{ "id": 186525, "name": "THE VILLAGE OF MAPLETON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATHY'S TAP, INC., d/b/a Shooters, et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Village of Mapleton v. Cathy's Tap, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-05-05", "docket_number": "Nos. 3\u201499\u20140837 through 3\u201499\u20140867 cons.", "first_page": "264", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 264" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "146 L. Ed. 2d 265", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9508427 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 N.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" }, { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 Ill. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3097642 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/92/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 271", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260445 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "33 F. Supp. 2d 720", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1386980 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/33/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 51", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847-48" }, { "page": "848" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3512445 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" }, { "page": "545" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 N.E.2d 534", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5437170 ], "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 533", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "91 Ill. App. 3d 865", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3148699 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/91/0865-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 N.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. App. 3d 758", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2541557 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/209/0758-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 N.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2485058 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "699 N.E.2d 1095", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073694 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906695 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "493 N.E.2d 1045", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5537948 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/112/0428-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 642, "char_count": 11619, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.043030007048876e-08, "percentile": 0.5043133788881128 }, "sha256": "14a568ac343baf628c633179828f3176bc4417d1828c99c22bf3ed77d256cb65", "simhash": "1:1748da96b7c544c0", "word_count": 1921 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:53.541010+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE VILLAGE OF MAPLETON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATHY\u2019S TAP, INC., d/b/a Shooters, et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BRESLIN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendants Cathy\u2019s Tap, Inc., d/b/a Shooters (Cathy\u2019s Tap), and Serena Kemper appeal from the trial court\u2019s refusal to stay an action filed against them by the Village of Mapleton (Village). On appeal, Cathy\u2019s Tap contends that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to grant the stay in light of a suit pending in federal court in which Cathy\u2019s Tap challenges the constitutionality of the Village ordinance under which it was charged. We agree and hold that a federal action testing the constitutionality of a new municipal ordinance and the municipality\u2019s subsequently filed prosecution of that ordinance constitute the \u201csame cause\u201d for purposes of a motion to stay under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (West 1998)). As such, this is a case in which comity requires that the state court action be stayed pending the outcome of the federal district court proceedings.\nFACTS\nCathy\u2019s Tap is a retail liquor licensee that employs nude female dancers through its alter-ego, Shooters, Inc. The Village amended its liquor license ordinance to make it unlawful to sell liquor by the drink in conjunction with an \u201cadult use\u201d without an adult establishment license. Village of Mapleton Ordinance 98 \u2014 02 (1998). The definition of \u201cadult use\u201d includes nonobscene live nude dancing. Village of Mapleton Ordinance 98 \u2014 02 (1998). Cathy\u2019s Tap challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance within three months of its passage. Approximately four months later, the Village filed 18 citations against Cathy\u2019s Tap, alleging violations of this new ordinance.\nCathy\u2019s Tap filed a motion to stay the state action under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) due to the federal court action that was pending. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the state and federal actions do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.\nANALYSIS\nSection 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code provides that a defendant may seek a dismissal or a stay on the ground that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause. 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 619(a)(3) (West 1998); Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 112 Ill. 2d 428, 493 N.E.2d 1045 (1986). Section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) is an inherently procedural device aimed at avoiding duplicative litigation (Miller v. Thomas, 275 Ill. App. 3d 779, 656 N.E.2d 89 (1995)) and it should be construed liberally. Kapoor v. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 780, 699 N.E.2d 1095 (1998). The trial court\u2019s decision on a section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) motion may be upset on appeal only if the decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Arthur Young & Co. v. Bremer, 197 Ill. App. 3d 30, 554 N.E.2d 671 (1990).\nThe Village does not contend that the federal and state cases do not involve the same parties. Rather, the Village confines its argument to asserting that the federal and state cases do not involve the same cause.\nTwo actions are for the same cause when the relief requested is based on substantially the same set of facts. Terracom Development Group, Inc. v. Village of Westhaven, 209 Ill. App. 3d 758, 568 N.E.2d 376 (1991). The crucial inquiry is whether the two actions arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, not whether the legal theory, issues, burden of proof or relief sought materially differs between the two actions. Tambone v. Simpson, 91 Ill. App. 3d 865, 414 N.E.2d 533 (1980). Furthermore, the purpose of the two actions need not be identical; rather, there need only be a substantial similarity of issues between them. People ex rel. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gitchoff, 65 Ill. 2d 249, 357 N.E.2d 534 (1976).\nOne case that we find instructive on how to apply these principles is Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co. v. Goad, 168 Ill. App. 3d 541, 522 N.E.2d 845 (1988). The parties in Illinois Central reached a verbal settlement over a dispute between them, but plaintiff refused to sign the written settlement agreement. The dispute involved injuries the defendant sustained while working for plaintiff. Defendant filed a state action, seeking a declaration that the verbal agreement was binding. The circuit court dismissed the state action in favor of a prior action pending between the parties in federal court. Defendant had filed the federal action against plaintiff under the Federal Employers\u2019 Liability Act (45 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 51 through 62 (1982)).