{ "id": 140077, "name": "In re CHRISTOPHER MAHER, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christopher Maher, Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Maher", "decision_date": "2000-07-21", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201499\u20140241", "first_page": "1088", "last_page": "1099", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 1088" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "631 N.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 527", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871275 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0527-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 N.E.2d 1098", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1101" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3618328 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "975-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597011 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 1032", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2866110 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/1032-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221514 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 N.E.2d 660", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" }, { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 Ill. App. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2562760 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236" }, { "page": "236" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/80/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249177 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 121968 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 N.E.2d 714", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "247 Ill. App. 3d 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2927696 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/247/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 555", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209988 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0482-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1217, "char_count": 27294, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.809546394216565e-08, "percentile": 0.416142408302569 }, "sha256": "91c4bcae84e8e66990d0ebd843a8b58b2bd4f1c604daacb905ebac05ee25b408", "simhash": "1:393aff4cb70fae76", "word_count": 4442 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:48:47.280070+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re CHRISTOPHER MAHER, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christopher Maher, Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn March 1999, the trial court found respondent, Christopher Ma-her, subject to involuntary admission to a mental health facility. Respondent appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court questioned a witness in chambers ex parte and then called the witness to testify, becoming an advocate for the State and depriving him of a fair trial, (2) the trial court misapplied the standard of proof and placed the burden of proof on respondent, (3) the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence he was subject to involuntary commitment, (4) his commitment was not in compliance with the emergency-admission-by-certificate procedures of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 600 et seq. (West 1998)), and multiple procedural deficiencies occurred in transferring him to the mental health center. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn March 16, 1999, a petition for emergency admission by certificate was filed by a crisis therapist pursuant to section 3 \u2014 601 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 601 (West 1998)) on the grounds respondent was mentally ill and, because of his illness, was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm on himself or another in the near future. Two certificates supporting the petition were prepared and filed that day. The certificates were prepared by an emergency room physician at BroMenn Hospital and by Dr. Robert Scott Hamilton, a psychiatrist. The certificates contained allegations respondent had barricaded or \u201cisolated\u201d himself in his room at his parents\u2019 house and threatened his parents.\nA hearing on the petition took place on March 19. Stephen Maher, respondent\u2019s father, testified respondent began engaging in \u201caberrant behavior\u201d as an adolescent. Respondent verbally harassed and physically abused his younger brothers and sister \u201cbeyond that which might have been expected of *** an adolescent.\u201d In 1977, Stephen and his wife obtained counseling for respondent and the family. The counselor diagnosed respondent with \u201cpassive-aggressive disorder.\u201d Counseling was discontinued after several months because respondent was uncooperative.