{ "id": 186485, "name": "DANIEL T. O'KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "O'Keefe v. Illinois State Police Merit Board", "decision_date": "2000-05-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201498\u20143471", "first_page": "817", "last_page": "829", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 817" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 N.E.2d 1027", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222633 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "240 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 Ill. App. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5323023 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/99/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 N.E.2d 199", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5263294 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 N.E.2d 680", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "682" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 931", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5085925 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "936" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 853", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "858" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864532 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 N.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780263 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 961", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307266 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 N.E.2d 662", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. App. 3d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3461034 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" }, { "page": "186-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/149/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "537 N.E.2d 1058", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "1061" }, { "page": "1061" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. App. 3d 304", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2621264 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "310" }, { "page": "310" }, { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/182/0304-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is not the function of the reviewing court to resolve factual disputes\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511352 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is not the function of the reviewing court to resolve factual disputes\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 N.E.2d 731", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732-33" }, { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 Ill. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3173147 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "202-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/113/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "finding that error is harmless when \"the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030946 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157", "parenthetical": "finding that error is harmless when \"the evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 88", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131046 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0091-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1162, "char_count": 28839, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.492953784723809e-08, "percentile": 0.39937675903112496 }, "sha256": "d2b5e63c8a2c5f15101a93dfb683037dac5a19182891c852fb463a6a22fd996f", "simhash": "1:1bdd645f1a85a421", "word_count": 4592 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:54:53.541010+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DANIEL T. O\u2019KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn February 17, 1995, defendant, the Illinois State Police (ISP), indefinitely suspended plaintiff, Trooper Daniel O\u2019Keefe, without pay and pending a termination proceeding before the Merit Board (Board) pursuant to section 14 of the State Police Act (the Act) (20 ILCS 2610/14 (West 1998)). On June 16, 1995, ISP filed a 10-count complaint before the Board, alleging various instances of misconduct by O\u2019Keefe. On September 24, 1996, a hearing officer found that ISP had proven 9 of the 10 counts. On October 31,1996, the Board unanimously adopted the hearing officer\u2019s findings and discharged O\u2019Keefe. On review, the circuit court affirmed the Board in part and reversed in part. O\u2019Keefe now appeals to this court, arguing that: (1) the hearing officer erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to investigators and his drug-test results; and (2) that ISP\u2019s investigation violated a collective bargaining agreement. ISP cross-appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred in finding that O\u2019Keefe was entitled to pay while the Board hearing was pending. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPaula Barrows testified at an evidence deposition that she is a special agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that she formerly worked for ISP Barrows further testified that, on February 17, 1995, she became involved in an investigation regarding O\u2019Keefe. According to Barrows, an informant, John Hernandez, had been arrested on drug charges and told investigators that O\u2019Keefe had been supplying him with confidential information in exchange for cocaine. Hernandez met with Barrows that same day and, according to Barrows, stated that he had been supplying O\u2019Keefe with cocaine for over five years. In exchange for the cocaine, O\u2019Keefe gave Hernandez confidential information relating to police code words, planned drug busts, and license plate information. According to Barrows, O\u2019Keefe also gave Hernandez an \u201cEPIC book.