{ "id": 980622, "name": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY FISHER et al., Defendants-Appellants (Ruby Smith, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Fisher", "decision_date": "2000-08-25", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201499\u20143396", "first_page": "1159", "last_page": "1167", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "698 N.E.2d 237", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073578 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 757", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "Bedoya" }, { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "679", "parenthetical": "Bedoya" }, { "page": "679" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 N.E.2d 705", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5427298 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "common law is comprised of flexible principles that adapt to changing times and, as adopted by the legislature, continually expand with the progress of society" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 Ill. 2d 74", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12121670 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81", "parenthetical": "common law is comprised of flexible principles that adapt to changing times and, as adopted by the legislature, continually expand with the progress of society" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/2/0074-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 N.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 253275 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 N.E.2d 25", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. App. 3d 936", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3556305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/115/0936-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 A.L.R.4th 261", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "A.L.R. 4th", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "669 A.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11308427 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "automobile business exclusion clause not contrary to public policy underlying the state-mandated insurance program" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/669/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 Kan. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 1426570 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"garage shop exclusion\" void because it contravened statutory requirements" }, { "parenthetical": "\"garage shop exclusion\" void because it contravened statutory requirements" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/229/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 2164408 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "automobile business exclusion void because it attempted to redefine \"insured\" to narrow the coverage required by statute" }, { "parenthetical": "automobile business exclusion void because it attempted to redefine \"insured\" to narrow the coverage required by statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/283/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 N.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295605 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 So. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11572479 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "605", "parenthetical": "Marcus" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/740/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 Ill. App. 3d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3574499 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/152/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. App. 2d 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2554043 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/84/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 205", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181505 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "268" }, { "page": "1073" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 N.E.2d 1227", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1230", "parenthetical": "Pekin" }, { "page": "1230" }, { "page": "1230" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208114 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "Pekin" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "695 N.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "Universal Underwriters" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "849" }, { "page": "850-51" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "850" }, { "page": "850-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864529 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "Universal Underwriters" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "241-42" }, { "page": "244-46" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "245" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 1125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1127" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535927 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 704", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 70", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411626 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 1196", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821405 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "441" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.J. Super. