{ "id": 411667, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TERRY L. WASSELL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Wassell", "decision_date": "2000-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 4 \u2014 99 \u2014 0491", "first_page": "506", "last_page": "514", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 506" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" }, { "page": "541-42" }, { "page": "542" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535949 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243932 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 N.E.2d 695", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2903225 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(vi) (134 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(vi)) requires the State to provide a defendant in advance of trial any records of defendant's prior convictions which are in the State's possession" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2496987 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724", "parenthetical": "Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(vi) (134 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(vi)) requires the State to provide a defendant in advance of trial any records of defendant's prior convictions which are in the State's possession" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 1380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1385" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 927", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2961546 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "933" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0927-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131032 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219", "parenthetical": "trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 1063", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "415" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864536 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 257", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229721 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0257-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 1135", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 369", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564604 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0369-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 501", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "506" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475193 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244-45" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 577", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 302", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "306" }, { "page": "307" }, { "page": "304" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173571 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "746" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "747" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "748" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 509", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5474756 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" }, { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "order barring admission of written laboratory report, and requiring testimony of person who actually performed the analysis, did not suppress evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151-52" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5475193 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247-48" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "748" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0743-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 809, "char_count": 20472, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.770845263994211e-08, "percentile": 0.4097404906618108 }, "sha256": "a98acfe7aa92ff0c76de06139bba78f1009b76d627081d7dbb374c3846588b9f", "simhash": "1:21b29764e7ef8ce4", "word_count": 3434 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TERRY L. WASSELL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn May 1998, the State charged defendant, Terry L. Wassell, with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14.1 (West Supp. 1997)). In September 1998, the State filed a petition to proceed under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725 ILCS 205/3 et seq. (West 1998)). In May 1999, the State filed notice of its intent to call four witnesses at trial who would testify that defendant sexually assaulted them on prior occasions, pursuant to section 115\u2014 7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.3 (West Supp. 1997)). In June 1999, defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit that testimony and the trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion. The State brings this interlocutory appeal from that order (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). Because we lack jurisdiction to hear this appeal, we dismiss it.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn May 1998, the State filed an indictment charging defendant with predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. The indictment alleged that defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with his three-year-old granddaughter.\nIn September 1998, the State filed a petition to have defendant adjudicated a sexually dangerous person. In November 1998 and December 1998, the State filed amended petitions to proceed under the Act. In January, February, and March 1999, the trial court struck paragraphs of the State\u2019s second-amended petition and limited the testimony of several witnesses. The stricken testimony included allegations by J.R., L.M., M.B., and W.S. that defendant sexually assaulted them when they were minors. The court found that the allegations were uncharged, unreported, nonlitigated, and uncorroborated, and that the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence outweighed its probative value.\nIn May 1999, the State filed a notice of intent to offer into evidence the statements of J.R., L.M., M.B., and W.S. at defendant\u2019s sexual assault trial. Pursuant to section 115 \u2014 7.3 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115- \u2014 7.3 (West Supp. 1997)), the State expected the witnesses to testify that defendant had sexually assaulted them when they were minors. In June 1999, defendant filed an objection to the State\u2019s notice and a motion in limine. The motion in limine argued that the testimony of the four witnesses was not admissible as \u201cother crimes\u201d evidence and any probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion in limine, finding that the four witnesses\u2019 testimony was not admissible under section 115 \u2014 7.3 of the Code or \u201cgenerally admissible.