{ "id": 411727, "name": "KATRINA VRZAL, a Minor, by her Next Friend, Nancy Sorcek, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONTRACT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Vrzal v. Contract Transportation Systems Co.", "decision_date": "2000-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 98 \u2014 4377", "first_page": "755", "last_page": "760", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 755" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "236 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5782533 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/236/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 Ill. App. 3d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1172451 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476-77", "parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude a prospective juror for cause who expressed a concern that the alleged robbery took place in a church, but who further stated he would do his best to be fair and would follow the law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/277/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252002 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307-08", "parenthetical": "no abuse of discretion in refusing to excuse prospective juror for cause in a drug prosecution case where the venireman stated he would \"try\" not to let his experiences with persons affected by drugs affect his judgment and expressed a willingness to follow the law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810080 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5264544 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781338 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "\"An equivocal response by a prospective juror does not necessitate striking the prospective juror for cause where the prospective juror later states that he will try to disregard his bias\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456149 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198914 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147596 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0048-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 718, "char_count": 13477, "ocr_confidence": 0.765, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.015280620607610713 }, "sha256": "4d9292b367819ea476f9e42b1c01a4728b8e1352b8c765b1526a93a27f112c14", "simhash": "1:c3aeda82b21fd407", "word_count": 2355 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:51:04.567640+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KATRINA VRZAL, a Minor, by her Next Friend, Nancy Sorcek, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONTRACT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe jury rendered a verdict in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs allege that the trial court erred in failing to excuse a juror for cause where one of the prospective jurors expressed views, during voir dire, antagonistic to personal injury plaintiffs and stated that she would have difficulty being fair to the plaintiffs. However, after examining the entire record of the trial court\u2019s voir dire, we find that the views expressed by the challenged juror did not prevent or impair the performance of her duties as a juror and that the interchange between the trial court, counsel and the juror indicated that she possessed the qualification to be a fair and impartial juror. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThe facts of this case are tragic and the injuries severe and deadly. At approximately 3 a.m. on July 3, 1992, plaintiffs\u2019 motor vehicle was traveling south on Interstate 57. This highway has north/south lanes of traffic divided by a 60-foot median strip and has shoulder area on both roadsides. The vehicle occupied by plaintiff and her decedents entered the 60-foot median strip and exited onto the northbound lanes, spinning across these lanes to the far right shoulder of the northbound lanes into the path of defendants\u2019 truck cab, which was equipped with a 40-foot trailer.\nThe plaintiffs\u2019 theory of the case was that the operator of the truck negligently failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to control his vehicle in order to avoid a collision. After a trial that included testimony from two eyewitnesses to the incident and several expert witnesses, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants.\nThe trial court questioned prospective juror Lynn Harris after the plaintiffs had exhausted their peremptory challenges. Initially, Ms. Harris expressed reservations concerning her ability to be fair and impartial; however, after further discussion with the court and plaintiffs\u2019 counsel, she gave answers that allowed, the court to determine that she possessed the objectivity to be a proper and conscientious juror who would afford the plaintiffs a fair and impartial trial.\nMs. Harris\u2019 first observations were that \u201cwhen I sat down I really didn\u2019t think I could be a fair and impartial juror. In sitting here all day I really don\u2019t think I could be.\u201d She observed that her sympathies \u201cwhen I heard the case\u201d leaned towards the defendants. The court immediately noted that she had not heard the case to which she responded: \u201cI understand that but I believe in tort reform based on life experience.\u201d Ms. Harris detailed these life experiences as viewing television commercials where lawyers solicit parents of children born with genetic disorders seeking medical malpractice plaintiffs; previous service as a juror 40 years earlier in a civil action against a railroad where, \u201cit seemed to be the opinion back then that a corporation is an empty pocket, and if anything bad happens, sue the corporation\u201d; listening to people talk; and that \u201cEverybody\u2019s always sue, sue, sue.