{ "id": 980691, "name": "ARMAND A. GONZALZLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CREDIT CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees (Robert S. Levy et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Gonzalzles v. American Express Credit Corp.", "decision_date": "2000-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201498\u20143888", "first_page": "199", "last_page": "213", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 199" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 1325", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 843", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927618 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0843-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 314", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351176 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 975", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415362 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "566" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 1133", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2493968 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "721 N.E.2d 605", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349630 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "611 N.E.2d 1350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 933", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5119529 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "935" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0933-01" ] }, { "cite": "700 N.E.2d 1018", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209983 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "672 N.E.2d 1207", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223609 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 1172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801348 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536033 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 N.E.2d 984", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725120 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0048-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 990, "char_count": 34148, "ocr_confidence": 0.679, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.264046148808592e-07, "percentile": 0.6131038913851734 }, "sha256": "f4d3eb9656ac01a822fe8d7654d07ba0c8a035d2ed9642bf30546f85c371a038", "simhash": "1:3fead590699296a6", "word_count": 5364 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:05:04.441996+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ARMAND A. GONZALZLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CREDIT CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees (Robert S. Levy et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BURKE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Armand Gonzalzles, M.D., appeals from an order of the circuit court dismissing counts VI through XVI of his sixth amended complaint, with prejudice, pursuant to defendants American Express Credit Corp.\u2019s (American Express), Montgomery Ward Enterprises, Inc.\u2019s (Montgomery Ward), and Signature Agency, Inc.\u2019s (Signature) section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615 (West 1998)). On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the counts against defendants because he sufficiently pled causes of action against defendants for breach of contract, negligent referral, breach of fiduciary relationship, unauthorized practice of law, and violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1996)) based on defendants\u2019 referral of attorney Robert S. Levy and the Chicago law firm of Robert S. Levy & Associates (Levy) to him pursuant to a legal services referral plan. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.\nOn July 22, 1991, plaintiff entered into a \u201ccontract\u201d (legal services plan or plan) with American Express whereby American Express agreed to provide plaintiff with legal representation in exchange for a monthly fee from plaintiff. Plaintiff signed a membership form to become a participant in the plan. Plaintiff received a return letter from the vice president of the plan which stated, in pertinent part:\n\u201cOur goal for this plan is to provide members, like you, with quality legal representation for a reasonable fee. And, in our constant efforts to provide you with this highly professional service, we have provided you with another law firm to meet your specific legal needs.\u201d\nThe letter also included a membership card informing plaintiff that his legal representation under the plan would be provided by Levy.\nThe plan was administered by Signature. Plaintiffs benefits in the plan were more fully set out in the \u201cConfidential Benefit Handbook\u201d (handbook). The handbook instructed participants on how to use the legal services detailed in the plan. When calling their plan attorney, participants were asked to\n\u201cbe prepared to say, in general terms, what the nature of your request or problem is so that you will be referred to the appropriate attorney in that law firm who handles that area of law.\u201d\nThe handbook explained that attorneys were chosen for participants based on geographic location. The handbook described the qualifications of its plan attorneys, stating:\n\u201cAll plan attorneys are licensed to practice in your state. They are registered with the State Bar Association or appropriate regulatory agency and proper references have been checked. All are experienced and in private practice. Plan attorneys have their own offices and are not employees of the Plan.