\nWhile affirming the circuit court\u2019s decision under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3), the appellate court reasoned that, regardless of the outcome of the state action, the prevailing party would use that result in the federal action. Illinois Central, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 544, 522 N.E.2d at 847-48. Accordingly, the appellate court further stated that to hold the cases do not arise from the same occurrence would be contrary to common sense and defeat the purpose of section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3). Illinois Central, 168 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 522 N.E.2d at 848.\nAlthough not decided under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code, we are also persuaded by the logic of Ruppel v. Ramseyer, 33 F. Supp. 2d 720 (C.D. Ill. 1999). In Ruppel, defendant was arrested in a hospital following an automobile accident. He was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant brought an action in federal court under section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1983 (1994)), alleging that the arresting officer, a physician, a nurse and the hospital violated her rights, secured by the state and federal constitutions, because, among other things, the arrest was not supported by probable cause. The federal district court stayed defendant\u2019s section 1983 suit, reasoning that a final determination by the state appellate court as to whether probable cause existed for the arrest would estop defendant from claiming that the arrest was without probable cause in the federal court. Ruppel, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 725.\nThe reasoning employed by the courts in Ruppel and Illinois Central is equally persuasive here. It is clear that the party who prevails in the federal action will use that judgment in the state court proceeding. Crucial to both proceedings is the constitutionality of the Village ordinance. If the ordinance is unconstitutional, then the Village\u2019s action must fail. If the ordinance is constitutional, then the Village must be allowed to proceed with its prosecution under the ordinance. To the extent that both actions involve the constitutionality of the ordinance, the proof elicited in each case would be the same. Consequently, we hold that the federal action testing the constitutionality of the ordinance and the Village\u2019s prosecution of that ordinance are the \u201csame cause\u201d for purposes of a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to stay.\nHaving so found, our analysis does not end. When deciding whether to stay an action under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3), the court should consider the following factors: (1) comity; (2) the prevention of multiplicity, vexation and harassment; (3) the likelihood of obtaining complete relief in a foreign jurisdiction; and (4) the res judicata effect of a foreign judgment on the local forum. In re M.K., 284 Ill. App. 3d 449, 672 N.E.2d 271 (1996). Moreover, the trial court must weigh the prejudice to the nonmovant if the motion is granted against the policy of avoiding duplicative litigation. Kapoor, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 786-87, 699 N.E.2d at 1100.\nBecause the trial court determined that the state and federal cases did not involve the same causes of action, it necessarily did not reach these factors. Because we disagree with the trial court, we now address them.\nIn this case, comity is served by issuing the stay in that our state court system will be granting deference to the federal court\u2019s expertise in interpreting the constitution. In addition, multiplicity is avoided because proof of the alleged unconstitutionality of the ordinance need not be presented in both the federal and state fora, and the chance of conflicting judgments will be removed. Moreover, while the Village is vexed by its inability to proceed against Cathy\u2019s Tap, the impediment will only be temporary if the ordinance is found to be constitutional. Furthermore, because the constitutionality of the ordinance will be tested, the chance for harassment of Cathy\u2019s Tap in being prosecuted under an unconstitutional law will be neutralized.\nRegarding the third factor, the Village argues that it would be denied relief in federal court because the federal court could not exercise pendent claim jurisdiction over its claims against Cathy\u2019s Tap for violating the ordinance. While this is true, the state action is not being dismissed, but stayed. Thus, if the ordinance is found to be constitutional, the stay will be lifted and the Village will be able to proceed in state court. Finally, as Cathy\u2019s Tap concedes, the outcome of the federal action will have res judicata effect on the question of the constitutionality of the ordinance. For all of these reasons, any prejudice to the Village caused by granting the stay is far outweighed by the chance to avoid the duplicative litigation.\nAnother case that involved the application of these factors is People ex rel. Department of Public Aid v. Santos, 92 Ill. 2d 120, 440 N.E.2d 876 (1982). In Santos, defendants brought a class action suit in federal court against two officials of the Illinois Department of Public Aid (Department), challenging the Department\u2019s practice of demanding that public aid recipients execute promissory notes for overpayment of benefits. Defendants alleged that the practice was violative of federal law and unconstitutional. The Illinois Attorney General later brought suit in state court, seeking collection upon the promissory notes. The state\" court dismissed the Attorney General\u2019s suits under what is now section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (formerly Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 48(l)(c)).\nOn direct appeal, the supreme court reversed the dismissal and held that the appropriate action was to stay the state court proceedings. Santos, 92 Ill. 2d at 130, 440 N.E.2d at 880. While the court did not discuss the factors individually, it specifically relied on the possibility that the outcome of the federal action could be dispositive of the state actions and that staying the state actions would remove the chance of conflicting judgments. Santos, 92 Ill. 2d at 130-31, 440 N.E.2d at 881. So too in this case, the outcome of the federal suit could be fatal to the state action, and, as stated earlier, by staying the state court proceeding we have quelled the possibility of conflicting judgments.\nBased on the preceding discussion, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions for the entry of an order staying the state action pending the completion of the federal district court proceedings.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nHOMER and LYTTON, JJ., concur.\nWe note that the substantive constitutional issue presented by this case has very recently been revisited by the Supreme Court in City of Erie v. Pap\u2019s A.M., 529 U.S._, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265, 120 S. Ct. 1382 (2000).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BRESLIN" } ], "attorneys": [ "W. Edgar Weer, of Smith & Weer, of Pekin, and John H. Bisbee (argued), of Law Offices of John H. Bisbee, of Bushnell, for appellants.", "David Benckendorf (argued) and Lynne M. Binkele, both of Benckendorf & Benckendorf, P.C., of Peoria, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE VILLAGE OF MAPLETON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CATHY\u2019S TAP, INC., d/b/a Shooters, et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nThird District\nNos. 3\u201499\u20140837 through 3\u201499\u20140867 cons.\nOpinion filed May 5, 2000.\nW. Edgar Weer, of Smith & Weer, of Pekin, and John H. Bisbee (argued), of Law Offices of John H. Bisbee, of Bushnell, for appellants.\nDavid Benckendorf (argued) and Lynne M. Binkele, both of Benckendorf & Benckendorf, P.C., of Peoria, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0264-01", "first_page_order": 282, "last_page_order": 287 }