{ "id": 140364, "name": "In re E.B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christa Burns, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Burns", "decision_date": "2000-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201499\u20140612", "first_page": "712", "last_page": "720", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 712" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352929 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198915 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 165", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 994", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725017 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0994-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 46", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596934 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259-60" }, { "page": "259" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477021 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" }, { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0218-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 749, "char_count": 20092, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.427254189765559e-08, "percentile": 0.4436480659683248 }, "sha256": "69313361e1df4210966a089d2b0e942ba088a239f75c2e1008bf2a7fe0841bb8", "simhash": "1:32e8111e73ef9562", "word_count": 3211 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:48:47.280070+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re E.B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christa Burns, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn October 1998, respondent mother stipulated to a neglect petition that alleged her children were in an injurious environment because she exposed the children to the risk of sexual abuse. The court continued the case under supervision (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 20 (West 1998)) at the recommendation of the State and the agreement of all parties.\nIn May 1999, the trial court sua sponte entered an adjudicatory order finding respondent\u2019s children neglected. However, no petition to terminate continuance of the case under supervision had been filed, and the court held no hearing to terminate the continuance under supervision. In June 1999, the court held a dispositional hearing, found the children neglected, and removed custody and guardianship from respondent parents and placed them with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondent mother appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court entered the May 1999 adjudicatory order in a constitutionally defective manner and in violation of state law; (2) the court\u2019s decision to terminate continuance under supervision and remove custody and guardianship from respondent was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) respondent received ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree that the trial court entered the adjudicatory order in a manner that was inconsistent with the statute and reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nBoth parents appealed the trial court\u2019s order removing custody and guardianship, docketed Nos. 4 \u2014 99\u20140596 (respondent father) and 4 \u2014 99\u20140612 (respondent mother). This opinion addresses only the mother\u2019s appeal, No. 4 \u2014 99\u20140612. Facts relating to the respondent father are discussed for the purpose of clarity.\nRespondents Christa and Robert Burns are the biological parents of E.B., born September 25, 1992, and WB., born December 11, 1994. DCFS received the following five indicated reports of abuse prior to filing the neglect petition in this case.\nIn March 1995, DCFS received a hot-line report alleging inadequate supervision due to respondent father being intoxicated while babysitting for the children. In March 1996, DCFS received a hot-line report alleging risk of harm to the children by respondent father.\nIn September 1997, DCFS received a hot-line report alleging that an uncle sexually molested E.B. DCFS opened a file on the family in October 1997 in response to this report.\nIn June 1998, DCFS received a hot-line report alleging inadequate and inappropriate supervision of the children based on respondent mother\u2019s inability to prevent five-year-old E.B. from sexually acting out with three-year-old W.B.\nIn July 1998, DCFS received an additional hot-line report alleging risk of sexual harm to E.B. and W.B. because a convicted sex offender resided with the children.\nIn August 1998, the State filed a two-count petition pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(1)(b) (West 1998)), alleging that the children\u2019s environment was injurious to their welfare because the environment exposed the children to sexual abuse (count I) and alcohol abuse (count II).\nIn September 1998, the trial court held a shelter-care hearing. The court found probable cause for the allegations in the petition and set an adjudicatory hearing. However, custody of the children remained with respondent mother.\nIn October 1998, the trial court held an adjudicatory hearing. Respondent mother initially agreed to stipulate to the petition on the condition that the case would be continued under supervision pursuant to section 2 \u2014 20 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 20 (West 1998)). The trial court would not accept a conditional stipulation, however, because it wanted to know the facts of the case before agreeing to continuance under supervision. The trial court also informed the parties that their decision to stipulate to the facts or waive a hearing was completely independent of, and would have no impact on, whether the court granted continuance under supervision.