\u201d\nThe handbook also contained a section on \u201cLimitation of Liability\u201d which explained the following:\n\u201cThe State Bar does not guarantee the quantity or quality of legal services provided under this plan. Total responsibility for delivery of services rests with the Plan and the Plan Attorneys in their individual attorney-client relationships. Plan Members may at any time file a complaint with the State Bar or other attorney regulatory authority concerning a problem with an attorney\u2019s professional conduct.\u201d\nFrom July 22, 1991, to February 17, 1994, plaintiff paid all of his fixed monthly fees to American Express as required by the plan.\nOn June 26, 1996, plaintiff filed an eight-count complaint against Levy, American Express, Montgomery Ward, and Signature. Counts I through III of the complaint were directed against Levy for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract, respectively. Plaintiff alleged that he retained Levy in 1991 to represent him in a breach of warranty action against a company from which he had purchased a boat and that Levy failed to file an action against the company within the appropriate statute of limitations period. Plaintiff also claimed that he retained Levy to represent him in a dissolution of marriage proceeding, but Levy failed to file a motion to modify his spousal support payments and to notify plaintiff that a judgment had been entered against Mm for unpaid support payments, thereby causing him damages.\nCounts IV through VIII of the complaint were directed against American Express, Montgomery Ward, and Signature. Count IV was a claim for negligent referral. Plaintiff alleged that defendants \u201cheld themselves out as providers of legal services\u201d and that despite their duty to provide \u201ccompetent legal representation,\u201d defendants breached this duty, injuring plaintiff \u201cin an undetermined amount.\u201d Counts V and VI were claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract, respectively, and contained similar allegations against defendants for failing to provide plaintiff with \u201ccompetent\u201d legal representation. Count VII of the complaint was a claim for the unauthorized practice of law by defendants. Plaintiff alleged that defendants had received compensation for \u201cproviding the legal services of [Levy] to [plaintiff]\u201d in violation of the Illinois Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act (705 ILCS 220/1 (West 1996)). Count VIII was a claim for defendants\u2019 violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.\nPlaintiff filed first and second amended complaints naming additional defendants but did not make any substantive changes in the allegations made in his initial complaint. Plaintiff filed a third amended complaint, which only amended the counts directed against Levy in response to a motion to dismiss filed by Levy. On June 16, 1997, the trial court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiff and against Levy in the amount of $235,555.59 plus costs based on Levy\u2019s failure to respond to plaintiffs third amended complaint.\nPlaintiff also filed fourth and fifth amended complaints in response to defendants\u2019 additional motions to dismiss, wMch were based upon, among other reasons, plaintiff s failure to attach to his complaint a copy of the contract between the parties.\nOn April 17, 1998, plaintiff filed a sixth amended complaint. Counts VI through XVI were directed against defendants. The complaint alleged the same causes of action as plaintiffs prior complaints but divided the causes of action against American Express, Montgomery Ward and Signature into separate counts. Plaintiff also added a \u201cthird-party beneficiary breach of contract\u201d claim (count VII) against Montgomery Ward and Signature based on their agreement with American Express to provide legal representation to participants in American Express\u2019 plan and Signature\u2019s administration of the plan. All of the causes of action in the sixth amended complaint were again based on defendants\u2019 alleged failure to provide \u201cquality legal representation\u201d for plaintiffs \u201cspecific legal needs.\u201d Similar to the prior complaints, the sixth amended complaint contained counts for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent referral, unauthorized practice of law, and violation of the Consumer Fraud Act.\nOn June 9, 1998, defendants filed a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss counts VI through XVI of plaintiffs sixth amended complaint (hereinafter referred to as the complaint). With respect to plaintiffs \u201cbreach of contract\u201d claims (counts VI through VIII), defendants argued that the legal services plan \u201c[made] it clear that the plan removed [defendants from any responsibility for the legal services delivered by the receiving attorney [Levy].\u201d Defendants further argued that Weisblatt v. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n, 292 Ill. App. 3d 48, 648 N.E.2d 984 (1997), held that a legal referral service was not absolutely liable for the negligence of the attorney providing the legal services through the plan. With respect to the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s claims for \u201cnegligent referral\u201d (counts IX and X), defendants relied on a provision in the handbook that stated that defendants were not responsible for, or involved in, \u201cthe attorney-client relationship between the plan member and the receiving attorney.