{ "id": 411660, "name": "JOHN LUKWINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STONE CONTAINER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee (ITW Signode et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Lukwinski v. Stone Container Corp.", "decision_date": "2000-03-08", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 98 \u2014 4583", "first_page": "385", "last_page": "394", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 385" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "869 F. Supp. 551", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7848327 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/869/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 1332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1340" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 1088", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499694 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1099" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/1088-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 N.E.2d 1021", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222659 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 N.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842", "parenthetical": "recognizing section 2 - 318 and its commentary leave \"a door at least slightly ajar for future extension of some warranties in appropriate circumstances to nonprivity plaintiffs\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5555263 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "recognizing section 2 - 318 and its commentary leave \"a door at least slightly ajar for future extension of some warranties in appropriate circumstances to nonprivity plaintiffs\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/125/0498-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3505980 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" }, { "page": "320" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864528 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "270" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "620 N.E.2d 1070", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1073" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 377", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777554 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 529", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" }, { "page": "532" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209990 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "477-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 N.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762-66" }, { "page": "765" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3180014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301-11" }, { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "546 N.E.2d 580", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569862 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "461" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 N.E.2d 1255", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1257" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 739", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5535917 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "742" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0739-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "150" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660622 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 N.E.2d 1243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5099683 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "662 N.E.2d 1377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" }, { "page": "1382" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156905 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" }, { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 1034", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073549 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/1034-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "176 Ill. 2d 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 544917 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/176/0179-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1041, "char_count": 23633, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.307983501902657e-07, "percentile": 0.6237641654011489 }, "sha256": "3dbf1ad556a5f730dd5a1a79cb50bb297beff37253fde8dc16eaae235f164094", "simhash": "1:3f7245970c0ea9c7", "word_count": 3872 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JOHN LUKWINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STONE CONTAINER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee (ITW Signode et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CERDA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this case, plaintiff, John Lukwinski, appeals the order of the circuit court dismissing with prejudice counts III and IV of his sixth amended complaint which alleged claims against defendant, Stone Container Corporation (Stone), for breach of the implied warranties of fitness and merchantability under sections 2 \u2014 314 and 2 \u2014 315 of the Uniform Commercial Code \u2014 Sales (UCC) (810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 314, 2 \u2014 315 (West 1998)). In dismissing these counts, the court concluded plaintiff could not maintain his warranty claims under section 2 \u2014 318 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 318 (West 1998)). We have jurisdiction of plaintiff\u2019s appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 301, 303 and 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 301, 303, 304(a)), and for the following reasons, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe following factual statement is derived from the well-pleaded facts contained in plaintiff\u2019s sixth amended complaint, which for purposes of review must be accepted as true (In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 184, 680 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1997)), as well as other record materials properly before us.