{ "id": 411701, "name": "CHRISTOPHER J. GREEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Respondents-Appellants (Stone Street Capital, Inc., Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Green v. Safeco Life Insurance", "decision_date": "2000-03-24", "docket_number": "No. 5 \u2014 99 \u2014 0489", "first_page": "577", "last_page": "581", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 577" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 935", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5798065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "945" }, { "page": "945" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0935-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221439 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "624" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 719", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5388337 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261388 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "552" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810354 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7 130", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 474, "char_count": 10260, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2808289386904988e-07, "percentile": 0.7851523389973701 }, "sha256": "7482458b7a6e4b28b9706264d3f044d1922d9d16f9176c945b7743d836e049d7", "simhash": "1:9be6977a6adfde3a", "word_count": 1598 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHRISTOPHER J. GREEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Respondents-Appellants (Stone Street Capital, Inc., Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WELCH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented to this court is whether the circuit court of Hamilton County erred in approving a request by petitioner, Christopher Green, pursuant to section 155.34 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155.34(b) (West 1998)), to assign some of his structured settlement payments to Stone Street Capital, Inc. (Stone Street), in exchange for a lump-sum payment. Respondents, Safeco Life Insurance Company and Safeco Assigned Benefits Service Company (SABSCO), challenge the approval, arguing petitioner\u2019s settlement agreement clearly and unambiguously prohibits petitioner from making such an assignment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Hamilton County.\nThe facts in this case are as follows. On November 19, 1993, petitioner\u2019s mother was killed in an automobile accident. At the time, petitioner was 12 years old. Petitioner, through the guardian of his estate, settled all claims (i.e., wrongful death, general damages) with Redland Insurance Company (Redland). The settlement agreement with Redland provides that Green receive five annual payments in the amount of $8,000 commencing on December 5, 1998, a lump-sum payment of $8,900 on December 5, 2002, a lump-sum payment of $10,800 on December 5, 2005, and a lump-sum payment of $15,120 on December 5, 2010. The settlement agreement contains an antiassignment clause, which provides that these periodic payments \u201ccannot be accelerated, deferred, increased]],] or decreased by [petitioner] or any payee; nor shall [petitioner] or any payee have the power to sell, mortgage, pledge, encumber[J or anticipate the Periodic Payments or any part thereof, by assignment or otherwise.\u201d The settlement agreement further provides that, within the meaning of section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Internal Revenue Code) (26 U.S.C. \u00a7 130(c) (1994)), Redland may make a \u201cqualified assignment\u201d to SABSCO of its obligation to make future payments.\nOn May 10, 1994, Redland made a \u201cqualified assignment\u201d to SABSCO. Redland and SABSCO entered into a uniform qualified-assignment agreement. The agreement noted that Redland and SABSCO desired to make a \u201cqualified assignment\u201d within the meaning of section 130(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The qualified-assignment agreement also contained an antiassignment provision, which provided, \u201cNone of the Periodic Payments may be accelerated, deferred, increased]],] or decreased and may not be anticipated, sold, assigned[,] or encumbered.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nSubsequent to the \u201cqualified assignment\u201d agreement, SABSCO purchased a \u201cqualified funding asset\u201d in the form of an annuity contract from Safeco Life Insurance Company. This also contained an antiassignment clause, which provided, \u201cNo payment under this annuity contract may be accelerated, deferred, increased, or decreased, or anticipated, sold, assigned, or encumbered in any manner by the annuitant (or either joint annuitant) or any other recipient of the payment.\u201d\nOn February 17, 1999, petitioner entered into an agreement to assign some of his structured settlement payments to Stone Street in exchange for a lump-sum payment. Petitioner agreed to assign his annual payments of $8,000, beginning with the December 5, 1999, payment and ending with the December 5, 2002, payment, along with the lump-sum payment of $8,900 due on December 5, 2002. Stone Street agreed to give petitioner an immediate lump-sum payment of $23,883. The aggregate amount of the payments petitioner agreed to assign was $40,900.\nOn April 15, 1999, petitioner petitioned the circuit court for approval of the assignment. This request for approval was made pursuant to what is now section 155.34(b) of the Illinois Insurance Code. This section provides:\n\u201cNo person who is the beneficiary of a structured settlement of a claim for personal injury may assign in any manner the payments of the settlement without prior approval of the circuit court of the county where an action was or could have been maintained.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/155.34(b) (West 1998).\nOn June 17, 1999, the circuit court approved Green\u2019s assignment under section 155.34(b) of the Illinois Insurance Code. The circuit court provided no reasoning in support of its ruling, merely stating that the assignment \u201cshould be approved.\u201d Respondents now appeal.