\u201d Barrows explained that an \u201cEPIC book\u201d contains intelligence information involving narcotics trafficking throughout the United States and probably the world, including information regarding current narcotics investigations.\nTo corroborate Hernandez\u2019 story, Barrows instructed Hernandez to call O\u2019Keefe and ask him to run a particular license-plate number. Barrows and other investigators watched Hernandez dial O\u2019Keefe\u2019s telephone number, saw O\u2019Keefe\u2019s number appear on the display of Hernandez\u2019 cellular telephone, and shared the telephone with investigators so that they could hear the conversation and identify O\u2019Keefe\u2019s voice. Later that day, O\u2019Keefe called back and provided the information Hernandez requested. Barrows verified through an ISP telecommunicator that, while O\u2019Keefe was off duty that day, he had in fact called in a request for information regarding the same license-plate number. Also that day, Barrows and three other officers searched O\u2019Keefe\u2019s squad car. Inside, they found several Penthouse magazines, individual photographs of a naked woman, and a set of brass knuckles. ISP prohibits troopers from having any such items in their patrol cars.\nArthur Sebek, a squad supervisor in the ISP internal investigations division, testified that he was also present when Hernandez called O\u2019Keefe, that he could identify O\u2019Keefe\u2019s voice, and that he heard O\u2019Keefe provide the license-plate information. Later that evening, O\u2019Keefe was instructed to report to police headquarters. Sebek testified that, when O\u2019Keefe arrived, and before Sebek could say anything, O\u2019Keefe stated that he had known Hernandez for several years and that Hernandez was involved in drugs. According to Sebek, O\u2019Keefe admitted, without being asked, that he ran a license plate for Hernandez and that he knew it was a mistake. Sebek testified that he cut O\u2019Keefe off and instructed him to complete a urinalysis test. Sebek accompanied O\u2019Keefe to the testing center and then returned to police headquarters with O\u2019Keefe. When the pair returned, O\u2019Keefe\u2019s commander informed O\u2019Keefe that he was suspended without pay. O\u2019Keefe\u2019s urinalysis results indicated that he had cocaine in his system.\nOn June 16, 1995, the ISP Director filed a 10-count complaint with the Board, alleging numerous instances of official misconduct and requesting that O\u2019Keefe be discharged. On February 1, 1996, O\u2019Keefe filed a motion to quash his suspension and be reinstated or, alternatively, to be suspended with retroactive pay. O\u2019Keefe also filed a motion to suppress the urinalysis test\u2019s results. On May 16, 1996, a hearing officer denied O\u2019Keefe\u2019s motions.\nThe hearing officer conducted a hearing on ISP\u2019s complaint, spread over several dates between May 21, 1996, and July 30, 1996. On May 23, 1996, O\u2019Keefe filed a supplemental motion to repress the urinalysis test\u2019s results, arguing that new evidence appeared indicating that an external chain-of-custody error had occurred. On September 24, 1996, after hearing testimony from several witnesses, including O\u2019Keefe, Hernandez, Sebek, several physicians, and several ISP officials, the hearing officer denied O\u2019Keefe\u2019s supplementary motion to suppress and submitted her proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. The hearing officer found that O\u2019Keefe knowingly associated with drug traffickers, had observed illegal drug use but failed to report it to ISf? divulged confidential information to drug traffickers (including license-plate and drug enforcement information) in exchange for cocaine, used cocaine while on or off duty, and had sexually explicit materials and unauthorized weapons in his patrol car. Further, the hearing officer found that ISP met its burden in proving 9 of the 10 counts in its complaint; On October 31, 1996, the Board unanimously adopted the hearing officer\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and ordered that O\u2019Keefe be removed and discharged from ISP\nOn November 27, 1996, O\u2019Keefe filed a petition for administrative review before the circuit court. O\u2019Keefe argued that the investigation and suspension violated section 14 of the Act and the collective bargaining agreement between ISP and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), and that the Board improperly relied on his urinalysis test results despite procedural and custodial errors. On August 1, 1997, the circuit court found that ISP violated section 14 of the Act by suspending O\u2019Keefe without pay and pending the hearing, and the court entered an order remanding the matter to the Board for payment of back pay. According to the transcript, the court also found that ISP violated section 14 of the Act by questioning O\u2019Keefe without sufficient notice, and that evidence obtained from such questioning should have been suppressed pursuant to section 14a of the Act (20 ILCS 2610/14a (West 1998)), but that sufficient evidence nevertheless existed to support the Board\u2019s finding. Further, the circuit court refused to disturb the Board\u2019s findings with respect to O\u2019Keefe\u2019s chain-of-custody argument and whether ISP violated the collective bargaining agreement. On August 22, 1998, O\u2019Keefe advised -the circuit court that he received his back pay, and the court entered a final order disposing of all matters before it. On September 11, 1998, O\u2019Keefe filed the instant appeal.