{ "id": 411640, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY BOCLAIR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Boclair", "decision_date": "2000-03-21", "docket_number": "No. 4 \u2014 98 \u2014 0997", "first_page": "346", "last_page": "350", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 346" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12032050 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "\" '[wjithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect' \"" }, { "page": "355", "parenthetical": "\" '[wjithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect' \"" }, { "page": "1074", "parenthetical": "\" '[wjithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738560 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 223", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3463902 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0223-01" ] }, { "cite": "684 N.E.2d 1062", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 185", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725141 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0185-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 N.E.2d 1029", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. App. 3d 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3515231 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/174/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" }, { "page": "660-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "210-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 1264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1266-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 Ill. App. 3d 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3531174 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/140/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218207 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S. Ct. 1567", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 L. Ed. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "503 U.S. 962", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6392951, 6393292, 6394221, 6393583, 6392176, 6393681, 6392495, 6393109, 6392792, 6393848, 6393434, 6392316, 6392669, 6394047 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/503/0962-06", "/us/503/0962-08", "/us/503/0962-14", "/us/503/0962-10", "/us/503/0962-01", "/us/503/0962-11", "/us/503/0962-03", "/us/503/0962-07", "/us/503/0962-05", "/us/503/0962-12", "/us/503/0962-09", "/us/503/0962-02", "/us/503/0962-04", "/us/503/0962-13" ] }, { "cite": "544 N.E.2d 715", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5567120 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/129/0458-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 673, "char_count": 11238, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2929967636958257e-07, "percentile": 0.6203624226740633 }, "sha256": "b62b0b3951058486fa994688609719bdce7b988e5e6807987a07a6a5356bfcfd", "simhash": "1:7a78961031b6afd6", "word_count": 1753 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY BOCLAIR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Stanley Boclair, currently serving a term of natural life in prison for murder, appeals the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of his supplemental petition for postconviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1998)) and postjudgment relief pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 1998)). Defendant previously appealed his case directly to the Supreme Court of Illinois and petitioned the state and federal courts for postconviction relief without success. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn April 1986, a Livingston County jury convicted defendant of the 1984 murder of Thomas Riley, a fellow inmate at the Pontiac Correctional Center. Defendant was also convicted of conspiring to murder Riley. Defendant was sentenced to death on the murder conviction. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated defendant\u2019s death sentence but affirmed his convictions. People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 544 N.E.2d 715 (1989). In November 1991, defendant was resentenced to natural life in prison. The United States Supreme Court denied defendant\u2019s later petition for a writ of certiorari. Boclair v. Illinois, 503 U.S. 962, 118 L. Ed. 2d 213, 112 S. Ct. 1567 (1992). In October 1992, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s pro se postconviction petition, a ruling this court upheld in People v. Boclair, No. 4 \u2014 92 \u2014 0969 (August 12, 1993) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23), and the Supreme Court of Illinois later denied leave to appeal. In November 1997, the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied defendant\u2019s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.\nIn August 1998, defendant submitted a supplemental petition for postconviction and postjudgment relief on grounds defense investigators obtained \u201cnewly discovered evidence\u201d pursuing defendant\u2019s federal habeas corpus challenge. According to the allegations, Kenneth Broughton, one of two inmates who testified to seeing defendant fatally stab Riley and one of four who directly tied defendant to the killing, now acknowledged he had perjured himself at trial. The petition alleged Broughton\u2019s recantation seriously undermined the State\u2019s case against defendant and revealed defendant\u2019s convictions were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.\nIn his April 1998 sworn affidavit, Broughton stated he did not actually see anyone stab Riley but falsely accused defendant of the crime out of fear he would be implicated in the murder and because prison officials promised him a prison transfer and agreed to reinstate some good-time credit to his prison sentence in return for his testimony against defendant. Broughton said he was recanting because he \u201cnow realize[d] it was wrong to testify untruthfully at [defendant\u2019s] trial.\u201d Defendant 'asserted in his supplemental petition Broughton would not have recanted sooner, having depended on his false testimony to obtain a prison transfer, and thereby had deprived defendant of the opportunity to uncover this information earlier.\nIn November 1998, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant\u2019s supplemental petition as \u201cpatently without merit.\u201d Defendant now appeals and argues the cause should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant contends he is entitled to a reversal of the trial court\u2019s summary dismissal of his supplemental petition and to an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition because Broughton\u2019s testimony constitutes newly discovered evidence that defendant is actually innocent and the use of Broughton\u2019s perjured testimony at defendant\u2019s trial entitles him to both postconviction and postjudgment relief. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1998); 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 1998).\nThe State contends defendant\u2019s supplemental petition is untimely and successive and his claims also fail on the merits. We agree defendant\u2019s petition is procedurally barred as untimely and successive.