\u201d\nOn June 7, 1999, the State filed a certificate of impairment and a notice of appeal. The State alleged that the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion in limine substantially impaired its ability to prosecute defendant for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child. That same day, the State filed an application for leave to appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) regarding its petition to proceed under the Act. In June 1999, this court denied the State\u2019s application. People v. Wassell, No. 4 \u2014 99 \u2014 0447 (June 24, 1999) (order denying appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308)). The State now seeks to appeal from the trial court\u2019s in limine ruling.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe State contends that we have jurisdiction pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)). We disagree and conclude, pursuant to People v. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d 743, 718 N.E.2d 302 (1999), appeal allowed, 187 Ill. 2d 577 (2000), that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal.\nIn Drum, we held that Rule 604(a)(1) did not confer jurisdiction on this court to hear an interlocutory appeal when (1) the State files a motion in limine that seeks admission of evidence and (2) the trial court enters a discretionary ruling denying that motion. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 718 N.E.2d at 304.\nOur holding in Drum was based on the interplay of three factors. The first factor was the availability of review under Rule 604(a)(1). Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 718 N.E.2d at 304. Rule 604(a)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: \u201cIn criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in *** suppressing evidence.\u201d 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The Supreme Court of Illinois has rejected a restricted reading of appellate jurisdiction through this rule. People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 244-45, 412 N.E.2d 501, 506 (1980). Interpreting the supreme court\u2019s reasoning in Young, this court concluded that the supreme court did not intend to create unlimited appellate jurisdiction to hear the State\u2019s interlocutory appeals from discretionary rulings. Rather, a distinction exists between traditional discretionary rulings that relate to the evidentiary value of proffered evidence and suppression of evidence in the furtherance of some social policy. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 746, 718 N.E.2d at 305.\nThe second factor was the nature of motions in limine. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 718 N.E.2d at 304. Motions in limine ask the trial court to make a ruling outside the normal trial context. McMath v. Katholi, 304 Ill. App. 3d 369, 376, 711 N.E.2d 1135, 1140 (1999), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 191 Ill. 2d 257 (2000). A trial court has the discretion not to address a motion in limine until the evidentiary issue arises in the normal course of the trial, and any ruling that the trial court makes is subject to reconsideration during the trial. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 747, 718 N.E.2d at 306. In either case, the trial court\u2019s final ruling takes place at trial, not before.\nIn addition, a review of in limine rulings in an interlocutory setting delays a trial on the merits, consumes judicial resources, and requires the reviewing court to make a ruling based upon the same underdeveloped record and limited information that was before the trial court when it made its preliminary ruling. Therefore, declining to review a trial court\u2019s discretionary pretrial ruling on a motion in limine prevents harming the flexibility of the motion in limine procedure and the fairness of trial. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 718 N.E.2d at 306.\nThe third factor this court considered was the nature and scope of deferential review. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 718 N.E.2d at 306. Generally, evidentiary motions, such as motions in limine, are directed to the trial court\u2019s discretion, and reviewing courts will not disturb a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling unless an abuse of discretion occurred. People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 78-79, 695 N.E.2d 391, 415 (1998). Absent an abuse of the trial court\u2019s discretion, a reviewing court may not change the result of the trial even if it would have viewed the matter differently. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388, 701 N.E.2d 1063, 1075 (1998). Therefore, no compelling reason exists for a reviewing court to assume jurisdiction over a case still pending when the question on review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 749, 718 N.E.2d at 307.\nIn Drum, we found that the interplay between these three factors compelled the conclusion that we did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 718 N.E.2d at 304. We reach the same conclusion in this case because that same interplay exists regardless of the party filing the motion in limine.\nIn the present case, the State filed a notice of intent to offer into evidence testimony of four witnesses. The witnesses were expected to testify, pursuant to section 115 \u2014 7.3 of the Code, that defendant previously sexually assaulted them. Defendant filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar the witnesses\u2019 testimony, arguing that the testimony was not \u201cotherwise admissible\u201d and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.\nSection 115 \u2014 7.3 of the Code provides that if a defendant is accused of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, evidence that the defendant committed predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or criminal sexual abuse on other occasions may be admissible if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.3(b) (West Supp. 1997). When weighing the probative value of the evidence against the undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider (1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense, (2) factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense, and (3) other relevant facts and circumstances. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.3(c)(1) through (c)(3) (West Supp. 1997). Such determinations of evidentiary value are routinely addressed in the exercise of the court\u2019s discretion. See People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 219, 718 N.E.2d 1, 42 (1999) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect). In this case, the trial court\u2019s ruling on defendant\u2019s motion in limine was based on the court\u2019s determination that the prejudicial effect of the testimony outweighed its probative value, an exercise of discretion subject to deferential review.\nThe procedural posture of this case is essentially the same as one that frequently arises in criminal cases \u2014 namely, where the State seeks to impeach a testifying defendant by introducing evidence of his prior convictions. In such a criminal case, the State must inform the defendant of his prior convictions, suggesting thereby that the State intends to use them to impeach him if he chooses to testify. See People v. Brooks, 251 Ill. App. 3d 927, 933, 623 N.E.2d 1380, 1385 (1993); People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d 708, 724, 550 N.E.2d 284, 295 (1990) (Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(vi) (134 Ill. 2d R. 412(a)(vi)) requires the State to provide a defendant in advance of trial any records of defendant\u2019s prior convictions which are in the State\u2019s possession). The defendant in such a case may file a motion in limine to bar the State from impeaching him with his prior convictions, and the trial court may grant the motion, concluding under People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 517-18, 268 N.E.2d 695, 699 (1971), that the prejudice that would result from admitting them substantially outweighs their probative value. (Note that this determination lies within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 456, 713 N.E.2d 532, 535 (1999).) Under these circumstances, surely any attempt by the State to appeal the trial court\u2019s interlocutory ruling granting the defendant\u2019s motion in limine would be dismissed no matter how earnestly the State asserted under Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) that the court\u2019s ruling \u201csubstantially impairs the State\u2019s ability to prosecute the case.\u201d Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507.\nSince this court\u2019s decision in Drum, the supreme court in People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 367, 721 N.E.2d 539, 541-42 (1999), has reviewed a State appeal from a trial court\u2019s granting of a defendant\u2019s motion in limine. In Williams, the defendant had pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of a person who died nearly five years later. The State then charged the defendant with murder, and at his preliminary hearing on that charge, the trial court granted his motion in limine to bar the State from using his prior guilty plea as evidence at his murder trial. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 367, 721 N.E.2d at 541-42.\nThe State appealed (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), and the appellate court upheld the in limine order in an unpublished decision. The supreme court granted the State\u2019s petition for leave to appeal and reversed the appellate and trial courts.\nBefore reaching the merits, however, the supreme court discussed the applicable standard of review. The State argued that the supreme court\u2019s review should be de novo because the in limine order centered on an issue of law. The defendant countered that review should be deferential because the order was within the trial court\u2019s discretion. The supreme court agreed with the State and explained as follows:\n\u201cA motion in limine is addressed to the trial court\u2019s inherent power to admit or exclude evidence. A court of review will not reverse a trial court\u2019s grant or denial of a motion in limine absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]\nHowever, a trial court must exercise its discretion within the bounds of the law. Where a trial court\u2019s exercise of discretion has been frustrated by an erroneous rule of law, appellate review is required to permit the exercise of discretion consistent with the law. [Citation.]\nIn this case, whether the use of a defendant\u2019s prior guilty plea to attempted murder as evidence at the defendant\u2019s murder trial was a \u2018direct\u2019 consequence of the guilty plea is a question of law. \u2018[W]here the question presented is one of law, a reviewing court determines it independently of the trial court\u2019s judgment.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369, 721 N.E.2d at 542.\nIn our judgment, the supreme court\u2019s decision in Williams supports our analysis in Drum and the conclusion we reached in that case and the present one \u2014 namely, to dismiss the State\u2019s appeal. In Williams, the supreme court drew the same distinction that we did in Drum between (1) orders granting motions in limine that present on appeal a question of law (as was the case in Williams) and (2) orders granting motions in limine that present on appeal a question involving the exercise of the trial court\u2019s discretion (as in the case here and in Drum).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we dismiss the State\u2019s appeal.\nDismissed.\nKNECHT, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE STEIGMANN" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent and would address the State\u2019s appeal on its merits.\nSupreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) allows the State to appeal from a pretrial order suppressing evidence. 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1). The State is not allowed to appeal every such order, only those where the prosecutor can certify to the trial court that the suppression substantially impairs his ability to prosecute the case. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151-52, 676 N.E.2d 665, 667 (1997). The courts will not second-guess a prosecutor\u2019s good-faith evaluation of the effect of a suppression order on his case, but the courts will make their own decision whether the order is one that has the effect of suppressing evidence. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152, 676 N.E.2d at 667 (order barring admission of written laboratory report, and requiring testimony of person who actually performed the analysis, did not suppress evidence).\nThis court has amended Rule 604(a)(1) to say that a reviewing court does not have jurisdiction to hear a Rule 604(a)(1) appeal where the State files a motion in limine that seeks the admission of evidence and the trial court enters a ruling not reviewable as a matter of law. Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 745, 718 N.E.2d at 304. \u201cInterlocutory review delays a trial on the merits and consumes judicial resources.\u201d Drum, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 748, 718 N.E.2d at 306. Today we further amend the rule to say there is no jurisdiction even where it is the defendant who files the motion in limine, and that motion is granted, barring the testimony of four witnesses.\nIt is true that a trial court that grants or denies a motion in limine in advance of trial may change its ruling as it learns more about the case at trial. I do not understand why that should prevent a prosecutor from appealing a pretrial interlocutory ruling suppressing evidence. Every interlocutory ruling, even a ruling excluding evidence because of an illegal search and seizure, is subject to change at trial. Should a prosecutor who has received an adverse ruling on a motion in limine proceed with trial, try again to get the evidence admitted, and then attempt a midtrial appeal when it is not? Generally, the State\u2019s right to appeal from suppression orders during trial is limited to orders entered pursuant to section 114 \u2014 12(c) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 12(c) (West 1998)) in cases where defendant is excused from filing the motion before trial. People v. Flatt, 82 Ill. 2d 250, 264, 412 N.E.2d 509, 516 (1980). Even if such a midtrial appeal were possible, requiring the trial to begin before the appeal can be taken entails a tremendous waste of resources. \u201c[T]he defendant\u2019s interests are not affected to the same extent by the appeal of a pretrial order as they are by an appeal which interrupts an ongoing trial.\u201d Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 244, 412 N.E.2d at 506.\nNor do I understand why we limit State appeals of pretrial orders suppressing evidence to cases that we would review de novo. It is possible for a reviewing court to reverse a trial court\u2019s determination if that determination is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or constitutes an abuse of discretion. In cases where the suppression of the evidence substantially impairs the prosecutor\u2019s case, why should the prosecutor be deprived of his one opportunity to question the trial court\u2019s ruling?\nThe majority tells us that the determination of whether hearsay is admitted under the residual hearsay exception (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 7.3 (West Supp. 1997)) lies in the discretion of the trial court. Cf. 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence \u00a7 327, at 363 (5th ed. 1999) (where new statutes present confrontation clause questions, a greater control by appellate courts over trial courts has been suggested as a procedural safeguard). \u201c[W]ithout the guidance and uniformity imposed by reviewing courts, erroneous interpretations and rulings may proliferate at the trial court level.\u201d Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 246, 412 N.E.2d at 507. \u201cThe difficulties posed by allowing such appeals, we believe, are outweighed by the need to ensure the accurate interpretation of constitutional and statutory provisions ***.\u201d Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507. The majority\u2019s approach will result in the only section 115 \u2014 7.3 and section 115 \u2014 10.2 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 10.2 (West 1998)) cases reaching the appellate court being those where defendant has been convicted and the trial court has exercised its discretion in favor of admitting the evidence. As in Young, the development of the law will thereby be distorted. Allowing interlocutory appeals in cases like the present one may actually enhance the functioning of the judicial system. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 244, 412 N.E.2d at 506.\nThe majority argues that in certain cases we should second-guess the State\u2019s decision to appeal a pretrial suppression order. \u201c[Sjurely any attempt by the State\u201d to appeal an order barring impeachment by prior conviction \u201cwould be dismissed no matter how earnestly the State\u201d asserts that its ability to prosecute is impaired. 312 Ill. App. 3d at 511. The majority analogizes the order in the present case to such an order. The supreme court, however, has refused to formulate a standard by which courts may determine the appealability of a particular order. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507. \u201cInstead we rely solely upon the good-faith evaluation by the prosecutor of the impact of the suppression order on his case.\u201d Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247, 412 N.E.2d at 507. The burdens of applying such a standard are not justified by the marginal reduction in appeals such a procedure would produce. The State\u2019s need to allocate its resources is a sufficient limitation on such appeals. Young, 82 Ill. 2d at 247-48, 412 N.E.2d at 507. We should follow Young.\nAn important prosecution interest is at stake here. If the prosecution is not allowed an immediate appeal from an adverse interlocutory ruling, the State will have no opportunity for later appellate review. 5 W LaFave, J. Israel, & N. King, Criminal Procedure \u00a7 27.3(c), at 890 (2d ed. 1999). Abandoning our jurisdiction in these cases is a major step, one that should be taken by the supreme court if it is taken at all.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Alvin S. Ratana, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.", "John B. Leonard, of Mt. Sterling, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TERRY L. WASSELL, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 99 \u2014 0491\nOpinion filed March 31, 2000.\nCOOK, RJ., dissenting.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and William L. Browers and Alvin S. Ratana, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the People.\nJohn B. Leonard, of Mt. Sterling, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0506-01", "first_page_order": 526, "last_page_order": 534 }