\nStephen stated respondent continued to engage in violent behavior, such as breaking items, kicking doors, and beating his brothers and sister. At one time Stephen attempted to pull respondent away from his brother, who was eight years younger than respondent, and respondent struck a blow to Stephen\u2019s forehead, breaking his eyeglasses. On another occasion, Stephen\u2019s daughter called him at work because respondent had been \u201cviolent to her\u201d and, when Stephen returned home, he found respondent had cut his sister\u2019s hand with a knife.\nRespondent abused alcohol, drove his car through the family\u2019s yard and verbally abused his family with \u201cloud and distasteful language.\u201d Stephen testified respondent was convicted of either aggravated assault or aggravated battery for assaulting a video store clerk who tried to detain him when he stole some merchandise. Respondent was also convicted of multiple incidents of driving under the influence of alcohol and driving while license revoked, spending periods of incarceration in the county jail. He was found to be unfit to stand trial in a criminal case and hospitalized for several months until he was found to be fit. A psychologist who evaluated respondent at that time diagnosed him with organic brain disorder induced by drug abuse as opposed to head trauma. At that time, respondent was using cannabis, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and cocaine. Respondent was convicted and sentenced to four years in the correctional facility at Dixon but only served six months.\nStephen and his wife enrolled respondent in a substance-abuse rehabilitation program at Lutheran General Hospital, but respondent did not successfully complete treatment. He did later stop using cocaine on his own and had abstained from alcohol for nine years.\nWhile living with his parents from 1993 through March 1998, respondent obtained a psychiatric evaluation in which he was diagnosed with bipolar disorder (manic-depressive disorder) and schizophrenia. Respondent received counseling and medication and obtained employment as a cook and a janitor. His behavior improved although he had occasional \u201coutbursts.\u201d In March 1998, respondent moved to Milwaukee. There he continued treatment with Dr. Bott, a psychiatrist who prescribed Thorazine and Cogentin. Stephen was aware respondent was not taking his medication in the quantity Dr. Bott prescribed. Dr. Bott told Stephen he did not really have a diagnosis for respondent\u2019s disorder but was treating him according to his \u201cbasic regimen\u201d for a patient with personality disorders.\nOn March 7, 1999, respondent returned to his parents\u2019 Blooming-ton residence. Respondent was upset the family dog died and wanted to know who had killed the dog and if he had been poisoned. Stephen told respondent the dog died a natural death, but the dog had actually been euthanized. In the evening hours of March 15, Stephen asked respondent to leave the room because he was directing foul remarks to his mother, who was in a great deal of pain from a broken arm. Respondent began talking about the dog and warned Stephen, \u201cSatan is going to get you folks.\u201d\nStephen told respondent he was going to get counseling for him. Respondent threatened to load his 30-30 and his 9 millimeter gun and \u201cblow away\u201d anyone that walked through the door. Stephen knew a .25-caliber handgun and a 30-30 were chained to a steel support pole in the basement. He thought respondent had a key to the lock. Stephen never saw a 9 millimeter gun, but he had a receipt he thought represented a down payment for such a weapon. Then he stated, \u201cIt does not mean that one exist [sz'c].\u201d\nWith his wife locked in the master bedroom, Stephen left for the crisis center because he was afraid to telephone for help from his residence. The crisis team suggested police intervention. When Stephen returned home, his wife was frightened because she thought she heard a gun being cocked. Stephen and his wife left the house immediately. Neither of them was physically harmed during the episode.\nDetective Clay Wheeler was called in as a police negotiator at about 8 p.m. on March 15, 1999, for what he was told was a barricaded subject possibly holding hostages. He telephoned the Maher residence, but respondent would not initially answer the phone. Wheeler left about eight messages on the answering machine before respondent called him back about 30 minutes later. Wheeler talked with respondent for about an hour. Respondent told him Stephen was to blame for the incident because he was intoxicated and had ridiculed respondent. Respondent mentioned his dog of 14 years had died. He also stated if his parents were dead he \u201cwould tear [his sister] apart.\u201d Wheeler tried to convince respondent to meet with him face to face, but respondent refused. Wheeler told respondent he knew about the threats respondent made toward his parents and the police needed to come into the house. Respondent admitted to Wheeler guns were in the house.\nAfter about an hour, respondent said he was tired and going to bed, and he hung up the phone. Wheeler did not get any response to about 27 more telephone calls to the house.