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  "name": "In re GEORGE O., Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. George O., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. George O.",
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    "parties": [
      "In re GEORGE O., Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. George O., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE KOEHLER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe respondent, George O., appeals from the Peoria County circuit court\u2019s final order that he was subject to involuntary admission and ordering him hospitalized in the Zeller Mental Health Institute for 30 days. This court must decide the following question: Does the State\u2019s failure to establish that it strictly complied with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code\u2019s (405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 1994)) mandatory involuntary admission procedural safeguards warrant a reversal? Because we conclude that the State\u2019s noncompliance with the statutorily prescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the circuit court\u2019s judgment erroneous, we reverse.\nFACTS\nOn February 23, 1999, respondent George O.\u2019s sister executed a petition for his emergency involuntary admission (the petition) pursuant to section 3 \u2014 601 of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (the Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601 (West 1992)). At 1:50 a.m. on February 24, Robert Johnston, M.D., executed a certificate pursuant to section 3 \u2014 602 (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 602 (West 1992)), but he failed to name George O. on the certificate. At 4 a.m., the Illinois Valley Community Hospital admitted George O. In this first certificate, Dr. Johnston stated that the unnamed individual was mentally ill and reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm on himself or another and unable to care for his basic needs, but he did not indicate that the individual was in need of immediate hospitalization and subject to involuntary admission. Later that day, the hospital timely filed the petition in La Salle County circuit court. At 2:15 p.m. that day, D. Hinshaw, M.D., examined George O. and executed a second certificate.\nOn February 25, George O.\u2019s cause was transferred to Peoria County circuit court, where the petition and the two above-mentioned medical certificates were filed at 3:24 p.m. Athena Guzman, M.D., filed a third medical certificate on February 26 at 11 a.m., reflecting her examination of George O. that occurred at 2 p.m. on February 25, in Peoria at Zeller Mental Health Institute (Zeller). The Peoria County circuit court appointed counsel for George O. After a March 3 hearing, during which George O. and Dr. Jayalakshmi Attaluri, George\u2019s treating psychiatrist at Zeller, testified, the circuit court concluded that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that George O. had a serious mental illness and that it could reasonably be expected that, if George O. were discharged, he would inflict serious harm to himself in the near future. Consequently, the circuit court found George O. subject to involuntary admission and ordered him hospitalized in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities for 30 days. George O. appeals.\nANALYSIS\nAt the outset, we note that our standard of review is de novo, as the issue before this court involves a question of law. People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551, 708 N.E.2d 372, 374 (1999).\n\u201cInvoluntary admission procedures represent the legislature\u2019s attempt to balance the individual\u2019s interest in liberty against society\u2019s dual interests in protecting itself from dangerous mentally ill persons and caring for those who are unable to care for themselves. [Citation.] The Code\u2019s procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities. [Citation.] Rather, they are essential tools to safeguard the liberty interests of respondents in mental health cases. [Citation.] Because involuntary admission proceedings pose a grave threat to an individual\u2019s liberty interests, the Code\u2019s procedural safeguards should be strictly construed in favor of the respondent. [Citation.]\u201d In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 964-65, 667 N.E.2d 720, 725 (1996).\nGeorge O. contends that the circuit court\u2019s order finding him subject to involuntary admission must be reversed because the State (1) failed to comply with section 3 \u2014 602 when the first certificate required by this section did not state his name, that he was subject to involuntary commitment, and that he required immediate hospitalization; (2) failed to show that he had been examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours after admission as required by section 3 \u2014 610; and (3) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was subject to involuntary admission.\nThe State conversely maintains that (1) the circuit court\u2019s order was proper, as clear and convincing evidence established by Dr. Attaluri\u2019s testimony showed that George O. was subject to involuntary admission because he suffered from a severe mental illness and, due to his past abuse of alcohol, depression, suicidal ideations, access to firearms and marital difficulties, he was reasonably expected to inflict serious harm on himself or another in the near future; (2) George O. waived his right to appeal any procedural deficiencies when he failed to preserve the issue in the circuit court; and (3), in the alternative, the circuit court had jurisdiction and any procedural deficiency did not prejudice George O. and was, therefore, harmless.\nSection 3 \u2014 602 of Article VI, governing emergency admissions by certification under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, provides:\n\u201cThe petition shall be accompanied by a certificate executed by a physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist which states that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission and r\u00e9quires immediate hospitalization. The certificate shall indicate that the physician, qualified examiner, or clinical psychologist personally examined the respondent not more that 72 hours prior to admission. It shall also contain the physician\u2019s, qualified examiner\u2019s, or clinical psychologist\u2019s clinical observations, other factual information relied upon in reaching a diagnosis, and a statement as to whether the respondent was advised of his rights under Section 3 \u2014 208.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 602 (West 1992).\nSection 3 \u2014 604 states:\n\u201cNo person detained for examination under this Article on the basis of a petition alone may be held for more than 24 hours unless within that period a certificate is furnished to or by the mental health facility. If no certificate is furnished, the respondent shall be released forthwith.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 604 (West 1992).