\nOn appeal before this court, O\u2019Keefe again argues that ISP\u2019s investigation and suspension violated section 14 of the Act and the collective bargaining agreement between ISP and the FOI? and that the Board improperly relied on his urinalysis test results despite procedural and custodial errors. O\u2019Keefe does not dispute the Board\u2019s factual findings or other conclusions of law.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Motion to Suppress O\u2019Keefe\u2019s Statements\nO\u2019Keefe first argues that ISP failed to advise him on February 17, 1995, that he had a right to counsel and that his statements could be used against him, as required under section 14 of the Act. Section 14 of the Act reads in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cBefore any such officer may be interrogated or examined ***, the results of which *** may be the basis for filing charges seeking his or her suspension for more than 15 days or his or her removal or discharge, he or she shall be advised in writing as to what specific improper or illegal act he or she is alleged to have committed; he or she shall be advised in writing that his or her admissions made in the course of the hearing, interrogation or examination may be used as the basis for charges seeking his or her suspension, removal or discharge; and he or she shall be advised in writing that he or she has a right to counsel of his or her choosing, who may be present to advise him or her at any hearing, interrogation or examination.\u201d 20 ILCS 2610/14 (West 1998).\nFurther, under section 14a of the Act (20 ILCS 2610/14a (West 1998)), \u201cstatements or admissions obtained during the course of any hearing or interrogation not conducted in accordance with this Act may not be utilized against the officer in any subsequent disciplinary proceeding.\u201d Therefore, O\u2019Keefe argues, the hearing officer erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement with regard to running license plates for Hernandez.\nISP disagrees, arguing that O\u2019Keefe was never interrogated or examined. Instead, ISP argues, O\u2019Keefe volunteered the information about Hernandez without being asked. Sebek testified that, before he had a chance to say anything, O\u2019Keefe voluntarily admitted that he ran license-plate information for Hernandez. O\u2019Keefe further admitted to Sebek that he knew it was a mistake and that he should not have done it. ISP Investigator Anthony Rapacz also testified that O\u2019Keefe made this admission voluntarily. Rapacz further testified that he reminded O\u2019Keefe that he was an FOP trustee, that they had a contract, and that he had rights. However, O\u2019Keefe waved Rapacz off and continued to state that he should not have done it. According to Rapacz, O\u2019Keefe said that he was sorry for putting the other officers in such an awkward position. O\u2019Keefe himself even admitted that he immediately told Sebek and the officers that he \u201cknew what this was about\u201d and then proceeded to tell them what he thought it was about, namely, running the license plate for Hernandez. O\u2019Keefe also admits in his brief that ISP never conducted an interrogation or examination.\nWe need not determine whether ISP violated section 14 of the Act because O\u2019Keefe has waived this issue. While the record indicates that O\u2019Keefe indeed filed a motion to suppress, O\u2019Keefe fails to cite where, nor does review of the record indicate that, he raised the matter again during the proceedings. Rulings on motions to suppress are not final and may be changed or reversed at any time prior to final judgment. See People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 127, 718 N.E.2d 88, 109 (1999). Failure to ask the court or administrative body to reconsider the motion when that evidence is introduced at trial results in waiver of that issue on appeal. See Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d at 128, 718 N.E.2d at 109.\nEven if we were to reach the merits of O\u2019Keefe\u2019s claim and conclude that O\u2019Keefe\u2019s statements should have been excluded, such error would be harmless. The gist of O\u2019Keefe\u2019s statement was that he knew Hernandez, he knew Hernandez was involved with drugs, and that he ran a license plate for Hernandez earlier that day. O\u2019Keefe\u2019s February 17, 1995, statements were cumulative and merely duplicated other testimony. Sebek, Barrows, and others testified that they heard Hernandez ask O\u2019Keefe to run a particular license plate and that they heard O\u2019Keefe supply the information that Hernandez requested. Hernandez testified that O\u2019Keefe often ran license plates for him. Carroll Gibbs, a telecommunicator with ISP testified that O\u2019Keefe called her on February 17, 1995, and asked her to run the same license-plate number that Hernandez requested. O\u2019Keefe himself testified during the hearing that he ran the license plate for Hernandez. Under these facts, even if the asserted error occurred, it would be harmless. See People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1981) (finding that error is harmless when \u201cthe evidence is cumulative or merely duplicates properly admitted evidence\u201d).\nB. Violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement\nO\u2019Keefe next argues that his suspension violated the collective bargaining agreement between ISP and the FOE Article 7 of the collective bargaining agreement provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cb. No internal investigation will be conducted and no discipline may be issued unless a file initiation report has been completed.