{ "id": 140373, "name": "WARREN R. LAMPE et al., Beneficiaries u/t/a of Mabel R. Triner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LINDA R. PAWLARCZYK, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Lampe v. Pawlarczyk", "decision_date": "2000-05-30", "docket_number": "Nos. 1\u201499\u20142251, 1\u201499\u20142276 cons.", "first_page": "455", "last_page": "476", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 455" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "567 N.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "trial court's denial of motion to reconsider is void for lack of jurisdiction where motion itself was untimely filed" }, { "page": "488-89", "parenthetical": "where trial court's initial order included Rule 304(a) finding and where motion to reconsider was untimely filed, appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear appeal of trial court's denial of that motion even though appeal was filed within 30 days of the denial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 Ill. App. 3d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2548106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563-64", "parenthetical": "trial court's denial of motion to reconsider is void for lack of jurisdiction where motion itself was untimely filed" }, { "page": "563, 564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/208/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "827", "parenthetical": "\"trial court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment [citations] unless a timely post-judgment motion is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592343 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "\"trial court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment [citations] unless a timely post-judgment motion is filed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1250" }, { "page": "1250" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 262", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3121152 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0262-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 957", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5797533 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964" }, { "page": "964" }, { "page": "964" }, { "page": "964" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0957-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 N.E.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639261 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 689", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381835 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0689-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576586 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "470 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291-92", "parenthetical": "judgment that is not final cannot be attacked by motion to reconsider" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152590 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "538-39", "parenthetical": "judgment that is not final cannot be attacked by motion to reconsider" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 N.E.2d 718", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "720", "parenthetical": "timely filed postjudgment motion tolls time for filing notice of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 Ill. App. 3d 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3554949 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "230", "parenthetical": "timely filed postjudgment motion tolls time for filing notice of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/175/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 F. Supp. 1294", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3921473 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1301", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t must appear that [the trustee] acted in bad faith as a trustee\" in order to justify depriving her of \"fees *** legitimately earned in the performance of [her] duties\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/429/1294-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 N.W2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Minn. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Minn.", "case_ids": [ 383272 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/minn/223/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "45 N.E.2d 511", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5647783 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/317/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "522" }, { "page": "522" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. App. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5176385 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" }, { "page": "90-92" }, { "page": "90-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/15/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 N.E.2d 634", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "62 Ill. App. 3d 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5622813 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/62/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. App. 3d 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3506891 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "715-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/156/0712-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1428, "char_count": 54135, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2479199400673706e-07, "percentile": 0.6094075368872857 }, "sha256": "bb8d2d970e9bc18dda257d70da8ddbfe523db76632cab9e00b7d3545eb7b2d7f", "simhash": "1:112fad75daee98a4", "word_count": 9032 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:48:47.280070+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WARREN R. LAMPE et al., Beneficiaries u/t/a of Mabel R. Triner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LINDA R. PAWLARCZYK, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn the first of these two consolidated appeals, Warren R. Lampe and W Robert Lampe (the Lampes) appeal from orders of the Cook County circuit court denying their requests for attorney fees incurred in bringing an action against Linda Pawlarczyk (Linda) and in defending against her counterclaim. The Lampes are nephews of Mabel R. Triner (Mabel) and beneficiaries of the Mabel R. Triner trust (Trust) dated December 19, 1990. In the second appeal, Linda, also a beneficiary of the Trust and formerly trustee, appeals from a circuit court order denying her request for compensation for trustee\u2019s fees. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court\u2019s judgment in Linda\u2019s appeal, and remand the cause. We dismiss the Lampes\u2019 appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nBACKGROUND\nThe Lampes filed a three-count complaint against Linda on September 2, 1997. In that complaint, they alleged that (1) on February 7, 1997, Linda withdrew from the Trust account and paid to herself $5,000; (2) on April 10, 1997, she caused certain Trust assets to be liquidated and withdrew and paid to herself $32,596; and (3) on April 15, 1997, she caused certain Trust assets to be liquidated and withdrew and paid to herself $2,930. The complaint also alleged that Linda made a claim against the Trust in her individual capacity for compensation for services rendered to Mabel diming Mabel\u2019s life. The Lampes thus allege that Linda put herself in a conflict of interest with the Trust beneficiaries and breached her fiduciary duty as trustee. In count I of their complaint, the Lampes seek Linda\u2019s removal as trustee of the Trust; count II seeks an accounting from her of the Trust assets; and count III asks that a constructive trust be imposed over funds she withdrew from the Trust account. Attached to the complaint is a copy of the Trust agreement executed by Mabel on December 19, 1990, naming Warren Lampe (Warren) and Linda as trustees and designating Robert Lampe (Robert) as successor co-trustee if Warren were unable to serve in that role. The trustees were authorized to distribute for Mabel\u2019s benefit \u201cas much of the net income and principal of the Trust, even to the extent of exhausting principal, as they may *** determine to be required for [Mabel\u2019s] welfare, comfort and support.