\nAfter additional discussion with counsel, respondent mother once again agreed to stipulate to count I. The State struck respondent father\u2019s name from count I of the petition and withdrew count II. Respondent father then waived a hearing on count I and agreed to the court taking judicial notice of respondent mother\u2019s stipulation. The court continued the matter under supervision at the recommendation of the State and with the agreement of all parties. The trial court based its order continuing the case under supervision on the condition that respondents \u201ccooperate fully and completely with [DCFS].\u201d The court then set the matter for a status review in April 1999.\nThe docket entries show at least two continuances in April 1999. The docket entries reveal that respondent mother\u2019s counsel was unavailable for the first review date and that respondent father was unavailable at the second review date. The trial court continued the matter until May 1999.\nIn May 1999, respondent father\u2019s attorney again moved for a continuance because DCFS failed to file its report on time. The transcript reveals that no party objected to the respondent father\u2019s motion, and the court continued the matter until June 1999. No other issues were discussed.\nLater that same day in May 1999, the trial court inexplicably entered an adjudicatory order finding \u201c[b]y a preponderance of the evidence and by clear and convincing evidence, the minors have an environment injurious to their welfare by reason of said environment exposting] the minors to risk of sexual abuse [because] respondent mother allowed Robert Skaggs, [knowing that Skaggs was] a convicted child molester, to live in the home with the minors for a minimum of two weeks.\u201d However, no docket entry reveals that any party filed a petition to terminate continuance of the case under supervision, and nothing in the record shows that an adjudicatory hearing took place prior to entry of the court\u2019s order terminating respondents\u2019 supervision.\nIn June 1999, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. The trial court asked if each party had received DCFS\u2019 reports dated April, May, and June 1999. Both respondents\u2019 counsel asserted that they had received the reports and had no additions, corrections, or additional evidence to present.\nThe reports described the case history to date and briefly reviewed the previously described indicated reports. The reports also informed the court that respondent father had pleaded guilty to aggravated battery to a child and was at that time serving an eight-year sentence on that offense. Respondent father was due to be released in April 2000. The reports stated that respondent father maintained his innocence.\nThe reports also revealed that two separate indicated reports involving the respondent father\u2019s paramour\u2019s children were filed against respondent father for (1) sexual abuse to a child in May 1997 and (2) risk of harm to a child in March 1996. Respondent father asserted, however, that he never previously received notice of these indicated reports and planned on filing an appeal with DCFS because he disputed the factual basis for each.\nThe respondent mother generally received a favorable review in all of the reports. The reports referred to respondent mother\u2019s continued \u201cwillingness to work cooperatively with the Department in insuring her children are safe from future victimization and receive the support services they need.\u201d However, the May and June reports also .expressed a great deal of concern over the respondent mother\u2019s continued belief that her husband is innocent of all charges and indicated reports.\nThe May and June reports concluded by expressing concern over the lack of counseling that respondent father had received while incarcerated. The May report specifically suggested that respondent father\u2019s denial and minimization of his behaviors and the consequence of his behaviors posed a significant problem. The report recommended that custody and guardianship be awarded to DCFS based primarily on the fact that (1) respondent father had received no services and continued to maintain his innocence on the charged offenses and indicated reports, and (2) respondent mother continued to believe in her husband\u2019s innocence and desired to reintegrate her husband into the family upon his release from prison.\nPrior to rendering its decision at the dispositional hearing, the court stated:\n\u201cThe \u2014 first of all counsel, I don\u2019t know if I mentioned this. This has been continued several times. I did enter an adjudicatory order in this cause back on May 27, 1999. I don\u2019t know if copies got distributed. All right. They did? All right. I just want to verify that.\nSecond clean! ]up matter, I don\u2019t know if I \u2014 when we had the initial hearing as to the possibility of continuing the court supervision!,] if I specifically enunciated my reasons for not wishing to grant supervision in this matter, so I thought I would at least review that today.\nFirst of all, there was an objection by one of the parties, and obviously that knocks out any possibility of supervision, but for the sake of the record, I will also note that I believe the respondent mother may have been doing all that she could, but that was not enough at that point. The case had been previously under supervision for six months and had not been resolved.\u201d\nThe court then asserted that it concurred with the more recent DCFS reports\u2019 concerns regarding respondent mother\u2019s continuing relationship with respondent father.