{ "id": 1096645, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD MATA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mata", "decision_date": "2000-10-20", "docket_number": "No. 4-99-0910", "first_page": "849", "last_page": "855", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 849" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411646 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "511 N.E.2d 993", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996", "parenthetical": "presumption of unfitness continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating defendant fit" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 Ill. App. 3d 860", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3578588 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "865", "parenthetical": "presumption of unfitness continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating defendant fit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/158/0860-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 N.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "32 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2840637 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/32/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 N.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. 2d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3188213 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/118/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173555 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 90", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "\"A court may not inject provisions not found in the statute, however desirable they may appear to be\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801355 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154-55", "parenthetical": "\"A court may not inject provisions not found in the statute, however desirable they may appear to be\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "701 N.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 330", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209986 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 1305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55998 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 N.E.2d 1074", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1083" }, { "page": "1076-77" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. App. 3d 436", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5477307 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/104/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 991", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "992" }, { "page": "993" }, { "page": "993" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 309", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3161103 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311-12" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0309-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "threats upon the persons in the home, before the unauthorized entry, constituted home invasion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. App. 3d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599748 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "threats upon the persons in the home, before the unauthorized entry, constituted home invasion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/135/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2608726 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0652-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 708, "char_count": 13432, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.298132930532853e-08, "percentile": 0.33221589366793197 }, "sha256": "c9c14a8528cd9c4fceeb06b0afbb2c9e63b3bdbeb2ac34387398f4a9eda6b7a4", "simhash": "1:135eba7c33059ef0", "word_count": 2257 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:00.608787+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD MATA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a July 20, 1999, jury trial, defendant Leonard Mata was convicted of home invasion (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a) (West 1998)), intimidation (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 6(a)(1) (West 1998)), criminal damage to government-supported property (720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 4(1)(a) (West 1998)), and domestic battery (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a) (West 1998)). Mata was sentenced to 11 years for home invasion, with concurrent sentences of 364 days for domestic battery, 5 years, for intimidation, and 3 years for damage to government-supported property. Mata appeals his home invasion conviction, arguing that the trial court erred when it gave a nonpattern issues instruction that \u201cto sustain the charge of home invasion, the State does not have to prove that the injury occurred within the dwelling,\u201d and refused his nonpattern issues instruction that \u201cthe State must prove that the injury was inflicted on a person who was within the dwelling when the defendant made his unauthorized entry.\u201d Mata also argues he was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.\nMata had been involved in a stormy relationship with Tina Merchant, who had borne him three children. The couple had been separated when, on February 14, 1999 (Valentine\u2019s Day), Mata appeared at Merchant\u2019s apartment bearing flowers and candy. When she saw Mata, Merchant closed the door and deadbolted it. Mata began pounding on the door, eventually breaking it. Merchant fled through the back door of her apartment and began banging on the door of a neighbor, asking for help. Mata entered the broken front door of the apartment, went through the apartment, and exited through the back door, catching Merchant in the courtyard where he began to beat her. Mata left the scene when Merchant\u2019s neighbor became involved.\nThere is some dispute whether Merchant had fled her apartment before Mata broke in her door. Merchant testified on cross-examination, \u201cBy the time I hit my back door I heard a loud commotion. I was assuming he had got the door broken in.\u201d Merchant conceded, however, that in a handwritten statement she had prepared four days after the incident, she had stated, \u201cI was banging on the [neighbor\u2019s] back door when I heard [Mata] break the door in.\u201d On redirect, Merchant testified, \u201cEverything happened so fast. I know I heard a crash. I don\u2019t know exactly at what point it was, where I was at.\u201d It does appear that Mata had begun his attempt to break down the door before Merchant attempted to flee. Merchant apparently left the apartment because she was afraid that Mata was coming inside.\nTwo elements are generally required for the offense of home invasion: (1) defendant \u201cknowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present\u201d (emphasis added) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a) (West 1998)) and (2) \u201c[i]ntentionally causes any injury to any person or persons within such dwelling place\u201d (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a)(2) (West 1998)). We do not read section 12 \u2014 ll\u2019s knowledge requirement to impose liability where the defendant mistakenly believes someone is present in the dwelling. Rather, we read that language to avoid liability where the defendant has no reason to know that a dwelling is occupied; for example, where the defendant enters a deserted residence in which a trespasser happens to be present. Does the requirement that the entry occur \u201cwhen\u201d defendant knows the victim is present require that the victim be inside the dwelling at the precise moment the entry occurred, or is it sufficient that the victim was inside the dwelling at about the same time the entry occurred?