{ "id": 411630, "name": "ROBERT WENIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Wenig v. Lockheed Environmental Systems & Technologies Co.", "decision_date": "2000-03-03", "docket_number": "Nos. 1 \u2014 98 \u2014 4674, 1 \u2014 99 \u2014 0198 cons.", "first_page": "236", "last_page": "242", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 236" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "433 N.E.2d 1132", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5468627 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/105/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 N.E.2d 762", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 Ill. App. 3d 699", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5678440 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/123/0699-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 U.S. 788", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6213232 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "799", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "3226", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/478/0788-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 F.3d 693", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 179444 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/59/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236711 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 731", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529254 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0731-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 N.E.2d 1122", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3542834 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 N.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3495198 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 N.E.2d 875", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 Ill. App. 3d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499048 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/232/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 1340", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2553425 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/207/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 N.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 134", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2944956 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "449 N.E.2d 268", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3590423 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/114/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 F.3d 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 943529 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/126/0837-01" ] }, { "cite": "971 F.2d 1295", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10518288 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1300" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/971/1295-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108159 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "2169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187993 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 394", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12045684 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "1560" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 N.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3270117 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 P.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 U.S. 281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3646578 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284-85" }, { "page": "610" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/202/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55986 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L 8953", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Lans. Ch.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9610", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777542 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 992", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182741 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0992-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9601", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 839, "char_count": 15986, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.485849792020655e-08, "percentile": 0.39912558608629306 }, "sha256": "d7f7acd4cd1bb58cda5356bd8aca6eb83b913220b289003795f907a5a1ca2041", "simhash": "1:826b52beba12bc87", "word_count": 2523 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ROBERT WENIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff appeals the circuit court\u2019s dismissal of his second and third amended complaints, which alleged defendants unlawfully discharged him in retaliation for \u201cblowing the whistle\u201d on their violations of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9601 et seq. (1994)), as later action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.