\nImmediately following the court\u2019s comments, the State agreed with the court\u2019s reasons for previously terminating continuance of the case under supervision and asserted that \u201cthe court has to find both of these parents unfit.\u201d The State asked the court to adopt the June report\u2019s recommendations and remove custody of the children from respondent mother. The parties failed to challenge the court\u2019s recall of events regarding its continuance of the case under supervision even though the record clearly demonstrates that no party had previously objected to continuance under supervision.\nShortly after the dispositional hearing concluded, the trial court entered a written order finding the children neglected and making each a ward of the court. The court further found that respondent parents were \u201cunfit for reasons other than financial circumstances alone\u201d and that removing custody from respondent parents was in the children\u2019s best interests. The trial court set a permanency hearing for December 1999. Respondent mother appealed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nRespondent mother first argues that the trial court entered the adjudicatory order in a constitutionally defective manner and in violation of state law. Respondent mother specifically asserts that the trial court erred when it terminated continuance of the case under supervision without a petition to terminate the continuance under supervision being filed or a hearing being held, as required by section 2 \u2014 20(5) of the Act. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 20(5) (West 1998). Respondent mother additionally asserts that the trial court violated her constitutional rights to due process (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2) when it terminated continuance of the case under supervision without notice or the opportunity to be heard.\nIn response, the State argues that section 2 \u2014 20(5) of the Act does not apply because the State objected to continuance under supervision during the June 1999 dispositional hearing. The State additionally asserts that section 2 \u2014 20(5) applies only \u201cif\u201d a petition charging a violation of supervision is filed. The State concludes, therefore, that (1) a court may terminate supervision without a petition to terminate continuance under supervision being filed, and (2) any objection by the State after continuance under supervision eliminates the need for a hearing under section 2 \u2014 20(5).\nThe basic issue before this court is whether a trial court may terminate continuance of a case under section 2 \u2014 20 without a petition to terminate such continuance under supervision having been filed or a hearing to terminate such continuance under supervision. A court may not do so.\nThe preeminent rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the language and intent of the legislature. People v. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d 218, 222, 647 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (1995). To accomplish this goal, words used in the statutory provision should be given their plain and ordinary meaning. Hicks, 164 Ill. 2d at 222, 647 N.E.2d at 259. A court must consider every part of the statute together, therefore, and give every word or phrase some reasonable meaning. People v. Bubolz, 288 Ill. App. 3d 46, 47, 679 N.E.2d 854, 855 (1997). Statutes are to be construed so that no clause is superfluous or void. In re Marriage .of Stevens, 292 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1001, 687 N.E.2d 165, 169 (1997). In addition, a court must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result. People v. Coleman, 166 Ill. 2d 247, 253, 652 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1995).\nThe plain language of the statute supports respondent mother\u2019s argument that the trial court terminated continuance of the case under supervision and entered its adjudicatory order in violation of state law. Section 2 \u2014 20 states:\n\u201c(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision (a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent *** of the facts supporting the petition and before proceeding to findings and adjudication, or after hearing the evidence at the adjudicatory hearing but before noting in the minutes of proceeding a finding of whether or not the minor is abused, neglected or dependent; and (b) in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his parent, guardian, custodian, responsible relative, defense attorney!,] or the State\u2019s Attorney.\n(2) If the minor, his parent, guardian, custodian, responsible relative, defense attorney!,] or the State\u2019s Attorney, objects in open court to any such continuance and insists upon proceeding to findings and adjudication, the court shall so proceed.\n* * *\n(5) If a petition is filed charging a violation of a condition of the continuance under supervision, the court shall conduct a hearing. If the court finds that such condition of supervision has not been fulfilled the court may proceed to findings and adjudication and disposition.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 20 (West 1998).