\u201d Upon Mabel\u2019s death the Trust principal and any accrued income were to be distributed as follows: $10,000 to Linda, and the remainder in equal shares to Mabel\u2019s nephews, the Lampes, and to a third nephew, Harold Richak, who was Linda\u2019s father. According to the terms of the Trust, if Richak predeceased Mabel (which he did), his one-third share was to go to Linda.\nOn December 5, 1997, Linda filed a countercomplaint seeking $98,000 from the Trust as reimbursement for services Linda allegedly rendered to Mabel for 14 years until her death in 1996. In her countercomplaint, Linda alleged that she and Warren were co-trustees of the Trust until July 13, 1993, when he resigned, and that Robert then was named successor co-trustee but that he resigned on November 15, 1993, leaving her as the sole trustee. She also alleged that on November 22, 1996, Mabel dictated (to Linda) and signed a \u201cletter of direction\u201d stating that Mabel wanted her entire estate to go to Linda. The counterclaim also states that in February 1997 Linda made a demand on the Trust in her individual capacity, claiming $98,000 as compensation for services rendered to Mabel. Attached to the counter-complaint is a copy of that demand, which is the same as the one Linda makes in the countercomplaint. In that demand, Linda states that she cared for Mabel from 1982 until her death in December 1996, providing a variety of services including taking Mabel grocery shopping, paying her utility bills, arranging for and providing transportation to and from doctor and dental appointments, and visiting with Mabel on a regular basis. Linda also oversaw Mabel\u2019s care after she fell and broke her hip in 1986, and upon Mabel\u2019s return home three months later Linda visited her daily for one year, and five times a week for the next five years, during which times she provided various services such as doing Mabel\u2019s laundry and cleaning her apartment. Linda also asserts that in September 1996, when plans were being made for Mabel to move to a nursing home, Linda inspected various facilities before deciding on the one best suited to meet Mabel\u2019s needs. Linda also visited Mabel every day during the time she was in the nursing home. Also included in the attachments to the counterclaim are copies of the Trust and of Mabel\u2019s pourover will, dated December 19, 1990, the date of the Trust agreement. The will names Robert and Warren as co-executors and names Linda as successor executor if both Warren and Robert are unable to serve. Under the terms of the will, any residue of Mabel\u2019s estate and any personal property not disposed of was to be added to the Trust at her death. Finally, the attachments to the counterclaim also included the previously mentioned \u201cletter of direction\u201d allegedly dictated and signed by Mabel stating that Mabel wanted to give $10,000 to each of the Lampes and the rest of her money to Linda.\nThe Lampes moved for summary judgment on their complaint on January 26, 1998, asking that Linda be removed as trustee, that she be ordered to provide an accounting of the Trust, and that a constructive trust be imposed over the funds Linda had withdrawn from the Trust. According to the Lampes, Linda should be removed as trustee because she put herself in the position of being both trustee of the Trust and an individual claimant against the Trust, thus creating a conflict of interest. They also allege that as beneficiaries they have a right to a full accounting of the Trust plus any other information needed to keep them fully informed. In addition, the Lampes allege that Linda breached her fiduciary duty and thus a constructive trust should be imposed over assets she withdrew from the Trust. The Lampes also move for an award of attorney fees based upon their efforts as beneficiaries to save the Trust from destruction and restore it to its proper purposes. In support of their motion, the Lampes attach a copy of their original complaint and of Linda\u2019s answer.\nIn her response as trustee to the motion, Linda asserted that she had provided the Lampes with copies of the monthly statements of the Trust account. She also stated that as of May 1, 1997, she and the Lampes agreed that she would make no further withdrawals from the Trust without the agreement of the Lampes or a court order, except to pay outstanding Trust bills. She asserts that she made no withdrawals or payments after May 1, 1997, except to pay outstanding bills of the Trust. Included in the attachments to Linda\u2019s response is a copy of a letter dated May 1, 1997, from Randy Curato, attorney for the Lampes, to Sandra Burns, the attorney for the Trust, confirming the above-mentioned May 1, 1997, agreement. In an affidavit submitted along with her response, Linda states that her attorney notified the Lampes\u2019 counsel on March 24, 1997, that the Trust investments would be converted to cash and that distributions would then be made. According to the affidavit, shortly thereafter attorney Burns told Linda not to convert all the assets to cash because the Lampes\u2019 attorney had indicated that they might want to take their distribution in kind. Linda asserts that Burns subsequently made several inquiries of the Lampes as to how they wanted their distribution made but received no reply. Linda also asserts that at the time of Mabel\u2019s death the Trust principal totaled about $180,000 and that all payouts thereafter were for final bills for Mabel\u2019s care, taxes due on the Trust or other direct costs, and two payments to herself: $10,000 to pay her specific gift under the Trust, and $35,596 as partial payment of her one-third share under the Trust\u2019s residuary paragraph. According to Linda, following those payments, there was about $150,000 remaining in the Trust account.\nThe trial court granted the Lampes\u2019 summary judgment motion on April 21, 1998, ordering Linda removed as trustee and directing her to prepare and submit an accounting of the Trust. The court also established a constructive trust over the Trust assets that had been withdrawn by Linda. The court found that Linda had breached her fiduciary duty to the Lampes by using her position as trustee \u201cto authorize payments to herself during the course of the trust relationship\u201d and by submitting \u201ca claim in her individual capacity against the Trust in the amount of $98,000.00 for services rendered.\u201d Also on April 21, the court took under advisement the Lampes\u2019 request for attorney fees.\nIn June 1998 Linda moved for a ruling on her countercomplaint granting her $98,000 claim, and the Lampes moved for summary judgment on Linda\u2019s counterclaim. In July the Lampes made a renewed motion for attorney fees, and in August Linda filed a \u201cpetition for compensation to trustee for services rendered to trust and to decedent.\u201d In that petition, Linda sought $10,000 per year for the 7.33 years from December 20, 1990 (the inception of the Trust), until April 21, 1998 (the date she was removed as trustee), as compensation for \u201cTrustee\u2019s services rendered to the Trust and to MABEL R. TRINER and performing other related services allowed to be paid by the Trust.