\u201d\nO\u2019Keefe contends that ISP violated the collective bargaining agreement by failing to complete the file initiation report until after O\u2019Keefe\u2019s suspension and that such failure requires that this court reverse the Board\u2019s finding.\nThis argument lacks merit. Assuming, arguendo, that ISP in fact violated article 7 of the collective bargaining agreement, we find that the Board lacked jurisdiction to hear such a claim or provide a remedy for such a violation.\nSection 8 of the Act (20 ILCS 2610/8 (West 1998)) provides in pertinent part that the \u201cBoard shall exercise jurisdiction over the certification for appointment and promotion, and over the discipline, removal, demotion and suspension of Department of State Police officers.\u201d O\u2019Keefe fails to cite any authority indicating that the Board has authority to provide a remedy for a violated labor agreement. Further, the plain language of section 8 indicates that the Board has no such power. Because the Board is a creature of statute, its powers are generally limited to those conferred upon it by statute. See Schalz v. McHenry County Sheriff\u2019s Department Merit Comm\u2019n, 113 Ill. 2d 198, 202, 497 N.E.2d 731, 732-33 (1986). The Board\u2019s authority arises either from the Act\u2019s express language or by fair implication and intendment of the Act\u2019s express provisions as an incident to achieving the objectives for which the Board was created. See Schalz, 113 Ill. 2d at 202-03, 497 N.E.2d at 733. Section 8 of the Act clearly limits the Board\u2019s jurisdiction to disciplinary actions regarding an officer\u2019s conduct. O\u2019Keefe\u2019s arguments relate not to his conduct but, rather, to ISP\u2019s alleged failure to adhere to a labor contract. We further note that, assuming the collective bargaining agreement is relevant here, article 8 of the agreement sets forth a separate procedure under which employees may file union grievances for agreement violations.\nFurther, assuming that the agreement is relevant here, O\u2019Keefe has failed to cite any persuasive evidence in the record to indicate that the agreement was even broken. Barrows testified that she completed the report but that she could not recall whether she completed it on February 17, 1995, or February 20, 1995. Even if we were to make such a factual determination (see Folbert v. Department of Human Rights, 303 Ill. App. 3d 13, 26, 707 N.E.2d 590, 599 (1999) (stating that \u201cit is not the function of the reviewing court to resolve factual disputes\u201d)), O\u2019Keefe has failed to explain how a delay of one business day prejudiced him.\nC. Motion to Suppress Drug Test\nDr. Robert DuPont testified that O\u2019Keefe\u2019s sample indicated that he had used cocaine within two or three days of the test. Dr. DuPont further testified that O\u2019Keefe\u2019s sample contained an unusually high level of cocaine. ISP also presented evidence that a second facility also tested O\u2019Keefe\u2019s sample and that it reached similar conclusions.\nHowever, O\u2019Keefe contends that the Board erred by considering his urinalysis results. Specifically, O\u2019Keefe argues that such evidence should have been excluded due to an external custodial chain error that was identified when the urine sample reached the toxicology center. According to an affidavit filed by Carmen Mitelescu, a lab worker, the sample was sent to the laboratory in a taped box, but that the tape \u201cbroke in transit.\u201d This discrepancy, according to O\u2019Keefe, was so significant that the Board should have granted his motion to suppress. We disagree.\nThe hearing officer found O\u2019Keefe\u2019s argument unconvincing and determined that ISP established a sufficient custodial chain. Reviewing courts will not disturb the Board\u2019s ruling on the sufficiency of a custodial chain absent an abuse of discretion. Williamson v. Police Board, 182 Ill. App. 3d 304, 310, 537 N.E.2d 1058, 1061 (1989). To support the Board\u2019s determination, the record must indicate that ISP took reasonable protective measures to ensure that the sample taken from O\u2019Keefe was indeed the same sample tested in the laboratory. Williamson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 537 N.E.2d at 1061. To prevail, O\u2019Keefe must present tangible suggestion of tampering, alteration or substitution. See Williamson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 537 N.E.2d at 1061. Mere speculation that the sample could have been altered is insufficient to undermine a custodial chain\u2019s adequacy. Williamson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 537 N.E.2d at 1061.\nWe find that sufficient evidence exists to support the Board\u2019s determination. Dr. Mohamad Rahmanian testified that, when a urine sample is collected, the sample is divided between two bottles. The bottles are then wrapped lengthwise with tamper-resistant tape and identified with a control number. The sample provider\u2019s initials and the date are also written on the tape. The bottles are then placed in a sealed bag, and the bag is placed inside a box. The box is then sealed with security tape baring the same control number. Dr. Rahmanian stated that the outer tape is designed to be fragile to prevent tampering. However, the tape is so fragile that it may be damaged during shipping. According to Dr. Rahmanian, such damage would not undermine the test\u2019s integrity so long as the bottles remain sealed. Dr. Donald Frederick testified on O\u2019Keefe\u2019s behalf. Dr. Frederick similarly admitted that the box\u2019s seal does not necessarily affect the sample\u2019s integrity. O\u2019Keefe does not dispute that, while the tape on the outer box was damaged, the seal on the bottles themselves remained intact. We further note that several doctors, including Frederick, testified that the tape on the outer boxes commonly breaks. Under these facts, we find that the broken tape on the outer box did not break the custodial chain.