{
  "id": 1096582,
  "name": "CALIFORNIA-PETERSON CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY FRIEDMAN, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "California-Peterson Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Friedman",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "CALIFORNIA-PETERSON CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY FRIEDMAN, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, California-Peterson Currency Exchange, Inc., a judgment creditor, appeals from an order of the circuit court discharging its citation to discover certain of defendant\u2019s assets and denying its motion for turnover of 85% of defendant\u2019s monthly earnings from Superior Bank FSB. We affirm.\nOn appeal, we consider whether defendant\u2019s compensation under a consulting contract falls within the definition of \u201cwages\u201d as defined by section 12 \u2014 801 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Wage Deduction Act) (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 801 (West 1998)), such that defendant may exempt 85% of that compensation from collection pursuant to section 12 \u2014 803 of the Wage Deduction Act (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 803 (West 1998)).\nPlaintiff obtained a judgment against defendant in the amount of $206,922.19 plus costs. To collect this judgment, plaintiff filed an affidavit for wage deduction order naming Superior Bank FSB as defendant\u2019s employer. Superior Bank filed a verified answer on which it had crossed out the word \u201cemployer\u201d and substituted the word \u201cagent\u201d and referred to defendant as an \u201coutside contractor.\u201d\nBecause of Superior\u2019s answer, plaintiff filed a third-party citation to discover assets, claiming defendant was not an \u201cemployee\u201d but an \u201coutside contractor\u201d or \u201cagent\u201d to Superior. Superior answered that defendant had no accounts with Superior Bank FSB and that Friedman was an \u201coutside contractor [per] prior court order taking 15% of monthly earnings.\u201d Superior provided plaintiff with a copy of the letter consulting agreement between Superior and defendant, copies of defendant\u2019s invoices to Superior from March 19, 1999, to April 18, 1999, and a history of Superior\u2019s payments to defendant.\nPlaintiff then filed a motion for turnover of assets alleging, inter alia, that based upon Superior\u2019s verified answer to the wage deduction proceedings, Superior\u2019s answer to the citation, and documents tendered therewith, the monies Superior paid to defendant are not \u201cwages\u201d or \u201csalary\u201d as defined by section 12 \u2014 801 (735 ILCS 5/12\u2014 801 (West 1998)), and plaintiff is entitled to all monies paid by Superior to defendant less the 15% being withheld per an earlier court order in another matter. Superior filed an emergency motion to discharge the citation alleging, inter alia, the compensation paid defendant was wages, salary, or commissions within the meaning of section 12 \u2014 803 (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 803 (West 1998)).\nThe circuit court conducted a nonevidentiary hearing, concluded the monies defendant receives from Superior fall within the provision of section 12 \u2014 803 (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 803 (West 1998)) as wages, salary or commission, discharged plaintiff\u2019s citation to discover defendant\u2019s assets and denied plaintiffs motion for turnover of 85% of defendant\u2019s monthly earnings from Superior. Plaintiff appealed. We review the circuit court\u2019s decision de novo. In re Application of County Collector, 265 Ill. App. 3d 485, 637 N.E.2d 679 (1994) (statutory interpretation); Davis v. Hass & Hass, Inc., 296 Ill. App. 3d 369, 694 N.E.2d 588 (1998) (appeal from dismissal).\nOn appeal, plaintiff frames the issue in a specific, narrow fashion. Plaintiff contends that Superior\u2019s characterization of itself as an \u201cagent\u201d and of defendant as an \u201coutside contractor\u201d in its answer to plaintiffs wage deduction proceedings controls and places defendant\u2019s income from Superior beyond the scope of the exception to wage deductions provided by sections 12 \u2014 801 and 12 \u2014 803 of the Wage Deduction Act. 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 801, 12 \u2014 803 (West 1998). Plaintiffs argument extrapolates from the legislature\u2019s use of the word \u201cemployer\u201d that only common law \u201cemployees\u201d are protected by the exception to wage deduction provided by section 12 \u2014 803 and that independent contractors are excluded from the exception even if their income is earned through labor. Plaintiff is in error.\nThe label given by the parties in a written agreement is not dispositive of the employment status, but the facts of the case must be considered to determine what the individual\u2019s employment status is. Earley v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 197 Ill. App. 3d 309, 317, 553 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (1990). Here, the circuit court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the circumstances of defendant\u2019s employment. However, even assuming the circumstances of defendant\u2019s employment are outside the common law definition of \u201cemployee,\u201d it does not necessarily follow that this places his income as an independent contractor beyond the scope of the exception to wage deductions provided by sections 12 \u2014 801 and 12 \u2014 803 of the Wage Deduction Act. 