\nOfficers tried to talk with respondent over a megaphone until respondent talked to Wheeler a second time on the phone. This time, respondent said he \u201cwould take care of his Dad\u201d if he lost his housing income and the \u201cnext time\u201d the police came out \u201cit would be a lot more of a problem to get him out of the house.\u201d Wheeler convinced respondent to surrender at 4:25 a.m. on March 16. Respondent did not resist the police when he walked out of the house. The officers entered the house and found the guns still secured in the basement.\nDr. Hamilton testified he was called in by the crisis team. Members of the crisis team as well as respondent\u2019s parents told him respondent \u201chad threatened physical violence\u201d and they were concerned respondent might have access to a gun. Dr. Hamilton first talked to respondent about 1 a.m. on March 16. After respondent was in custody, Dr. Hamilton learned respondent had not been armed, but the police negotiator told him respondent had threatened to \u201cbe violent with his family, with his parents in particular,\u201d when he was discharged from the hospital.\nDr. Hamilton examined respondent later in the morning on March 16 after he was brought to BroMenn Hospital by the police. He prepared a history and physical report of respondent and relied upon a social service investigative report and dispositional report prepared by clinical social worker Calene Roberts. Roberts\u2019 report revealed respondent had a long psychiatric history with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and had been hospitalized at least once. He also had been hospitalized for substance abuse and had been incarcerated at the state correctional facility in Dixon. Respondent had been receiving outpatient treatment near Chicago just prior to the incident that caused the filing of this petition.\nIn the history gathered by Dr. Hamilton, respondent reported he is a recovering alcoholic, he occasionally used marijuana, and he received psychiatric care in Milwaukee, where he currently lived. Respondent also stated he sustained head trauma following a car accident and at times he hears voices and gets \u201csomewhat paranoid.\u201d Respondent stated he had not been taking his prescribed medication, Trifluoperazine, for the past week because he could not afford the prescription.\nRespondent told Dr. Hamilton everybody, particularly his family, told lies about him and anybody providing an account of the March 15 incident contrary to his was lying. Respondent believed \u201cpeople were following him.\u201d He told Dr. Hamilton his father \u201cset off\u201d the incident on March 15 by demeaning him and his family \u201calways harassed him.\u201d Respondent told Dr. Hamilton he came to Bloomington because he wanted his parents to help him move into a new apartment in Milwaukee.\nDr. Hamilton attempted to confer with respondent\u2019s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Bott, but could not reach him. Respondent told Dr. Hamilton he would \u201cgo nuts\u201d if he were committed, which Dr. Hamilton interpreted to mean respondent would be \u201cviolent and disruptive.\u201d\nDr. Hamilton\u2019s initial diagnosis was organic personality syndrome due to a closed head trauma with psychosis and possible developmental delay. His dispositional report recommended long-term psychiatric hospitalization, followed by admission to a supervised or supportive living situation and outpatient treatment with a psychiatrist at a mental health clinic. Dr. Hamilton changed his diagnosis to paranoid schizophrenia after conferring with respondent\u2019s family and nurse Char Tyler.\nStephen Maher told Dr. Hamilton respondent\u2019s mental problems started long before his automobile accident and respondent had been diagnosed by other professionals with passive-aggressive behavior disorder and paranoid schizophrenia, had engaged in physical violence in the past, and had been admitted previously to a mental hospital. Stephen also showed him a receipt for a 9 millimeter gun.\nDr. Hamilton obtained information from nurse Tyler that respondent stated he would \u201cget\u201d his parents if they did not give him money and take care of him and the police could not watch him 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Respondent later explained he was not going to physically harm his parents but would \u201cget them\u201d some other way.\nDr. Hamilton stated a paranoid schizophrenic does not necessarily have paranoid delusions, but respondent did. He also explained most schizophrenics are not violent but several factors increase the risk of violence, such as substance abuse, noncompliance with taking medication, and a history of threats or engaging in violent behavior. All of these factors applied to respondent.\nDr. Hamilton stated both his original diagnosis and his current diagnosis would account for respondent\u2019s behavior. He believed respondent\u2019s mental condition was \u201cmore schizophrenic.\u201d Dr. Hamilton opined respondent was mentally ill and, because of his illness, he was reasonably expected to inflict physical harm on himself or another in the future. He recommended long-term hospitalization because of respondent\u2019s noncompliance with taking medication and his potential for violence. Anything less than hospitalization would be a potential danger for society and respondent.