\u201d The amount requested was $73,300 \u201cminus $35,596.00, the amount already paid to [herself] for Trustee\u2019s duties,\u201d yielding a net request of \u201c$37,704.00 to be paid to [herself] from the Mabel R. [Triner] Trust prior to disbursements of amounts due beneficiaries under the terms of the Trust.\u201d The petition also included a listing of her purported services to the Trust, which she termed her \u201cTrustee duties *** from December 20, 1990, until April 21, 1998,\u201d many of which were the same services to Mabel that were enumerated in Linda\u2019s $98,000 claim. Finally, Linda averred in her petition that Mabel promised her she would be reimbursed for her services when Mabel died, and that Warren had essentially agreed to that promise, telling Linda in December 1990 that she would be \u201ctaken care of.\u201d\nOn October 16, 1998, the trial court granted the Lampes\u2019 motion for summary judgment on Linda\u2019s counterclaim and denied with prejudice Linda\u2019s motion for grant of her $98,000 claim. The court also denied without prejudice Linda\u2019s separate ($73,300) petition for compensation to trustee. In denying that petition, the court stated that Linda had mixed together trustee services with nontrust, personal services such as \u201cdaily visits to the home, the *** tender loving care that she gave to the deceased,\u201d and that the court therefore was unable to determine \u201chow much time [Linda] spent in preserving the assets of the trust.\u201d The court explained that the petition was being denied without prejudice until Linda \u201ccan spell out how much time [she] spent on the trust.\u201d Also on that same date (October 16, 1998), the trial court denied the Lampes\u2019 renewed motion for attorney fees.\nOne month later, Linda filed a five-count amended countercomplaint. Count I purports to seek compensation under the express terms of the Trust for services rendered to the Trust and to the decedent. Included in count I is a listing of services provided by Linda that is similar to the list in her previous, $73,300 petition for compensation to trustee. However, in the amended countercomplaint Linda then breaks those services into three categories. The first category is described by Linda as \u201cservices and duties performed [b]y LINDA during the time she acted as Trustee [that] have been acknowledged by WARREN and ROBERT *** to be duties relating to the Trust *** for which LINDA should be reimbursed.\u201d Included in that group are the following:\n\u201ca. All banking activities, cashing of pension checks, depositing checks, monthly reconciliation of checking account and monthly review of financial statements;\nb. Management of household expenses and writing checks for payment of household expenses including food, medication, utilities and all other monthly expenses of MABEL;\nc. Paying quarterly deposits for state and federal taxes;\nd. Cashing checks for payment of dry cleaning! ] [and] laundry expenses;\ne. Upon the death of MABEL, coordinating all funeral arrangements including! ] purchasing burial clothing, ordering funeral flowers, purchasing the headstone and coordinating] all arrangements with the cemetery.\u201d\nThe second category is described as \u201cservices and duties performed by LINDA relating] to the Trustee\u2019s power to \u2018distribute to MABEL or apply for MABEL\u2019s benefit as much of the net income and principal of the Trust as the Trustee may from time-to-time [sic] determine to be required for MABEL\u2019s welfare, comfort and support.\u2019 \u201d Included in that group are services such as coordinating all doctor and dental appointments, processing Mabel\u2019s mail, and \u201c[t]raveling with MABEL and alone\u201d to stores. The third category is described as services performed during Mabel\u2019s life \u201cto provide for MABEL\u2019s \u2018maintenance, comfort, companionship, enjoyment and medical care\u2019 as provided in the Trust. That language refers to article III (A) (5) (m) of the Trust agreement, which authorizes the trustees \u201c[t]o employ during [Mabel\u2019s] life any person or persons to attend to [her] maintenance, comfort, companionship, enjoyment and medical care.\u201d Included in that third group are services such as writing letters for Mabel, reading to her, and visiting her daily.\nCounts II through V of the amended countercomplaint are designated as complaints for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment/contract implied in law, and promissory fraud. In the countercomplaint, Linda seeks $72,960 as compensation for \u201cservices and care to MABEL by LINDA as Trustee\u201d from the inception of the Trust until April 1998, when Linda was removed as trustee. She also seeks an additional $115,950 as compensation for care and services rendered to Mabel from 1981 to the inception of the Trust in December 1990. Included among the attachments to the amended countercomplaint is an affidavit showing the hours per month and total hours spent in performing various duties and services. Those services are broken into two categories: services performed by Linda for Mabel from 1982 to the inception of the Trust in December 1990, and those performed for Mabel from that date until her death in 1996.\nOn December 1, 1998, the Lampes filed a motion asking the court to reconsider its denial of the request for attorney fees. On the same date, Warren filed with the court a petition for trustee\u2019s fee seeking $7,737.50 as compensation for services rendered when he was co-trustee.\nThe trial court struck Linda\u2019s amended countercomplaint on April 7, 1999, and granted her leave to file an amended petition for trustee\u2019s fees to comply with the Trusts and Trustees Act (760 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Linda filed her \u201camended petition for compensation to trustee for services rendered to trust\u201d on April 29, 1999. In that petition, she shortened her list of services and duties that Warren and Robert acknowledged as compensable under the Trust. This abbreviated list included only items a, c and e from the previous list in count I of the amended countercomplaint, which were as follows:\n\u201ca. All banking activities, cashing of pension checks, depositing checks, monthly reconciliation of checking account and monthly review of financial statements;\nc. Paying quarterly deposits for state and federal taxes;\ne. Upon the death of MABEL, coordinating all funeral arrangements including! ] purchasing burial clothing, ordering funeral flowers, purchasing the headstone and coordinat[ing] all arrangements with the cemetery.\u201d\nAlso included in Linda\u2019s amended petition is a list of services and duties that is nearly identical to the second category of services provided in count I of her amended countercomplaint, but with some items added. The list in the amended petition has a similar description as well: \u201cservices and duties *** performed by LINDA as Trustee, which duties include duties relative to the Trustee\u2019s duties and powers as stated in the Trust to \u2018distribute to MABEL or apply for MABEL\u2019s benefit as much of the net income and principal of the Trust as the Trustee may from time-to-time [sic] determine to be required for MABEL\u2019s welfare, comfort and support.\u2019 \u201d The amended petition omits a separate category of services to provide for Mabel\u2019s \u201cmaintenance, comfort, companionship, enjoyment and medical care.\u201d\nLinda alleges in her amended petition that she, Warren and Robert met shortly after Mabel\u2019s death in December 1996 to discuss the amount of compensation to be paid to Linda for her services to Mabel and the Trust. The negotiations broke down, but Linda alleges that it was her understanding from the meeting that she had Warren\u2019s approval \u201cto advance to herself a payment for less than the amount she would receive as her share of the Trust\u201d and that \u201cpayment to all three beneficiaries would be \u2018re-worked\u2019 when the parties reached an agreement on the amount to be paid to LINDA for services provided to MABEL and the Trust.