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 403637 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "state's public policy to provide coverage to anyone using a vehicle with the owner's permission voids and makes unenforceable a provision excluding coverage for anyone parking the insured's vehicle" }, { "parenthetical": "state's public policy to provide coverage to anyone using a vehicle with the owner's permission voids and makes unenforceable a provision excluding coverage for anyone parking the insured's vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/297/0437-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 861, "char_count": 19630, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0494703592889357e-07, "percentile": 0.5536058279845659 }, "sha256": "9d9f9673c5764baca326d07b19afba3639505e5d29e66b863f2a0bbf0f917544", "simhash": "1:f2b5495b674f8cb2", "word_count": 3101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:05:04.441996+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY FISHER et al., Defendants-Appellants (Ruby Smith, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HARTMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRuby Smith (Smith) allegedly sustained injuries while entering Maurice Barnes\u2019 (Barnes) vehicle following its return from the valet parking service at Harrah\u2019s Casino Illinois (Harrah\u2019s). Smith filed suit against Barnes, Jeremy Fisher (Fisher), the valet driver employed by Harrah\u2019s, and Harrah\u2019s. Fisher and Harrah\u2019s tendered their defense to Barnes\u2019 automobile insurance carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm).\nState Farm later sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Fisher or Harrah\u2019s because there was no coverage under the \u201cautomobile business\u201d exclusion clause (sometimes exclusion clause) in Barnes\u2019 insurance policy. The circuit court granted State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment, finding that the policy exclusion clause applied. Fisher and Harrah\u2019s allege State Farm\u2019s exclusion clause violates public policy, was ambiguous, and does not apply by its own terms because Fisher was acting as Barnes\u2019 agent. They seek reversal of the court\u2019s judgment, entry of summary judgment in their favor, and sanctions against State Farm.\nOn September 21, 1995, Barnes and Smith visited Harrah\u2019s in Joliet, Illinois. Upon arrival, Barnes, driving his 1985 Mercury Cougar, gave his vehicle to an employee of Harrah\u2019s valet service. When finished with their visit, Fisher retrieved Barnes\u2019 vehicle and returned it to the front of the casino. As Smith entered the passenger side, the vehicle rolled backward, causing her to be knocked to the ground. At the time of the accident, Barnes\u2019 vehicle was insured through State Farm.\nIn August 1997, Smith filed suit against Fisher, Harrah\u2019s, and Barnes, alleging that defendants negligently managed and operated the vehicle, failed to keep the vehicle under proper control, failed to apply the emergency brake upon returning the vehicle, and negligently left the motor running on an inclined driveway. Subsequently, Fisher and Harrah\u2019s tendered their defense to State Farm, which State Farm denied, alleging that it had no duty to defend Fisher and Harrah\u2019s under Barnes\u2019 insurance policy, based upon the exclusion clause in Barnes\u2019 policy that provided, in pertinent part:\n\u201cTHERE IS NO COVERAGE:\n1. WHILE ANY VEHICLE INSURED UNDER THIS SECTION IS:\n* *\nb. BEING REPAIRED, SERVICED OR USED BY ANY PERSON EMPLOYED OR ENGAGED IN ANY WAY IN A CAR BUSINESS. This does not apply to:\n(1) you or your spouse\n^\n(4) any agent, employee or partner of you, your spouse, any relative or such resident.\u201d\nThe policy defined a \u201ccar business\u201d as \u201ca business or job where the purpose is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport, store or park land motor vehicles or trailers.\u201d\nIn July 1998, State Farm sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend Fisher and Harrah\u2019s because of the excluded coverage. In September 1998, Fisher and Harrah\u2019s filed an answer and affirmative defense to State Farm\u2019s declaratory judgment complaint, arguing that the exception did not apply because Fisher and Harrah\u2019s were acting as Barnes\u2019 agent when the injury occurred.\nIn March 1999, State Farm moved for summary judgment. In April 1999, Fisher and Harrah\u2019s responded to State Farm\u2019s motion for summary judgment and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were Barnes\u2019 agents and therefore were exempt from the exclusion clause; the clause language was ambiguous; and the exclusion violated public policy.\nIn May 1999, the circuit court granted State Farm\u2019s summary judgment motion and denied Fisher and Harrah\u2019s cross-motion, finding that \u201cFisher, while working as a valet for Harrah\u2019s was in the \u2018car business\u2019 [because] his job was to \u2018store or park land motor vehicles.\u2019 \u201d In addition, Fisher and Harrah\u2019s were not exempt from the exclusion clause because Fisher was a bailee, not Barnes\u2019 agent, when he parked Barnes\u2019 vehicle. Last, the exclusion clause was not ambiguous and State Farm appropriately relied upon the provision when it denied the claim.\nIn August 1999, Fisher and Harrah\u2019s moved to reconsider the grant of summary judgment, arguing that Fisher could be both Barnes\u2019 bailee and agent, and asked the circuit court to follow a factually similar case from New Jersey, Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J. Super. 