\u201d Additionally, she related that her daughter was currently a defendant in a \u201cfender bender.\u201d\nAfter some questions by the court she said \u201cI\u2019m just saying I\u2019m not sure I could be fair and impartial. I\u2019m not saying I couldn\u2019t be. I\u2019m just not sure.\u201d Then the court queried: \u201cDo you think people who are involved in accidents resulting in personal injury have the right to their day in court?\u201d to which she answered \u201cyes\u201d and made a similar statement as to defendants in such cases.\nAfter further questions on her family, news sources and recreation, the following exchange occurred:\n\u201cQ. Ma\u2019am, if you were chosen to serve on this jury, would you keep an open mind?\nA. I would try to.\nQ. You would try to be fair?\nA. I would try to.\nQ. And you would listen to the evidence?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And you would wait until you heard all of the evidence and the court\u2019s instructions with respect to the law before you reached any final opinions or conclusions?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And even if you may not like the law, you think the law ought to be changed, you understand that you would have a sworn obligation to follow the law whether or not you agreed therewith?\nA. Yes, I understand.\nQ. And you would do that?\nA. Yes, I do understand.\u201d\nPlaintiffs\u2019 counsel was then given an opportunity to examine Ms. Harris and the following colloquy appears in the record:\n\u201cQ. Mrs. Harris, given the answers that you gave when the judge was asking you questions, do you believe that as you sit here and before the case begins that you can be fair to both sides or do you believe that one side \u2014 that you have a rooting interest for one side over another?\nA. I\u2019m a very honest and moral person. I could listen to both sides.\nQ. I understand.\nA. Yes. I just had to tell you my reservations before we started.\nQ. And quite frankly, that\u2019s what we\u2019re probing for because we want to find 12 people, not the 12 best people, not the 12 people who are good people, but 12 people who are right to do this job at this time. We\u2019re not talking about a different type of case but this type of case. Given the\u2014\nTHE COURT: Is there a question?\nMR. CUSHING, III: There is one coming, your Honor.\nQ. Given what you\u2019ve said about your concerns about the tort system, do you feel that you\u2014\nTHE COURT: Counsel, we\u2019ve been through this.\nMR. CUSHING, III: Yes, your Honor, we have.\nTHE COURT: Okay. It\u2019s not necessary to repeat the questions of the court.\nA. I just don\u2019t know that I would be the best person to be picked for the jury. I have explained that, yes, I think I could listen to both sides. I\u2019m just not sure that given the case that I would be the best juror. Yes, I can listen to both sides and be fair. I don\u2019t know the facts and I can listen to both sides.\nBY MR. CUSHING, III:\nQ. Despite your determination to do everything you can to be objective in the case, do you have reservations about whether you can do this?\nMR. SERRITELLA: I\u2019m going to object.\nTHE COURT: Sustained.\nTHE WITNESS: I have to answer that?\nTHE COURT: No.\nBY MR. CUSHING, III:\nQ. Mrs. Harris, without having heard any of the evidence, I understand, but is there \u2014 you\u2019re aware of the case, roughly what it\u2019s about. Some people died in an accident and there were injuries. In the event that the plaintiff proved her case, is there a number that you have in your mind beyond which you could not go on a verdict?\nA. No, there is not a number in my mind.\u201d\nThereafter, plaintiffs\u2019 counsel sought to exclude Ms. Harris for cause and the court rejected this request. In urging us to affirm this ruling, defendants stress the fact that the plaintiffs\u2019 case was, to say the least, difficult and that the jury was out less than one hour. We reject these as matters for us to consider. Both parties are entitled to a fair and impartial jury and neither the strength of the evidence presented at trial nor the length of deliberations is relevant in determining the issue.\nIn Illinois there are a plethora of criminal cases dealing with the objectivity and biases of prospective jurors, but a dearth of civil cases addressing those issues. In People v. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48 (1996), a prosecution for murder, a prospective juror indicated a bias against guns and their use and expressed doubts as to his ability to be fair and impartial. An examination of the entire voir dire of the prospective juror revealed that he believed that he \u201c \u2018would hear it out\u2019 \u201d and that he would base his consideration of the case on the law and the evidence notwithstanding his notions regarding guns. Williams, 173 Ill. 2d at 66-67. The issue to be resolved by the trial court is whether, considering the entire voir dire examination, the individual possessed the essential qualification to be a fair and impartial juror despite preconceived beliefs.\nA similar result was obtained in People v. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d 414 (1995), where the prospective juror stated that the death penalty should be given in certain types of cases and that he could not imagine circumstances where it should not be given within these genres of cases. Taylor, 166 Ill. 2d at 419-20. After continued examination by the trial court and counsel, it was apparent that he would put aside his previously stated opinion and that any vote with respect to the death penalty would be predicated on the law and the evidence. It is difficult to imagine a case more instructive to us on the proposition that competency to serve as a juror is based upon the entire voir dire examination rather than upon selected excerpts or statements of that person.