{ "id": 186517, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEADOTTO McGAUGHY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. McGaughy", "decision_date": "2000-05-19", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201499\u20140005", "first_page": "656", "last_page": "660", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 656" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "666 N.E.2d 839", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150218 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 946", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 279", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 476988 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0279-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "535 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5563775 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 1361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612499 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "983 F.2d 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11645922 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/983/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "160 F.3d 1071", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11679879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1075" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/160/1071-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 F.3d 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 857902 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/186/0907-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 N.E.2d 1279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5211240 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 N.E.2d 1107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228767 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 1068", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2881696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 614, "char_count": 9882, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.436057418262789e-08, "percentile": 0.27783724070399474 }, "sha256": "7060a672c90362a280cb640fe99b437c08150be93a9b5429b7d3d183a6d6e2fe", "simhash": "1:0b85bd6a2f2fde92", "word_count": 1596 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:53.541010+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEADOTTO McGAUGHY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury found defendant, Deadotto McGaughy, guilty of aggravated battery. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 4(b)(6) (1996). He appeals, contending that (1) the State improperly used its peremptory challenges, and (2) he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nOnly 1 of the 30 venirepersons summoned for defendant\u2019s trial, Angela Hopkins, was black. The prosecutor used a peremptory challenge on Hopkins, and defendant\u2019s attorney immediately objected. The judge noted that Hopkins was the only black person in the panel and requested a race-neutral basis for the challenge. The prosecutor said the challenge was based on Hopkins\u2019 young age, 18 years; he explained that he struck two other venirepersons for the same reason. The judge found that age was an acceptable basis for the challenge.\nAt trial, police officer David Harris testified that he approached defendant\u2019s car at approximately 3 a.m. looking for Unarice Jones. Jones was defendant\u2019s friend and had fled from police earlier that evening. As Harris approached, in uniform, defendant put his car in reverse and started backing up. Harris identified himself as a police officer and commanded defendant to stop. Defendant said \u201cokay\u201d but continued backing up. Harris ran beside the car and repeated his command to stop three or four times. Defendant eventually backed around a corner and his front fender hit Harris and \u201ctripped [his] legs.\u201d Defendant stopped, and Harris stood in front of the car with his gun drawn because of suspicious movement inside. Defendant then shifted into drive and hit the accelerator. As Harris \u201crolled\u201d out of the way, the fender struck his leg and the driver\u2019s side mirror struck his arm. He had no doubt that defendant was trying to hit him. He sustained bruises and experienced some soreness but did not go to the hospital.\nDefendant testified that he started backing up because he saw an unidentified person running toward his car with a pistol. He did not hear any commands to stop. He recognized the person as Officer Harris after backing around the corner. Nevertheless, he still shifted into drive and sped away because he felt that Harris was approaching in a threatening manner. Harris was not standing in front of the car; defendant did not know and did not believe that he had hit Harris.\nThe jury returned a guilty verdict, and defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.\nDISCUSSION\n1. Peremptory Challenges\nDefendant claims that the judge erred in accepting Hopkins\u2019 age as a race-neutral explanation for the State\u2019s peremptory challenge against her. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), the Supreme Court established a three-pronged analysis for determining whether peremptory challenges are racially motivated in violation of the equal protection clause. First, the defendant must establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the State\u2019s use of its challenges. Second, if the prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the potential juror. Third, the judge must determine whether the defendant has proven purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712. Once a prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation and the judge rules on the issue, the question of whether the defendant established a prima facie case becomes moot and a reviewing court focuses solely on whether the judge\u2019s ruling was proper. People v. Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 630 N.E.2d 1068 (1994). We will not overturn such a ruling unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Smith, 258 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 630 N.E.2d 1068.\nThe State argues that defendant did not establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. However, the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation for challenging Hopkins and the judge ruled on the discrimination issue. Thus, our sole focus is on whether the judge\u2019s ruling was proper.