\u201d In her amended petition, Linda seeks compensation for 4,150.8 hours spent on Trust duties and services to Mabel, for a total amount ranging from $62,262 to $211,815.32, depending upon the hourly rate used. Linda\u2019s statement in the ad damnum clause that she seeks compensation for those hours \u201cas Trustee\u201d underscores her insistence that she should be compensated for personal services to Mabel as trustee services. Included in the attachments to the amended petition is an affidavit that is nearly identical to the second portion of the affidavit included in the amended countercomplaint. The listing of services and hours spent on them is described in the same way: trust duties and services for Mabel performed by Linda from the inception of the Trust on December 19, 1990, to Mabel\u2019s death in 1996.\nOn May 19, 1999, the court denied Linda\u2019s amended petition for compensation to trustee. The court stated that the claim was \u201cmost unartfully [sic] presented\u201d and that there was \u201cno basis to award compensation to the trustee for services rendered.\u201d Also on May 19, the court denied the Lampes\u2019 motion to reconsider the award of attorney fees. The instant appeals followed, both of which were filed on June 17, 1999.\nDISCUSSION\nThe standard of review in both of these appeals is abuse of discretion. The question of attorney fees rests within the sound discretion of the trial court (Rennacker v. Rennacker, 156 Ill. App. 3d 712, 715-16, 509 N.E.2d 798, 801 (1987); Brown v. Brown, 62 Ill. App. 3d 328, 337, 379 N.E.2d 634, 641 (1978)), as does the amount of compensation to be awarded to a trustee (Smith v. Stover, 15 Ill. App. 2d 78, 93, 145 N.E.2d 515, 523 (1957); Rogers v. Belt, 317 Ill. App. 81, 83, 45 N.E.2d 511, 512 (1942)).\nA. Linda\u2019s appeal\nLinda appeals from the trial court\u2019s order on May 19, 1999, denying her request for compensation for trustee\u2019s fees. She argues on appeal that the trial court had authority to award compensation for,all of the services she requested under both the Trusts and Trustees Act (760 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1994)) (the Act) and the specific terms of the Trust agreement, as well as under a theory of quantum meruit. She also argues that there was an implied contract between her and Mabel to pay her the reasonable value of the Trust services she performed for Mabel and the Trust.\nThe Lampes argue that neither the Act nor the Trust agreement authorizes compensation for trustees for non-Trust, personal services. They argue that Linda\u2019s petition was correctly denied because she persisted in claiming compensation for non-Trust, personal services as well as Trust services, and she failed to identify the Trust services with specificity, both in contravention of the trial court\u2019s order. They also argue that Linda failed to provide sufficient factual support for her claims.\nLinda argues first that the trial court had authority to award all the fees she requested, including compensation for personal services to Mabel, under sections 3 and 7 of the Act and under the terms of the Trust agreement. We disagree.\nSection 7 of the Act provides that a \u201ctrustee shall be reimbursed for all proper expenses incurred in the management and protection of the trust and shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for services rendered.\u201d 760 ILCS 5/7 (West 1994). Although Linda appears to argue that the language referring to \u201creasonable compensation for services rendered\u201d applies to the personal services she performed for Mabel, that is clearly not the case. By its terms, section 7 authorizes compensation only for services performed \u201cin the management and protection of the trust,\u201d not for personal services. See In re Butler\u2019s Trusts, 223 Minn. 196, 206, 26 N.W2d 204, 211 (Minn. 1947) (usual and normal services performed by trustee in return for compensation are \u201c[a]ll services involved in the exercise of his discretionary powers or duties in managing the trust and, in addition, certain ministerial duties\u201d such as \u201ckeeping accurate and complete bookkeeping records and *** preparing periodic administration accounts\u201d), cited with approval in Smith v. Stover, 15 Ill. App. 2d 78, 90-92, 145 N.E.2d 515, 522 (1957); see generally G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees \u00a7 980, at 189 (rev. 2d ed. 1983) (compensation of trustee is paid for administration of the trust). While services such as the monthly reviewing of financial statements or the paying of quarterly deposits for state and federal taxes might be deemed administration of the trust, other, more personal services that Linda rendered to Mabel such as taking her grocery shopping or visiting with her on a regular basis clearly are not. Section 7 does not authorize compensation to Linda as trustee for non-Trust services.\nLinda also points to section 3(1) of the Act, which provides:\n\u201cA person establishing a trust may specify in the instrument the rights, powers, duties, limitations and immunities applicable to the trustee, beneficiary and others and those provisions where not otherwise contrary to law shall control, notwithstanding this Act. The provisions of this Act apply to the trust to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the instrument.\u201d 760 ILCS 5/3(1) (West 1998).\nThus, under the foregoing language Linda contends that specific provisions in a trust agreement are valid under the Act so long as they are not contrary to law. According to Linda, there are three provisions in the instant Trust agreement that, taken together, authorize compensation to the trustee not only for regular Trust services but for the personal services she rendered to Mabel as well. We disagree here as well.\nArticle 1(C) states, approximating the language of section 7 of the Act, that the trustees \u201cshall be entitled to receive reasonable compensation for their services under this Trust\u201d and that they \u201cshall be reimbursed for reasonable expenses.\u201d Hence, article 1(C) authorizes compensation to the trustee for services provided under the Trust. Article 1(A) states that the trustees \u201cshall distribute to [Mabel] or apply for [her] benefit as much of the net income and principal of the Trust, even to the extent of exhausting principal, as they may from time-to-time [sic] determine to be required for [Mabel\u2019s] welfare, comfort and support.\u201d Further, article III(A)(5)(m) authorizes the trustee \u201c[t]o employ during [Mabel\u2019s] life any person or persons to attend to [Mabel\u2019s] maintenance, comfort, companionship, enjoyment and medical care.\u201d Although the Trust agreement authorizes the trustee to apply Trust assets for Mabel\u2019s welfare and comfort, and even authorizes the trustee to employ someone to attend to such needs, that does not mean the agreement authorizes compensation to Linda as trustee for personal services to Mabel. As already noted, such personal services are not by definition trust services. Further, if Linda in effect hired herself under article 111(A) (5) (m) to provide these services, then they cannot be trustee services since they were performed by Linda not as trustee but as individual employee who was hired by the trustee. As previously noted, what Linda seeks in this appeal is compensation for trustee\u2019s fees. In her notice of appeal, she states that she appeals from the trial court\u2019s order \u201con May 19, 1999, denying [her] Complaint for Compensation for Trustee\u2019s Fees.