{ "id": 1096543, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIE B. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Sanders", "decision_date": "2000-09-21", "docket_number": "No. 2-99-0659", "first_page": "614", "last_page": "617", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 614" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "161 Ill. App. 3d 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3468153 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/161/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945601 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 194", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147022 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "when the theory of self-defense is raised, the victim's aggressive and violent character is relevant to show who was the aggressor, and the defendant may show it by appropriate evidence, regardless of when he learned of it" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0194-01" ] }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2435893 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268-69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 Ill. App. 3d 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 45691 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "641" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/295/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564880 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295798 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "152" }, { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0148-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 427, "char_count": 8686, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.03965231177570584 }, "sha256": "c8e2984f7689a4c9e163a5442824e892b35ff55e8fd75ec117ba60f752916dde", "simhash": "1:fbe8d113f2685760", "word_count": 1435 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:00.608787+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIE B. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALASSO\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Willie B. Sanders, was indicted on two counts of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)) in connection with the death of Jacqueline D. Trammell-Anderson (the victim). Prior to trial, the State filed a series of motions in limine seeking to exclude the defendant from offering evidence of the victim\u2019s violent behavior between 1977 and 1996. The trial court granted some of the motions, denied others, and denied others in part. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appeals from the trial court\u2019s ruling.\nOn appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the victim\u2019s violent behavior because the State was prepared to concede that the victim was the first aggressor. Alternatively, assuming some of the evidence was admissible, the State contends that the trial court should have limited the evidence sought to be admitted.\nAt the outset, the State, anticipating a challenge to this court\u2019s jurisdiction, contends that the denial of certain of its motions in limine impaired its prosecution of the murder charges against the defendant and had the substantive effect of dismissing the charges of first degree murder. We disagree and dismiss the State\u2019s appeal.\nSupreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)) restricts the State\u2019s right to appeal in criminal cases to four situations. Under the rule, the State may appeal only from an order or judgment that has the substantive effect of (1) dismissing a charge for any of the grounds enumerated in section 114 \u2014 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/114 \u2014 1 (West 1996)); (2) arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information, or complaint; (3) quashing an arrest or search warrant; or (4) suppressing evidence. People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148, 151 (1997).\nThe State suggests the fact that the prosecutor filed a certificate of impairment renders the trial court\u2019s order appealable. In Truitt, our supreme court rejected the State\u2019s premise that the certification forecloses any further assessment of a suppression order by the reviewing court and renders the order automatically appealable. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152. While it should not second-guess a prosecutor\u2019s good-faith evaluation of the effect of a suppression order on his case, the reviewing court must first determine whether a pretrial evidentiary ruling constitutes a suppression order within the meaning of Rule 604(a)(1). Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152. In the case before us, the trial court did not dismiss the charges against the defendant. Therefore, regardless of the certificate of impairment, we must determine, first, if the trial court\u2019s denial of the motions in limine had the \u201csubstantive effect\u201d of dismissing the first degree murder charges against the defendant.\nThe State\u2019s position may be summed up as follows: the admission of evidence that the victim had a 22-year history of violent behavior prevents the State from prosecuting the defendant for first degree murder. The State relies on several cases in support of the above theory.\nIn People v. DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d 486 (1989), the defendant was tried as an adult, but the trial court ruled that she should be sentenced under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (now 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 1996)). The supreme court recognized that the State has an interest in seeking prosecution under the criminal laws based upon the different dispositional alternatives, available under the Unified Code of Corrections (now 730 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West 1996)) and the Juvenile Court Act. Since the court\u2019s ruling terminated the criminal prosecution, the State had a right to appeal pursuant to Rule 604(a)(1). DeJesus, 127 Ill. 2d at 496.