\nO\u2019Keefe further argues that Dr. DuPont improperly examined O\u2019Keefe\u2019s specimen and verified the positive result before investigating the alleged custodial-chain error. ISP procedure requires that Dr. DuPont, as the ISP medical review officer, \u201creceive all pertinent information\u201d prior to making such a determination, and O\u2019Keefe contends that this omission required that the Board suppress his drug-test results. While Dr. DuPont admitted that he indeed examined O\u2019Keefe\u2019s sample before investigating the broken tape, this argument nevertheless lacks merit. As previously stated, the seals on the bottles themselves remained intact. Dr. DuPont testified that, in verifying that proper procedures were utilized, his concern is not for the tape on the box but, rather, the integrity of the specimen bottle. We further note that Dr. DuPont regularly contacts the provider of a positive sample to ask a series of questions that might establish an alternative reason for the positive result. Dr. DuPont left such a message for O\u2019Keefe, but O\u2019Keefe did not return his call.\nCiting People v. Slaughter, 149 Ill. App. 3d 183, 500 N.E.2d 662 (1986), O\u2019Keefe next argues that the testing facility improperly stored his sample in an unlocked refrigerator. Failure to store the sample securely, O\u2019Keefe contends, violated ISP procedures and constituted a break in the custodial chain. We find that Slaughter\u2019s facts are inapposite to the instant case. In Slaughter, the State acknowledged that the evidence at issue, an envelope containing two hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes, was handled in a lackadaisical manner. Slaughter, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 186, 500 N.E.2d at 665. Further, the court noted:\n\u201c[T]he testimony is wholly inadequate to \u2018match\u2019 the description of the envelope ***. [The corrections officer] did not testify to the color, or the size, of the envelope into which he put the cigarettes he found ***. He also did not state that he ever sealed the envelope, marked, labelled, or identified the envelope, or that he inventoried the envelope.\nFurthermore, the evidence *** is insufficient to trace the individuals who did have access to the envelope, or the number of persons who could have had access to it. ***\nIn addition, the record does not establish the degree to which access was restricted to the correctional facility\u2019s safe. [The officer] stated that he himself \u2018dropped\u2019 the envelope into the safe. He also stated that the safe was accessible to two persons, the lieutenant and the facility\u2019s accountant. Because [the officer\u2019s] access to the safe enabled him to drop the envelope into the safe, we cannot determine the degree to which access to the safe was permitted, beyond the two persons *** specified at the hearing. Also, although [the officer] testified that the safe was of the type which is locked by a key, he did not state that it was locked ***.\n*** The record is also inconclusive with respect to whether access was restricted to the correctional facility\u2019s safe in which the guard placed the envelope containing the cannabis. We therefore determine that the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody of the cannabis evidence it presented at the revocation hearing.\u201d Slaughter, 149 Ill. App. 3d at 186-87.\nThe veritable litany of errors identified by the court in Slaughter simply does not exist in this case. In Slaughter, the court relied on numerous factors, including the . fact that the record failed to adequately show whether others had access to the safe and whether the envelope had been sealed. Here, access is not a dispositive issue because the fact remains that the container\u2019s inner seals remained intact and, therefore, the sample was in fact not disturbed. Carmen Mitelescu testified that she collected O\u2019Keefe\u2019s sample and placed it in a triple-sealed container. Mitelescu wrote the date, O\u2019Keefe\u2019s initials, and a control number on the seals. That the inner seals remained intact negates the conclusion that someone tampered with the sample.\nD. Cross-Appeal\nOn cross-appeal, ISP argues that the circuit court misinterpreted section 14 of the Act and erred in finding that the Board should have granted O\u2019Keefe\u2019s motion to quash his unpaid suspension. We disagree. Statutory construction is a matter of law and is considered de novo. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 630 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1994). To determine the legislature\u2019s intent, courts first look to the statute\u2019s language. Zekman v. Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 368-69, 695 N.E.2d 853, 858 (1998). Statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter should be construed harmoniously where possible. Rawles v. Hartman, 172 Ill. App. 3d 931, 936, 527 N.E.2d 680, 682 (1988). The relevant portion of section 14 of the Act states as follows:\n\u201cExcept as is otherwise provided in this Act, no Department of State Police officer shall be removed, demoted or suspended except for cause, upon written charges filed with the Board by the Director and a hearing before the Board thereon upon not less than 10 days\u2019 notice at a place to be designated by the chairman thereof. At such hearing, the accused shall be afforded full opportunity to be heard in his or her own defense and to produce proof in his or her defense.