{ "id": 411665, "name": "ALLAN WEINSTEIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Weinstein v. Zoning Board of Appeals", "decision_date": "2000-04-06", "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 99 \u2014 0631", "first_page": "460", "last_page": "466", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 460" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 868", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3518639 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "30 Ill. App. 3d 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621174 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "267-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/30/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 566", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2822883 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0566-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 944", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5156807 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0944-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208018 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0483-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 596, "char_count": 13152, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.99493444558632e-08, "percentile": 0.4227960780725054 }, "sha256": "70f0f2386e0d535869be2c28c8aba0b1563149d6813e2cb9c5795ee1d4d3e6a1", "simhash": "1:9b6f630a470d004e", "word_count": 2053 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALLAN WEINSTEIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE INGLIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs, Allan and Margot Weinstein, appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County affirming the order of defendant Zoning Board of Appeals of the City of Highland Park (the Board) that granted a variance to defendants Edward and Janice Litke (defendants) to allow them to construct an addition to their house. Plaintiffs contend that defendants could have completed plans for the addition that would not have required a variance, that defendants failed to offer sufficient evidence to support their request for a variance, and that the Board\u2019s order was invalid for failing to make specific findings of fact. We affirm.\nDefendants\u2019 property is located at the intersection of Florence Avenue and Sheridan Road in Highland Park and is immediately west of plaintiffs\u2019 property. Defendants\u2019 driveway accesses Sheridan Road.\nOn June 19, 1997, defendants requested variances to exceed the maximum allowable floor-area ratio and to encroach into the front yard, backyard, and side yard setbacks in order to build an attached garage, add to existing interior rooms, and construct an attached covered porch. At the hearing on the variances before the Board, the plaintiffs conceded that defendants\u2019 additions affecting the front yard and backyard did not require a variance and plaintiffs did not object to granting a variance for the floor-area ratio. The only evidence specifically presented to the Board at the hearing concerned the issue of granting the variance from the side yard setback requirement.\nAt the time defendants requested the variances, their home already encroached 6 feet 3 inches into the required 12-foot side yard setback. Defendants proposed to extend the existing legal nonconformity for a distance of 33.4 feet in order to build an. attached two-car garage.\nAt the hearing, Bruce Green, defendants\u2019 architect, presented his design for the addition. His plan converted the one-car garage into additional kitchen space, an added laundry room, and a mud room. Additionally, Green\u2019s plan called for the construction of a two-car garage, a turnaround driveway with two exits onto Sheridan Road, and an attached covered porch. Green\u2019s plan called for the extension of the existing nonconformity, which would be the new garage wall, to have no windows.\nRichard Williams, senior planner for a land-use consulting firm, testified that, owing to the steep slope in the backyard, it would be extremely expensive to put the proposed addition on the back of defendants\u2019 house. Williams also testified that defendants\u2019 small lot created a hardship and Green\u2019s plan was a reasonable use of the property and in keeping with the other residences in the neighborhood. Williams also testified that allowing the variance would not be detrimental to the public welfare or injurious to other property in the neighborhood.\nRenee Tickman, a real estate broker, testified that the property was functionally obsolete and would be difficult to sell. She also testified that the addition would increase the value of the property.\nDefendant Edward Litke testified that his growing family needed more space. He testified that he and his family loved the neighborhood and did not want to move.\nBarry Weinstein, an architect, testified for plaintiffs. He noted that a variance for the front yard setback was unnecessary. Weinstein presented an alternate plan for the addition. Weinstein testified that, if defendants were to adopt his plan, they could construct the addition without needing to obtain a variance and that his plan would provide defendants with the same functionality they would receive from Green\u2019s plan. Weinstein also testified that, unlike defendants\u2019 plan, his plan would not impair the supply of light and air to plaintiffs\u2019 property.\nTony Sanchez, a landscaper, testified that the line of pine trees along the plaintiff-defendant property line would be harmed by the proposed addition and would die prematurely. Sanchez also noted that several of the pine trees were distressed as a result of the existing legal nonconformity and would likely die prematurely. Sanchez testified that it would cost plaintiffs $15,000 to replace all of the pine trees if they were to die.\nWayne Wanek testified that defendants\u2019 addition would cause plaintiffs\u2019 property to decrease in value. Wanek testified that, in its present configuration, defendants\u2019 house currently had the least impact on the value of plaintiffs\u2019 property; any change to defendants\u2019 house, either an increase or decrease in its size, would cause the value of plaintiffs\u2019 property to decrease.\nThe Board made the following findings of fact. It determined that the proposed side yard variation was nothing more than the extension of an existing legal nonconformity that harmonized well with the existing building. The Board also found that plaintiffs\u2019 privacy would not be compromised and the trees along the property line would not be harmed by the proposed addition. The Board further resolved any credibility issues in favor of defendants and granted defendants\u2019 request for the side yard variance. The Board granted variances for all of defendants\u2019 requests and conditioned them on defendants\u2019 agreement to put in two windows into the garage wall extension.\nPlaintiffs filed a complaint in the circuit court for administrative review. The circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision and plaintiff timely appeals.\nBefore turning to the merits of plaintiffs\u2019 contentions, we first review the standards pertaining to the review of a decision made by a local zoning board. As in any administrative review case, we review the decision of the trial court de novo. Town of Sugar Loaf v. Environmental Protection Agency, 305 Ill. App. 3d 483, 491 (1999). Further, we may not disturb the Board\u2019s determination unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence or the Board acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Smith v. Town of Normal, 238 Ill. App. 3d 944, 950 (1992).