\u201d Defendants claimed that the plan was not a lawyer, and they did not have a duty or responsibility to monitor the services of the referred attorney. Defendants also argued that they had confirmed that Levy was a licensed attorney in good standing in Illinois in accordance with the provisions of the handbook.\nWith respect to plaintiffs claims for \u201cbreach of fiduciary duty\u201d (counts XI and XII), defendants argued that the counts should be dismissed because plaintiff only pled conclusory allegations that a fiduciary relationship existed between defendants and plaintiff and failed to plead the prima facie elements of this cause of action. With respect to plaintiffs claims for the \u201cunauthorized practice of law\u201d (counts XIII and XIV), defendants again relied on Weisblatt, arguing that the acceptance of a referral fee did not make defendants the \u201cguarantors of the legal service[s] delivered or not delivered by the Levy Defendants.\u201d Lastly, with respect to plaintiffs claims for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (counts XV and XVI), defendants argued that there was no evidence to support plaintiffs allegation that defendants committed a deceptive act. Defendants further argued that plaintiff had admitted in the allegations of his fourth amended complaint that Levy was licensed to practice law in Illinois, thereby negating any suggestion that defendants committed a deceptive act in the referral of Levy.\nIn response, plaintiff, relying on Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 719 N.E.2d 756 (1999), argued that defendants were providing a \u201cmanaged legal care plan via its legal services plan\u201d similar to a health maintenance organization (HMO). Plaintiff further argued that the HMO in Petrovich was held potentially liable on many of the same legal theories upon which plaintiff based his cause of action against defendants and that there was no basis to distinguish Petrovich from the present case. Plaintiff also argued that the disclaimer in the handbook, that participating attorneys were not employees of the plan, created a genuine issue of material fact regarding the degree of defendants\u2019 control over Levy and did not eliminate their responsibility for Levy\u2019s negligent representation of plaintiff.\nPlaintiff further argued that he properly pled the various causes of action included in his complaint. Plaintiff claimed that he adequately pled a cause of action for breach of contract by defendants based on his allegation that they did not provide the \u201cquality legal representation\u201d to serve his \u201cspecific legal needs\u201d as defendants had promised. Plaintiff maintained that defendants\u2019 claim, that Levy was chosen based on his geographic location to plaintiff, supported his claim that defendants did not properly investigate Levy\u2019s competence and were negligent in their referral of him because he could not meet plaintiff\u2019s specific legal needs. Plaintiff further argued that he had \u201cadequately pled the relationship between himself and Robert Levy [attorney-client] as well as the agency relationship between the Defendants and Robert Levy\u201d and that these allegations sufficiently supported the existence of defendants\u2019 fiduciary duty to him to satisfy the pleading requirements for breach of that duty. Plaintiff also argued that he properly pled a cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law by defendants because he was only required to allege that defendants had violated the statute (705 ILCS 220/1 (West 1998)) prohibiting corporations from such practice. Plaintiff maintained that \u201cdefendants made certain representations concerning [their] legal abilities and what [they] could legally provide to the plaintiff and therefore [had] violated the statute.\u201d With respect to his claim for defendants\u2019 violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, plaintiff argued that he properly pled a deceptive act by defendants based on his allegation that they had failed to provide him with the quality legal service defendants promised him to meet his specific legal needs.\nOn September 21, 1998, the trial court entered an order dismissing, with prejudice, counts VI through XVI of plaintiffs complaint, finding that the facts alleged were legally insufficient to state the causes of action claimed in those counts. This appeal followed.\nPlaintiff contends that he properly pled the elements for a cause of action based on breach of contract against defendants in counts VI through VIII of his complaint, arguing that defendants breached the contract by failing to provide \u201cquality legal representation\u201d to serve his \u201cspecific legal needs\u201d as promised in the contract.\nDefendants contend that the language in the contract, stating that the referral plan sought to provide \u201cquality legal representation\u201d to serve plaintiffs \u201cspecific legal needs,\u201d did not make them guarantors or absolute insurers regarding the quality of the legal service ultimately delivered under the plan. Defendants argue that the trial court properly found that the terms of the contract revealed an \u201cunambiguous contractual purpose to refer a duly licensed attorney who will provide specified services at a fixed or reduced rate\u201d and that they performed this duty.