\u201d That \u201cComplaint\u201d is titled by Linda \u201cVerified Amended Petition for Compensation to Trustee for Services Rendered to Trust.\u201d Further, in the prayer for relief, she asks that she \u201cbe compensated for 4,150.80 hours of service as Trustee and that LINDA be paid for Trustee\u2019s services rendered to the Trust.\u201d Finally, the trial court\u2019s order of May 19, 1999, states that \u201c[Linda] Pawlarczyk\u2019s Petition for Compensation to Trustee is DENIED.\u201d Linda includes the personal services she rendered to Mabel as part of the trust services for which she seeks trustee fees, but as already noted, they cannot be such services. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Linda\u2019s claim for trustee fees for personal services to Mabel.\nNevertheless, Linda contends that the personal services she performed under article III(A) (5) (m) are Trust related because, if she had not performed them, someone else would have been employed for that purpose. She argues that the payments to that third party or parties would have exhausted the Trust estate years before Mabel\u2019s death, leaving no Trust property to be distributed to any beneficiary. We find that contention unavailing. As already noted, the personal services Linda performed for Mabel under article III (A) (5) (m) are not trust services and Linda thus cannot be compensated for them as trust services. See Butler\u2019s Trusts, 223 Minn, at 206, 26 N.W.2d at 211, cited with approval in Smith v. Stover, 15 Ill. App. 2d at 90-92, 145 N.E.2d at 522; see generally G. Bogert & G. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees \u00a7 980, at 189 (rev. 2d ed. 1983).\nThe situation is different with respect to the Trust-related services for which Linda seeks compensation. The Lampes argue that Linda\u2019s claim cannot succeed because she persisted in claiming compensation not only for Trust-related duties but for non-Trust, personal services, and she failed to identify the Trust services with specificity, thus ignoring the trial court\u2019s instructions. We disagree. It is true that when the trial court denied without prejudice Linda\u2019s initial petition for trustee fees, it noted that Linda\u2019s claims for Trust-related services were \u201cmixed in\u201d with non-Trust, personal services and that it was thus impossible to determine how much time Linda had spent \u201cpreserving the assets of the trust.\u201d The logical inference from that instruction is that, in any amended petition, Linda was at least to separate out Trust-related from non-Trust services. In her amended petition, we believe that she substantially complied with that directive. Before listing services performed for Mabel\u2019s welfare, comfort and support, she presented the following list of Trust-related services:\n\u201ca. All banking activities, cashing of pension checks, depositing checks, monthly reconciliation of checking account and monthly review of financial statements;\nc. Paying quarterly deposits for state and federal taxes;\nHi * *\nz. Upon the death of MABEL, coordinating all funeral arrangements including! ] purchasing burial clothing, ordering funeral flowers, purchasing the headstone and coordinating] all arrangements with the cemetery.\u201d\nThose items correspond to items 5(a), (c) and (z) in the affidavit attached to Linda\u2019s amended countercomplaint, items that the Lampes acknowledge (in their motion to dismiss the countercomplaint) \u201care compensable under the Act since they relate directly to the trustee\u2019s duties.\u201d It appears to us that Linda did follow the trial court\u2019s instructions, at least as to separating out Trust-related from personal services and specifically identifying the Trust-related services. Under both the Act and the Trust agreement, Linda clearly is entitled to compensation for services directly related to her duties as trustee.\nHowever, the Lampes argue that Linda nevertheless failed to provide sufficient factual support for her claims, again in contravention of the trial court\u2019s instruction. They assert that she failed to provide specific dates on which various services were performed and the time spent performing the service on each date. We find that argument unavailing. In the affidavit attached to her amended petition, Linda did list (where appropriate) the number of hours spent per month in performing each service, and in each case the total number of hours spent. \u201cThe intent of the law is that th\u00e9 trustee, in some manner, make a showing of the performance of his acts with sufficient detailed proof in connection therewith, so that the court can determine what is a fair and proper amount of compensation to be granted.\u201d Rogers v. Belt, 317 Ill. App. 81, 84, 45 N.E.2d 511, 512 (1942). It may be that what Linda provided is not \u201csufficient detailed proof\u2019 and that the dates and times noted by the Lampes would be helpful in determining an appropriate amount of compensation. Even so, we do not think the appropriate course in this case is to deny Linda\u2019s petition entirely. As already noted, she followed the trial court\u2019s instruction as to separating out the Trust-related services, even to the point of limiting that list to items that the Lampes conceded were Trust-related. If all she needs to do now is provide more factual support for the claims, that can be accomplished by giving her leave to amend. We are aware that she was given leave to amend before and still came back with a claim for non-Trust, personal services as well as legitimate Trust duties. Nevertheless, we think the fact that Linda separated out the Trust-related services shows that she made a good-faith attempt to follow the trial court\u2019s instructions. Cf. Templeton v. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co., 429 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (\u201c[I]t must appear that [the trustee] acted in bad faith as a trustee\u201d in order to justify depriving her of \u201cfees *** legitimately earned in the performance of [her] duties\u201d). Further, we are not convinced that the trial court did instruct Linda to provide dates and times spent. In any case, we think Linda should be given an opportunity to provide whatever additional support is needed as to her Trust-related services. We therefore reverse the trial court\u2019s denial of Linda\u2019s petition with respect to clearly Trust-related services and remand the cause for the purpose of giving her leave to amend her petition one more time.\nBecause of our disposition of this issue, we need not consider Linda\u2019s arguments as to implied contract and quantum meruit. We have already held that she is entitled to compensation for services clearly related to trustee duties. She seeks further compensation for personal services as trustee services, and we have already indicated that the personal services rendered to Mabel cannot be characterized as trust services. Further, none of the three cases upon which she relies for her implied contract and quantum meruit arguments involved a trustee or trustee fees.\nB. The Lampes\u2019 Appeal\nThe Lampes appeal from those portions of the trial court\u2019s orders of October 16, 1998, and May 19, 1999, denying their motion for attorney fees and their motion for reconsideration of that denial. On appeal, the Lampes argue that under Illinois law they are entitled to an award of attorney fees and that the trial court thus abused its discretion in denying their fee request. According to the Lampes, it was their efforts that protected the Trust from destruction and preserved its assets, while Linda\u2019s actions were aimed at dissipating Trust funds for her personal benefit, to the detriment of the other beneficiaries. The Lampes claim that Linda is at fault for necessitating the litigation against her and that whatever attorney fees are awarded therefore should come from her share of the Trust assets and not from the Trust assets generally. The Lampes also argue that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny their fee request without explaining the reasons for the denial.