{ "id": 1096642, "name": "In re M.R. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Renee R., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Renee R.", "decision_date": "2000-08-31", "docket_number": "No. 1-98-2859", "first_page": "399", "last_page": "404", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 399" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 232", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411589 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0232-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229710 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173529 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 252662 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "466" }, { "page": "463" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026449 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334-35" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "902-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352929 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0770-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 602, "char_count": 11575, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.389134665657536e-07, "percentile": 0.642388031116872 }, "sha256": "d8f2058b6cc07febc03364c981b49ec3ac0f048b2c6e492690101ef20cd13c1e", "simhash": "1:b363e046594f3cf7", "word_count": 1818 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:00.608787+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re M.R. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Renee R., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BARTH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Renee R. appeals from the trial court\u2019s judgment terminating her parental rights as to her five children after finding respondent an unfit parent and finding it in the children\u2019s best interest to terminate her rights. On appeal, respondent contends that her right to be present and her due process rights were violated when the trial court conducted the parental fitness and termination hearings in her absence.\nIn her appeal, respondent does not challenge the evidence presented at the termination hearing or argue that the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of that evidence, and we therefore briefly review the facts that were presented to the trial court. On June 9, 1998, the date of the termination hearing, respondent\u2019s counsel informed the trial court that respondent was in the hospital and under psychiatric care, and counsel requested that the hearing be continued. Respondent\u2019s counsel further informed the trial court that the length of respondent\u2019s hospital stay was \u201cunknown\u201d and that counsel was \u201cready to go forward.\u201d The trial court denied the request for a continuance, noting that respondent was \u201cably represented by counsel.\u201d\nThe court heard testimony from a psychiatrist and three caseworkers from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and Lutheran Social Services. Respondent\u2019s case was first referred to DCFS immediately after the birth of her first child, M.R., in March 1985. Later that year, DCFS was awarded custody of M.R. following a determination that the child would be endangered if left in respondent\u2019s care. This court affirmed, stating that respondent had not progressed in controlling her reactions to everyday stresses. The court also noted respondent\u2019s personality disorder, drug abuse and violent behavior. In re M.R., No. 1 \u2014 86\u20142162 (1988) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). A second child, C.R., was born in 1986 and removed from respondent\u2019s care at birth but was later returned to respondent. Respondent gave birth to a third child, D.R., in 1987, followed by twins, M.R. and M.R., in 1990.\nThe testimony established that since 1973 respondent had been admitted to psychiatric hospitals approximately 23 times and had been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and schizophrenia, for which respondent was prescribed several medications that she sometimes failed to take. Respondent\u2019s conditions caused her to be delusional, have hallucinations and exhibit unstable moods and periods of depression. Between 1987 and 1993, respondent lived in at least 20 different locations. Respondent had minimal participation with parenting services offered to her, often starting programs but failing to complete them. The testimony established that respondent would have difficulty caring for her children in the future due to her confused speech and thought processes and her often erratic behavior.\nThe trial court found respondent unfit as to the State\u2019s allegations that respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the minors\u2019 welfare; (2) desertion of the children for more than three months; (3) habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitness proceeding; (4) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of the removal of the children or to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children within nine months after the adjudication; and (5) inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to mental impairment, illness or retardation beyond a reasonable time period. After the best interest phase of the termination hearing, the trial court terminated respondent\u2019s parental rights.\nOn appeal, respondent contends that the trial court\u2019s acts of finding her unfit and terminating her parental rights in her absence violated her \u201cstatutory right to be present\u201d and her due process rights. Respondent argues that she had been hospitalized for a psychiatric condition and that her attorney was aware that she wanted to be present and wanted the case to be continued.\nWe initially address the State\u2019s contention that respondent\u2019s appeal should be dismissed because she challenges the denial of her request that the termination hearing be continued. The State argues that the denial of a motion to continue is not a final and appealable order. However, according to the notice of appeal, respondent\u2019s appeal was taken from the judgment of \u201ctermination of parental rights.\u201d Moreover, respondent\u2019s brief addresses alleged violations of her statutory and constitutional rights. We therefore find respondent\u2019s appeal properly before this court and will address its merits.\nRespondent contends that, as the parent whose rights were being determined, she had a statutory right to be present at the termination hearing, citing section 1 \u2014 5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 5(1) (West 1998)). However, although respondent has such a right, her presence is not mandatory. See In re C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d 770, 778 (1999).