\nPlaintiff is employed as a truck driver with FAB Express (FAB), a delivery carrier company. Stone is a manufacturer and seller of corrugated containers, otherwise known as cardboard boxes. Stone manufactures its boxes at a plant located in North Chicago, Illinois, and pursuant to a motor carrier agreement, contracts FAB to deliver the boxes to its customers. As part of the delivery process, Stone organizes its boxes in bundles with the use of pressurized straps made by defendant ITW Signode. Stone then loads the bundles on pallets and into FAB\u2019s delivery trucks.\nOn October 17, 1995, plaintiff, during the course of his employment with FAB and pursuant to FAB\u2019s carrier contract with Stone, transported boxes from Stone\u2019s North Chicago facility to Stone\u2019s customer, Coca-Cola, in Niles, Illinois. Notably, plaintiff was not a party to the sales contract between Stone and Coca-Cola. Plaintiff was simply engaged to deliver Stone\u2019s goods to Coca-Cola.\nPrior to leaving Stone\u2019s facility, plaintiff was allegedly directed by Stone\u2019s dispatcher to comply with all requests of Coca-Cola and to participate, as necessary, in the unloading and stocking of the boxes at Coca-Cola\u2019s facility. Once at Coca-Cola, plaintiff was allegedly asked by the dock forklift operator to assist in the unloading of the boxes from the truck and was specifically requested to adjust one of the bundles that had shifted during transport. As plaintiff attempted to reposition this bundle, the pressurized strapping that secured the boxes suddenly broke or separated, causing plaintiff to fall and sustain injuries.\nPlaintiff thereafter filed the instant action against Stone and various other defendants that are not parties to this appeal. In his sixth amended complaint, plaintiff alleges claims against Stone for negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (count III), and breach of implied warranty of merchantability (count IV). Plaintiffs claim for breach of the implied warranty of fitness alleges that the delivery agreement between Stone and FAB implicitly provided that the boxes would be fit for a particular purpose, namely, delivery. According to the complaint, Stone had reason to know the purpose for which FAB and himself had the boxes, in particular their transport and delivery to Coca-Cola. When FAB agreed to receive and deliver the goods, Stone purportedly knew that FAB and plaintiff relied on it to provide suitable packaging for the transport and delivery of the boxes and, further, that the packaged bundles would be safe for FAB\u2019s employees, including plaintiff, during their unloading at Coca-Cola.\nIn his claim for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, plaintiff alleges that Stone is a merchant with respect to the manufacturing and selling of boxes. Plaintiff further alleges the delivery agreement between Stone and FAB implicitly provided that the boxes prepared for delivery would be merchantable. The boxes, however, were purportedly not of merchantable quality in that they were unfit for the ordinary purposes for which they are used, \u201cwhich foreseeably included the use of, transporting, aligning and handling *** [the boxes] while in the possession of FAB.\u201d Additionally, the boxes would not pass without objection in \u201cthe trade,\u201d which presumably would be the corrugated container manufacturing industry.\nAs to both counts, plaintiff alleges Stone breached its implied warranties of fitness and merchantability to him by: (1) utilizing oversized pallets for transportation of the boxes, thereby resulting in lateral instability; (2) failing to positively attach the bundles of boxes to the pallets; (3) stacking the bundles two or more high without securing them to their respective pallets; (4) failing to properly apply heat sealing to the straps used to secure the bundles; (5) using an inadequate number and size of strapping for the boxes being delivered; (6) failing to use reinforced or crimped metal strapping for the bundles; and (7) causing nicks or abrasions to the bundles\u2019 strapping, thereby significantly degrading their strength. According to plaintiff, his injuries were a direct and proximate result of Stone\u2019s foregoing breaching conduct.\nStone responded to plaintiffs amended complaint, in part, by filing a combined motion to dismiss the implied warranty claims under sections 2 \u2014 615(a) and 2 \u2014 619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615(a), 2 \u2014 619(a)(9), 2 \u2014 619.1 (West 1998)). In relevant part, Stone asserted plaintiff is not a third-party beneficiary of the implied warranties it extended to its customer, Coca-Cola, and thus could not sustain his warranty claims. As such, Stone argued plaintiffs amended complaint fails to state a cause of action.\nThe circuit court agreed and dismissed count\u2019s III and IV of plaintiffs amended complaint under section 2 \u2014 615 of the Code. Upon Stone\u2019s request, the court entered a finding of no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of its ruling pursuant to Supreme Court 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and plaintiffs timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nAlthough not addressed by either party, we find the amended complaint insufficient to invoke article 2 and its implied warranty provisions. A section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss attacks the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs claim and presents the question of whether the complaint states a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Grund v. Donegan, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1037, 700 N.E.2d 157, 159 (1998). All pleadings are to be construed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party (In re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d at 189, 680 N.E.2d at 268), and all well-pleaded facts together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are admitted as true. Lawson v. City of Chicago, 278 Ill. App. 3d 628, 634, 662 N.E.2d 1377, 1382 (1996). Conclusions of law and conclusions of fact not supported by allegations of specific fact, however, are not admitted. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382. Since the question presented by a section 2 \u2014 615 motion is one of law, this court\u2019s review is conducted de novo. Lawson, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 634, 662 N.E.2d at 1382.\nThe allegations contained in counts III and IV of plaintiff\u2019s amended pleading concern solely the transport agreement between Stone and FAB and assert that Stone extended certain implied warranties to FAB and plaintiff regarding the packaging of the boxes that were delivered to Coca-Cola. These counts further allege that, due to Stone\u2019s purported breach of these implied warranties, plaintiff sustained injuries.\nThe law is well settled that article 2 is limited in application to \u201ctransactions in goods.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102 (West 1998); Garcia v. Edgewater Hospital, 244 Ill. App. 3d 894, 899, 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1247 (1993). Section 2 \u2014 314 of the UCC provides that in every sale of goods conducted by a seller who is a merchant with respect to the goods of that kind, a warranty that the goods are merchantable is implied, unless excluded or modified. 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 314 (West 1998). Moreover, under section 2 \u2014 315, when the seller, whether a merchant or not, at the time of contracting has reason to know that the buyer needs the goods for a particular purpose and that the buyer is relying on the seller\u2019s skill and judgment in selecting or furnishing the goods, an implied warranty that the goods are fit for such a purpose arises, unless excluded or modified. 810 ILCS 2 \u2014 315 (West 1998).\nAs the plain language of the above provisions clearly indicates, the implied warranties under the UCC apply only in cases involving the sale of goods. Hence, where the transaction at issue does not involve a sale of goods, the implied warranty provisions of article 2 are not implicated and are thus inapplicable. \u201cGoods\u201d are defined in relevant part by the UCC to mean \u201call things *** which are moveable at the time of identification to the contract for sale.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 105(1) (West 1998). A \u201csale\u201d is defined as \u201cthe passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 106(1) (West 1998).\nThe contract between Stone and FAB here is entirely one for the rendition of services. Namely, pursuant to the agreement, Stone contracted FAB to deliver its boxes to its various customers. The contract does not involve the sale of Stone\u2019s goods to FAB. Because contracts for the rendition of services are not transactions in goods so as to be covered by the warranty provisions of the UCC (Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems, 118 Ill. App. 3d 520, 531, 455 N.E.2d 142, 150 (1983); Pitler v. Michael Reese Hospital, 92 Ill. App. 3d 739, 742, 415 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (1980); 32 Ill. Law & Prac. Sales \u00a7 141, at 421 (1998)), no implied warranties ran from Stone to FAB, and the provisions of article 2 are not available to plaintiff under the facts alleged in the amended complaint. Consequently, counts III and IV fail to state a cause of action under the UCC.\nA review of the record and briefs filed on appeal indicates plaintiff intended to allege that certain implied warranties ran from Stone to Coca-Cola and its employees pursuant to the sale of Stone\u2019s boxes. Plaintiff is not a party to Stone\u2019s contract with Coca-Cola and, thus, lacks the necessary privity to assert a direct warranty action against Stone. Plaintiff sought to assert a derivative warranty claim under section 2 \u2014 318 of the UCC, which extends warranty protections to certain nonprivity persons. In pertinent part, section 2 \u2014 318 states:\n\u201cA seller\u2019s warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 318 (West 1998).\nAccording to plaintiff, this provision permits him to seek recovery against Stone for its alleged breach of implied warranties running to Coca-Cola.\nAssuming the amended complaint sufficiently alleges claims against Stone under the aforementioned implied warranty theories, as the parties and the circuit court have done, we conclude plaintiff falls outside the class of third-party beneficiaries extended warranty protection by section 2 \u2014 318 and, thus, cannot maintain his warranty claims.\nPlaintiff initially urges this' court to adopt an expansive reading of section 2 \u2014 318. Plaintiff claims section 2 \u2014 318 essentially allows any party in the horizontal chain of the goods distribution to sue the seller under a warranty theory. In this regard, plaintiff asserts the relevant inquiry is not whether the injured party is in the family or household of the buyer, or a guest in the buyer\u2019s home, but rather whether it was reasonable to expect that the party would use, consume or be affected by the seller\u2019s goods. Thus, plaintiff asserts section 2 \u2014 318 authorizes any nonprivity person who was reasonably expected to use, consume or be affected by the seller\u2019s goods to bring a warranty cause of action as a third-party beneficiary. In this case, plaintiff contends it was reasonable to expect he would use or be affected by Stone\u2019s boxes during the course of their delivery.