{ "id": 980621, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM PONYI, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ponyi", "decision_date": "2000-07-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201497\u20141256", "first_page": "568", "last_page": "574", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 568" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" }, { "page": "418-19" }, { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419", "parenthetical": "and cases cited therein" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 366", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209962 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0366-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 404", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864527 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0404-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864533 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "502" }, { "page": "502" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0491-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 561, "char_count": 12729, "ocr_confidence": 0.715, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.22383782585142e-08, "percentile": 0.38487205238606575 }, "sha256": "9f027390f114c2fbb62cc846070821eeff2725db312d90b3bd925395f1e689d6", "simhash": "1:d2f8fc8de3efe7fc", "word_count": 2078 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:05:04.441996+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM PONYI, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant William Ponyi appeals from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his pro se petition for postconviction relief. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court\u2019s determination of whether the pro se postconviction petition was frivolous or without merit was tainted by a discussion that took place between the trial judge and the assistant State\u2019s Attorney; (2) whether defendant raised the gist of a meritorious claim that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was denied based on his allegation that defense counsel failed to explain the plea bargain process; and (3) whether defendant raised the gist of a meritorious claim that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was denied when trial counsel failed to request a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104 \u2014 21(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/104 \u2014 21(a) (West 1994)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for the appointment of an attorney.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nOn January 28, 1994, after a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. He was sentenced on April 22, 1994, to 21 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal on June 10, 1996. People v. Ponyi, No. 1 \u2014 94\u20141515 (1996) (unpublished order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23).\nOn January 2, 1997, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. Defendant alleged in the petition that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was denied when his trial counsel failed to inform him of the nature of a plea offer made by the State or to adequately explain the plea. Defendant also alleged that his right to the effective assistance of counsel was denied when his trial counsel failed to inform the trial court that he was on psychotropic drugs at the time of his sentencing hearing. Defendant also alleged that he was denied his right to due process of law when he was denied his right to a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104 \u2014 21(a) (725 ILCS 5/104\u2014 21(a) (West 1994)). Attached to the petition were defendant\u2019s affidavit, a prison law clerk\u2019s affidavit, and a letter requesting defendant\u2019s medical records from Cermak Health Services. On February 27, 1997, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s petition as frivolous and without merit.\nAfter filing his brief on appeal from the dismissal of the postconviction petition, defendant filed a motion to supplement the record with the medical records he received from Cermak Health Services covering the time period of January 28, 1994, to April 6, 1994. The medical records from Cermak Health Services and the medication log sheets from the residential treatment unit indicated that Desipramine was administered to defendant from March 8 through March 31. Although the medication log sheets for the month of April were not included with the records, a prescription, dated April 11, 1994, was included, and it ordered Desipramine to continue with 50 milligrams in the morning and 100 milligrams at night. On August 12, 1998, this court granted defendant\u2019s motion to supplement the record on appeal with the medical records and remanded the matter to the trial court \u201cfor its consideration of the medical records and a reconsideration of its previous order.\u201d\nOn May 21, 1999, the trial court held the remand hearing. Harry Semrow, an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, appeared on behalf of the State. Defendant was not represented by an attorney. At the hearing, the trial court asked the State several questions about the law and the facts:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Okay Mr. Semrow, what is the current fitness standard? What does that provide?\nMR. SEMROW: Well, currently it provides there must be, absent the showing, before the Court, that the Defendant is not entitled to a fitness hearing. However, at the time that this offense occurred, the law provided that the Defendant would be entitled to a fitness hearing in the event that approximate to the, uh \u2014 \u25a0\nTHE COURT: Date of sentencing.\nMR. SEMROW: Well, approximate to the crucial period of time\u2014\nTHE COURT: Either the trial or the date of sentencing.\nMR. SEMROW: Yes. That he had ingested some psychotropic medications. It was, therefore, in this instance, and I believe the Court had an opportunity to review the records and to make a determination whether or not in this Court\u2019s judgment psychotropic medications were ingested at the times approximate, uh\u2014\nTHE COURT: Prior to sentencing.\nMR. SEMROW: Prior to sentencing.\nHi >!'\nTHE COURT: So the question we have before us is whether he was administered medication prior to \u2014 immediately prior to the sentencing hearing which could have certainly affected his right to cooperate with Counsel and assist in his defense as to the issue of sentencing. Is that correct?\nMR. SEMROW: Yes. I believe the remand of the Appellate Court was to have this Court review the medical records and the drug ingestion records that were submitted.\nTHE COURT: Didn\u2019t I review them once already?\nMR. SEMROW: Judge, they were not presented to this Court when the post-conviction petition was presented. This Court initially dismissed this matter as being frivolous and blatantly without merit because the allegations were totally unsupported. It was upon the appeal to the Appellate Court that the Appellate Court Counsel, I must surmise, got the Petitioner to waive his rights to confidentiality and acquire those medical records and presented them to the Appellate Court. The Appellate Court then looked at those records and sent them back to this Court saying given these medical records would this change your conclusion as to whether or not this individual was denied his right to a fitness hearing because of ingestion of psychotropic medications approximate to the time of the sentencing.