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2610/14 (West 1998).\nSection 13 of the Act also provides for suspensions and states in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cDisciplinary measures prescribed by the Board for Department of State Police officers may be taken by the Director for the punishment of infractions of the rules and regulations of the respective divisions as promulgated by the Department. Such disciplinary measures, may include suspension of any such officer for a reasonable period, not exceeding 30 days.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2610/13 (West 1998).\nConstruing sections 13 and 14 together, we find that the Director may impose disciplinary measures, including suspension, on officers for a reasonable period not exceeding 30 days. Illinois courts have upheld such suspensions even if they were unpaid. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois State Police Merit Board, 222 Ill. App. 3d 496, 584 N.E.2d 199 (1991); Clark v. Morris, 99 Ill. App. 2d 24, 31, 240 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1968). However, before ISP may suspend an officer beyond 30 days, it must have cause, must file written charges with the Board, and must hold a hearing, to which officers must receive not less than 10 days\u2019 notice. The record indicates that ISP suspended O\u2019Keefe without pay for approximately four months before filing written charges and providing him with the hearing required under section 14 of the Act.\nISP contends that section 14 does not apply here, arguing that \u201cit did not file a complaint with the Merit Board seeking the suspension-of O\u2019Keefe in this case, but rather his discharge.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) ISP asserts that two types of suspensions exist. According to ISP \u201cO\u2019Keefe\u2019s suspension pending discharge was not a disciplinary suspension but rather an administrative suspension\u201d intended to remove a corrupt officer from the street pending a hearing. (Emphasis in original.) O\u2019Keefe disagrees, arguing that the Act\u2019s plain language makes no such distinction. While the hearing officer agreed with ISP the circuit court rejected ISP\u2019s argument, finding:\n\u201c[Section] 14 of the Police Act could hardly be clearer in its requirement that written charges be filed with the board before any disciplinary action takes place. Here, it is undisputed that no such charges were filed until June 16, 1995, four months after O\u2019Keefe was indefinitely suspended. *** The hearing officer found that the requirementsTof section 14] were followed. *** The court finds that the hearing officer\u2019s construction of [section 14] were [sic] erroneous and, consequently, rejects the result reached by the hearing officer [with respect to O\u2019Keefe\u2019s motion to quash].\u201d\nWe find the circuit court\u2019s interpretation of section 14 persuasive. Courts must accord a statute\u2019s language with its plain and commonly understood meaning. R.L. Polk & Co. v. Ryan, 296 Ill. App. 3d 132, 140, 694 N.E.2d 1027, 1033 (1998). Our review of section 14 indicates that it makes no distinction between administrative and disciplinary suspensions and we must not depart from its plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express. See Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656, 291 (1990). While we agree with ISP\u2019s assertion that it \u201cshould not be put in the position of *** permitting an officer of dubious character to remain on duty pending discharge proceedings,\u201d we do not agree that it may place an officer on unpaid suspension while it drags its feet for nearly four months before filing written charges and providing the accused officer with the hearing to which he or she is entitled under section 14. Had ISP wished to avoid providing O\u2019Keefe with \u201ca happy boon and a favor, i.e., pay without work,\u201d it should have filed charges and granted his hearing more promptly. We further reject ISP\u2019s argument that a four-month suspension without pay is acceptable because, had the Board exonerated O\u2019Keefe, he would have been entitled to back pay, interest, and benefits pursuant to section 14 of the Act. Officers exonerated after four months of unpaid suspension, followed by a hearing and then another four months awaiting a determination, will have sustained severe financial harm that cannot necessarily be remedied by back pay with interest.\nWe find that ISP had authority to suspend O\u2019Keefe without pay for 30 days pursuant to section 13 of the Act. Had ISP found it necessary to suspend O\u2019Keefe for a period exceeding 30 days, it was required under section 14 to file written charges and provide him with a hearing.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s determination.\nAffirmed.\nZWICK, EJ., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul D. Geiger, of Chicago, for appellant.", "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Paul Racette, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DANIEL T. O\u2019KEEFE, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee, v. ILLINOIS STATE POLICE MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees and Cross-Appellants.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20143471\nOpinion filed May 26, 2000.\nPaul D. Geiger, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Paul Racette, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0817-01", "first_page_order": 835, "last_page_order": 847 }