437, 688 A.2d 614 (1997). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that Fisher was acting as a bailee, not Barnes\u2019 agent, and the court was not bound to follow rulings of other states\u2019 courts. This appeal followed.\nI\nFisher and Harrah\u2019s initially assert that entry of summary judgment in State Farm\u2019s favor was in error because it should not have been permitted to rely on the \u201ccar business\u201d exclusion of the policy.\nThe construction of an insurance policy is a question of law subject to de novo review. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Villicana, 181 Ill. 2d 436, 441, 692 N.E.2d 1196 (1998); Zimmerman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1068, 729 N.E.2d 70 (2000), appeal denied, 189 Ill. 2d 704 (2000).\nThe primary objective in construing the language of a policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in their agreement. McKinney v. Allstate Insurance Co., 188 Ill. 2d 493, 497, 722 N.E.2d 1125, 1127 (1999). Language in a policy will not be enforced, however, if it contradicts public policy as mandated by the Illinois legislature. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 246, 695 N.E.2d 848, 850 (1998) (Universal Underwriters); Pekin Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 305 Ill. App. 3d 417, 420, 711 N.E.2d 1227, 1230 (1999) (Pekin).\nInsurance is based upon the theory of spreading risk among many policyholders. Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 211, 59 L. Ed. 2d 261, 268, 99 S. Ct. 1067, 1073 (1979). The purpose of mandatory automobile liability insurance is not only to protect the owner against liability or some other insurance company; rather, its principal purpose is to protect the public by securing payment of their damages. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 84 Ill. App. 2d 200, 206, 228 N.E.2d 141, 144 (1967); Insurance Car Rentals, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 152 Ill. App. 3d 225, 232, 504 N.E.2d 256 (1987); Marcus v. Hanover Insurance Co., 740 So. 2d 603, 605 (La. 1999) (Marcus); 7 Couch on Insurance 3d \u00a7 109:5 (1997).\nSection 7 \u2014 601(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) requires vehicles to be insured through a \u201cliability insurance policy.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(a) (West 1998). The definition of a \u201cmotor vehicle liability policy,\u201d contained in section 7 \u2014 317 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317 (West 1998)) (section 7 \u2014 317), mandates coverage requirements in such a policy. See Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 244, 695 N.E.2d at 850.\nSection 7 \u2014 317(b) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c \u2018Motor vehicle liability policy\u2019 defined. ***\n(b) Owner\u2019s Policy. Such owner\u2019s policy of liability insurance:\n2. Shall insure the person named therein and any other person using or responsible for the use of such motor vehicle or vehicles with the express or implied permission of the insured.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 317(b)(2) (West 1998).\nFisher and Harrah\u2019s argue first that State Farm cannot deny coverage based on the automobile business exclusion clause of the policy because the exception violates public policy as mandated in section 7 \u2014 317(b)(2), relying on Universal Underwriters and Pekin. State Farm responds that section 7 \u2014 317(b)(2) and Universal Underwriters should not apply in the present situation because the named insured does not control the selection of the driver or the manner in which the car is driven once he relinquishes control to a third party.\nIn Universal Underwriters, a car dealership allowed Rodney Luck-hart to test-drive one of its vehicles. During the test-drive, Luckhart was involved in an automobile accident. The car dealership\u2019s policy stated that an insured included any person required by law to be insured while test-driving one of its vehicles. Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 241-42, 695 N.E.2d at 849. Luckhart\u2019s insurance carrier, State Farm, settled all claims against Luckhart and then sued the dealership\u2019s insurance carrier, Universal Underwriters, for reimbursement. The circuit court granted State Farm summary judgment and the appellate court affirmed (State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285 Ill. App. 3d 115, 674 N.E.2d 52 (1996)). The supreme court affirmed, finding section 7 \u2014 317(b) mandated that \u201ca liability insurance policy issued to the owner of a vehicle must cover the named insured and any other person using the vehicle with the named insured\u2019s permission,\u201d and if an insurance policy fails to include a clause providing coverage to persons who are permitted to use the named insured\u2019s vehicle, such a clause will be read into the policy. Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 244-46, 695 N.E.2d at 850-51.\nIn Pekin, the appellate court found the language in a car dealership\u2019s insurance policy that excluded test-drivers from coverage could not be enforced because it contradicted the mandatory language of 7 \u2014 317(b). Pekin, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 420, 711 N.E.2d at 1230.