\nBefore we can determine whether the circuit court\u2019s decision was in error, we must first determine which standard of review to apply. Respondents contend this is an issue of law and that, therefore, we should apply a de novo standard of review. Petitioner contends the issue is whether the circuit court properly exercised its discretion and that, therefore, we should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. We agree with petitioner. Where discretion has been vested in the circuit court, only a clear abuse of discretion or an application of impermissible legal criteria justifies reversal. See Boatmen\u2019s National Bank v. Martin, 155 Ill. 2d 305, 314 (1993). Section 155.34 grants the circuit court discretion to approve or disapprove an assignment of structured settlement payments. Therefore, as discretion is vested in the circuit court, we shall review the circuit court\u2019s approval under an abuse-of-discretion standard. We now turn to the arguments raised by respondents on appeal.\nRespondents contend the circuit court erred in approving the assignment because the terms of the settlement agreement clearly prohibit petitioner from assigning any of his payments. Respondents argue that the terms of the settlement agreement are clear and unambiguous and that, therefore, the circuit court erred by failing to uphold and enforce the clear terms of the contract.\nOur research of Illinois case law has revealed only one case wherein an Illinois appellate court has reviewed a circuit court\u2019s decision pursuant to section 155.34. As the facts in that case are nearly identical to the facts in the case at bar, it is helpful for us to discuss that decision. In Henderson v. Roadway Express, 308 Ill. App. 3d 546 (1999), the Fourth District Appellate Court affirmed the circuit court of Vermilion County\u2019s decision denying a request for an approval of an assignment of structured settlement payments under section 155.34. In Henderson, the plaintiff attempted to assign some of the future settlement payments for an immediate, discounted lump-sum payment. See Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 547. Similar to the settlement agreement in the case at bar, the settlement agreement in Henderson had an antiassignment provision that clearly and unambiguously prohibited the plaintiff from assigning any of his periodic payments. See Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 547. The circuit court in Henderson ruled that the settlement agreement \u201cclearly and unambiguously prohibited the parties from assigning any of the periodic payments,\u201d and the court therefore refused to approve the plaintiffs assignment. Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 548.\nOn appeal, the Fourth District Appellate Court addressed a \u201cbarrage\u201d of arguments raised by the plaintiff. Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 548. Eventually, it agreed with the circuit court that the antiassignment provision in the settlement agreement \u201cvery clearly forbids [the plaintiff] from assigning his periodic payments.\u201d Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 552. The appellate court further held that the provision was bargained for and that the plaintiff provided no persuasive authority to justify why the court should ignore the parties\u2019 clear intentions to incorporate this bargained-for provision into the settlement agreement. Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 552. The circuit court\u2019s refusal to approve the assignment was therefore affirmed.\nIn the instant case, as in Henderson, the settlement agreement clearly and unequivocally forbids petitioner from assigning any portion of his periodic payments. Petitioner does not dispute the clear and unambiguous language of the settlement agreement, nor does petitioner contend that the provision was not freely bargained for. Public policy strongly favors the freedom to contract. See Holstein v. Grossman, 246 Ill. App. 3d 719, 726 (1993). Settlement agreements are encouraged and should be given their full force and effect. See M.H. Detrick Co. v. Century Indemnity Co., 299 Ill. App. 3d 620, 624 (1998).\nConstruing a contract is a question of law, and our duty is to effectuate the intent of the parties to the contract. See Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 548. \u201cThe intent of the parties must be determined from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the contract, unless the contract is ambiguous.\u201d Henderson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 548. Parties to a contract are free to include any terms they choose, as long as those terms are not against public policy and do not contravene some positive rule of law. See McMahon v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 221 Ill. App. 3d 935, 945 (1991). Such a contract is binding on both parties, and it is the duty of the court to construe it and enforce the contract as made. See McMahon, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 945.\nIn the instant case, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the antiassignment provision in the settlement agreement is to prohibit petitioner from making an assignment of his periodic payments. The terms of the contract are clear. We believe that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to uphold the clear terms of the settlement agreement. Wherefore, the circuit court\u2019s approval of petitioner\u2019s request for an assignment constitutes an abuse of discretion.\nWherefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nHOPKINS and RARICK, JJ., concur.\nAlthough the circuit court\u2019s order indicates that its ruling is pursuant to section 155.31, effective July 30, 1998, Public Act 90 \u2014 655 renumbered section 155.31 as section 155.34.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WELCH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard M. Roessler and Karen E. Mason, both of Gundlach, Lee, Eggmann, Boyle & Roessler, of Belleville, for appellants.", "Richard O. Hart, of Hart & Hart, of Benton, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHRISTOPHER J. GREEN, Petitioner-Appellee, v. SAFECO LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Respondents-Appellants (Stone Street Capital, Inc., Appellee).\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 99 \u2014 0489\nOpinion filed March 24, 2000.\nRichard M. Roessler and Karen E. Mason, both of Gundlach, Lee, Eggmann, Boyle & Roessler, of Belleville, for appellants.\nRichard O. Hart, of Hart & Hart, of Benton, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0577-01", "first_page_order": 597, "last_page_order": 601 }