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 801, 12 \u2014 803 (West 1998).\nAs originally enacted, the Wage Deduction Act provided neither a definition of \u201cemployer\u201d nor any process for notifying a judgment debtor of an impending wage garnishment. Pub. Act 82 \u2014 280, art. XII, part 8, eff. July 1, 1982. In Kirby v. Sprouls, 722 E Supp. 516 (C.D. Ill. 1989), the Federal District Court for the Central District of Illinois declared the statute unconstitutional as a violation of due process. The Illinois legislature responded by amending the statute to add a notice requirement and the right to a hearing. Pub. Act 86 \u2014 1268, eff. November 5, 1990. As part of this amendment, the legislature added a provision to section 12 \u2014 801 that defined \u201cemployer\u201d simply as \u201cthe person named as employer in the affidavit filed under Section 12\u2014 805,\u201d and a provision to section 12 \u2014 805 that required the named \u201cemployer\u201d to provide \u201cthe information necessary to determine the proper amount of nonexempt wages\u201d and to \u201ccertify that [this information] has been mailed or hand delivered to the judgment debtor.\u201d Pub. Act 86 \u2014 1268, \u00a7 1, eff. November 5, 1990 (codified at 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 801, 12 \u2014 805 (West 1998)). Thus, the legislature did not define \u201cemployer\u201d in terms of the manner or conditions of the engagement to perform services, but simply as the person named in the wage deduction affidavit. See also 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 18, 1990, at 3-5, and June 26, 1990, at 48-49 (statements of Representative Cullerton); 86th Ill. Gen. Assem, Senate Proceedings, June 20, 1990, at 6-7, and June 21, 1990, at 63-64 (statements of Senator Rock). This court is required to accept the legislature\u2019s definition. See Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 379, 666 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (1996).\nSubstituting the statutory definition of \u201cemployer\u201d in the Wage Deduction Act for the word \u201cemployer\u201d in the statutory definition of wages in the Wage Deduction Act, the term \u201cwages\u201d means \u201cany hourly pay, salary, commissions, bonuses, or other compensation owed by [the person named in the wage deduction affidavit] to a judgment debtor.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 801 (West 1998). When this definition is read together with section 12 \u2014 803 of the Wage Deduction Act, which provides that the maximum wages subject to collection under a deduction order shall not exceed 15% of the gross amount paid for that week (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 803 (West 1998)), it is clear that the legislature did not intend its definition of \u201cemployer\u201d in the Wage Deduction Act to narrow the application of the statutory exemption to exclude compensation owed an independent contractor for services. To hold otherwise would be to deprive a judgment debtor whose wages are derived from work as an independent contractor of the ability to earn a living as the debtor\u2019s entire wage would be subject to attachment.\nHere, plaintiff admits that defendant received \u201ccompensation\u201d from Superior, the person named in the wage deduction affidavit. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in concluding that defendant\u2019s compensation under a consulting contract falls within the definition of \u201cwages\u201d as defined by section 12 \u2014 801 of the Wage Deduction Act (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 801 (West 1998)), such that defendant may exempt 85% of that compensation from collection pursuant to section 12 \u2014 803 of the Wage Deduction Act (735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 803 (West 1998)). The circuit court\u2019s order discharging plaintiff\u2019s citation to discover defendant\u2019s assets and denying plaintiffs motion for turnover of 85% of defendant\u2019s monthly earnings from Superior is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nZWICK and BUCKLEY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Ehrenberg & Frost, PC., of Chicago (Alan I. Ehrenberg, of counsel), for appellant.",
      "Law Offices of Merle L. Royce, of Chicago (Merle L. Royce, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "CALIFORNIA-PETERSON CURRENCY EXCHANGE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY FRIEDMAN, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1-99-2982\nOpinion filed September 8, 2000.\nEhrenberg & Frost, PC., of Chicago (Alan I. Ehrenberg, of counsel), for appellant.\nLaw Offices of Merle L. Royce, of Chicago (Merle L. Royce, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0610-01",
  "first_page_order": 630,
  "last_page_order": 633
}