\nThe plain language of section 2 \u2014 20(1) clearly requires that any objection to supervision must be made in open court \u201cbefore\u201d the continuance of the case under supervision. The State argues, however, that a later objection to continuance under supervision after continuance under supervision is granted also eliminates the need for either a petition or a hearing under section 2 \u2014 20(5). We disagree. Moreover, even if this proposed interpretation were correct, the State did not voice any objection to the continuance under supervision until almost one month after the court terminated the continuance of the case under supervision, providing little support for the court\u2019s terminating the continuance under supervision about a month earlier without a petition being filed or a hearing being held.\n\u20222 In the present case, the only condition that the trial court imposed in its order continuing the case under supervision required respondents to \u201ccooperate fully and completely with [DCFS].\u201d Section 2 \u2014 20(5) of the Act states that \u201c[i]f the court finds that such condition of supervision has not been fulfilled the court may proceed to findings and adjudication and disposition.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 20(5) (West 1998). However, section 2 \u2014 20(5) also requires that \u201cthe court shall conduct a hearing\u201d prior to making a finding of noncompliance with a condition of supervision. 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 20(5) (West 1998).\nThe court clearly did not hold a hearing to determine whether the parents were cooperating fully and completely with DCFS prior to terminating continuance of the case under supervision. Instead, the trial judge sua sponte terminated continuance under supervision in response to the May 1999 status report from DCFS. The trial court terminated continuance under supervision, therefore, prior to any objection in open court \u2014 without the benefit of a petition alleging a violation of a condition of continuance under supervision and without the benefit of hearing to determine whether any allegations in the status report were true.\nDue process requires adequate notice to a minor\u2019s parents prior to a juvenile proceeding. In re C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d 770, 778, 706 N.E.2d 123, 129 (1999). Section 1 \u2014 5(1) of the Act states that the parents of a minor who is subject to a proceeding under the Act have \u201cthe right to be present, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, [and] to examine pertinent court files and records.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 5(1) (West 1998). The State\u2019s proffered interpretation of the Act, therefore, is not only inconsistent with section 2 \u2014 20(5), but also with section 1 \u2014 5(1), because it would allow continuance of the case under supervision to be terminated without notice or an opportunity to be heard.\nThe trial court\u2019s alarm in the face of this situation is understandable. Regrettably, the State did not undertake appropriate action to terminate the continuance under supervision. However, the Act requires that respondents be provided with notice and a hearing as to whether respondents violated any conditions prior to terminating the continuance of the case under supervision. On remand, the State may file a petition to terminate the continuance under supervision and proceed accordingly.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" }, { "text": "COOK, P.J.,\nconcurs.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "COOK, P.J.," }, { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH,\ndissenting:\nOn June 18, 1999, the State\u2019s Attorney, the guardian ad litem (GAL), the respondent mother and her attorney, the respondent father and his attorney, and DCFS by its attorney were present before the court. The court stated the cause was \u201ccalled for dispositional hearing.\u201d The trial court then stated the entry of the adjudicatory order on May 29, 1999. It then reviewed various reports that had been filed. In response, the State, the GAL, respondent mother\u2019s attorney, and respondent father\u2019s attorney stated that they had \u201cno additions, corrections or additional evidence.\u201d Each party was given an opportunity to address the reports and make recommendations. The trial court then made a detailed and expansive statement concerning its order appointing DCFS as guardian, advised the parties of their right to appeal, and set the matter for a permanency hearing.\nNone of the parties objected to proceeding with the dispositional hearing. No party then objected to any failure to comply with section 2 \u2014 20 of the Act. The majority suggests that no hearing was held concerning the cooperation of the parents with DCFS. I believe a review of the record shows the trial court had the reports of DCFS, had the benefit of all the parties\u2019 input with respect to those reports, provided each party an opportunity to present additional evidence, and made its detailed findings. The trial court\u2019s actions were not inconsistent with section 2 \u2014 20(5) or section 1 \u2014 5(1) of the Act. The parties were present, given an opportunity to be heard, and given all of the rights set forth in section 1 \u2014 5(1) of the Act.\nI would affirm the trial court\u2019s decision.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "James B. Kuehl, of Thomas A. Bruno & Associates, of Urbana, for appellant.", "John C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re E.B. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christa Burns, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201499\u20140612\nOpinion filed June 29, 2000.\nMcCULLOUGH, J., dissenting.\nJames B. Kuehl, of Thomas A. Bruno & Associates, of Urbana, for appellant.\nJohn C. Piland, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and James C. Majors, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0712-01", "first_page_order": 730, "last_page_order": 738 }