\nContrary to plaintiffs suggestion, section 2 \u2014 318 is not unlimited in scope and does not remove the requirement of privity in all cases. On its face, section 2 \u2014 318 extends warranties, both expressed and implied, to a certain class of nonprivity persons in the horizontal chain of distribution who sustain personal injuries. This class is not limitless, but is confined to members of the buyer\u2019s family or household and guests in the buyer\u2019s home. The effect of section 2- \u2014 318 is to permit parties having a certain relationship with the buyer to maintain warranty claims under the UCC despite a lack of privity with the seller of the good. In this regard, section 2 \u2014 318 reflects only a limited abolition of privity and is not intended to allow recovery by all persons foreseeably affected by defects in the seller\u2019s product. 3A R. Anderson, Anderson on the Uniform Commercial Code, \u00a7 2 \u2014 318:27 at 321 (3d ed. rev. 1995). Parties not covered by section 2 \u2014 318 must still demonstrate privity. See Board of Education of City of Chicago v. A, C & S, Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 461, 546 N.E.2d 580, 595 (1989); see generally Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294, 301-11, 503 N.E.2d 760, 762-66 (1986).\nSection 2 \u2014 318 was adopted by our General Assembly in 1961 and is identical to the original version drafted by the uniform committee, now commonly known as alternative A. Because many states declined to adopt this version, the uniform committee drafted two alternate versions, B and C, in 1966. Alternatives B and C afford broader coverage than, alternative A and extend warranty coverage to a larger class of nonprivity users. Illinois has not adopted either alternative B or C but instead has elected to retain the original version of the section.\nIn arguing that he qualifies for third-party beneficiary protection, plaintiff actually relies on the wording of alternative B. Alternative B extends warranty protections to \u201cany natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.\u201d Uniform Commercial Code (Sales), 1A U.L.A. \u00a7 2 \u2014 318 (1989). As noted, this provision is not the law in Illinois and thus cannot be invoked by plaintiff to defeat Stone\u2019s motion for dismissal. Acceptance of plaintiffs contention here would render the version of the UCC passed by our legislature ineffective and meaningless.\nIn the alternative, plaintiff claims he was a \u201cguest\u201d of Coca-Cola at the time he sustained his injuries. Notably, section 2 \u2014 318 extends warranty protections to persons who are guests in the buyer\u2019s \u201chome.\" (Emphasis added.) 810 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 318 (West 1998). The UCC does not provide a definition of the term \u201chome,\u201d and no court of this state has considered the matter of whether the premises or property of a business constitutes a \u201chome\u201d for purposes of section 2 \u2014 318. Notwithstanding, assuming the word \u201chome\u201d encompasses business property such as Coca-Cola\u2019s facility, we conclude plaintiff was not a \u201cguest\u201d as contemplated by the UCC.\nIn interpreting a statute, our primary aim is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature, and in doing so our first step is to consider the specific wording of the legislation. Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475, 702 N.E.2d 529, 532 (1998). Where the intent can be determined from the plain language of the statute, that intent must prevail (DiFoggio v. Retirement Board of the County Employees Annuity & Benefit Fund, 156 Ill. 2d 377, 382, 620 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1993)) and, unless otherwise defined, statutory terms are to be ascribed their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. Gem Electronics, 183 Ill. 2d at 477-78, 702 N.E.2d at 532; Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. Mc-Gaw, 182 Ill. 2d 262, 270, 695 N.E.2d 481, 485 (1998).\nThe term \u201cguest\u201d is not defined in the UCC. Giving the word its ordinary and popular meaning, it is clear plaintiff does not qualify for warranty protection in this regard. \u201cGuest\u201d is defined, in relevant part, as \u201ca person entertained in one\u2019s house[;] *** a person to whom hospitality is extended,\u201d particularly \u201cone invited to participate in some activity (as an excursion) at the expense of another\u201d (Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 1008 (1986)), and \u201ca person who is received and entertained at one\u2019s home, club, etc., and who is not a regular member.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 707 (6th ed. 1990). Here, plaintiff was not invited to be entertained or participate in any activity at Coca-Cola. Rather, plaintiff was at Coca-Cola\u2019s facility because he was required to be there as part of his job duties with FAB.\nPlaintiff further argues that if he does not qualify as a guest under the statute, he falls within the framework of those decisions that have declined against a literal reading of section 2 \u2014 318 to find that an employee of a purchaser may sue the seller for an alleged breach of warranty where the contracting parties contemplated that the employee was within the class of persons to be extended warranty protection. In Whitaker v. Lian Feng Machine Co., 156 Ill. App. 3d 316, 509 N.E.2d 591 (1987), the plaintiff sued the defendant-vendor under a warranty theory for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of a defective band saw that was purchased from the defendant by the plaintiffs employer. The employee was not in privity with the seller and sought to bring himself within the class of nonprivity persons covered under section 2 \u2014 318.