{ "id": 1096553, "name": "ARTHUR TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF'S MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Taylor v. Cook County Sheriff's Merit Board", "decision_date": "2000-09-15", "docket_number": "No. 1-99-3550", "first_page": "574", "last_page": "580", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 574" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208059 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 486", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333141 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1333" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 645", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333067 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0645-01" ] }, { "cite": "119 Ill. App. 3d 648", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3628275 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/119/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927690 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415415 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5083212 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 901", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3114634 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "47 Ill. App. 3d 872", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3368734 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "874" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/47/0872-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2711656 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "249" }, { "page": "877" }, { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0246-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 715, "char_count": 16083, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.121703570277716e-08, "percentile": 0.42770292785409497 }, "sha256": "3b892cadb34250962702b8d695ebbf8c291b40fe3af067158aed8a39410978a4", "simhash": "1:f3db652633a135db", "word_count": 2616 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:00.608787+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ARTHUR TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Sheriff Michael Sheahan charged plaintiff Arthur Taylor (Taylor) with a violation of the rules and regulations of the Cook County Department of Corrections (DOC) and sought his dismissal as an officer with the DOC. The complaint was filed with the defendant Cook County Sheriff\u2019s Merit Board (Board), which conducted a hearing regarding the matter. At the hearing\u2019s close, the Board issued an order finding cause for separation. Taylor then brought this action for administrative review following his decertification, and the circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s ruling. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decisions of the Board and of the circuit court and remand to the Board for further proceedings.\nThe Cook County sheriff\u2019s complaint alleged that Taylor: (1) submitted and certified four separate employment applications containing false answers concerning his criminal background history; (2) violated General Order 4.1, paragraph III, section A \u2014 18, prohibiting the making of a false official report; and (3) violated Article X, paragraph B, section 3, of the Board\u2019s rules and regulations prohibiting the violation of general orders.\nIn short, the sheriff charged Taylor with \u201cmaking a false official report\u201d on the basis that he filed four separate employment applications with the sheriffs office that all supplied false or misleading information regarding his criminal history. Apparently, the sheriff construed these employment applications as \u201cofficial reports\u201d and thus concluded that Taylor\u2019s submissions constituted the making of a false official report. For reasons not apparent from the record, the Board chose not to charge Taylor with Article X, paragraph B, section 5, of the rules and regulations, which empowers the Board to discipline officers who \u201chave provided false or misleading information during the hiring process.\u201d\nOn April 9, 1987, plaintiff filed his first employment application with the sheriffs office. One of the questions inquired whether the applicant had ever been convicted of anything other than a minor traffic violation. In response, Taylor answered \u201cNo.\u201d At the end of the application, Taylor signed his name and certified that the contents of the application were true. However, about a year later, in a letter dated February 26, 1988, Taylor revealed to the Board the existence of a conviction for resisting arrest and obstructing a police officer, for which he was sentenced to one year of nonreporting probation. This letter did not coincide with the filing of an employment application. It is undisputed that on December 5, 1983, plaintiff pled guilty to this criminal offense.\nOn September 1, 1989, plaintiff again submitted an employment application with the sheriffs office, and this time he did not respond to the same question regarding previous convictions. Taylor was hired as a Cook County correctional officer that same month. A few months after having been hired, Taylor resigned and took a job with the Illinois State Police.\nOn December 28, 1990, after resigning from the Illinois State Police, plaintiff submitted another employment application with the Cook County sheriffs office, seeking to be rehired. In this application, he again represented that he had never been convicted of a crime. This application also included plaintiffs signature and a certification that the contents of the application were true.\nFinally, on January 2, 1991, plaintiff submitted a fourth employment application, which he again signed and certified, and again represented that he had never been convicted of a crime. Plaintiff was subsequently hired and began his second job with the DOC on January 2, 1991.\nOn April 29, 1998, at the hearing before the Board, Taylor claimed that in 1987 he spoke to a Mr. James Hogan from the Board about filling out the employment application. Taylor testified that he told Mr. Hogan about his 1983 conviction and that Mr. Hogan told him to mark \u201cNo\u201d on the application, indicating that he had never been convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense. He also testified that when he filled out the January 2, 1991, application, he spoke to an unknown female clerk at the sheriffs office who gave him the employment application. She too advised him to answer the question regarding criminal history with a \u201cNo.