{ "id": 1096609, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES LUSIETTO, JR., Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Lusietto", "decision_date": "2000-09-15", "docket_number": "No. 3-99-0506", "first_page": "143", "last_page": "147", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 143" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "644 N.E.2d 1137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477908 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/163/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 1351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Ill. 2d 13", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3236660 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/142/0013-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 12", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182687 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 1191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "289 Ill. App. 3d 835", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 351109 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/289/0835-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 Ill. 2d 195", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3251719 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/137/0195-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 803", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 89", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5573939 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0089-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 N.E.2d 1124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5550081 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/122/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243932 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0450-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 559, "char_count": 10415, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.676830387708631e-08, "percentile": 0.35380248037626905 }, "sha256": "f1732ca2fe2cd9f66b005b145f007a969f23405f31e89019ecb68aed85a52f1a", "simhash": "1:3cda3c6c3276afa7", "word_count": 1691 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:00.608787+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES LUSIETTO, JR., Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOMER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nA jury convicted the defendant, James Lusietto, Jr., of cannabis trafficking. 720 ILCS 550/5.1 (West 1998). The defendant was sentenced to 15 years of imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the court erred in allowing the \u201cmere fact\u201d of his previous felony conviction into evidence; (2) his sentence was excessive; and (3) the cannabis trafficking provision violates equal protection guarantees (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; 111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2). We affirm.\nBefore trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine seeking to bar introduction of his 1985 felony conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The court ruled that the fact the defendant had a prior felony conviction could be introduced, but the name of the offense could not.\nAt trial, the State presented evidence that on May 12, 1998, Federal Express contacted La Salle police about a suspicious package. A dog trained to detect narcotics alerted on the package. A police officer then disguised herself as a Federal Express employee and delivered the package to its destination. Richard Presthus accepted the package and signed for it. Presthus took the package to his sister\u2019s home while he was followed by police. When Presthus emerged from the home without the package, the police stopped him. Presthus admitted to the police that the package contained cannabis. He said it had been sent by the defendant. The police retrieved the package from the home of Presthus\u2019 sister.\nThe return address on the package indicated that it had been sent from San Diego, California. Inside it, the police found a quantity of cannabis wrapped in saran wrap and newspapers. The police searched Presthus\u2019 home and found a Federal Express receipt for a parcel sent to the defendant in San Diego. Presthus admitted to the police that he had sent money to the defendant by Federal Express as payment for the defendant\u2019s shipments of cannabis and sunglasses.\nPolice officers went to San Diego and determined that the defendant was living there on a boat. The police searched the boat and found the following items: (1) a notebook containing Presthus\u2019 name and phone number; (2) a calendar containing Presthus\u2019 name and the address of his ex-wife; and (3) a card in the defendant\u2019s wallet containing the word \u201cStretch\u201d and the phone number of Presthus\u2019 ex-wife.\nAt trial, Richard Presthus testified that his nickname was Stretch and he was 26 years old. He was a long-time friend of the defendant. Presthus stated that he and the defendant had entered into a scheme to sell cannabis and imitation designer sunglasses. He reaffirmed that the cannabis in the package had been sent to him by the defendant.\nPresthus admitted that he had pled guilty to possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver in connection with this case. Presthus had agreed to provide truthful testimony in the defendant\u2019s case in return for the prosecutor\u2019s promise not to charge him with cannabis trafficking.\nForensic experts testified that two fingerprints found on the newspaper the cannabis was wrapped in belonged to the defendant. One fingerprint belonged to the defendant\u2019s wife. The cannabis seized weighed 2,530.6 grams.\nThe defendant testified that he had been convicted of a felony in 1985. According to the defendant, he had given Presthus some sunglasses for resale, and they had agreed to split the profits. Presthus had also asked the defendant for help in selling cannabis, but the defendant had refused. However, the defendant introduced Presthus to someone called Jesus who worked at the marina where the defendant lived. Jesus supplied the defendant with cannabis. Jesus sometimes worked in an area where the defendant took out his garbage. On May 11, 1998, the defendant\u2019s wife took out the garbage, including the Sunday newspaper.\nFollowing the defendant\u2019s conviction, the cause proceeded to sentencing. The evidence at sentencing showed that the defendant was 46 years old. He had six prior convictions for robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, and several drug offenses. Presthus had no prior convictions and had received probation for his conviction of possession of cannabis with the intent to deliver. The court imposed a sentence of 15 years of imprisonment on the defendant.