\nSection 122 \u2014 1(c) of the Act precludes the filing of a postconviction petition beyond three years after the date of conviction or six months after denial for leave to appeal, whichever is sooner, unless defendant alleges facts showing the delay was not due to his own culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(c) (West 1998). This limit applies retroactively to convictions made before the current limitations period. People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 84-86, 529 N.E.2d 227, 228-29 (1988); People v. Robinson, 140 Ill. App. 3d 29, 33-34, 487 N.E.2d 1264, 1266-67 (1986). Further, the Act contemplates the filing of only one postconviction petition unless proceedings on the initial petition were deficient in some fundamental way. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 211, 688 N.E.2d 658, 661 (1997); People v. Carlisle, 174 Ill. App. 3d 454, 455-56, 528 N.E.2d 1029, 1030 (1988). Similarly, a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition filed beyond the statute\u2019s two-year limitation period cannot be considered absent a clear showing the period should be tolled due to legal disability or duress or to fraudulent concealment of the grounds for relief. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401(c) (West 1998); Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 210-11, 688 N.E.2d at 660-61.\nThese procedural hurdles are not superfluous. A defendant who claims the untimeliness of his belatedly filed postconviction petition was not due to his own culpable negligence must make a \u201csubstantial showing\u201d this is the case by alleging facts supporting such a claim. People v. McClain, 292 Ill. App. 3d 185, 188, 684 N.E.2d 1062, 1064 (1997). Likewise, a defendant seeking section 2 \u2014 1401 relief must not only allege facts demonstrating his opponent affirmatively attempted to prevent discovery of the purported grounds for relief but also offer factual allegations demonstrating his good faith and reasonable diligence in trying to uncover such matters before trial or within the limitations period. Aroonsakul v. Flanagan, 155 Ill. App. 3d 223, 227, 507 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1987).\nThese are significant standards and are not easily overcome. A defendant who asks the courts to apply exceptions to time limits or other stringent procedural bars in his case is affirmatively obliged to show why such exceptions apply, and the burden upon the defendant is a heavy one. He may not merely assert he is entitled to a legislative or judicial exception or make vague, conclusory assertions as to why such exceptions apply in his case. Rather, the defendant must also show clearly through factual allegations that he previously made diligent attempts to uncover matters he now purports entitle him to judicial relief or otherwise demonstrate in significant detail how he could not have obtained such information before the limitations period expired or at prior postconviction proceedings.\nWithout such requirements, procedural bars enacted by the legislature to be enforced by the courts to curtail excessive and unnecessary appeals would be virtually meaningless and the State\u2019s legitimate interest in the finality of criminal litigation and judgments constantly disrupted and jeopardized. See People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 274, 606 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (1992), quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 355, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1074 (1989) (\u201c \u2018[wjithout finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect\u2019 \u201d).\nIn this case, defendant has failed to even purport he was not culpably negligent or exercised due diligence in bringing this petition before the court more than 12 years after his conviction. He also failed to offer any evidence or even allege his first postconviction proceeding was fundamentally unfair. Defendant offered only the conclusory allegation Broughton came forward only now because he previously relied on his false testimony to preserve a prison transfer he received in 1984. In his affidavit, Broughton provides no further enlightenment as to his reasons for waiting to recant almost a decade and a half after first telling prison officials he saw defendant commit the murder, other than to say he now realized he should not have testified falsely at defendant\u2019s trial. None of this shows defendant diligently pursued Broughton regarding his willingness to recant or that defendant could not have obtained Broughton\u2019s recantation years earlier.\nDuring oral argument, our court pointedly queried whether defendant had adequately alleged the absence of culpable neglect in securing the recantation evidence. Thereafter defendant filed both a motion to clarify a statement made at oral argument and a motion for leave to amend with a proposed amended supplemental petition for postconviction and postjudgment relief. The motions, attachments, and proposed amendment were designed to be responsive to the questions raised at oral argument.\nThe statutory requirement that an untimely postconviction petition allege \u2014 and demonstrate \u2014 the delay was not due to defendant\u2019s culpable negligence has been in effect for many years. We view the in-, adequacy of the petition as far more than a pleading defect and deny both motions.\nWe granted defendant leave to file the supplemental authority of People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 723 N.E.2d 230 (1999), and directed the State to file a response to the supplemental authority.\nIn Wright, the supreme court held the time limit set forth in the Act is a statute of limitations rather than a matter of jurisdiction and it is improper to address the timeliness of a postconviction petition for the first time on appeal. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d at 9-12, 723 N.E.2d at 235-37. In Wright, the State moved to dismiss the defendant\u2019s second and amended petitions for postconviction relief. Thus, in Wright, the State had the opportunity to present any appropriate issue to the trial court.\nIn the case of defendant Boclair, the trial court dismissed his petitions at stage one of the postconviction process. The State had no opportunity to raise timeliness or culpable negligence issues in the trial court. The issue of timeliness has now been raised on appeal. It is our responsibility to make a de novo assessment of the petition (People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 387-89, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998)), and nothing in Wright precludes us from considering whether the defendant\u2019s petition comports with the requirements of the Act. Simply put, the petition was successive, untimely, and did not sufficiently allege the untimely delay was not due to defendant\u2019s culpable negligence.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nIn sum, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment summarily dismissing defendant\u2019s supplemental petition for postconviction and postjudgment relief.\nAffirmed.\nSTEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT" } ], "attorneys": [ "Joel T. Pelz, Jeffrey T. Shaw, and Clark C. Johnson, all of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STANLEY BOCLAIR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 98 \u2014 0997\nArgued May 26, 1999.\nOpinion filed March 21, 2000.\nJoel T. Pelz, Jeffrey T. Shaw, and Clark C. Johnson, all of Jenner & Block, of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas J. Brown, State\u2019s Attorney, of Pontiac (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and David E. Mannchen, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0346-01", "first_page_order": 366, "last_page_order": 370 }