{ "id": 186467, "name": "PHYLLIS CAPPS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BELLEVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 201, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Capps v. Belleville School District No. 201", "decision_date": "2000-05-10", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201499\u20140228", "first_page": "710", "last_page": "718", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 710" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "712 N.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243891 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 808", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 1386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544435 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186553 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 N.E.2d 1104", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278377 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1177", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821401 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 N.E.2d 1077", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080" }, { "page": "1080" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" }, { "page": "837" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 1119", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801360 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 887", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222754 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 N.E.2d 586", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251657 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801344 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821401 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342", "parenthetical": "interpreting section 2 - 201" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801360 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508-09" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222754 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379-81" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0372-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 793, "char_count": 18594, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0552953922197961e-07, "percentile": 0.5551941445234838 }, "sha256": "e1309b828e76b4cb3f04d63dfbdbf64869cec06c99b883b297c44984d48ed67b", "simhash": "1:322ec0be58c5bca6", "word_count": 3047 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:53.541010+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PHYLLIS CAPPS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BELLEVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 201, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn June 2, 1995, Phyllis Capps (plaintiff) attended a graduation ceremony at a school gymnasium in Belleville School District No. 201 (the School District). As she left the gymnasium after the ceremony, plaintiff fell off the side of an accessibility ramp and was injured. Plaintiff filed a two-count complaint for damages for her injuries. The first count sounds in negligence, and the second alleges willful and wanton conduct. Both counts allege that the School District failed to place a railing on the ramp, failed to warn of a drop-off, failed to light the area, and failed to supervise patrons as they left the graduation ceremony. The School District denies liability and also claims that it is immune from liability based on the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1998)). The trial court denied the School District\u2019s motion for summary judgment but found that there are issues of law presented upon which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The School District appeals under Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.\nThe trial court identified the following four issues of law for our review:\n1. Whether an accessibility ramp leading into a school recreational facility is an integral part of said facility, thereby affording the School District the immunity of section 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106 (West 1998)).\n2. Whether the School District\u2019s conduct did rise to the level of willful and wanton as a matter of law.\n3. Whether the School District is afforded the immunity of section 2\u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 1998)) where, according to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff stepped off the side of an accessibility ramp while exiting a school gymnasium.\n4. Whether the School District is afforded the immunity of section 3\u2014 108(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996)) where, according to the allegations of the complaint, plaintiff allegedly stepped off the side of an accessibility ramp while exiting a school gymnasium.\nThe review of summary judgment rulings is de novo. See Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 688 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1997). A motion for summary judgment can only succeed if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1998); Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 293, 560 N.E.2d 586, 589 (1990).\nAccording to the record, the accessibility ramp was designed under the supervision of Robert Ganschinietz, who was then with WHGK Architects, Inc. Currently, Ganschinietz is the director of health, life, and safety for St. Clair County. Before its construction, the ramp was also approved by the School District\u2019s business manager, Eugene Sawalich. The ramp was constructed in 1980, apparently in accordance with the design approved by both Ganschinietz and Sawalich.