\nOn appeal, we consider whether dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s federal administrative retaliatory discharge proceeding \u201cwith prejudice\u201d for want of prosecution constitutes a \u201cjudgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction\u201d and thus warrants dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s state statutory retaliatory discharge action as being barred under principles of res judicata. Because the orders of the circuit court were entered pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (1998)), our standard of review is de novo. Spiegel v. Hollywood Towers Condominium Ass\u2019n, 283 Ill. App. 3d 992, 998 (1996), citing Kedzie & 103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116-17 (1993). We reverse and remand for trial.\nAccording to plaintiffs complaint, he was employed by Lockheed Environmental Systems and Technologies Company, a subsidiary of Lockheed Corporation (Lockheed), from 1991 to 1994. His job as a senior scientist was to supervise organic chemical analyses of water brought to the Chicago laboratory of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from sites that had been identified as toxic waste dumps within the scope of CERCLA.\nAccording to plaintiff\u2019s complaint, a supervisor ordered him to alter certain chemical test results. Plaintiff, believing that such alteration would violate CERCLA, refused and reported the suspected violation to Lockheed through confidential internal channels. Then, another supervisor requested that he alter the test results. Plaintiff refused and was subsequently demoted, barred from entering the laboratory and humiliated in various ways. After he was demoted and barred from the lab, plaintiff again reported the suspected violation to Lockheed. Lockheed informed plaintiff that he would be terminated and compelled him to resign. According to plaintiffs complaint, Lockheed\u2019s actions toward him were in retaliation for, and as a result of, his reports that his supervisors had violated CERCLA.\nPlaintiff filed a charge with the United States Department of Labor (Department) pursuant to the retaliatory discharge provision of CERCLA (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 9610 (1994)). Following an investigation, the Department determined the charges were well-founded and ordered Lockheed to reinstate plaintiff to his employment. Lockheed appealed the order and the case was assigned to a Department administrative law judge (ALJ).\nLater, plaintiff filed a complaint in the state circuit court against Lockheed which alleged, inter alia, retaliatory discharge. The next day, plaintiff notified the ALJ of the state circuit court case and indicated his desire to terminate the Department proceeding.\nPlaintiff asked Lockheed to stipulate to a dismissal of the Department proceeding. Lockheed refused unless the dismissal was \u201cwith prejudice.\u201d Plaintiff rejected Lockheed\u2019s offer and moved to stay the Department proceeding while he prosecuted his claim in state circuit court. Lockheed objected to a stay and moved for dismissal of the Department proceeding with prejudice.\nThe ALJ denied both the motion for a stay and the motion for dismissal with prejudice and entered two amended scheduling orders. Based upon those orders, Lockheed pressed to take plaintiffs deposition. Plaintiff refused and moved for voluntary dismissal of the Department proceeding explaining, \u201cComplainant Wenig has elected to prosecute his actions solely in the Circuit Court of Cook County where his lawsuit has been docketed as 95 L 8953.\u201d Lockheed had no objection to the dismissal, but insisted that it should be \u201cwith prejudice\u201d so plaintiff would have \u201cno further recourse to the Department of Labor.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.)\nCiting this procedural history, the ALJ issued an order to show cause why the Department proceeding should not be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff did not respond and the ALJ dismissed the Department proceeding with prejudice.\nBased upon the \u201cwith prejudice\u201d language in the ALJ\u2019s dismissal order, Lockheed raised res judicata as an affirmative defense in plaintiffs state circuit court case. Plaintiff argued that res judicata does not apply unless the prior adjudication is \u201con the merits\u201d and that the Department proceeding had not addressed the merits of the claim. Lockheed argued that the ALJ applied Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P 41(b)) and, thus, the dismissal was an adjudication on the merits. Initially, the circuit court agreed with plaintiff and dismissed, inter alia, Lockheed\u2019s res judicata affirmative defense. However, while the parties prepared for trial in the state circuit court, a new judge assumed the case and plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. Lockheed resurrected its res judicata defense and presented it to the new judge as a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The circuit court, by the new judge, granted Lockheed\u2019s motion and entered an order stating there were no just grounds to delay the appeal under Supreme Court Rule 304(a). 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a). Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal as to the second amended complaint.\nMeanwhile, plaintiff obtained leave to file a third amended complaint in order to add Lockheed Martin (created from the merger of Lockheed Corporation and Martin-Marietta Corporation) and Lockheed Martin Advanced Environmental Systems (the successor to the original defendant, Lockheed Environmental Systems and Technologies, Inc.) as defendants. The new judge granted the request for leave to file the third amended complaint over Lockheed\u2019s objections, but then dismissed it as being barred by res judicata as to the new defendants. Plaintiff filed his notice of appeal as to the third amended complaint. The two cases were consolidated on appeal.