\nA section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss a complaint challenges only the legal sufficiency of a complaint and alleges only defects on the face of the complaint. Vernon v. Schuster, 179 Ill. 2d 338, 344, 688 N.E.2d 1172 (1997). The critical inquiry in deciding a section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss is whether the allegations of the complaint, when considered in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344, citing Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 86-87, 672 N.E.2d 1207 (1996). A cause of action will not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts that will entitle it to relief. Vernon, 179 Ill. 2d at 344. In reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 615 motion to dismiss, we apply a de novo standard of review. Doe v. McKay, 183 Ill. 2d 272, 274, 700 N.E.2d 1018 (1998). A reviewing court must take all well-pleaded facts in the challenged complaint as true. Person v. Behnke, 242 Ill. App. 3d 933, 935, 611 N.E.2d 1350 (1993).\nTo properly plead a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must allege the essential elements, which are: (1) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract; (2) performance by the plaintiff; (3) breach of the contract by the defendant; and (4) resultant injury to the plaintiff. Gallagher Corp. v. Russ, 309 Ill. App. 3d 192, 199, 721 N.E.2d 605 (1999). A defendant\u2019s failure to comply with a duty imposed by the contract gives rise to the breach. Hickox v. Bell, 195 Ill. App. 3d 976, 992, 552 N.E.2d 1133 (1990).\nIn the present case, the documents constituting the contract between the parties which have been attached to the pleadings do not define the term \u201cquality.\u201d Additionally, the handbook merely states that the plan attorneys are licensed to practice in the participant\u2019s state and are registered with the state bar association or appropriate regulatory agency. The language of the contract, as alleged by plaintiff and indicated in the documents attached to the complaint, therefore, amounts to a promise by defendants to furnish plaintiff with a licensed attorney at a specific price. Defendants did not make any other assertions regarding Levy\u2019s practice capabilities. Defendants only agreed to offer the name of a licensed attorney who would work at a specified rate. Plaintiff did not allege any facts suggesting that defendants, through their referral of Levy, breached this agreement. There are no allegations in the complaint that at the time of the referral Levy was not licensed as an attorney in Illinois or that any professional regulatory agency had investigated, reprimanded or suspended him for any reason, or that defendants were aware of any prior acts of negligence or malpractice by Levy. Plaintiff therefore failed to sufficiently plead a breach of contract claim, and we find that the trial court properly dismissed counts VI through VIII of his complaint.\nPlaintiff next contends that he properly pled the necessary elements for the tort of negligent referral against defendants in counts IX and X. He argues that defendants, as operators of a \u201cprofit oriented legal services plan where premiums are collected monthly,\u201d are potentially liable for the referral of an attorney who was not competent or qualified to handle his legal claims or provide professional service. Plaintiff maintains that he did not receive the benefit of the representation he had \u201cbargained for\u201d under the plan. Defendants contend that nonlawyer entities are not responsible for the referral of a licensed attorney who commits malpractice and that \u201c[t]he pleadings here do not warrant such a sweeping and far-reaching change in the law\u201d as proposed by plaintiff.\nWe find Weisblatt, relied on by defendants, dispositive of this issue. In Weisblatt, the plaintiff contacted the defendant Chicago Bar Association\u2019s (CBA) Lawyer Referral Service seeking the name of a lawyer who specialized in legal malpractice cases. The plaintiff claimed that the CBA breached its duty of care to her because the attorney to whom she was referred did not have expertise in legal malpractice matters, resulting in her loss of a cause of action against her divorce attorney, and that the referred attorney did not have adequate malpractice insurance herself. The plaintiff also alleged that the CBA\u2019s Lawyer Referral Service was liable because it required lawyer participants to pay referral fees to the CBA when they were retained by individuals who had been referred to them by the CBA. The plaintiffs complaint sought damages from the CBA for negligent performance of a voluntary undertaking and legal malpractice as a \u201creferring attorney.\u201d\nThe Weisblatt court affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint. With respect to the plaintiffs claim for legal malpractice against the CBA, the court stated: \u201cThe CBA is not a lawyer. The CBA is not licensed to practice law nor was it engaged by the plaintiff to represent her.