\nLinda argues that because the Lampes filed no postjudgment motion or notice of appeal within 30 days after the October 16, 1998, denial of their attorney fee request, their appeal in this case was untimely and we have no jurisdiction to hear it. Linda also argues that the Lampes neither protected the Trust nor restored it to its proper purpose. She contends that the Trust was not in danger of being destroyed and its purpose was being fulfilled; hence, she argues that the Lampes are not entitled to attorney fees.\nWe consider first Linda\u2019s contention that we lack jurisdiction to hear the Lampes\u2019 appeal. The trial court denied the Lampes\u2019 renewed motion for attorney fees on October 16, 1998. According to Linda, that decision was appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(1)). However, because the Lampes\u2019 notice of appeal was not filed until June 17, 1999, more than 30 days after the October 16 decision, she contends it was untimely. We find that argument persuasive. Under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)), a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days \u201cafter the entry of the final judgment appealed from.\u201d If a \u201ctimely post-trial motion *** is filed,\u201d then the time for filing the notice of appeal is extended to \u201cwithin 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion.\u201d 155 111. 2d R. 303(a)(1). The Lampes\u2019 motion to reconsider was a postjudgment motion, but it was not filed until December 1, 1998, more than 30 days after the October 16 judgment. Hence it was untimely under section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 1992)) and it did not toll the time for filing the notice of appeal. Cf. Benet Realty Corp. v. Lisle Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 175 Ill. App. 3d 227, 230, 529 N.E.2d 718, 720 (1988) (timely filed postjudgment motion tolls time for filing notice of appeal under Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1)). Thus the Lampes\u2019 June 17, 1999, appeal of the October 16 denial of their fee request was untimely, and we lack jurisdiction to hear it. See 155 111. 2d R. 301.\nThe Lampes argue that their appeal was timely filed because it came within 30 days after May 19, 1999, when the trial court denied their motion to reconsider and hence resolved the last pending post-judgment motion in the case. Implicit in that argument is the contention that their motion to reconsider was itself not untimely and thus tolled the period for filing a notice of appeal. That contention is based upon the Lampes\u2019 claim that the October 16, 1998, denial of their fee request was not final and appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1). Section 2 \u2014 1203 applies only to motions following final judgments, and if the October 16 ruling was not final, then there was no 30-day limit within which to file the motion to reconsider. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538-39, 470 N.E.2d 290, 291-92 (1984) (judgment that is not final cannot be attacked by motion to reconsider). We disagree with the Lampes\u2019 contentions.\nUnder Supreme Court Rule 304(a), if a final judgment disposes of fewer than all of the claims in an action (as is the case here), it is appealable only if the trial court makes an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 464, 563 N.E.2d 459, 463 (1990). Without such a finding, the trial court\u2019s order is not appealable until all of the claims have been resolved. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); Marsh, 138 Ill. 2d at 464, 563 N.E.2d at 463. No such Rule 304(a) finding was made here. However, the October 16 ruling is still appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1), which provides:\n\u201cThe following judgments and orders are appealable without the finding required for appeals under paragraph (a) of this rule:\n(1) A judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally determines a right or status of a party.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(1).\nThe trial court\u2019s October 16 decision was an order entered in the administration of an estate, and it finally determined the Lampes\u2019 rights as to their request for attorney fees. Hence, Rule 304(b)(1) applies, and the Lampes\u2019 appeal was untimely.\nThe Lampes contend that Rule 304(b)(1) does not apply to privately administered trusts and therefore is inapplicable here. They rely upon In re Estate of Nicholson, 268 Ill. App. 3d 689, 644 N.E.2d 47 (1994), and Yardley v. Yardley, 137 Ill. App. 3d 747, 484 N.E.2d 873 (1985), but their reliance is misplaced. In Nicholson, the plaintiff, who was the son and sole heir of the decedent, sued The Northern Trust Company (Northern), which served as executor under the decedent\u2019s will and as successor trustee under his declaration of trust. The plaintiff pled eight counts alleging that the will and trust were invalid. Northern\u2019s motion to dismiss was granted as to all counts, but the plaintiff was given leave to replead one of the counts pertaining to the will. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the other seven counts. The appellate court held that the appeal was premature, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that there was jurisdiction under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1). Focusing first on the trust counts, the court held:\n\u201c[T]his rule does not apply to the counts involving the trust because this trust is not a \u2018similar proceeding\u2019 involving comprehensive court administration of an estate. The trust is being administered privately, out of court, without any court involvement such as court-approved administrators or a requirement of a final accounting to the court.\u201d Nicholson, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 693, 664 N.E.2d at 50.\nThe Lampes argue that here, just as in Nicholson, their claims arise from a privately administered trust and that Rule 304(b)(1) does not apply. However, even though the trust in the instant case may have been privately administered, there was court involvement of the very type referred to by the Nicholson court: Linda was ordered by the trial court to submit an accounting of the Trust.\nThe situation is the same with Yardley, where the plaintiff filed a six-count complaint against The Northern Trust Company (Northern) and two other defendants, individually and as trustees. The trial court dismissed five of the six counts (count I survived), in which the plaintiff sought various remedies against the defendants in connection with their administration of certain trusts. Subsequently the trial court denied the plaintiffs motion to vacate the dismissal, refusing to make a Rule 304(a) finding that there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal. The plaintiff appealed the order of dismissal (of the five counts) within 30 days of that denial but before judgment was entered on count I. Northern moved to dismiss the appeal as premature. Later, after judgment was entered in the plaintiffs favor on count I, she filed a second appeal of the dismissal order. The appellate court accepted jurisdiction over the second appeal but found that the first was premature, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that the appeal was timely filed under Rule 304(b)(1). The court explained:\n\u201cThe trusts involved in this case were not being administered in comprehensive court proceedings like estate or guardianship proceedings. They were being administered privately, out of court, by defendant trustees. Moreover, the trustees were not court-approved administrators required to settle various claims, and to make a final accounting to the court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Yardley, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 751, 484 N.E.2d at 876.