\nThe record shows that, in addition to Hopkins, the prosecutor challenged two white venirepersons because of their young ages, 23 and 24. He also challenged the only other venireperson who was under 30 years old, although the record is silent as to why. These facts support the prosecutor\u2019s statement that he was concerned about empaneling young jurors. Such a concern is an acceptable race-neutral explanation for exercising peremptory challenges. See, e.g., People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 538 N.E.2d 1107 (1989); People v. Hemphill, 230 Ill. App. 3d 453, 594 N.E.2d 1279 (1992). Accordingly, we cannot say that the judge\u2019s ruling contravened the manifest weight of the evidence.\nDefendant then claims that we should treat age as a suspect class subject to heightened scrutiny, like race, under the Batson analysis. The United States Supreme Court has not extended Batson to encompass age-based peremptory challenges, and several federal circuit courts have specifically rejected such claims. See, for example, Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071 (6th Cir. 1998). Young people are not part of a distinct group protected by the fourteenth amendment\u2019s equal protection clause. Maxwell, 160 F.3d at 1075. Thus, age is not a suspect classification entitled to strict or even heightened scrutiny. Weber, 186 F.3d at 911. Accordingly, we decline to extend Batson in the manner urged by defendant.\nDefendant also claims that the State\u2019s use of age-based peremptory challenges violated his sixth amendment right to trial by a fair and impartial jury. A similar claim was rejected in United States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1993). Young adults do not qualify as a \u201cdistinctive group\u201d whose exclusion from a petit jury through peremptory challenges invokes the sixth amendment. People v. Treece, 159 Ill. App. 3d 397, 411-12, 511 N.E.2d 1361, 1369-70 (1987). Thus, we find no sixth amendment violation in the instant case.\nDefendant also relies on the Illinois Human Rights Act, which declares a public policy of securing individual freedom from discrimination based on age. 775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 102(A) (West 1998). The Act, however, does not apply to defendant\u2019s case. First, its protections do not encompass the jury selection process. 775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 102(A) (West 1998) (declaring a policy against discrimination \u201cin connection with employment, real estate transactions, access to financial credit, and the availability of public accommodations\u201d). Second, its definition of \u201cage\u201d excludes defendant, who was 24 years old at the time of his trial. The part of the statute applicable to defendant defines \u201cage\u201d as \u201cthe chronological age of a person who is at least 40 years old.\u201d 775 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 103(A) (West 1998).\n2. Reasonable Doubt\nFinally, defendant claims that \u201c[Harris\u2019] testimony was so fraught with inconsistencies such that the State has failed to prove [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d During a criminal trial, the jury\u2019s role is to determine the credibility of witnesses, weigh their testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 535 N.E.2d 889 (1989). When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State\u2019s evidence on appeal, our role is to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). We will not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it leaves a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant\u2019s guilt. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 647 N.E.2d 946 (1995).\nA person commits aggravated battery when he: (1) intentionally or knowingly makes physical contact of an insulting nature; (2) knowing that the individual harmed is a peace officer; and (3) knowing that the officer is engaged in official duties. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3(a)(2), 12 \u2014 4(b)(6) (West 1996). In the instant case, defendant\u2019s own testimony established the second and third elements of aggravated battery. The jury could have reasonably inferred the first element from Harris\u2019 testimony.\nDefendant argues that his testimony contradicted Harris\u2019 testimony on the issue of whether Harris was hit by the car. This argument is unavailing because such conflicts in the evidence do not warrant reversal of a conviction on review. See People v. Morales, 281 Ill. App. 3d 695, 666 N.E.2d 839 (1996). Defendant also argues that Harris\u2019 claim of being hit is suspect because he did not fall to the ground, seek medical treatment, or miss any work due to injuries. However, these facts pertain to Harris\u2019 credibility and the weight his testimony should receive. Such determinations belonged to the jury, which apparently found Harris to be a credible witness. Defendant alleges several other \u201cinconsistencies,\u201d but any discrepancies do not contradict the State\u2019s evidence on the key question of whether he intentionally or knowingly hit Harris with his car. Thus, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of aggravated battery proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the Will County circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOMER and KOEHLER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE LYTTON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Verlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Geoffrey P. Campbell, of Rock Island, for appellant.", "James Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Ottawa), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DEADOTTO McGAUGHY, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201499\u20140005\nOpinion filed May 19, 2000.\nVerlin R. Meinz, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Geoffrey P. Campbell, of Rock Island, for appellant.\nJames Glasgow, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Gary F. Gnidovec, of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of Ottawa), for the People." }, "file_name": "0656-01", "first_page_order": 674, "last_page_order": 678 }