\u201d 292 Ill. App. 3d at 57. Because the CBA was a not-for-profit organization providing, among other services, a legal referral service, the court applied Rule 7.2(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (134 Ill. 2d R. 7.2(b)) to the CBA\u2019s acceptance of a referral fee, stating:\n\u201cWhile that rule [Rule 7.2(b)] allows lawyer referral services to collect referral fees, it does not, however, impose any duty or responsibility upon the lawyer referral service or legal service organization to monitor or maintain responsibility for the legal services ultimately rendered by the lawyer receiving the referral. Thus, the mere taking of a referral fee as a referring agency under Rule 7.2(b) rather than as a referring lawyer under Rule 1.5 [of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct] will not suffice to make the CBA an insurer or otherwise vicariously accountable for the actions of the attorney to whom the matter is referred.\u201d Weisblatt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 57.\nIn Richards v. SSM Health Care, Inc., 311 Ill. App. 3d 560, 724 N.E.2d 975 (2000), this court relied on Weisblatt in finding that there was no requirement that a legal referral service \u201cstand legally responsible\u201d for the services provided by a referred attorney in order to enforce a fee remittal agreement between the service and the attorney. Richards, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 566.\nLike the CBA in Weisblatt, defendants in the present case were not licensed as attorneys or retained by plaintiff to represent him in legal matters. Plaintiff has failed to present any authority in support of the proposition that a nonlawyer becomes the insurer of, or vicariously liable for, the actions of an attorney referred to a third party by a nonlawyer. In Weisblatt, even the receipt of a referral fee did not create a duty by the CBA to monitor the attorney it had referred to the plaintiff. In the present case, plaintiff did not even allege that a referral fee agreement existed between defendants and Levy, and plaintiff thus failed to plead any basis upon which to hold that defendants had a duty or responsibility to monitor Levy\u2019s representation of plaintiff following the referral.\nPlaintiff attempts to distinguish Weisblatt, arguing that that decision was limited to not-for-profit, nonattorney referral services. However, as argued by defendants here, the holding in Weisblatt was not so limited. The rule at issue in Weisblatt, Rule 7.2(b) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, refers to \u201c \u2018not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Weisblatt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 57, quoting 134 Ill. 2d R. 7.2(b). The reference to \u201cother legal service organization\u201d indicates that neither Rule 7.2(b) nor the holding in Weisblatt was limited to not-for-profit lawyer referral services. Weisblatt, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 57.\nWe briefly note that plaintiffs reliance on Petrovich is misplaced. In Petrovich, our supreme court held that an HMO may be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its independent contractor physicians under both the doctrines of apparent and implied authority. Although the defendant HMO in Petrovich offered evidence that it customarily supplied its members with information and documents indicating that participating physicians were independent contractors and not agents or employees of the HMO, the evidence did not show that the HMO ever actually provided the plaintiff with that information, creating an issue of fact as to the issue of apparent authority. The Petrovich court also held that the facts of the case created an issue of fact as to whether the physician\u2019s independent status was negated by the degree of the HMO\u2019s control or actual authority over the physician.\nPetrovich is distinguishable because the plan handbook issued by defendants in the present case clearly states that the participating attorneys in the plan are independent contractors and not employees or agents of defendants. Unlike the plaintiff in Petrovich, plaintiff here does not dispute that he received the handbook, which was in fact attached as an exhibit to his complaint. Additionally, neither the allegations in plaintiffs complaint nor the supporting exhibits suggest that defendants either retained any control over the attorney-client relationship between Levy and plaintiff or attempted to control Levy\u2019s representation of plaintiff in any manner. Accordingly, we find that the trial court properly dismissed counts DC and X of plaintiffs complaint which were based on negligent referral claims.\nPlaintiff next argues that he adequately pled a cause of action for a breach of a fiduciary duty by defendants. Plaintiff maintains that defendants do not have to be attorneys in order for the court to find that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties. Plaintiff argues that when a relationship is that of an attorney-client or principal-agent, a fiduciary relationship arises as a matter of law and nothing further needs to be pled. Plaintiff further argues that the allegations in his complaint referring to the attorney-client relationship between himself and Levy and Levy\u2019s agency relationship with defendants satisfies the pleading requirements to state a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty. Plaintiff also argues that, at the very least, his allegations in his complaint raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties.\nDefendants contend that plaintiff failed to plead any facts indicating that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties as a matter of law. They argue that plaintiff did not plead any facts that there was a \u201cdegree of kinship\u201d or a \u201cdisparity in age, health or mental condition\u201d that would have created a fiduciary relationship. Defendants maintain that no fiduciary relationship existed between them and plaintiff, but rather between plaintiff and Levy, plaintiffs attorney.\nA fiduciary duty may arise as a matter of law from the existence of a particular relationship, such as an attorney-client or principal-agent relationship. Ransom v. A.B. Dick Co., 289 Ill. App. 3d 663, 672, 682 N.E.2d 314 (1997). A fiduciary relationship and the attendant duties may also arise as the result of special circumstances of the parties\u2019 relationship, where one party places trust in another so that the latter gains superiority and influence over the former. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 672. When the relationship between the parties is not one that gives rise to a fiduciary relationship as a matter of law, the party asserting the existence of the relationship has the burden of establishing such by clear and convincing evidence. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 672. The relevant factors in determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists include: the degree of kinship between the parties; the disparity in age, health, mental condition and education and business experience between the parties; and the extent to which the \u201cservient\u201d party entrusted the handling of its business affairs to the \u201cdominant party\u201d and placed trust and confidence in it. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 673.\nIn the present case, plaintiff has failed to cite to any authority in support of his contention that he satisfied the pleading requirements for a cause of action based on a breach of fiduciary duty by merely alleging that Levy was his attorney and that Levy was an agent of defendants. Although plaintiffs allegations suggest the existence of a fiduciary relationship, as a matter of law, between Levy and himself, plaintiffs allegations are insufficient to suggest that a fiduciary relationship existed, as a matter of law, between himself and defendants, who were neither his attorney nor his principal.\nAdditionally, plaintiffs allegations in his complaint are insufficient to suggest that special circumstances between plaintiff and defendants created a fiduciary relationship between them. As argued by defendants, plaintiff did not allege a degree of kinship between the parties or a disparity in age, health or mental condition that would support a finding of a fiduciary relationship. See Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 673. Plaintiff, a licensed physician, has also failed to plead any disparity between his education and business knowledge and that of defendants which might give rise to a fiduciary relationship. We find, therefore, that the trial court properly dismissed counts XI and XII of plaintiffs complaint.\nPlaintiff next contends that he properly pled a cause of action for the unauthorized practice of law by defendants. Plaintiff argues that defendants violated the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation in \u201c[furnishing] attorneys to render legal services and [making] various representations to its plan members regarding the types of cases which the plan attorneys were qualified to handle.\u201d Plaintiff maintains that the fact that defendants are not attorneys is not controlling on this issue because a claim based on the unauthorized practice of law presupposes that the defendants are not licensed attorneys. Without providing further explanation or argument, plaintiff contends that the language in the plan handbook, stating that the attorney-client relationship exists only between the referred attorney and the plan member, \u201craises more questions than [it] answers.\u201d Plaintiff also argues that the statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law does not have restrictive language supporting the trial court\u2019s finding that there was no private cause of action for the claims pled in counts XIII and XIV of plaintiffs complaint.\nDefendants again emphasize that plaintiff only had an attorney-client relationship with Levy and that the plan handbook clearly states that the plan is not involved in any aspect of the delivery of legal services by the attorney to the client. Defendants also argue that the Illinois Supreme Court rules, \u201cby negative inference, provide that group legal services may exist and operate in Illinois without necessarily engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.\u201d Defendants further maintain that Rule 7.2 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct allows an attorney to pay \u201cthe usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal service organization.\u201d\nSection 1 of the Illinois Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act (705 ILCS 220/1 (West 1998)) provides:\n\u201cIt shall be unlawful for a corporation to practice law *** or to hold itself out to the public as being entitled to practice law or to render or furnish legal services or advice or to furnish attorneys or counsel or to render legal services of any kind in actions or proceedings of any nature ***.