\nThe ramp attaches to a series of gymnasium doors. There are four sets of doors, each with two doors divided by an immovable glass partition. The ramp is located on the left set of doors as they are viewed from the outside. The ramp is 9 feet wide and 5 feet 6 inches long and rises approximately 4Vs inches from the sidewalk to a 5-foot-deep and 9-foot-wide landing area that is flush with the interior of the gymnasium. The other three sets of doors share a stairway that rises approximately 4Vs inches from the sidewalk to the top of the stairs.\nThe gymnasium is used for a variety of noncompulsory, school-sponsored, extracurricular sports including, but not limited to, basketball, volleyball, baseball, track, wrestling, and football. The gymnasium is also used for nonsporting, noncompulsory events, such as choral and band concerts, assemblies, holiday programs, and graduation ceremonies.\nWe turn to the issue of whether the School District is immune from liability pursuant to section 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106 (West 1998)), which provides:\n\u201cNeither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury where the liability is based on the existence of a condition of any public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but not limited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings[,] or other enclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity or public employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximately causing such injury.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106 (West 1998).\nA 1986 amendment expanded the scope of this section from parks, playgrounds, and open areas to include enclosed facilities and virtually all public property used for recreational purposes. Pub. Act 84 \u2014 1431, art. I, \u00a7 2, eff. November 25, 1986.\nThe issue before us is whether the accessibility ramp is public property intended or permitted to be used for recreational purposes within the meaning of this statute. Section 3 \u2014 106 is to be applied on a case-by-case basis by evaluating the subject property\u2019s character. See Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 384, 657 N.E.2d 887, 893-94 (1995).\nIn Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 689 N.E.2d 1119 (1997), a woman was walking through a Chicago Park District parking lot on her way to Soldier Field and a Bears game. She tripped over an improperly placed concrete car stop. The supreme court held that the district was immune for any negligence, on the ground that the parking lot increased the usefulness of, and was an integral part of, the Soldier Field recreational facility.\nThe \u201cincreased usefulness\u201d factor is properly considered only after a determination that the nonrecreational structure is within the recreational public property covered by section 3 \u2014 106. See Batson v. Pinckneyville Elementary School District No. 50, 294 Ill. App. 3d 832, 836, 690 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (1998). In this case, the ramp is located outside the recreational public property covered by section 3 \u2014 106. The plain language of section 3 \u2014 106 contemplates a determination of immunity for bounded public property. See Batson, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 837, 690 N.E.2d at 1080. Therefore, the ramp is not recreational public property, and the School District is not afforded section 3 \u2014 106 immunity under these circumstances.\nWe now turn to the second issue, whether the School District\u2019s conduct was willful and wanton. Willful and wanton conduct means a course of action that shows an actual or deliberate intention to cause harm or that, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property. See 745 ILCS 10/1 \u2014 210 (West 1998).\nIn this case, the ramp was designed under the supervision of Robert Ganschinietz, who was then with WHGK Architects, Inc. At the time it was designed, the ramp met all applicable standards, and its design was approved by Ganschinietz. No one has reported an injury associated with the accessibility ramp from the date of its construction to June 2, 1995. Furthermore, no one, with the exception of plaintiff in this case, has ever reported that the ramp or lighting appeared unsafe. Under these circumstances, the School District\u2019s conduct cannot be said to be willful and wanton. Thus, on the issue of whether the School District\u2019s conduct rose to the level of willful and wanton, we conclude that the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment on behalf of the School District.\nWe now turn to the remaining issues on appeal.\nIn its motion for summary judgment, the School District claimed absolute immunity from liability under section 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 1998)). Section 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act states:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by Statute, a public employee serving in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission in determining policy when acting in the exercise of such discretion even though abused.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 201 (West 1998).\nThe Tort Immunity Act further provides that a local public entity is not liable for an act or omission of its employee if the employee is not liable. 745 ILCS 10/2 \u2014 109 (West 1998).