\nFurther, section 3 \u2014 610 prescribes:\n\u201cAs soon as possible but not later than 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after admission of a respondent pursuant to this Article, the respondent shall be examined by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist may be a member of the staff of the facility but shall not be the person who executed the first certificate. If the respondent is not examined or if the psychiatrist does not execute a certificate pursuant to Section 3 \u2014 602, the respondent shall be released forthwith.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 610 (West 1992).\nLast, we note section 3 \u2014 611, which states:\n\u201cWithin 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after the respondent\u2019s admission under this Article, the facility director of the facility shall file 2 copies of the petition, the first certificate, and proof of service of the petition and statement of rights upon the respondent with the court in the county in which the facility is located. Upon completion of the second certificate, the facility director shall promptly file it with the court. The facility director shall make copies of the certificates available to the attorneys for the parties upon request. Upon the filing of the petition and first certificate, the court shall set a hearing to be held within 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, after receipt of the petition. The court shall direct that notice of the time and place of the hearing be served upon the respondent, his responsible relatives, and the persons entitled to receive a copy of the petition pursuant to Section 3 \u2014 609.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 611 (West 1992).\nIn the instant case, the first certificate signed by Dr. Johnston and required by section 3 \u2014 602 did not include George O.\u2019s name and failed to state that he was subject to involuntary admission and required immediate hospitalization. Accordingly, we conclude that section 3 \u2014 602, which, when strictly construed, requires that such a statement be contained within this first certificate, was not satisfied. In addition, sections 3 \u2014 602 and 3 \u2014 611, strictly construed, require the first certificate to be filed with the petition, while section 3 \u2014 604 additionally prohibits any person from being detained on the basis of a petition alone beyond 24 hours unless the mental health facility furnishes or is furnished this first certificate. Although the petition was timely filed in La Salle County, the record shows that this first certificate required by section 3 \u2014 602 was filed after the cause was transferred to Peoria County \u2014 more than 24 hours after the respondent was admitted. When such certificate is not furnished within 24 hours after admission, the respondent \u201cshall be released forthwith.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 604 (West 1992).\nSection 3 \u2014 610 requires that a psychiatrist must examine the respondent no later than 24 hours after he is admitted. 405 ILCS 5/3\u2014 610 (West 1992). The psychiatrist who conducts this examination must execute a certificate similar to that required by section 3 \u2014 602 and may not be the same individual who executed the first certificate. Again, we note that the record only shows that the first and second certificates were filed when the cause was transferred to Peoria County. Since the cause was not transferred by 4 a.m. on February 25 \u2014 within 24 hours after George O.\u2019s admission \u2014 but at 3:24 p.m. on February 25, we likewise conclude that the second certificate was not properly filed as section 3 \u2014 610, strictly construed, required.\nAdditionally, with regard to the section 3 \u2014 610 mandatory requirement that the second certificate be executed by a psychiatrist, the State concedes that the record does not identify Dr. Hinshaw as a psychiatrist but argues that it is reasonable to presume he is a psychiatrist since he is a medical doctor who practices at the mental health facility. Courts should not engage in speculation to reach such a presumption. See Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 965, 667 N.E.2d at 725. The record at bar does not provide us with enough information to conclude with certainty that Dr. Hinshaw was a psychiatrist. We, therefore, conclude that the State has not shown that George O. was examined by a psychiatrist within 24 hours of his admission and, thus, George O. should have been \u201creleased forthwith.\u201d See 405 ILCS 5/3\u2014 610 (West 1992); see Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 965-66, 667 N.E.2d at 726. Because the State failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of section 3 \u2014 610, we must reverse the order for involuntary admission. See Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 965-66, 667 N.E.2d at 726. \u201cAny noncompliance with the statutory prescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the judgment entered in such a cause erroneous and of no effect.\u201d People v. Valentine, 201 Ill. App. 3d 10, 13-14, 558 N.E.2d 807, 810 (1990); see also In re Elkow, 167 Ill. App. 3d 187, 193, 521 N.E.2d 290, 294 (1988).\nWe further reject the State\u2019s argument that George O. has waived this error by failing to raise an objection in the circuit court. \u201c \u2018[E]rrors demonstrating noncompliance with the statutory provisions that appear on the face of the record may render a judgment erroneous even if not raised at trial; furthermore, such errors may be considered on appeal under a doctrine analogous to plain error.\u2019 \u201d Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 966, 667 N.E.2d at 726, quoting In re Martens, 269 Ill. App. 3d 324, 327 (1995). We, therefore, decline to apply waiver in this case, since the State\u2019s failure to comply with section 3 \u2014 610 appears on the face of the record and clearly prejudiced George O. In light of these conclusions, we need not address George O.\u2019s other contentions.\nCONCLUSION\nIn sum, the State\u2019s noncompliance with the statutorily prescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the circuit court\u2019s judgment erroneous. We, therefore, reverse.\nReversed.\nSLATER, P.J., and HOLDRIDGE, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE KOEHLER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Cynthia Z. Tracy (argued), of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, and Jeff Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.",
      "Kevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re GEORGE O., Asserted to be a Person Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. George O., Respondent-Appellant).\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201499\u20140279\nOpinion filed July 26, 2000.\nCynthia Z. Tracy (argued), of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Peoria, and Jeff Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, for appellant.\nKevin W. Lyons, State\u2019s Attorney, of Peoria (John X. Breslin and Richard T. Leonard (argued), both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "1044-01",
  "first_page_order": 1062,
  "last_page_order": 1067
}