\nDr. Hamilton admitted on cross-examination that respondent\u2019s threats were verbal, and although guns were located in the house, respondent never had one in his hand. Dr. Hamilton admitted he may have assumed respondent threatened someone with a gun.' He also admitted respondent did not appear to him to be violent, hostile, or aggressive at the time Dr. Hamilton signed the certificate.\nThe only evidence offered by respondent was a written letter to the trial judge, which was admitted into evidence. Respondent described the incident in question as an argument between himself and his father that got blown out of proportion by the police and later the media. He stated he told the police they could come into the house any time they wanted and he would never harm his parents. Respondent stated he knew right from wrong and was making a new life for himself in Wisconsin, where he had just obtained a new apartment.\nArguments by counsel followed. The trial court then expressed its concern about hospitalizing someone simply because he or she was unreasonable, belligerent, or even threatening unless the court believed the threatened behavior was likely to occur in the near future. The court found the testimony indicated respondent had mental problems but found it to be contradictory and unclear on whether he had a mental illness or a personality disorder. The trial court expressed its frustration the only two options available were ordering hospitalization or letting respondent go. The judge wished someone could look after respondent if he let him go and queried where respondent would go if he were free.\nRespondent\u2019s counsel then stated respondent told her he had employment with a landscaping firm in Milwaukee and had recently been accepted into a subsidized-living apartment. The trial court then asked if the parties objected if he \u201ctalked\u201d to respondent\u2019s father, Stephen, in chambers. Counsel for the State replied, \u201cNo, sir,\u201d and respondent\u2019s counsel said, \u201cI don\u2019t care.\u201d\nThe trial judge then took Stephen into his chambers for an ex parte conversation that was not recorded or transcribed. After the court\u2019s conversation with Stephen, the judge called Stephen back to the witness stand. The judge made a record that in chambers he. inquired of Stephen, what would happen if he gave respondent a bus ticket back to Milwaukee. He asked Stephen to tell the parties what he told the court in chambers. According to Stephen, respondent did not have an apartment because he had been evicted. He stated respondent had applied for subsidized housing, but Stephen had no proof respondent would get such housing. As for a job, Stephen stated there was \u201cno absolute promise of work at this present time.\u201d There was \u201can indication\u201d respondent could start work. Stephen stated that, although respondent did not have a place to go in Wisconsin, he was not welcome at his parents\u2019 home.\nStephen also told the trial court about a receipt for a gun, a 9 millimeter Rugen The trial court asked Stephen to tell the parties what he had told the court. Stephen stated he had the receipt, which did not state the purchaser\u2019s name but noted a $25 down payment had been made on February 3. He stated he did not have the receipt with him but it represented a purchase made in Wisconsin.\nOn cross-examination by respondent\u2019s counsel, Stephen admitted he did not know whether respondent contacted Lutheran Social Service Agency in Wisconsin about placement in subsidized housing. Stephen did not know respondent had a business card from an agency representative indicating respondent\u2019s dealings with the agency. Stephen thought respondent could not take such steps on his own but would need Stephen\u2019s help, as he had in the past. Stephen stated respondent worked for the landscaping company on a temporary, as-needed basis the previous summer. The receipt for the gun purchase only indicated a down payment had been made and not that the gun was actually received.\nWhen cross-examined by the State, Stephen stated respondent had repeatedly talked about the gun and that he needed it to protect himself from people who might enter his apartment. Further, respondent stated he would use the gun to stop the \u201cauthorities\u201d from harassing him or, if times got really tough, he would use it to hold up places. Stephen helped respondent at times in the past to move to new apartments or obtain new housing. He had been to Milwaukee a few weeks before this incident to help respondent obtain subsidized housing as he was about to be evicted. When respondent came to Bloomington, he left all his personal property in Milwaukee. He told Stephen he had an appointment in Milwaukee set on the day of the hearing.