\nOn appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the \u201cmere fact\u201d of his prior felony conviction into evidence.\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has recently ruled that a witness should not be impeached by introducing the fact that he had a prior felony conviction without stating the offense for which he was convicted. People v. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450, 713 N.E.2d 532 (1999).\nThe defendant did not object to the mere fact method at trial or in his posttrial motion. Therefore, he has waived this issue, and we will only reverse if plain error occurred. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988). Plain error is error that denies the defendant a fair trial or error that occurs in a trial in which the evidence is closely balanced. People v. Hayes, 139 Ill. 2d 89, 564 N.E.2d 803 (1990). We conclude that plain error did not occur.\nFirst, the evidence was not closely balanced. The defendant\u2019s guilt was clearly established by Presthus\u2019 testimony, the evidence on the boat and in Presthus\u2019 home, and the fingerprints of the defendant and his wife on the newspaper that was wrapped around the cannabis.\nSecond, we hold that the defendant was not denied a fair trial. This prong of the plain error test is reserved for rare cases where a reviewing court must correct an error \u201cto preserve the integrity and reputation of the judicial process.\u201d People v. Herrett, 137 Ill. 2d 195, 214, 561 N.E.2d 1, 10 (1990). The use of the mere fact method \u2014 which was apparently intended to lessen the prejudice to the defendant \u2014 was not such an error. We therefore conclude that plain error did not occur.\nThe defendant next argues that his sentence was excessive when compared to that of his codefendant, Richard Presthus.\nThe sentence of a codefendant who pled guilty cannot be compared to the sentence of a defendant who stood trial. People v. Reyna, 289 Ill. App. 3d 835, 682 N.E.2d 1191 (1997). Codefendants are not similarly situated if they have been convicted of different crimes. People v. Eubanks, 283 Ill. App. 3d 12, 669 N.E.2d 678 (1996). In addition, differences in sentences of codefendants may be justified by their relative character and history, their degree of culpability, their rehabilitative potential, and their criminal records. Reyna, 289 Ill. App. 3d 835, 682 N.E.2d 1191. The sentence imposed by the trial court will not be reversed unless it was an abuse of discretion. People v. Streit, 142 Ill. 2d 13, 566 N.E.2d 1351 (1991).\nPresthus pled guilty in this case to a lesser charge and, pursuant to the agreement, provided testimony against the defendant. Therefore, his sentence is not a suitable basis for comparison to that of the defendant. In addition, a longer sentence for the defendant was justified by his greater criminal record and Presthus\u2019 relative youth. We therefore conclude that the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.\nLastly, the defendant argues that the cannabis trafficking provision violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; 111. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 2. The defendant states that a person who sends less than 2,500 grams of cannabis into Illinois is guilty of no crime in this state. See 720 ILCS 550/5.1(a) (West 1998) (minimum amount of cannabis for application of cannabis trafficking provision is 2,500 grams). The defendant argues that since he sent an amount slightly greater than 2,500 grams into this state and was found guilty of an offense punishable by 8 to 30 years of imprisonment (720 ILCS 550/5.1(b) (West 1998)), he was denied equal protection.\nThe constitutional right to equal protection of the law guarantees that the State must treat similarly situated persons in a similar manner. People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 644 N.E.2d 1137 (1994). However, the State retains the power to classify and draw lines that treat different classes of persons differently. If a statutory classification neither impinges on a fundamental constitutional right nor is based on a \u201csuspect\u201d class, a court will use the \u201crational basis\u201d test to review the statute\u2019s validity. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 644 N.E.2d 1137. Under the rational basis test, a statutory classification will be upheld if it bears a rational basis to a legitimate state interest. Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 644 N.E.2d 1137.\nThe provision at issue is found in the Cannabis Control Act (Act) (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 1998)). The legislative declaration accompanying the Act acknowledges that the use of cannabis is widespread in Illinois. 720 ILCS 550/1 (West 1998). The declaration further states that previous efforts to limit the use of cannabis unnecessarily drew a large segment of the population into the criminal justice system without deterring the use of cannabis. Therefore, the declaration concludes, the intent of the legislature in passing the Act was to establish a penalty system that directs the efforts of law enforcement toward large-scale traffickers.\nThe provision at issue affects neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class. See Kimbrough, 163 Ill. 2d 231, 644 N.E.2d 1137. Therefore, the rational basis test is used to determine its validity. The deterrence of cannabis trafficking into this state is clearly a legitimate state interest. The legislature\u2019s decision to focus state resources on the deterrence of large-scale traffickers was rationally related to the state interest. We therefore conclude that the cannabis trafficking provision does not violate equal protection.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSLATER, EJ., and LYTTON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOMER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Michael H. Vonnahmen, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Michael James, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMES LUSIETTO, JR., Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-99-0506\nOpinion filed September 15, 2000.\nRobert Agostinelli, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, and Michael H. Vonnahmen, of Springfield, for appellant.\nMichael James, State\u2019s Attorney, of Ottawa (John X. Breslin and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0143-01", "first_page_order": 163, "last_page_order": 167 }