\nOnce again, we note that in the instant case, unlike Yardley, Linda was ordered to submit an accounting of the Trust. We therefore find that the Trust in the instant case was not privately administered within the meaning of Nicholson and Yardley but was instead public to an extent sufficient for Rule 304(b)(1) to apply.\nThe Lampes also argue that Rule 304(b)(1) does not apply because their fee request was collateral or incidental to the principal action in the case. According to the Lampes, because the fee request itself (and its subsequent denial) were only indirectly related to the complaint against Linda, there is no danger that delaying the appeal of such an incidental ruling (until all the claims are resolved) would mean the entire case had to be reopened. See People ex rel. A.M. v. Herlinda M., 221 Ill. App. 3d 957, 964, 583 N.E.2d 36, 40 (1991). There is thus no reason for the immediate appealability provided under Rule 304(b)(1). We find that argument unpersuasive.\nThe court in In re Estate of Kime, 95 Ill. App. 3d 262, 419 N.E.2d 1246 (1981), upon which Linda relies, found that Rule 304(b)(1) did apply to a fee request very similar to the Lampes\u2019. We find that case instructive. The petitioner in Kime brought suit against her family members, alleging that certain grain and livestock possessed by those respondent family members were in fact owned by her deceased father at the time of his death and not by a partnership between her father and the respondents. The trial court found that the property was owned by the father and not by the partnership and directed the executors to inventory it as part of the father\u2019s estate. Subsequently the petitioner sought attorney fees and costs from the estate, based upon the alleged benefit to the estate resulting from her attorney\u2019s efforts in the earlier proceeding. The trial court denied the petition for fees and costs on November 28, 1979. More than six months later, on June 26, 1980, the petitioner appealed that denial as well as five other orders relating to the estate. The petitioner conceded that her appeal of the two earliest orders might be time-barred under Rule 304(b)(1), but she argued that three of the other orders, including the denial of the fee request, did not fall under that rule because they did not finally determine the right or status of a party. The appellate court rejected that argument with respect to the fee denial and one other order. Referring to the fee denial, the court held that it was a final determination that the petitioner and her attorney were not entitled to attorney fees and costs based upon their efforts in the earlier, property proceeding. \u201cAs such, under Rule 304(b)(1), if an appeal was desired from that order, it was incumbent upon petitioner *** to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of November 28, 1979.\u201d Kime, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 268, 419 N.E.2d at 1250. The court held that because no such timely appeal was filed, the court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.\nIn reaching that conclusion, the court in Kime discussed the rationale for allowing certain orders in an estate proceeding to be appealed under Rule 304(b)(1) without a Rule 304(a) finding. The court stated:\n\u201cA central reason behind making the time for appeal of such orders mandatory, and not optional, is that certainty as to some issues is a necessity during the lengthy procedure of estate administration. Little imagination is needed to conjure up the intolerable consequences of permitting a party, at his option, to wait until an estate administration is concluded before appealing an order, entered perhaps several years previously, which denied a motion to remove an executor or allowed a claim against the estate. In such circumstances, were an appellant successful, then the entire administration might have to be begun again. Thus, in the interests of efficiency and the sound and practical administration of estates, orders in estate proceedings must be appealed within 30 days from entry when they finally determine the right or status of a party, even though they are preliminary to a final settlement of estate proceedings.\u201d Kime, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 268, 419 N.E.2d at 1250.\nThe Lampes argue for a distinction in the application of Rule 304(b)(1), contending in essence that a fee request in an estate proceeding that is collateral to the main action should not fall within the scope of the rule even if its denial does finally determine a party\u2019s right to attorney fees. We disagree.\nOur reading of the rationale presented in Kime is that no such distinction is to be made. Under Rule 304(b)(1), \u201c[a] judgment or order entered in the administration of an estate, guardianship, or similar proceeding which finally determines a right or status of a party\u201d is appealable without a Rule 304(a) finding. 155 111. 2d R. 304(b)(1). The rule itself makes no such distinction for collateral rulings, and neither does Kime. We therefore find that Rule 304(b)(1) does apply to the Lampes\u2019 fee request and its denial. Just as in Kime, the trial court\u2019s October 16 decision here was a final determination that the Lampes had no right to attorney fees. Thus their motion to reconsider, coming more than 30 days later, was untimely under section 2 \u2014 1203. It did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal, and the Lampes\u2019 subsequently filed notice of appeal (June 17, 1999) was therefore untimely as well. We do not have jurisdiction to hear the Lampes\u2019 appeal of the October 16 denial of their fee request.\nEven if we were to accept the collateralness distinction argued by the Lampes, there still would be no jurisdiction. A close reading of Herlinda, upon which the Lampes rely, shows that their fee request is not collateral within the meaning of that case. In Herlinda, the public guardian of Cook County sought attorney fees for its representation of minors as a guardian ad litem in a child abuse proceeding. The request was pursuant to section 2 \u2014 17(5) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 17(5)), which provided:\n\u201cThe reasonable fees of a guardian ad litem appointed under this Section shall be fixed by the court and charged to the parents of the minor, to the extent they are able to pay. If the parents are unable to pay those fees, they shall be paid from the general fund of the county.\u201d Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, par. 802 \u2014 17(5).\nThe trial court denied the request, holding that section 2 \u2014 17(5) applied only to private attorneys and not to the public guardian. On appeal, the public guardian argued initially that the denial of its fee request was appealable under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1), but the appellate court disagreed. The court noted that fee requests generally are \u201ccollateral or incidental to the principal action,\u201d adding that it did not believe \u201cthe denial of the fee request in this case is the type of decision contemplated by Rule 304(b)(1) as interpreted by Kime.