\nEven where a prospective juror has been a victim of a crime and responds \u201cI don\u2019t know\u201d or \u201cI would hope so\u201d to the inquiry as to whether she can view the case with an open mind, further examination can show that she can be fair and impartial and base her decisions on the law and the evidence. People v. Alksnis, 291 Ill. App. 3d 347 (1997).\nJurors do not come to the justice system as empty shells. They have life experiences that shape their beliefs on a myriad of issues and it is precisely that \u201clife experience\u201d that we seek when we impanel a jury. See People v. Hobley, 159 Ill. 2d 272, 297 (1994) (\u201cAn equivocal response by a prospective juror does not necessitate striking the prospective juror for cause where the prospective juror later states that he will try to disregard his bias\u201d), citing People v. Tipton, 222 Ill. App. 3d 657, 664 (1991); People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 464-66 (1993) (no abuse of discretion for failure to excuse prospective juror for cause in a murder case where the prospective juror expressed a belief that the criminal justice system ties the prosecutor\u2019s hands and that the process should be streamlined, but also stated that he could be fair to both sides); People v. Reid, 272 Ill. App. 3d 301, 307-08 (1995) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to excuse prospective juror for cause in a drug prosecution case where the venireman stated he would \u201ctry\u201d not to let his experiences with persons affected by drugs affect his judgment and expressed a willingness to follow the law); People v. Bragg, 277 Ill. App. 3d 468, 476-77 (1995) (no abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude a prospective juror for cause who expressed a concern that the alleged robbery took place in a church, but who further stated he would do his best to be fair and would follow the law).\nAfter continued examination of Ms. Harris, the trial court observed:\n\u201cThis lady indicated that she was a highly moral and honest person. My impression is that she is very sincere, that she in all probability is a very honest and moral person. She expressed what reservations she felt that we should hear. I don\u2019t think I pushed her. I can understand perhaps why you don\u2019t want her on the jury, but I don\u2019t think you\u2019ve given a basis to excuse her for cause. My impression and my belief is that this lady will do everything within her power to be totally fair and to be totally impartial.\u201d\nThe issue in the instant case is not unlike the issue raised in Flynn v. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d 770 (1992), where the trial court refused to exclude a prospective juror who expressed concern about \u201c \u2018the frequency and the amount of liabilities that this country is going through right now\u2019 \u201d but who acknowledged his ability to be fair and impartial and his intention to award any damages according to the law and the evidence. Edmonds, 236 Ill. App. 3d at 781-82.\nPlaintiffs also argue that certain jurors were excused for cause who might have been favorable to the plaintiffs and that, in essence, the trial court exerted a double standard in exercising its discretion as to them. In examining the-full record, it is apparent that those jurors who were excused for cause on motion of the defendants had clearly expressed their intentions with respect to this case. Three of the prospective jurors, in light of their experiences, expressed bias against the defendants and believed they could not be fair to the defendants or could not give the defendants a level playing field. Another had tragically lost a son in an auto accident the same year that this cause of action arose and felt that she could not hear this case with an open mind. Finally, one of the excused members of the venire, when asked if she could be fair to the defendants, stated, \u201cI wouldn\u2019t be objective in this case at all. No way.\u201d Nothing in the record restored the trial court\u2019s confidence that these people would render a fair and impartial verdict.\nIn Williams, the court\u2019s action in excusing a prospective witness who held strong feelings against the death penalty did not affect the reviewing court\u2019s determination that the person prejudiced against guns should remain on the jury, since the excused juror made it plain that she was not able to render a verdict on the law and the evidence if the death penalty was a part of the consideration.\nFor the reasons expressed, we affirm the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nTHEIS, EJ., and QUINN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ambrose & Cushing, P.C., of Chicago (Thomas M. Cushing and Marilyn Martin, of counsel), for appellants.", "William D. Serritella and Joann T. Angarola, both of Ross & Hardies, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATRINA VRZAL, a Minor, by her Next Friend, Nancy Sorcek, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CONTRACT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 98 \u2014 4377\nOpinion filed March 31, 2000.\nRehearing denied April 21, 2000.\nAmbrose & Cushing, P.C., of Chicago (Thomas M. Cushing and Marilyn Martin, of counsel), for appellants.\nWilliam D. Serritella and Joann T. Angarola, both of Ross & Hardies, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0755-01", "first_page_order": 775, "last_page_order": 780 }