\nThe instant case presents a question of first impression for the Illinois state courts. No Illinois case is found in which a court has determined whether automobile business exclusions are against public policy, post mandatory liability insurance (625 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 601(a) (West 1998)) and Universal Underwriters. The holding in Universal Underwriters, that \u201ca liability insurance policy issued to the owner of a vehicle must cover the named insured and any other person using the vehicle with the named insured\u2019s permission\u201d (Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 244, 695 N.E.2d at 850), is contrary to the automobile business exclusion because the exception does not cover \u201cany other person using the vehicle with the named insured\u2019s permission.\u201d Language contrary to the mandatory language of section 7 \u2014 317(b) is not enforced. Pekin, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 420, 711 N.E.2d at 1230.\nOther state courts that have considered an automobile business exclusion with reference to the state\u2019s compulsory liability insurance laws have found that such exclusions conflict with public policy and are not enforceable. See Scott v. Salerno, 297 N.J. Super. 437, 688 A.2d 614 (1997) (state\u2019s public policy to provide coverage to anyone using a vehicle with the owner\u2019s permission voids and makes unenforceable a provision excluding coverage for anyone parking the insured\u2019s vehicle); Marcus, 740 So. 2d 603 (automobile business exclusion conflicted with the state\u2019s compulsory insurance law and was not enforceable); Farmland Mutual Insurance Co. v. Jim Moore Cadillac-Oldsmobile, Inc., 283 S.C. 33, 320 S.E.2d 719 (1984) (automobile business exclusion void because it attempted to redefine \u201cinsured\u201d to narrow the coverage required by statute); DeWitt v. Young, 229 Kan. 474, 625 P.2d 478 (1981) (\u201cgarage shop exclusion\u201d void because it contravened statutory requirements). Cf. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Travelers Insurance Co., 669 A.2d 45 (Del. 1995) (automobile business exclusion clause not contrary to public policy underlying the state-mandated insurance program). See Annotation, Who is \u201cEmployed or Engaged in the Automobile Business\u201d Within Exclusionary Clause of Liability Policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261 (1987).\nNotwithstanding State Farm\u2019s argument to the contrary, Universal Underwriters is controlling. Here, as in Universal Underwriters, the owner of the vehicle permitted another person to drive his vehicle by surrendering his vehicle to him, thereby relinquishing control over the manner in which the vehicle was driven. Universal Underwriters held that, in Illinois, \u201ca liability insurance policy issued to the owner of a vehicle must cover the named insured and any other person using the vehicle with the named insured\u2019s permission\u201d (Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 244, 695 N.E.2d at 850). The subject automobile business exclusion clause directly conflicts with Universal Underwriters, the mandatory language of section 7 \u2014 317(b), and the policy of mandatory automobile liability insurance legislation. Accordingly, the exclusion is not enforceable.\nII\nA State Farm argument, tardily brought to the court\u2019s attention for the first time at oral argument, concerns a sentence contained in section 7 \u2014 601(a) (625 ILCS 7 \u2014 601(a) (West 1998)): \u201c[njothing herein shall deprive an insurer of any policy defense available at common law.\u201d State Farm urges that this provision requires affirmation of the circuit court\u2019s judgment because previous case law, now common law, found the automobile business exclusions proper defenses to coverage. See, e.g., Van Vleck v. Barbee, 115 Ill. App. 3d 936, 451 N.E.2d 25 (1983). The language cited by State Farm was present at the time both Universal Underwriters and Pekin were decided. Neither court specifically addressed the cited clause; nevertheless, the courts were certainly aware of the clause, as well as previous case law that found exclusion clauses were permissible in \u201cgarage policies,\u201d the same type of policy at issue in Universal Underwriters and Pekin. In Universal Underwriters, the supreme court construed the very section of the Code, if not the specific language (Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 244, 695 N.E.2d at 850). See, e.g., Steinberg v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 272 Ill. App. 3d 79, 650 N.E.2d 14 (1995). Each court found that public policy mandated coverage. Although case law exists that found automobile exclusions did not violate public policy, these cases were decided before compulsory insurance was mandated by legislation and are therefore inapposite. See Universal Underwriters, 182 Ill. 2d at 245, 695 N.E.2d at 850-51; see also Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 81, 117 N.E.2d 74, 79 (1954) (common law is comprised of flexible principles that adapt to changing times and, as adopted by the legislature, continually expand with the progress of society).\nFurthermore, section 7 \u2014 601 was amended by Public Act 91 \u2014 661 (Pub. Act 91 \u2014 661, eff. December 22, 1999), after the supreme court construed the section in Universal Underwriters. The court\u2019s construction, which we follow, did not evoke an amendment offering further explanation of the legislature\u2019s intent regarding section 7 \u2014 601(a), creating a presumption that the legislature acquiesced in the court\u2019s construction. Kobylanski v. Chicago Board of Education, 63 Ill. 2d 165, 172, 347 N.E.2d 705, 709 (1976).