\u201d\nWe find that the allegations pled in plaintiffs complaint do not state a cause of action against defendants for the unauthorized practice of law. Plaintiff has not provided any authority supporting his argument that the referral of an attorney at a certain price by a for-profit referral plan violates section 1 of the Corporation Practice of Law Prohibition Act or otherwise constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. As we held in Weisblatt, nonattorney entities are permitted to receive a fee for referrals without becoming the insurers or guarantors of the legal services provided by the attorney.\nAdditionally, the relevant provisions of the contract incorporated into plaintiffs complaint state that defendants had no involvement in the legal services provided by the referred attorney, Levy, and that the referred attorney was an independent contractor with the plan and not an employee. Although plaintiff alleges that defendants made certain assertions regarding the quality of the attorney referred to him, as stated above, these assertions constitute nothing more than a promise to provide an attorney with a license. Additionally, plaintiffs complaint contains no allegations that defendants, in fact, performed or offered legal services. The trial court, therefore, properly dismissed plaintiffs counts based on the unauthorized practice of law\nLastly, plaintiff contends that he properly pled a cause of action based on defendants\u2019 violation of the Consumer Fraud Act, by alleging that defendants would provide competent legal representation to plaintiff, defendants would provide plaintiff with highly professional service, and the referred attorney would be able to serve plaintiffs specific legal needs. He also argues that defendants\u2019 deception was compounded by the fact that they did not ascertain whether Levy would be competent to handle his legal needs.\nDefendants respond that plaintiff failed to properly plead a deceptive practice on their part because their referral of Levy preceded his alleged malpractice in handling plaintiffs claims. Defendants argue that plaintiff has not alleged that they knew or should have known that Levy would fail to handle plaintiffs legal matters based on any prior acts of professional negligence or malpractice by Levy. Defendants also argue that plaintiff did not sufficiently allege that defendants intended that plaintiff would rely on their alleged deceptions. Defendants further maintain that allegations in the complaint referring to a fiduciary relationship between Levy and plaintiff, as attorney and client, indicate that plaintiff, in fact, had placed his trust in Levy rather than in them.\nThe elements for a cause of action based on a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act are: (1) a deceptive act or practice; (2) the defendant intended that the plaintiff rely on the deception; (3) the plaintiff, in fact, relied on the deception; and (4) the deception occurred in the course of conduct involving trade or commerce. Smith v. Prime Cable, 276 Ill. App. 3d 843, 856-57, 658 N.E.2d 1325 (1995).\nAs stated above, in their contract with plaintiff, defendants effectively promised only to provide a licensed attorney to plaintiff. There are no allegations in the complaint or in any of the attached exhibits incorporated into the complaint indicating that defendants knew, or should have known, that Levy was incompetent to render legal services to plaintiff. There are no allegations that Levy did not have his license or was not in good standing at the time of the referral. Although plaintiff did plead that Levy was negligent in representing him following the referral, those allegations are not the equivalent of pleading facts indicating that defendants knew or should have known that Levy was ineffective. Plaintiffs allegations that defendants did not perform a sufficient background check on Levy before referring him are also insufficient to plead a deceptive act or practice by defendants. Because plaintiff failed to plead a prima facie case for violation of the Consumer Fraud Act against defendants, we find that the trial court properly dismissed counts XV and XVI of plaintiffs complaint.\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court'.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, P.J., and WOLFSON, J., concur.\nLevy is not a party to this appeal.\nAttached as an exhibit to plaintiffs sixth amended complaint was an affidavit from plaintiff indicating that he did not possess a copy of an \u201cexecuted contract for services.\u201d\nPlaintiff attached the handbook as an exhibit to his sixth amended complaint.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BURKE" } ], "attorneys": [ "McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, of Chicago (James P. DeNardo, Sara E. Cook, and Kristin L. Dvorsky of counsel), for appellant.", "Peter J. Borzeka & Associates, of Chicago (Peter J. Borzeka, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ARMAND A. GONZALZLES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN EXPRESS CREDIT CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees (Robert S. Levy et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201498\u20143888\nOpinion filed June 28, 2000.\nMcKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, of Chicago (James P. DeNardo, Sara E. Cook, and Kristin L. Dvorsky of counsel), for appellant.\nPeter J. Borzeka & Associates, of Chicago (Peter J. Borzeka, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0199-01", "first_page_order": 217, "last_page_order": 231 }