\nThe trial judge indicated this was a borderline case where it was hard for him to know what to do. The court indicated its preference for sending respondent for further evaluation to see if he had a long psychiatric history, whether he really was schizophrenic, whether he was a danger to himself or others, with the court to receive a report in a couple of weeks. The judge noted he had nowhere to send respondent to have this evaluation and, therefore, found him to meet the statutory criteria and ordered him involuntarily admitted to the Zeller Mental Health Center. The judge then stated Zeller was required to provide a report to him in 30 days concerning the patient\u2019s needs. At that time, the trial court would decide whether to keep him for a longer period of time or \u201cturn him loose.\u201d\nThe trial court entered a written order finding respondent was a person subject to involuntary admission and hospitalizing him for up to 180 days in the Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities, finding that was the least-restrictive environment currently appropriate and available.\nRespondent filed a timely notice of appeal on March 23. On April 15, 1999, a notice of change in status was filed with the court by the facility director of Zeller Mental Health Center, informing the court respondent had been discharged from the facility on April 12.\nII. ANALYSIS\nBoth parties contend this case is not moot, despite respondent\u2019s release from the Zeller Mental Health Center, based on an exception to the rule of mootness. Our supreme court has recognized where the case involves an event of short duration that is \u201ccapable of repetition, yet evading review,\u201d review may be had despite the issue otherwise being moot. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1998). To qualify for this exception, the challenged action must be too short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to cessation and the cause must present a reasonable expectation the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702 N.E.2d at 559. Both parties contend this case meets both criteria. For involuntary hospitalizations, the maximum term is 180 days, after which a new petition must be filed, a new hearing held, and a new order entered by the court. 405 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 813 (West 1998). The commitment order expired in its entirety in this case prior to our review. Respondent had been released long before the expiration of the order.\nRespondent does have a history of mental illness, and at least a brief history of prior involuntary hospitalization, so it is reasonable to expect the same action that was taken against him here might be undertaken again. We elect to address this appeal on the merits.\nRespondent argues the trial court\u2019s ex parte conversation with a witness in chambers and then recalling him to testify to information gained in that conversation, thus supplying additional evidence for the State, was error requiring reversal of the trial court\u2019s order.\nThe State argues respondent has forfeited this issue due to his counsel\u2019s failure to object during the hearing and failure to raise this issue in a posttrial motion. See In re Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 234, 252, 616 N.E.2d 714, 727 (1993). Application of the forfeiture rule is less rigid where the basis of the objection is the trial court\u2019s own conduct. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 343, 706 N.E.2d 473, 485 (1998). Specifically, where the trial court departs from its role and becomes an advocate for the State\u2019s position, no objection by opposing counsel is necessary to preserve the issue for review. People v. Rega, 271 Ill. App. 3d 17, 24, 648 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1995); People v. McGrath, 80 Ill. App. 2d 229, 236, 224 N.E.2d 660, 664 (1967).\nA trial court may, in its discretion, question witnesses to elicit the truth or clarify material issues that seem obscure as long as it does so in a fair and impartial manner. People v. Smith, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1062, 702 N.E.2d 218, 222 (1998). However, the trial court must not depart from its function as a judge and may not assume the role of an advocate for the State. Smith, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1064, 702 N.E.2d at 223; McGrath, 80 Ill. App. 2d at 236, 224 N.E.2d at 664. The propriety of an examination of a witness by the trial court must be determined by the circumstances of each case and rests within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Gallo, 260 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1039, 632 N.E.2d 99, 104 (1994).\nSupreme Court Rule 63(A)(4)(c) provides a judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 155 Ill. 2d R. 63(A)(4)(c). Generally, private conversations with a judge concerning a pending case are improper. See People v. Taylor, 288 Ill. App. 3d 21, 27, 679 N.E.2d 847, 851 (1997). A trial judge has an obligation to assure the public that justice is administered fairly and must avoid the appearance of impropriety. People v. Bradshaw, 171 Ill. App. 3d 971, 975-76, 525 N.E.2d 1098, 1101 (1988). While no reported case has been found dealing with a trial judge having ex parte communications with a witness during a trial, it has been held an administrative law judge should avoid ex parte communications with a testifying witness and reversal is required where actual prejudice to the complainant is shown. Korunka v. Department of Children & Family Services, 259 Ill. App. 3d 527, 530-31, 631 N.E.2d 759, 761 (1994).