\nOther reasons suggest themselves in support of reversal. The amenities of providing valet parking are to be found in many commercial and business enterprises, such as restaurants, hotels, country clubs, other recreational establishments, catering establishments, athletic events, among others, where parking of vehicles becomes inconvenient because of weather conditions or distance from the establishment, etc., which makes parking valet services a competitively effective, adjunctive business attraction. In such instances, it cannot be said that the establishments providing parking valet services to their patrons are engaged in the \u201ccar business\u201d or \u201cbusiness *** where the purpose is to transport, store or park land motor vehicles\u201d (emphasis added), as defined by the instant State Farm policy. To the contrary, common sense persuades that the purpose of such a service is to run a convenient and attractive restaurant or hotel or business or, as in this instance, a gaming casino, thereby making the enterprise profitable, competitive and attractive to those inclined to attend, rather than to carry on a \u201ccar business.\u201d In the present case, the purpose of providing a parking valet service for Harrah\u2019s patrons was hardly that of a \u201ccar business\u201d as defined by the State Farm policy. In light of this disposition, Fisher and Harrah\u2019s remaining arguments, that the automobile business exclusion clause was ambiguous and that it did not apply by its own terms, need not be addressed.\nIll\nFisher and Harrah\u2019s lastly argue that State Farm denied coverage in bad faith and should be sanctioned pursuant to section 155 of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/155 (West 1998)).\nSection 155(1) provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cIn any action by or against a company wherein there is in issue the liability of a company on a policy or policies of insurance *** or for an unreasonable delay in settling a claim, and it appears to the court that such action or delay is vexatious and unreasonable, the court may allow as part of the taxable costs in the action reasonable attorney fees, other costs, plus an amount not to exceed ***.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/155(1) (West 1998).\nThe circuit court determines what conduct constitutes a vexatious and unreasonable refusal to defend. Bedoya v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co., 293 Ill. App. 3d 668, 679, 688 N.E.2d 757, 764 (1997) (Bedoya). The court may consider whether the insured was forced to file suit to recover and whether the insured was deprived the use of his property. If there is a bona fide dispute concerning coverage, delay in settling the claim may not violate the statute. Bedoya, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 679, 688 N.E.2d at 764.\nIn the instant case, the circuit court found that State Farm \u201cappropriately relied upon [the automobile business exclusion] when it denied Fisher and Harrah\u2019s tender.\u201d Fisher and Harrah\u2019s did cite Universal Underwriters in their pleadings and correspondence to State Farm; however, the court agreed with State Farm\u2019s argument and distinguished Universal Underwriters on the facts. No specific Illinois case law existed and State Farm\u2019s argument and interpretation were reasonable and did not evince vexatiousness. A bona fide dispute concerning coverage existed. The court properly found that sanctions under section 155 were not mandated. This aspect of the court\u2019s determination is affirmed.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed in part and affirmed in part. The order of summary judgment in State Farm\u2019s favor is reversed and the cause is remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants; the court\u2019s denial of sanctions is affirmed.\nReversed in part with directions; affirmed in part.\nTHEIS, EJ., and GREIMAN, J., concur.\nFuller\u2019s Car Wash, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 167, 698 N.E.2d 237 (1998), addressed an automobile business exclusion but did not address whether the exclusion violated public policy. Van Vleck v. Barbee, 115 Ill. App. 3d 936, 451 N.E.2d 25 (1983), found an automobile business exclusion was not contrary to public policy; however, this case was decided before mandatory liability insurance was required and Universal Underwriters became law.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HARTMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Fraterrigo, Beranek, Feiereisel & Kasbohm, of Chicago (Francis P. Kasbohm, of counsel), for appellants.", "Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago (Frank C. Stevens, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY FISHER et al., Defendants-Appellants (Ruby Smith, Defendant).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201499\u20143396\nOpinion filed August 25, 2000.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied September 22, 2000.\nFraterrigo, Beranek, Feiereisel & Kasbohm, of Chicago (Francis P. Kasbohm, of counsel), for appellants.\nTaylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnagle & Merletti, of Chicago (Frank C. Stevens, of counsel), for appellee.\n^though the notice of appeal caption contains Ruby Smith\u2019s name and designates her as an appellant, the body of the notice contains no reference to her and she has not participated in this appeal." }, "file_name": "1159-01", "first_page_order": 1177, "last_page_order": 1185 }