\nThe doctrine of res judicata bars the refiling of an action previously adjudicated on the merits when the action is directed against the same parties and involves the same claims. Rein v. David A. Noyes & Co., 172 Ill. 2d 325, 334, 665 N.E.2d 1199 (1996). The doctrine applies if three conditions are satisfied: (1) a final judgment on the merits has been entered in the first lawsuit by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) an identity of causes of action exists; (3) the parties or their privies are identical in both lawsuits. Rein, 172 Ill. 2d at 335. Here, there is no issue as to criterion (2) or (3). The question is whether the ALJ\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs Department proceeding with prejudice for failure to prosecute constitutes a final judgment on the merits that has been entered in the first lawsuit by a court of competent jurisdiction.\nHistorically, courts refused to give administrative decisions res judicata effect because administrative agencies are instruments of executive power, not courts of law. See, e.g. Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281, 284-85, 26 S. Ct. 608, 610 (1906); Churchill Tabernacle v. Federal Communications Comm\u2019n, 160 P.2d 244, 246 (D.C. Circ. 1947); Jager v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm\u2019n, 74 Ill. App. 3d 33, 43, 392 N.E.2d 176, 183 (1979). However, given the proliferation of administrative hearings in the last half century, the United States Supreme Court eased the strictness of this rule, reasoning that, when an administrative agency acts in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate, there is \u201cneither need nor justification for a second evidentiary hearing on these matters already resolved as between these two parties.\u201d United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422, 16 L. Ed. 2d 642, 661, 86 S. Ct. 1545, 1560 (1966). See also Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 72 L. Ed. 2d 262, 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982); Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107, 115 L. Ed. 2d 96, 104, 111 S. Ct. 2166, 2169 (1991). An agency is said to act in a judicial capacity when it provides: \u201c(1) representation by counsel, (2) pretrial discovery, (3) the opportunity to present memoranda of law, (4) examination and cross-examination at the hearing, (5) the opportunity to introduce exhibits, (6) the chance to object to evidence at the hearing, and (7) final findings of fact and conclusions of law.\u201d Reed v. AMAX Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1992). Thus, the current rule regarding administrative res judicata provides that \u201c[w]hen an agency conducts a trial-type hearing, makes findings, and applies the law, the reasons for treating a decision as res judicata are the same as the reasons for applying res judicata to a decision of a court that has used the same procedure.\u201d Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security, 126 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 1997), citing 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise \u00a7 13.3 (3d ed. 1994).\nIllinois courts accept and adopt this analysis. Raper v. Hazelett & Erdal, 114 Ill. App. 3d 649, 652, 449 N.E.2d 268, 270 (1983), quoted Utah Construction with approval regarding the general principles of res judicata despite a resolution on other grounds. More recently, the court in Powers v. Arachnid, Inc., 248 Ill. App. 3d 134, 617 N.E.2d 864 (1993), provided a thoughtful analysis of administrative res judicata. In all six cases discussed by the Powers court (Osborne v. Kelly, 207 Ill. App. 3d 488, 565 N.E.2d 1340 (1991); McCulla v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 232 Ill. App. 3d 517, 597 N.E.2d 875 (1992); Pedigo v. Johnson, 130 Ill. App. 3d 392, 474 N.E.2d 430 (1985); Martinez v. Admiral Maintenance Service, 157 Ill. App. 3d 682, 510 N.E.2d 1122 (1987); Colvett v. L. Karp & Sons, Inc., 211 Ill. App. 3d 731, 570 N.E.2d 611 (1991); Mitchell v. Jewel Food Stores, 142 Ill. 2d 152, 568 N.E.2d 827 (1990)), the question of res judicata arose only after the administrative agency conducted a hearing on the merits of the controversy before it and made findings of fact on contested issues.\nAllahar v. Zahora, 59 F.3d 693 (7th Cir. 1995), is instructive. There, the Allahars filed a claim with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) alleging Zahora had violated their civil rights. Shortly thereafter, the Allahars filed a similar claim in federal district court and notified the IDHR that they wished to withdraw their IDHR claim. However, the IDHR dismissed the Allahars\u2019 administrative complaint for failure to comply with its procedures because the Allahars failed to complete the paperwork attendant to a voluntary withdrawal.\nLater, in the federal district court, Zahora moved for summary judgment claiming the IDHR dismissal barred the Allahars\u2019 federal district court claim under the doctrine of res judicata because the IDHR dismissal was an adjudication on the merits of the same claim. The federal district court disagreed and denied the motion for summary judgement.