two days after this incident, however, Carlson requested and received a certificate of insurance from Field. A certificate of insurance was issued by Warren Insurance Agency, listing Carlson as an additional insured on Field\u2019s insurance policy with Hartford Insurance Company (Hartford).\nIn January 1995, Tomaska filed suit against Carlson to recover for injuries he sustained while working at Modern Drop on May 21, 1994. Carlson tendered the defense of the suit to Hartford. Hartford refused the tender, claiming Carlson was not an insured.\nCarlson and Carlson\u2019s insurer, United States Fire Insurance Company (U.S. Fire), brought a declaratory judgment action against Hartford seeking a declaration that Hartford had the duty to defend and indemnify Carlson in the underlying negligence action brought by Tomaska.\nThe trial court, ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, found that, at the time of Tomaska\u2019s accident, Carlson was neither a named insured nor an additional insured under the terms of the Hartford policy. For a person or organization to be an \u201cadditional insured\u201d under the policy, the court said, there had to be some form of written agreement by the named insured to provide insurance coverage.\nIn an order dated April 22, 1999, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hartford.\nU.S. Fire and Carlson appeal this decision. Though other arguments were raised at trial, this appeal comes down to a single question: whether the Hartford policy requires that the agreement to provide insurance must be written. We conclude that it does and for that reason we affirm the trial court.\nDECISION\nWe review de novo the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in this case. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285 Ill. App. 3d 115, 120, 674 N.E.2d 52 (1996). The sole issue before us is the construction of the Hartford insurance policy \u2014 -a question of law. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 108, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).\nWe construe an insurance policy as a whole, giving policy words their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning, at the same time striving to fulfill the intent of the parties. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108. A policy term is ambiguous only if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520, 655 N.E.2d 842 (1995).\nThough an insurance policy generally will be construed liberally in favor of coverage, of paramount importance is the reasonable construction of the policy. Travelers Insurance Cos. v. P.C. Quote, Inc., 211 Ill. App. 3d 719, 570 N.E.2d 614 (1991). A strained, forced, unnatural, or unreasonable construction, or one that would lead to an absurd result, must not be adopted. Universal Underwriters Group, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 121; see also, 45 C.J.S. Insurance \u00a7 366, at 89 (1993).\nIn this case, the Hartford policy contained the following provision:\n\u201cADDITIONAL INSURED \u2014 BY CONTRACT, AGREEMENT, OR PERMIT\na. WHO IS INSURED (SECTION II) is amended to include as an insured any person or organization with whom you agreed, because of a written contract or agreement or permit, to provide insurance such as is afforded under this policy, but only with respect to your operations, \u2018your work\u2019 or facilities owned by you.\nb. This provision 9 does not apply:\n(1) unless the written contract or agreement has been executed or permit has been issued prior to the \u2018bodily injury,\u2019 \u2018property damage,\u2019 \u2018personal injury,\u2019 or \u2018advertizing injury[.]\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn construing the phrase \u201cbecause of a written contract or agreement or permit,\u201d Carlson and U.S. Fire contend each term, separated by the disjunctive word \u201cor,\u201d must be considered separately and the word \u201cwritten\u201d must be read as modifying the term \u201ccontract,\u201d but not \u201cagreement\u201d or \u201cpermit.\u201d\nThey reach this conclusion because a \u201cpermit,\u201d they say, is a written document by definition. Thus, if the word \u201cwritten\u201d modified all of the terms, including \u201cpermit,\u201d it would create a redundancy. From this, they conclude the term \u201cagreement\u201d may be interpreted to include either a written or oral agreement.\nThough no Illinois court has interpreted a similar policy phrase, a California court has. See Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pacific Clay Products Co., 13 Cal. App. 3d 304, 91 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1970). Deciding whether \u201cwritten\u201d in the phrase \u201cany written contract or agreement\u201d modified both \u201ccontract\u201d and \u201cagreement,\u201d the Pacific Clay court held:\n\u201cWere [defendant\u2019s] interpretation accepted, the clause \u2018written contract or agreement\u2019 would mean any written contract, or any written or oral agreement, expressed or implied. This is unreasonable and absurd. We reject [defendant\u2019s] contention in the premises.\u201d 13 Cal. App. 3d at 313, 91 Cal. Rptr. at 458.\nWe concur with the California court\u2019s holding. Plaintiffs\u2019 construction leads to an absurd result. We cannot adopt it.\nWhen reading the policy phrase within the context of the entire provision, as we must, the only reasonable construction is that there must be a written document \u2014 contract, agreement, or permit \u2014 which evidences the insured\u2019s intention to provide insurance coverage to another person or organization before the Hartford policy will cover that person or organization as an additional insured.\nThis interpretation is strengthened by paragraph (b), which states: \u201cThis provision 9 does not apply: (1) unless the written contract or agreement has been executed or permit has been issued prior to the \u2018bodily injury/ \u2018property damage/ \u2018personal injury/ or \u2018advertizing injury.\u2019 \u201d\nIn legal terms \u201cexecute\u201d means \u201cperform what is required to give validity to (as by signing and perhaps sealing and delivering).\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 794 (1981). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary says an \u201cexecuted\u201d contract generally is considered to be one that has been signed or fully performed. Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 589 (7th ed. 1999).\nCarlson\u2019s and U.S. Fire\u2019s fallback position is that the phrase at issue is ambiguous, requiring us to find against Hartford, the drafter of the policy. We would be reluctant to use the anti-drafter inference where the adversaries are two insurance companies. More to the point, we see nothing ambiguous in the contested language. To declare an ambiguity, we would have to find either interpretation is reasonable. Lapham-Hickey Steel Corp., 166 Ill. 2d at 530. We do not believe it is reasonable to say the policy requires a \u201ccontract\u201d to be written but allows an \u201cagreement\u201d to be oral. Since a contract is an agreement, the interpretation urged on us by Carlson and U.S. Fire would create a nonsensical reading of the insurance policy.\nThe only reasonable interpretation of the Hartford policy provision is that an \u201cadditional insured\u201d will include only those persons or organizations that have received written confirmation \u2014 in the form of a contract, agreement, or permit \u2014 of the insured\u2019s promise to provide insurance coverage prior to the event for which coverage is being claimed. It would be unreasonable to hold any \u201ccontract\u201d or \u201cpermit\u201d must be evidenced by a writing, but an \u201cagreement\u201d would not.\nWe affirm the order of the trial court granting Hartford Insurance Company\u2019s motion for summary judgment in its favor.\nAffirmed.\nCERDA and BURKE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Kralovec & Marquard, Chartered, of Chicago (William E. Spizzirri, David T. Nani, and Kathleen A. Johnson, of counsel), for appellants.", "Kiesler & Berman, of Chicago (Robert L. Kiesler and Patti M. Deuel, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee (Warren Insurance Agency et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 99 \u2014 1847\nOpinion filed February 23, 2000.\nKralovec & Marquard, Chartered, of Chicago (William E. Spizzirri, David T. Nani, and Kathleen A. Johnson, of counsel), for appellants.\nKiesler & Berman, of Chicago (Robert L. Kiesler and Patti M. Deuel, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0153-01", "first_page_order": 173, "last_page_order": 177 }