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted section 2 \u2014 201 to mean that immunity will not attach unless the plaintiff\u2019s injury results from an act or omission by the employee involving both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion. Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 692 N.E.2d 1177 (1998).\nPolicy decisions are those decisions that require the municipality to balance competing interests and to make a judgment call as to which solution will best serve each of those interests. See West v. Kirkham, 147 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 588 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (1992).\nIn Harrison v. Hardin County Community Unit School District No. 1, 313 Ill. App. 3d 702 (2000), Connie Harrison sued the defendant school district for injuries she sustained when Joshua Davis\u2019s automobile struck her automobile. Harrison claimed that school personnel were responsible because they refused the request of Davis, an inexperienced driver, to leave school early due to inclement weather and deteriorating road conditions.\nIn Harrison, the school superintendent made the policy decision as to whether school would be dismissed early. The appellate court held that, although the superintendent\u2019s decision was one of policy, the principal\u2019s decision whether to allow Joshua Davis to leave early was an individual discretionary determination. The court held that that decision, although discretionary, was not made in the course of determining policy. Since the supreme court in Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 692 N.E.2d 1177 (1998), has held that section 2 \u2014 201 immunity will not attach unless the injury results from an act that involves both the determination of policy and the exercise of discretion, the school district was not entitled to section 2 \u2014 201 immunity.\nIn the case at bar, we agree with the School District that the initial decision to construct the ramp was a determination of policy, namely, the School District\u2019s broad policy determination to make the school campus more accessible for the disabled. The allegations of misconduct about which plaintiff complains, however, do not stem from the initial policy decision to construct the ramp.\nThe decision regarding whether to make the campus more accessible, and in what manner, involved a considered evaluation of the benefits such a plan would provide to the students and to the community. The School District\u2019s determinations whether to put a railing on the ramp, install lighting, warn of a drop-off, or supervise patrons are discretionary decisions. Like the principal\u2019s decision whether or not to dismiss Joshua early, the decisions in the case at bar were not exercises of discretion in the determination or implementation of policy. These decisions were the result of individual discretionary determinations as to whether or not certain maintenance procedures should be taken. We conclude, therefore, that section 2 \u2014 201 does not provide immunity in this case.\nSection 2 \u2014 201 aside, the School District also argues that it is immune under section 3 \u2014 108(a) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996)). That section, which has been amended since the accident, provided:\n\u201cExcept as otherwise provided by this Act and subject to subdivision (b)[,] neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury caused by a failure to supervise an activity on or the use of any public property.\u201d 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996).\nPlaintiff alleges that the School District was negligent by failing to place a railing on the ramp, failing to warn of a drop-off, failing to adequately light the ramp, and failing to supervise the exiting of graduation attendees. The School District argues that all of the allegations in plaintiffs complaint relate directly to its failure to supervise and that the School District is thus entitled to immunity pursuant to section 3 \u2014 108(a). Plaintiff concedes summary judgment in favor of the School District as to her allegation that the School District failed to supervise the exiting of patrons from the graduation ceremony. Plaintiff argues, however, that the other three allegations of negligence are not subject to the School District\u2019s immunity defense under section 3 \u2014 108(a).\nSection 3 \u2014 106 of the Tort Immunity Act deals with the condition of a particular type of property \u2014 recreational property. 745 ILCS 10/ 3 \u2014 106 (West 1998). Section 3 \u2014 108(a) concerns a specific type of conduct and has nothing to do with the condition of the property. 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996). The School District\u2019s claim under section 3 \u2014 108(a) is misplaced, except for subparagraph 5(d) of count I of plaintiffs complaint, which concerns the failure to supervise the exiting patrons.\nCases under section 3 \u2014 108(a) typically deal with adult leaders overseeing after-school programs (see Longfellow v. Corey, 286 Ill. App. 3d 366, 675 N.E.2d 1386 (1997)), lifeguards supervising swimming pools (see Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 665 N.E.2d 808 (1996)), and teachers supervising physical education classes (see Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 712 N.E.2d 298 (1998)). Accordingly, with the exception of the School District\u2019s alleged failure to supervise the exiting patrons, we find that the trial court properly denied the School District\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to section 3 \u2014 108(a).