\u201d Aside from these two individuals, no one else gave him the advice to answer \u201cNo\u201d on the applications.\nAfter the hearing, the Board found that Taylor \u201cmade a false report\u201d regarding his criminal history in his employment application. Based on those findings, the Board entered an order on June 23, 1998, that plaintiff be terminated from his employment effective July 31, 1997. Taylor then challenged the Board\u2019s decision in the circuit court of Cook County. On April 27, 1999, the trial court affirmed the decision of the Board and entered an order that the decision of the Board was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, that Taylor made a false report, and that there was sufficient cause for discharge. The trial court then denied plaintiffs postjudgment motion, and plaintiff now appeals.\nUnder Dwyer v. Police Board, 31 Ill. App. 3d 246, 249 (1975), plaintiff asserts that the term \u201cofficial report\u201d has a specific meaning, which is that it relates to an officer\u2019s \u201cofficial duties\u201d as that term is used in the sense of obligations ordinarily associated with police work. Plaintiffs first contention is that his conduct of denying and omitting his conviction on his employment application was not and did not involve a matter related to his official duties as a correctional officer, as he was not employed by the sheriff at the time he engaged in such conduct. Because Taylor had no \u201cofficial duties\u201d at the time of his application, he reasons that it would be impossible for him to produce an \u201cofficial report.\u201d Although not enacted by the same administrative body, the pertinent Chicago police board rule that was allegedly violated in Dwyer was \u201cMaking a false report, written or oral.\u201d Dwyer, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 247. There, this court found that an officer\u2019s refusal to answer a grand jury question concerning \u201cwho his employer was\u201d and a subsequent internal affairs inquiry regarding that refusal did not relate to the officer\u2019s official duties, and therefore, such answers could not constitute an official report. Dwyer, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 249.\nPlaintiff also points to this court\u2019s examination of that rule in Noro v. Police Board, 47 Ill. App. 3d 872 (1977). There, before a grand jury, an officer was asked whether \u201che was a Chicago police officer,\u201d and he refused to answer. Noro, 47 Ill. App. 3d at 874. Later, his superiors asked him if he had refused to answer questions relating to his conduct as a police officer. The court found that when he answered \u201cNo,\u201d he gave a false answer that fell within the ambit of \u201cmaking a false report\u201d because it was an attempt to mislead his superiors concerning his duties as an officer. Noro, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 877. The court found the facts in Noro inapposite to Dwyer, as the officer in Dwyer was only asked if he would answer a question as to \u201cwho his employer was,\u201d as opposed to \u201cif he was a Chicago police officer.\u201d Noro, 31 Ill. App. 3d at 877. By comparison, Taylor claims that filling out an employment application is not a task or obligation associated with police work and, furthermore, that it is not a report to a superior officer about one\u2019s conduct as an officer. However, he concedes that if he had offered deceptive answers to his superiors after he had been appointed, that would have been a violation of the rule as interpreted by Noro.\nOn this point, Taylor cites two additional cases that help chalk out this court\u2019s definition of \u201cofficial report.\u201d In Shallow v. Police Board, 95 Ill. App. 3d 901 (1981), where an officer\u2019s dismissal was sought for \u201cmaking a false report, written or oral,\u201d the Board\u2019s determination that a false report had been made was rejected where a false statement was not made on an official report, where the oral statement was a denial, and where the report was never admitted into evidence. Shallow, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 909. Similarly, plaintiff notes, in Phillips v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 172 Ill. App. 3d 278 (1988), a social worker was charged with falsifying her reports concerning her official duties where the evidence indicated that the employee had prepared reports for which there were no contemporaneous notes or investigative reports. Phillips, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 287. Taylor emphasizes that, unlike the present case, Phillips actually made a report concerning a matter for which she actually had a duty to report, and the contents of that report were found to be false.\nIn response, defendants agree that an official report must relate to an officer\u2019s \u201cofficial duties,\u201d as that term is used in the sense of obligations ordinarily associated with police work. However, they also assert that because plaintiff has not supplied any case law which shows that an employment application is not an official report, it is equally as reasonable that the application is the first obligation of every active police officer in that it commences the employer/employee relationship. Because its sole purpose is to begin an official relationship, defendants claim, it falls under the category of official reports.\nDefendants bolster their view by supplying the dictionary definition of the word \u201cofficial.\u201d According to Webster\u2019s II New College Dictionary, page 760 (1995), the word \u201cofficial\u201d is defined as \u201cof or relating to an office or post of authority.\u201d Using this definition, defendants argue, an employment application easily falls within the category of official report. Consequently, defendants conclude that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that as a matter of law and fact all reasonable and unbiased persons, acting within the limits prescribed by law and drawing all inferences in support of the finding that an employment application is an official report governed by the general order, would agree that the finding is erroneous and that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident.\nInitially, we note that the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review to be employed by this court. In Leonard v. Department of Employment Security, 311 Ill. App. 3d 354 (1999), this court confronted a similar dispute:\n\u201cJudicial review of the Board\u2019s decisions extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the record. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 1998). The Board\u2019s factual findings are considered prima facie true and correct, and a reviewing court may set aside such decisions only if they are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141 (1995). Questions of law, however, are subject to de novo review. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998).\u201d Leonard, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 356.\nOn the one hand, Taylor\u2019s analysis suggests that the Board\u2019s determination that the employment application is an \u201cofficial report\u201d is one of law and, as such, is subject to a de novo review. This is evident from his references to comparable cases where this court has made its own determination of what does or what does not constitute an \u201cofficial report.\u201d Appellees, however, suggest that this determination is actually a finding of fact, which is considered prima facie true and correct (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 1998)) and may only be set aside if it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Given that, appellees maintain that the Board\u2019s decision may only be reversed if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. O\u2019Boyle v. Personnel Board, 119 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653 (1983).\n\u201cGenerally, courts give a great deal of deference to an agency\u2019s interpretation of a statute which it is charged with administering [citations]. However, an agency\u2019s interpretation is not binding and will be rejected if erroneous [citations].\u201d Denton v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 277 ILl. App. 3d 770, 774 (1996). \u201cThe deference accorded to an administrative agency\u2019s findings of fact is not accorded to its conclusions of law, including the erroneous construction of a statute or the legal effect of factual findings. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 267 Ill. App. 3d 645, 649, 642 N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (1994). The legal effect of undisputed facts is a question of law, and the appellate court considers the propriety of the determination de novo. Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 386, 392, 642 N.E.2d 486, 491 (1994).\u201d Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Doherty, 305 Ill. App. 3d 141, 147 (1999).\nWe are all quite familiar with the meaning and usage of the term \u201cemployment application,\u201d and clearly, there is no dispute that Taylor\u2019s submissions factually constitute employment applications. However, the issue \"of whether those applications comprise official reports is a legal one, where that determination gives effect to how those applications may be legally construed. As a result, we find that the proper standard of review is de novo.\nWe are convinced by Taylor\u2019s argument and the lack of persuasive evidence to the contrary that the Board\u2019s finding was erroneous. Both parties agree on the meaning of the word \u201cofficial\u201d as relating to the duties of an office or post of authority. Furthermore, the term \u201cemployment application\u201d has a meaning so easily understandable as not to be confused with an \u201cofficial report,\u201d as it bears no relation to the duties of an officer or one in a post of authority. Rather, it bears all of its relation to the actions of a civilian seeking employment with the office or post of authority in question. Accordingly, we find that Taylor\u2019s employment application is not an \u201cofficial report\u201d and, therefore, that the Board was incorrect in finding him liable for violating General Order 4.1, paragraph III, section A \u2014 18.\nBased on our finding that the Board carried out its charges under an incorrect provision, we need not consider the applicability of any additional issues. While it is undisputed that Taylor did provide incorrect answers on his employment applications, the Board charged him with a violation of General Order 4.1, paragraph III, section A \u2014 18, which prohibits \u201cmaking a false official report, oral or written.\u201d This conclusion also nullifies the Article X, paragraph B, section 3, charge. That section provides that \u201cNo *** Correctional Officer *** shall violate any of the general orders, special orders, directives, or rules and regulations of the Cook County Sheriffs Office.\u201d Obviously, given our finding that an employment application is not an official report and that Taylor could not have violated General Order 4.1, he cannot be liable for violating a general order that prohibits the making of a false report (Article X, paragraph B, section 3). As we previously indicated, the record does not disclose why the Board chose not to charge Taylor with Article X, paragraph B, section 5, of the rules and regulations, which empowers the Board to discipline officers who \u201chave provided false or misleading information during the hiring process.\u201d However, we note that nothing in this opinion should be construed to be a holding that the Board is precluded from proceeding against Taylor on remand under the correct charging provision.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decisions of the trial court and the Board and remand this cause to the Board for proceedings not inconsistent with this order.\nReversed and remanded.\nQUINN, EJ., and THEIS, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Matthew M. Litvak, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Thomas Lyons, John J. Murphy, and Kimberly A. Mozdzierz, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ARTHUR TAYLOR, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COOK COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S MERIT BOARD et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1-99-3550\nOpinion filed September 15, 2000.\nMatthew M. Litvak, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Patrick T. Driscoll, Thomas Lyons, John J. Murphy, and Kimberly A. Mozdzierz, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0574-01", "first_page_order": 594, "last_page_order": 600 }