\nIn People v. Tellez, 295 Ill. App. 3d 639 (1998), the information charging the defendant with neglect of a disabled person specified that it was a Class 3 felony. The trial court struck the \u201cClass 3 felony\u201d language from the indictment and ruled that the offense was a business or petty offense. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed the trial court\u2019s ruling. In denying the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the appeal, this court held that the State could appeal because the substantive effect of the trial court\u2019s action was to dismiss a Class 3 felony charge and to replace it with a petty offense charge. Tellez, 295 Ill. App. 3d at 641.\nFinally, in People v. Marty, 241 Ill. App. 3d 266 (1993), following the declaration of a mistrial, the trial court dismissed the criminal charges against the defendant with prejudice, and the State appealed. The reviewing court denied the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, holding that the State\u2019s right of appeal was not limited to those orders specifically listed in section 114 \u2014 1 and that, since the State had the right to appeal a judgment the effect of which resulted in the dismissal of a charge, the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the charges in this case was appealable by the State. Marty, 241 Ill. App. 3d at 268-69.\nNone of these cases provide support for the State\u2019s theory. In Marty, for example, the charges against the defendant were in fact dismissed. Therefore, the jurisdictional basis for the State\u2019s appeal was clear. In Tellez, the trial court\u2019s action prevented the State from trying the defendant on a felony, which would carry far greater consequences for the defendant than would a petty or business offense charge. Similarly, in DeJesus, the trial court\u2019s ruling that the defendant be sentenced as a juvenile rather than an adult effectively terminated the criminal prosecution because of the different sentencing alternatives under the Juvenile Court Act and the Unified Code of Corrections.\nIn the present case, while the evidence of the victim\u2019s history of violent behavior may increase the difficulty the State may encounter ultimately in convincing the jury that the defendant committed first degree murder in the killing of the victim, it does not amount to the dismissal of the first degree murder charges. Unlike the above cases, the trial court\u2019s ruling on the motions in limine did not prevent the State from trying the defendant on first degree murder charges. The ruling does not prevent or hinder the State from proving each and every element of the offense of first degree murder. The victim\u2019s history of violent behavior is relevant evidence a defendant may avail himself of when he raises the theory of self-defense. See People v. Lynch, 104 Ill. 2d 194, 200 (1984) (when the theory of self-defense is raised, the victim\u2019s aggressive and violent character is relevant to show who was the aggressor, and the defendant may show it by appropriate evidence, regardless of when he learned of it).\nWe find the State\u2019s reliance on this court\u2019s decisions in People v. Smith, 248 Ill. App. 3d 351 (1993), and People v. Hatfield, 161 Ill. App. 3d 401 (1987), to be equally misplaced. Based on language from both cases, the State argues that the only requirement to render the order appealable is that the ruling \u201csubstantially\u201d impairs the ability of the State to prosecute the crime. See Smith, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 356-57; Hatfield, 161 Ill. App. 3d at 405-06. However, both of those cases involved orders that this court found, in effect, suppressed evidence. Under Rule 604(a)(1), orders suppressing evidence may be appealed by the State. The instant case involves neither an order suppressing evidence nor a dismissal order. As we stated earlier, before we accept the State\u2019s certification that the order appealed from impairs its ability to prosecute the case, we must determine, first, if the order has the effect of dismissing the case. In this case, we have found that it does not.\nWe conclude, therefore, that since the trial court\u2019s order denying and denying in part the State\u2019s motions in limine was not an order the effect of which was to dismiss the first degree murder charges against the defendant, the State may not appeal from that order.\nTherefore, we dismiss the State\u2019s appeal.\nAppeal dismissed.\nBOWMAN, RJ., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALASSO" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Glen A. Weber, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Martin E Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "G. Joseph Weller and Kathleen J. Hamill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIE B. SANDERS, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-99-0659\nOpinion filed September 21, 2000.\n\u2014 Rehearing denied November 1, 2000.\nPaul A. Logli, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rockford (Glen A. Weber, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and Martin E Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nG. Joseph Weller and Kathleen J. Hamill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0614-01", "first_page_order": 634, "last_page_order": 637 }