\nPlaintiffs initially contend that defendants failed to present evidence in support of every essential element required to obtain a variance. Specifically, plaintiffs argue that defendants failed to include evidence that the zoning ordinances caused practical difficulties or a particular hardship only to defendants that the proposed variation would alleviate. Section 150.1205 of the Highland Park Zoning Ordinance of 1997 provides, in pertinent part, that the Board shall not grant a variance unless, based on the evidence presented at the hearing, it finds:\n\u201c(2) The plight of the petitioner is due to unique circumstances and the proposed variation will not merely serve as a convenience to the petitioner, but will alleviate some demonstrable and unusual hardship which will result if the strict letter of the regulations of this Chapter were carried out and which particular hardship or practical difficulty is not generally applicable to other property within the same zoning district;\n(3) The particular surroundings, shape, or topographical condition of the subject property would result in a particular hardship upon the owner, as distinguished from a mere inconvenience, if the strict letter of the regulations were carried out, or the application of this Chapter to the subject property has a discriminatory effect thereon.\u201d Highland Park Zoning Ordinance \u00a7 150.1205 (1997).\nPlaintiffs properly note that one seeking a variance must present affirmative evidence to prove each of the necessary elements required to obtain a variance, even in the absence of opposition. Karasik v. City of Highland Park, 130 Ill. App. 2d 566, 572 (1970). Plaintiffs contend that defendants failed to present evidence to demonstrate that they were under a particular hardship or practical difficulty. We disagree.\nThe record demonstrates that defendants presented evidence showing that their lot was small compared to the other lots in the neighborhood and that their home was functionally obsolete. Additionally, the record shows that, as a result of the steepness of their backyard, defendants could not practically construct an addition to the back of their house. We also note that plaintiffs either conceded that defendants were entitled to variances or showed that defendants\u2019 plans did not require variances for defendants\u2019 front yard and backyard and for the floor-area ratio. The Board concluded that defendants\u2019 evidence satisfied the standards of the zoning ordinance and proved each essential element required to grant a variance. After reviewing the record, we find that defendants\u2019 evidence demonstrated that, due to the circumstances of their property, there existed a particular hardship if the zoning ordinance were strictly enforced and that the Board\u2019s determination to allow defendants\u2019 variances was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nPlaintiffs also assert that, because they presented a plan for an addition that could be built without the need for variances, defendants failed to prove that they were under any particular hardship. Plaintiffs rely on Lincoln Central Ass\u2019n v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 30 Ill. App. 3d 258 (1975), to support this argument. We find Lincoln Central to be inapposite. There, a hospital sought a variance to build an addition and a special use to build a parking garage. Lincoln Central, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 260. The zoning board granted the variance and special use. The court found that the zoning board\u2019s decision was unsupported by the evidence. Specifically, there was no evidence that the hospital could not yield a reasonable return without the variance. The hospital wanted to increase the number of beds by 55% but presented no evidence on the fact that the increase was necessary; indeed, the evidence showed that the hospital operated at less than 100% capacity. Lincoln Central, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 267-68. Thus, the decision in Lincoln Central was premised on the failure to present evidence, not on the fact that the proposed addition could be constructed to conform to the zoning ordinance without granting a variance. Lincoln Central is therefore inapposite to the purpose for which plaintiffs cite it.\nPlaintiffs further suggest that, because they presented a plan that complied with the zoning ordinances, the Board was obliged to accept that plan. We find no basis in Illinois law to support the proposition; further, the Board determined that defendants had demonstrated that they would experience a particular hardship if the zoning ordinances were strictly enforced, notwithstanding the existence of the alternate plan. Having reviewed the record and finding that the determination of the Board was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we see no reason to disturb the Board\u2019s determination on the ground suggested by plaintiffs.\nPlaintiffs next essentially reiterate their argument that defendants did not present sufficient evidence to justify the award of variances in this case. Plaintiffs point to the evidence they presented, especially the alternate plan submitted by their architect, Weinstein, as support for their argument. Plaintiffs\u2019 argument, then, urges us to accept their evidence and reject defendants\u2019 evidence. A reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence but will only determine whether the Board\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Hope Deliverance Center, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 116 Ill. App. 3d 868, 872 (1983). We note that the Board specifically stated that it was resolving all issues of credibility in defendants\u2019 favor. We therefore defer to the Board\u2019s resolution of the factual disputes embodied in the evidence presented by each party. We also note that defendants presented evidence showing that, as a result of the unique circumstances of their property, the strict enforcement of the zoning ordinances would place them under particular hardships. Accordingly, we again find that the Board\u2019s determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nPlaintiffs last contend that the Board\u2019s order granting defendants\u2019 variances is inadequate for failing to make specific findings of fact and for \u201cmere[ly] parroting the language of the ordinance.\u201d We disagree. The record shows that the Board considered the evidence presented at the hearing and determined that defendants had satisfied their burden of proof under the zoning ordinances. Further, contrary to plaintiffs\u2019 assertion, the Board\u2019s order does not merely parrot the terms of the ordinance but indicates that the Board deliberated on the evidence and made the requisite factual findings. Accordingly, plaintiffs\u2019 argument is without merit.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nMcLaren and HUTCHINSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE INGLIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Berle L. Schwartz, of Highland Park, for appellants.", "John J. Zimmermann and Michael F. Zimmermann, both of Bradtke & Zimmermann, Ltd., of Mt. Prospect, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALLAN WEINSTEIN et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF THE CITY OF HIGHLAND PARK et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 99 \u2014 0631\nOpinion filed April 6, 2000.\nBerle L. Schwartz, of Highland Park, for appellants.\nJohn J. Zimmermann and Michael F. Zimmermann, both of Bradtke & Zimmermann, Ltd., of Mt. Prospect, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0460-01", "first_page_order": 480, "last_page_order": 486 }