\nTherefore, our answers to the certified questions are in the negative. In summary, the result of our answers is that the trial court erred in denying the School District\u2019s motion for summary judgment as to count II, because the School District\u2019s conduct cannot be said to be willful and wanton. We also hold that the School District is entitled to the immunity of section 3 \u2014 108(a), as regards plaintiffs allegation in paragraph 5(d) of count I that the School District failed to supervise the exiting of patrons from the graduation ceremony. We affirm the trial court\u2019s decision in all other respects.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nRARICK, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CHAPMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE WELCH,\ndissenting in part and concurring in part:\nIn my opinion the School District is immune from liability pursuant to sections 3 \u2014 106 and 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106, 2 \u2014 201 (West 1998)).\nIn regard to section 3 \u2014 106, I believe the accessibility ramp increased the usefulness of, and was an integral part of, the school gymnasium. In Sylvester v. Chicago Park District, 179 Ill. 2d 500, 508-09 (1997), our supreme court set forth the \u201cincreased usefulness\u201d test under section 3 \u2014 106 for adjoining nonrecreational structures to recreational public property. In that case, the court held that section 3 \u2014 106 immunity applied to a walkway adjacent to a Soldier Field parking lot, because it increased the usefulness of, and was an integral part of, the Soldier Field recreational facility. Thus, Sylvester directs me to conclude that immunity should apply going in and going out.\nIn the instant appeal, the accessibility ramp led to the gymnasium and provided the primary, if not the sole, means of ingress and egress to the gymnasium for those with mobility impairments. In other words, the ramp welcomed all gymnasium users. Thus, it was an integral part of \u2014 and much more than merely incidental to \u2014 the recreational character of the property as a whole. See Sylvester, 179 Ill. 2d at 509, citing Bubb v. Springfield School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 379-81 (1995). Thus, section 3 \u2014 106 immunity should apply. See 745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 106 (West 1998).\nUnder section 2 \u2014 201, immunity is not possessed unless the plaintiff\u2019s injury resulted from an act or omission by a public employee, in a position involving the determination of policy or the exercise of discretion, who was exercising discretion and determining policy. See Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Partnership, 181 Ill. 2d 335, 342 (1998) (interpreting section 2 \u2014 201). In 1980, when the ramp was constructed, the architect and the business manager for the School District exercised discretion when deciding how to design the ramp and determined policy in deciding to build the ramp to increase access for the disabled. Thus, section 2 \u2014 201 immunity should apply because plaintiff\u2019s injury complained of here resulted from alleged deficiencies \u2014 namely, the lack of a railing \u2014 in the design and in the building of the ramp.\nTherefore, I believe that certified question one (whether an accessibility ramp leading into a school recreational facility is an integral part of said facility thereby affording the School District the immunity of section 3 \u2014 106) and question three (whether the School District is afforded the immunity of section 2 \u2014 201 where plaintiff allegedly stepped off the side of an accessibility ramp while exiting a school gymnasium) should be answered with a resounding \u201cYes.\u201d\nI concur with the majority, answering \u201cNo,\u201d in response to question two (whether the School District\u2019s conduct rose to the level of willful and wanton as a matter of law). I also concur with the majority in regard to question four (whether the School District is afforded the immunity of section 3 \u2014 108(a) (745 ILCS 10/3 \u2014 108(a) (West 1996)) for failure to supervise). However, I would conclude that the School District is immune for failure to place a rail, for failure to warn, and for failure to illuminate under section 3 \u2014 106 or under section 2 \u2014 201 of the Tort Immunity Act.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE WELCH," } ], "attorneys": [ "John J. Kurowski and Timothy J. O\u2019Leary, both of Kurowski Law Firm, P.C., of Swansea, for appellant.", "Harriet Homsher Hamilton and Joseph A. Bartholomew, both of Cook, Shevlin, Ysursa, Brauer & Bartholomew, Ltd., of Belleville, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PHYLLIS CAPPS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BELLEVILLE SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 201, Defendant-Appellant.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201499\u20140228\nOpinion filed May 10, 2000.\nWELCH, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part.\nJohn J. Kurowski and Timothy J. O\u2019Leary, both of Kurowski Law Firm, P.C., of Swansea, for appellant.\nHarriet Homsher Hamilton and Joseph A. Bartholomew, both of Cook, Shevlin, Ysursa, Brauer & Bartholomew, Ltd., of Belleville, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0710-01", "first_page_order": 728, "last_page_order": 736 }