\nOn review of the circuit court\u2019s ruling dismissing the plaintiff\u2019s claim, this court determined our legislature intended for the judiciary \u201cto decide, in accord with common law principles and with the guidance of the UCC, whether warranty coverage should further extend to any *** nonpurchasing users of a product\u201d beyond those persons specified in section 2 \u2014 318. Whitaker, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 320, 509 N.E.2d at 594. According to the court, the designated class is not fixed, but can be expanded to encompass other nonprivity parties in the horizontal chain when warranted by the circumstances of a particular case. Whitaker, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 320, 509 N.E.2d at 594; see also Collins Co. v. Carboline Co., 125 Ill. 2d 498, 516, 532 N.E.2d 834, 842 (1988) (recognizing section 2 \u2014 318 and its commentary leave \u201ca door at least slightly ajar for future extension of some warranties in appropriate circumstances to nonprivity plaintiffs\u201d).\nUnder Whitaker, an employee can sue a seller under section 2 \u2014 318 \u201cas long as the safety of that employee in the use of the goods was either explicitly or implicitly part of the basis of the bargain when the employer purchased the goods.\u201d Whitaker, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 321, 509 N.E.2d at 595. The court, in finding the plaintiff covered under section 2 \u2014 318, explained the employer bargained for a band saw that was as safe as any other merchantable band saw, and since \u201c[a] corporation cannot use the band saw at all unless its employees operate it,\u201d it concluded the plaintiffs safety was an implicit part of the parties\u2019 bargain. Whitaker, 156 Ill. App. 3d at 321, 509 N.E.2d at 595.\nSignificantly, Whitaker and its progeny concern solely the situation where the injured party is an employee of the buyer. These cases do not address whether any other party can maintain a warranty claim pursuant to section 2 \u2014 318 and are thus limited in application to the circumstances under which they were decided. Plaintiff in this case was not an employee of Coca-Cola at the time of his injuries but, rather, was a third party engaged by the vendor to deliver its products. Consequently, plaintiff cannot rely on Whitaker to bring himself within the class of parties to whom that case and similar decisions have extended warranty protection.\nPlaintiff, recognizing this dilemma, argues he was akin to an employee of Coca-Cola by virtue of the directive he received from Stone\u2019s dispatcher and the request for assistance expressed by Coca Cola\u2019s forklift operator. We disagree. The record clearly shows that at the time of his injuries plaintiff was acting within the course of his employment with FAB. The instructions of Stone\u2019s dispatcher to assist its customer in unloading its goods and the request of Coca-Cola\u2019s operator to remove the boxes from the delivery truck, by themselves, are insufficient to transform plaintiffs employee status for purposes of applying Whitaker in this case.\nAs discussed, the courts may enlarge the scope of section 2 \u2014 318 where the circumstances of the case warrant. Notwithstanding this discretion, we are extremely reluctant, in light of the express wording of the statute, to expand this section\u2019s operation absent a compelling and well-founded reason. The policy underlying the Whitaker ruling is quite clear. If coverage was not provided to employees of a corporate buyer, any warranties of the seller would be ineffective and extend to no person since it is impossible for a corporation to be the beneficiary. Plaintiff here, other than asserting the need of protecting the general safety of delivery persons, provides no compelling basis under warranty law for the extension of third-party beneficiary coverage under the facts of the case. We similarly fail to discern any such basis. Plaintiff\u2019s relationship with Coca-Cola under the facts is too far removed from those relationships warranting protection under section 2 \u2014 318. Notably, plaintiff is not without a remedy for his injuries and has other legal theories available under which he can pursue relief.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the order of the circuit court dismissing counts III and IV of plaintiffs sixth amended complaint with prejudice is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, EJ., and WOLFSON, J., concur.\nPlaintiff\u2019s amended complaint is also directed against ITW Signode, I.T.W., Inc., I.T.W Development Company and Illinois Tool Works, which are not parties to this appeal.\nHorizontal privity concerns the nonprivity of consumers and sellers and refers to those who are not in the distributive chain of a product but who nonetheless use the product and retain a certain relationship with the buyer. On the other hand, vertical privity refers to the relationship between those who are in the distributive chain of the good. Szajna v. General Motors Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 294, 307, 503 N.E.2d 760, 765 (1986).\nThe rationale and holding of Whitaker have been expressly followed in Maldonado v. Creative Woodworking Concepts, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 935, 938, 694 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (1998), and in Wheeler v. Sunbelt Tool Co., 181 Ill. App. 3d 1088, 1099, 537 N.E.2d 1332, 1340 (1989), and have been recognized as the controlling law in Illinois in Thomas v. Bombardier \u2014 Rotax Motorenfabrik, 869 F. Supp. 551, 556-57 (N.D. Ill. 1994).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CERDA" } ], "attorneys": [ "O\u2019Connor, Schiff & Myers, of Chicago (John W. Grove and Jill B. Lewis, of counsel), for appellant.", "Kaplan, Papadakis & Gournis, P.C., of Chicago (Eric D. Kaplan and Dean Gournis, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JOHN LUKWINSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STONE CONTAINER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee (ITW Signode et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 98 \u2014 4583\nOpinion filed March 8, 2000.\nO\u2019Connor, Schiff & Myers, of Chicago (John W. Grove and Jill B. Lewis, of counsel), for appellant.\nKaplan, Papadakis & Gournis, P.C., of Chicago (Eric D. Kaplan and Dean Gournis, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0385-01", "first_page_order": 405, "last_page_order": 414 }