\nThe court acted out of a desire to do the right thing for respondent. It was concerned with the family problem the case presented and was grasping for a practical solution. Whether Stephen here fell within the language of Rule 63(A)(4)(c), which allows the court, with consent, to confer separately with parties and their attorneys, is unclear. Nevertheless, because respondent consented to the separate conference in this matter, we perceive no prejudice. We recommend that the court not engage in such conferences in the future absent compelling circumstances.\nOnce the ex parte conference was held, the court could appropriately call Stephen to the stand to make a record of what had been discussed. Likewise the court could appropriately question Stephen for the purpose of educating itself fully regarding the circumstances of this case, although a court that questions a witness must be careful not to appear as if it is acting as an advocate. The fact that the judge\u2019s questions brought out information damaging to respondent does not mean the judge was acting as an advocate.\nWe have examined the other issues advanced by respondent and decline to address them, as they are moot.\nWe affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK" }, { "text": "MYERSCOUGH, J.,\nconcurs.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "MYERSCOUGH, J.," }, { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent.\nIn this case, the trial court abused its discretion and overstepped its bounds by conversing with Stephen Maher ex parte. The error was exacerbated because no court reporter was present. Prior to speaking with Stephen ex parte in chambers, the court was frustrated with the choices of disposition and opined it was not yet convinced as to which way it should rule.\nMental health cases are often frustrating. A trial judge with a sincere desire to solve or ameliorate a human problem may be sorely tempted to become a counselor or mediator. However, ex parte communication such as that which occurred here is improper no matter the benevolent motivation of the trial court. It is especially damaging when it occurs with the major complaining witness and a liberty interest is at stake. While my view of the trial judge\u2019s effort to resolve this case is charitable, what must the respondent have thought when he saw the chief witness against him being ushered to a private audience with the court? An ex parte conversation with the chief witness in a mental health case is akin to a trial judge having a private conversation with a victim in a criminal case. Such ex parte conversations should only occur on television or in films.\nAfter the ex parte communication, the trial court compounded the error by recalling Stephen as a witness and not only questioning him concerning whether respondent had a place to live and a place to work in Milwaukee, but also questioning him about the actual existence of the 9 millimeter gun to which he had previously referred. The additional cross-examination of Stephen revealed new assertions respondent threatened to use the gun against authorities or to commit robberies. The State\u2019s case against respondent was significantly bolstered, and the trial judge apparently gleaned enough additional evidence to persuade him the respondent should be committed.\nSupreme Court Rule 63(A)(4) clearly does not apply. Stephen Ma-her is not a party, and respondent did not consent to the conference.\nThe trial court\u2019s finding that respondent suffered from mental illness was not erroneous. However, the trial court\u2019s finding respondent was an immediate threat to harm either himself or others was not proved to the trial court\u2019s satisfaction prior to the additional testimony elicited by the court following the ex parte conversation. The trial court\u2019s ex parte conversation with Stephen and the ensuing testimony in open court prejudiced respondent. I would reverse the trial court\u2019s order involuntarily committing respondent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT," } ], "attorneys": [ "Jeff M. Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, and William J. Conroy, Jr., (argued) of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re CHRISTOPHER MAHER, a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Christopher Maher, Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201499\u20140241.\nArgued September 22, 1999.\nOpinion filed July 21, 2000.\nKNECHT, J., dissenting.\nJeff M. Plesko, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Anna, and William J. Conroy, Jr., (argued) of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Denise M. Ambrose (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1088-01", "first_page_order": 1106, "last_page_order": 1117 }