\u201d Herlinda, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 964, 583 N.E.2d at 40. The court explained:\n\u201cThere is no danger that the trial court\u2019s denial of fees will cause the entire proceeding to be relitigated. After all, the very reason fee requests are deemed to be collateral is that the issues involved in adjudicating such requests largely lie outside the issues involved in the principal action.\u201d Herlinda, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 964, 583 N.E.2d at 40.\nThe fee request in Herlinda is indeed unlike the request in Kime. In Herlinda, the request is pursuant to a statute that focuses essentially on the award of fees. It states simply that the reasonable fees of a guardian ad litem \u201cappointed under this Section\u201d are to be fixed by the court and charged to the parents of the minor. In Kime, however, the request was based upon the alleged benefit to the petitioner\u2019s father\u2019s estate arising from her attorney\u2019s efforts in a proceeding that resulted in property being added to the estate. The issues involved in adjudicating the fee request in Kime, unlike Herlinda, did not \u201clie outside the issues involved in the principal action.\u201d Herlinda, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 964, 583 N.E.2d at 40. Indeed, they invoked essentially the same issues as in the principal action. Further, the situation in the instant case is almost exactly on point with Kime but unlike that in Herlinda. The Lampes\u2019 fee request is not pursuant to a statute such as the one in Herlinda. Instead, the Lampes seek attorney fees based upon the alleged benefit to the Trust that resulted from their efforts. According to the Lampes, they \u201csaved the trust from destruction and preserved the trust assets.\u201d Hence, the issues involved in adjudicating their fee request are the same as the central issues in their action against Linda. Accordingly, contrary to the Lampes\u2019 contention, their fee request is not collateral or incidental to the principal action here, and it falls under the scope of Rule 304(b)(1).\nWe also find that we have no jurisdiction to consider the Lampes\u2019 appeal of the May 19, 1999, denial of their motion to reconsider. Because that motion was untimely, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear it, and therefore the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to reconsider is itself void for lack of jurisdiction. See Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 238, 579 N.E.2d 824, 827 (1991) (\u201ctrial court loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify its judgment 30 days after entry of judgment [citations] unless a timely post-judgment motion is filed\u201d); In re Application of the County Treasurer & Ex-Officio County Collector of Cook County for Judgment & Order of Sale Against Real Estate Returned Delinquent for the Nonpayment of General Taxes for 1984, 208 Ill. App. 3d 561, 563-64, 567 N.E.2d 486, 488 (1990) (trial court\u2019s denial of motion to reconsider is void for lack of jurisdiction where motion itself was untimely filed). Therefore, we lack jurisdiction to hear the Lampes\u2019 appeal of the May 19, 1999, denial of their motion to reconsider. Cf. Phoenix Bond, 208 Ill. App. 3d at 563, 564, 567 N.E.2d at 488-89 (where trial court\u2019s initial order included Rule 304(a) finding and where motion to reconsider was untimely filed, appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear appeal of trial court\u2019s denial of that motion even though appeal was filed within 30 days of the denial).\nFor the reasons set forth above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s denial of Linda\u2019s petition for trustee fees insofar as it applies to personal services to Mabel, but reverse as to the denial of fees for Trust-related services and remand for further consideration of the latter issue. We dismiss the Lampes\u2019 appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We note further that, even if there were jurisdiction, it would be unnecessary to consider the merits of the Lampes\u2019 request for fees. As previously noted, the issues involved in adjudicating that request are the same as the central issues in the Lampes\u2019 complaint against Linda. Because we reversed in part the trial court\u2019s decision in favor of the Lampes on Linda\u2019s complaint, the issues as to the Lampes\u2019 fee request would in any event have to be reconsidered even if the trial court\u2019s determination with respect to them would also have favored the Lampes.\nThe appeal of Linda Pawlarczyk (No. 1\u201499\u20142276) is affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nThe appeal of Warren R. Lampe et al. (No. 1\u201499\u20142251) is dismissed.\nNo. 1\u201499\u20142276, Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nNo. 1\u201499\u20142251, Dismissed.\nMcNULTY and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.\nLinda, acting individually, previously filed this claim on September 17, 1997, as a separate complaint against the Lampes and herself, acting as Trust beneficiary and trustee. The case was dismissed pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure because there was \u201canother action [the Lampes\u2019 complaint against Linda] pending between the same parties for the same cause.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (West 1994). On December 5, 1997, the trial court allowed Linda to refile the complaint as her countercomplaint in the Lampes\u2019 suit.\nWe note that in their response to Linda\u2019s earlier petition for compensation to trustee, the Lampes acknowledged that most of these services were \u201ccompensable under the Trust[s] and Trustees act or the trust instrument.\u201d\nIn the countercomplaint, Linda refers to this period as \u201cfrom the inception of the Trust until April, 1996,\u201d but \u201c1996\u201d clearly is a typographical error.\nAs was the case with the listing in count I of the amended countercomplaint, here too the Lampes acknowledged (in their motion to dismiss Linda\u2019s amended countercomplaint) that those items \u201care compensable under the Act since they relate directly to the trustee\u2019s duties.\u201d In the motion to dismiss the amended countercomplaint, the specific items to which the Lampes referred were a, c and z of paragraph 5 of the affidavit attached to Linda\u2019s amended countercomplaint. Items a, c and z of paragraph 5 of that affidavit are identical to items a, c and e in count I of the amended countercomplaint and to the three items included in the abbreviated list included in the amended petition for compensation to trustee.\nThe Lampes also contend that Linda waived any right to a trustee\u2019s fee because in the nearly eight years that she served as trustee she never submitted an accounting of her services, never billed the Trust estate, and never took a fee. The Lampes cite no case authority (or any other authority) to support that position, and we are aware of no authority that does. We therefore disregard it.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Randy J. Curato and Edward M. Graham, both of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, of Chicago, for appellants.", "Sandra K. Burns, of Law Offices of Sandra K. Burns, Ltd., of River Forest, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WARREN R. LAMPE et al., Beneficiaries u/t/a of Mabel R. Triner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LINDA R. PAWLARCZYK, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 1\u201499\u20142251, 1\u201499\u20142276 cons.\nOpinion filed May 30, 2000.\nRandy J. Curato and Edward M. Graham, both of Bell, Boyd & Lloyd, of Chicago, for appellants.\nSandra K. Burns, of Law Offices of Sandra K. Burns, Ltd., of River Forest, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0455-01", "first_page_order": 473, "last_page_order": 494 }