\nThe seventh circuit upheld the denial of Zahora\u2019s motion, stating:\n\u201cAgency decisions may have a preclusive effect, but only in the limited area of factfinding. \u2018[FJederal courts must give the agency\u2019s fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would he entitled in the State\u2019s courts.\u2019 University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3226, 92 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1986) (emphasis added).\nIn this case, however, there was no hearing on the merits or fact-finding by the IDHR prior to dismissal. The Allahars merely filed the case and then failed to complete the requisite paperwork for a voluntaiy dismissal. The IDHR\u2019s dismissal was certainly not based on the merits of the case nor did any factfinding occur at that juncture. The IDHR\u2019s dismissal was a self-defined action of administrative closure \u2014 a dismissal prompted by the Allahars\u2019 stated intent to withdraw the claim. This occurred before any fact-finding or consideration of the case by the IDHR.\u201d 59 F.3d at 696.\nHere, as in Allahar, the dismissal of plaintiffs Department proceeding was not the result of a hearing on the merits or fact finding by the ALJ, but the result of plaintiffs efforts to withdraw his Department proceeding so he could proceed against Lockheed in the state circuit court. Moreover, the record reveals the ALJ added the \u201cwith prejudice\u201d language to its dismissal order to prevent plaintiff from reinstating his Department proceeding if the state circuit court case did not proceed to his satisfaction, not to prevent plaintiff from proceeding with the state circuit court case. Accordingly, dismissal of plaintiffs state circuit court case based upon administrative res judicata was error.\nLockheed, nevertheless, contends that because the dismissal of plaintiffs Department proceeding was entered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which states that a dismissal for failure to prosecute \u201coperates as an adjudication upon the merits,\u201d plaintiffs state circuit court claim is res judicata. In support, Lockheed relies upon Blaszczak v. City of Palos Hills, 123 Ill. App. 3d 699, 463 N.E.2d 762 (1984), and Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 105 Ill. App. 3d 28, 433 N.E.2d 1132 (1982).\nThe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be adopted by a federal agency for its own use, but federal administrative rules do not bind the state courts. Fed. R. Civ. P 1 (stating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the procedure of the United States district courts); Fed. R. Civ. R. 81 (applicability in general). Thus, although the Department adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for its own use and the ALJ dismissed plaintiffs Department proceeding pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute, Illinois courts are not bound to accept that this was an \u201cadjudication on the merits\u201d warranting dismissal of plaintiffs state circuit court case as being barred by res judicata. Lockheed\u2019s reliance on Blaszczak and Martin-Trigona is misplaced. Blaszczak and Martin-Trigona involved the dismissal of a federal district court claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) as the basis for res judicata, not the dismissal of a federal agency decision based upon an administrative rule, patterned after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), as the basis for res judicata. The distinction makes a difference. As Utah Construction and its progeny make clear, federal administrative res judicata applies only when the administrative agency acts in a judicial capacity to resolve disputed issues of fact which the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate.\nHere, the ALJ issued scheduling orders and considered the parties\u2019 arguments as to plaintiff\u2019s efforts to voluntarily dismiss the Department proceeding. However, the ALJ conducted no hearing on the merits of the case and resolved no disputed issues of fact. Thus, the orders of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs state statutory retaliatory discharge action as being barred by res judicata were error.\nAccordingly, we reverse the orders of the circuit court dismissing plaintiffs state statutory retaliatory discharge action and remand the matter for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nZWICK, EJ., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dale A. DeLoriea, of Hinsdale, and Lavelle Motta Klopfenstein & Saletta, Ltd., of Franklin Park (Keith A. Klopfenstein, of counsel), for appellant.", "Rudnick & Wolfe, of Chicago (Adrianne C. Mazura, Holly A. Hirst, and Aberdeen W Marsh, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ROBERT WENIG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LOCKHEED ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNos. 1 \u2014 98 \u2014 4674, 1 \u2014 99 \u2014 0198 cons.\nOpinion filed March 3, 2000.\nRehearing denied April 12, 2000.\nDale A. DeLoriea, of Hinsdale, and Lavelle Motta Klopfenstein & Saletta, Ltd., of Franklin Park (Keith A. Klopfenstein, of counsel), for appellant.\nRudnick & Wolfe, of Chicago (Adrianne C. Mazura, Holly A. Hirst, and Aberdeen W Marsh, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0236-01", "first_page_order": 256, "last_page_order": 262 }