\nIn determining whether the procedures followed in a parental rights termination proceeding satisfied the constitutional requirements of due process, this court must balance three factors. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976); In re C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465 (1995). The factors outlined in Mathews are: (1) the private interest affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government\u2019s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33, 96 S. Ct. at 902-03. Applying the first factor, respondent\u2019s liberty interest in maintaining a parental relationship with her five children cannot be denied. See In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 478, 483 (1999); C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 465.\nRegarding the second criterion, it is equally apparent that the procedures used by the trial court in this case offered little or no risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent\u2019s interest in parenting her children. Although respondent was not present at the termination hearing, in light of the testimony as to respondent\u2019s psychiatric conditions, respondent\u2019s attorney likely represented the interest of respondent to the best degree possible. After respondent\u2019s counsel requested the continuance and informed the court that respondent was hospitalized, counsel stated that she was nevertheless \u201cready to go forward.\u201d Respondent\u2019s counsel fully cross-examined witnesses and argued respondent\u2019s case to the trial court. Contrary to respondent\u2019s arguments, the parameters of due process do not include a parent\u2019s absolute right to be present at a termination proceeding.\nAs to the final factor in Mathews, the governmental interest in seeking to adjudicate parental rights also weighs against additional delay in the adjudication of this case. Such delay imposes a serious cost on the functions of government, as well as an intangible cost to the lives of the children involved. See In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000). When the trial court inquired, prior to the termination hearing, about respondent\u2019s release from the hospital, the public guardian stated that it was a \u201cpsych hospitalization\u201d and was \u201cindefinite,\u201d to which respondent\u2019s attorney responded that the time period of her client\u2019s hospitalization was unknown. The court also noted before proceeding with the termination hearing that respondent\u2019s case had previously been continued and set for trial at least once since 1996. The Mathews balancing test therefore does not support respondent\u2019s claim of a violation of her due process rights.\nRespondent likens her case to C.J., in which the Third District Appellate Court held that the trial court violated an incarcerated parent\u2019s due process rights by refusing to grant the parent\u2019s request to continue the termination hearing for approximately one year, at which time the parent would be out of prison. The parent had alternatively requested that the hearing be continued at the end of the State\u2019s evidence so that the parent could review the transcripts and respond to them. C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 463. The parent was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 464. The appellate court found that the State would not have been burdened in allowing respondent a better opportunity to participate in the proceeding, adding that \u201c[t]he exact method of participation is left to the [trial] judge\u2019s discretion.\u201d C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 466.\nWe find C.J. distinguishable from respondent\u2019s case. In C.J., when the parent sought a continuance of the termination hearing to allow her to be present, she requested a continuance for a specific period of time, i.e., her date of release from prison, which was set for approximately one year hence. C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 463. Here, contrary to respondent\u2019s assertions, the trial court did inquire how long respondent would be hospitalized, and the public guardian stated that respondent would be in psychiatric care for an \u201cindefinite\u201d period. We note that respondent\u2019s counsel did not object to this assertion, but instead added that respondent\u2019s status was \u201cunknown at this point.\u201d In addition, the parent in C.J., when requesting the continuance, also suggested an alternative manner by which she could participate in the proceedings if they were conducted in her absence. C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 463. While respondent in this case contends that the court should have \u201cprovided a means for her to participate,\u201d respondent\u2019s counsel did not propose such a method at the time the continuance was requested, nor does counsel offer such a suggestion on appeal.\nRespondent also cites People v. Williams, 312 Ill. App. 3d 232 (2000), in which the First District Appellate Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendant the right to be present at his discharge hearing. The court stated that the trial court did not identify evidence to support its statement that the defendant was \u201cdisturbed\u201d and lacked the requisite mental state to be present during the hearing. Williams, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 233.\nIn contrast to Williams, the record here supports the inference that respondent lacked the capacity to attend the termination hearing because she was in a psychiatric hospital. Furthermore, as previously discussed, respondent\u2019s presence was not absolutely required for the termination hearing to proceed.\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, we therefore find that the trial court did not violate respondent\u2019s due process rights by proceeding in her absence.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOFFMAN, EJ., and SOUTH, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BARTH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Eublic Defender, of Chicago (Todd Avery Shanker, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Grauer Kisicki, and Catherine Boyd, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. ." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re M.R. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Renee R., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1-98-2859\nOpinion filed August 31, 2000.\nRita A. Fry, Eublic Defender, of Chicago (Todd Avery Shanker, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Grauer Kisicki, and Catherine Boyd, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People. ." }, "file_name": "0399-01", "first_page_order": 419, "last_page_order": 424 }