\nTHE COURT: People versus Kincade stands on the issue, does it not, how any observation this Court observed during his sentencing, that is essentially irrelevant. Is that correct?\nMR. SEMROW: That would be irrelevant due to the fact that if he were ingesting psychotropic medications at that time, pursuant to the statute, and I don\u2019t remember the section offhand, but pursuant to the statute, the individual was ingesting drugs approximate to that time. He was entitled by virtue of that fact and that fact alone to a fitness hearing. And the determination then, therefore, would be whether or not he ingested drugs approximate to\u2014\nTHE COURT: Correct me if I\u2019m wrong. The records show that Mellaril and Sinequan were administered February 3 and March 27.\nMR. SEMROW: I believe that\u2019s accurate, Judge.\nTHE COURT: And Desipramine was administered March 7 and April 7. And he was sentenced 4-22. So there\u2019s a fifteen day span, is there not?\nMR. SEMROW: By my calculations that\u2019s accurate.\nTHE COURT: Well, it\u2019s this Court\u2019s conclusion that a fifteen day period, and certainly, it does not appear that he was overdosed, that he was provided in this in those medical quantities on those dates, a 15 day period would certainly be a sufficient period, this Court finds, to dissipate any effect that it would have in him.\u201d\nThereafter, the trial judge ruled that the original dismissal order would stand and requested that the assistant State\u2019s Attorney prepare something for his signature.\nDefendant filed a supplemental brief addressing the trial court\u2019s decision on limited remand.\nDISCUSSION\nA. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nThe Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1994)) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claim that a substantial violation of their federal or state constitutional rights occurred in their trial or sentencing hearing. See People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). The scope of a postconviction proceeding, which is a collateral attack on a prior conviction and sentence, is limited to inquiry into constitutional issues involved in the conviction and sentence that have not been, and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 502.\nAn evidentiary hearing on the petition is required only when the allegations of the petition, supported by the trial record and the accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing of a violation of a constitutional right. See People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 428 (1998). For the purpose of determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in the supporting affidavits are to be taken as true. See Towns, 182 Ill. 2d at 503. If the circuit court determines that the petition should be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing, its judgment is subject to de novo review. See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).\nB. INPUT FROM STATE DURING PROCEEDING\nIn its supplemental brief addressing issues raised at the hearing on limited remand, defendant contends that the State\u2019s input at the remand hearing \u201ctainted the circuit court\u2019s independent evaluation\u201d of the petition and, thus, the court\u2019s denial of the petition should be reversed.\nUnder the Act, a postconviction proceeding that does not involve the death penalty has three distinct stages. 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1 (West 1994). In the first stage, the defendant files a petition and the circuit court must, within 90 days, determine whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 1994). In this first stage, the Act does not permit any further pleadings from the State. \u201cInstead, the circuit court considers the petition independently, without any input from either side.\u201d People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). If the petition is not dismissed after the first stage, it advances to the second stage for the appointment of counsel. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 4 (West 1994). In the second stage, the State may file a motion to dismiss or answer the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 5 (West 1994). If the circuit court does not dismiss or deny the petition in the second stage, the proceeding advances to the final stage where the circuit court conducts an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 6 (West 1994).\nAs noted in Gaultney, although the Act specifically contemplates that the State may file a motion to dismiss or answer only after the trial court has made its \u201cfirst stage\u201d independent evaluation of the petition to determine if it is frivolous, the mere premature filing of a motion or responsive pleading in the first stage does not per se contaminate the circuit court\u2019s determination of frivolousness. See Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418-19. This is because such a premature filing does not necessarily prevent the judge from conducting an independent evaluation. See Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 419. However, \u201creversal is required where the record shows that the circuit court sought or relied on input from the State when determining whether the petition is frivolous.\u201d Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 419 (and cases cited therein).\nHere, the trial court clearly relied on the State\u2019s input when it reconsidered defendant\u2019s petition and denied it. The court sought input from the State when it asked the State about the current fitness standard. The court also questioned the State about the contents of defendant\u2019s medical records. The State represented to the court that the last time the defendant received medication was on April 7. However, as pointed out in defendant\u2019s brief on appeal, the medical records also contained a prescription dated April 11, 1994, and it ordered Desipramine to continue with 50 milligrams in the morning and 100 milligrams at night. Thus, the record suggests that defendant was taking medication beyond the April 7 date. Had the judge independently reviewed the record, he may have realized that fact. Instead, the judge relied on the State\u2019s concurrence that defendant last received medication on April 7. Therefore, we find that the circuit court\u2019s ruling was improperly tainted by the State\u2019s input.\nCONCLUSION\nAccordingly, the circuit court\u2019s order dismissing defendant\u2019s petition is hereby reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with sections 122 \u2014 4 through 122 \u2014 6 of the Act. Consequently, we need not reach defendant\u2019s arguments related to the merits of his petition.\nReversed and remanded.\nZWICK, P.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Yasemin Eken, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Jean T. McGuire, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILLIAM PONYI, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201497\u20141256\nOpinion filed July 28, 2000.\nYasemin Eken, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJean T. McGuire, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People." }, "file_name": "0568-01", "first_page_order": 586, "last_page_order": 592 }