\nConcern has been expressed that defendants who \u201cflush somebody out of the dwelling and cause injury, in an immediate sequence, within the area of the dwelling,\u201d might avoid liability. People v. Kolls, 179 Ill. App. 3d 652, 655, 534 N.E.2d 673, 675 (1989). In Kolls, the defendant broke into his ex-wife\u2019s apartment, followed his ex-wife\u2019s male friend to the landing outside her apartment, and began punching and kicking him. Kolls, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 654, 534 N.E.2d at 674. The appellate court upheld the conviction of home invasion, holding that the words \u201cpersons within such dwelling place\u201d merely identified the required victims and did not impose any requirement that the injury be inflicted within the dwelling. Kolls, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 656, 534 N.E.2d at 675; see also People v. Kovacs, 135 Ill. App. 3d 448, 481 N.E.2d 1071 (1985) (threats upon the persons in the home, before the unauthorized entry, constituted home invasion).\nRolls did not refer to People v. Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d 309, 461 N.E.2d 991 (1984). In Pettit, convictions for home invasion were reversed, where defendants forced their way into a first-floor apartment, then took the occupants to a deserted second-floor apartment where they threatened and injured some of the individuals. Defendants were charged only with home invasion of the second-floor apartment; but when defendants invaded that apartment, it was deserted. Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d at 311-12, 461 N.E.2d at 992. The court held that \u201c[t]he plain meaning of the home-invasion statute requires the presence of one or more persons within the dwelling at the time of the invasion.\u201d Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d at 313, 461 N.E.2d at 993. Pettit overruled People v. Pavic, 104 Ill. App. 3d 436, 447, 432 N.E.2d 1074, 1083 (1982), which had held the basement of an apartment building was part of the victim\u2019s \u201cdwelling place.\u201d The defendant in Pavic had lured a woman from her apartment to the basement by flipping circuit breakers. When the woman left her apartment to turn the electricity back on, the defendant entered the apartment and raped the woman on her return. Pavic, 104 111. App. 3d at 438, 432 N.E.2d at 1076-77.\nThe legislature responded to the specific problem addressed in Pet-tit by amending the home invasion statute to include as an offender one who \u201cknowingly enters the dwelling place of another and remains in such dwelling place until he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present.\u201d Pub. Act 85 \u2014 1387, \u00a7 1, eff. September 2, 1988 (1988 111. Laws 3201, 3202).\nThe State argues that it is necessary only that the victim be within the dwelling place at some time during the course of the home invasion, and that the term \u201chome invasion\u201d is broader than the term \u201centers,\u201d including the point in this case where defendant began kicking the victim\u2019s door. The State argues that the jury might have found, on this evidence, that the victim did not leave the dwelling place until after the entry. The jury was never asked to decide that question, however, despite the objections of defense counsel. The court refused defendant\u2019s instruction No. '2, which would have informed the jury that the State was required to prove \u201cthe injury was inflicted on a person who was within the dwelling when the defendant made his unauthorized entry.\u201d\nCriminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. People v. Robinson, 172 Ill. 2d 452, 457, 667 N.E.2d 1305, 1307 (1996). Penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 337, 701 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1998). We may not expand the meaning of a criminal statute simply to correct an apparent oversight or to achieve a desirable result. See Bridgestone/ Firestone, Inc. v. Aldridge, 179 Ill. 2d 141, 154-55, 688 N.E.2d 90, 96 (1997) (\u201cA court may not inject provisions not found in the statute, however desirable they may appear to be\u201d); cf. People v. Smith, 307 Ill. App. 3d 414, 418, 718 N.E.2d 640, 643 (1999) (\u201cWhile we are mindful of the necessity to strictly construe criminal statutes in favor of the accused, such construction should not be so rigid as to defeat the intent of the legislature\u201d; absence of language \u201cpredatory criminal sexual assault of a child\u201d from sentencing provisions of indecent solicitation statute a simple legislative oversight).\nThis rule of strict construction has its roots in the due process clause, which requires that the proscriptions of a penal statute be clearly defined. People v. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d 263, 269, 515 N.E.2d 45, 48 (1987). Impossible levels of specificity are not required, but a penal statute must convey a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The statute must provide definite standards, so as to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and application by police officers, judges, and juries. Haywood, 118 Ill. 2d at 269, 515 N.E.2d at 48.\nIs the present case more like Kolls, or is it controlled by Pettit? Pettit held that the plain meaning of the home invasion statute requires the presence of one or more persons within the dwelling at the time of the invasion, but it did not attempt to draw any fine lines in the situation of our case, when the victim is fleeing the dwelling at the same time the defendant breaks in. Pettit involved a situation where the apartment invaded by the defendants was clearly deserted at the time of entry.\nA fair reading of section 12 \u2014 11 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11 (West 1998)) suggests that there is a home invasion when a victim flees a dwelling in response to a defendant\u2019s knock on the door. When Mata knocked on Merchant\u2019s door he had \u201creason to know that one or more persons [were] present.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 11(a) (West 1998). There is a presumption or inference that a condition, once proved to exist, continues. M. Graham, Cleary & Graham\u2019s Handbook of Illinois Evidence \u00a7 302.6, at 104 (7th ed. 1999). When the existence of a state of things is once established by proof, the law presumes that the state of things continues to exist until the contrary is shown. Skil Corp. v. Korzen, 32 Ill. 2d 249, 251, 204 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1965); People v. Thompson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 860, 865, 511 N.E.2d 993, 996 (1987) (presumption of unfitness continues until there has been a valid subsequent hearing adjudicating defendant fit). Mata knew that Merchant was inside the dwelling when he began his attempt to enter it and had no reason to change that belief, even if it is possible that Merchant cleared the back door before Mata entered the front door.\nEven if Merchant had testified unequivocally that she had cleared the back door before Mata\u2019s entry, there should still be liability under section 12 \u2014 11 of the Criminal Code unless it was established that Mata was aware of that fact. We base that conclusion upon the fact that section 12 \u2014 11 does not state that the victim must be inside the dwelling when the entry is made. The section requires only that the victim be \u201cpresent.\u201d The second element of the offense requires an injury to a person \u201cwithin such dwelling place\u201d (720 ILCS 5/12\u2014 11(a)(2) (West 1998)), but Kolls held that language merely identified the required victims and did not impose any requirement that the injury be inflicted within the dwelling. Kolls, 179 Ill. App. 3d at 656, 534 N.E.2d at 675. Pettit stated there must be a person within the dwelling at the time of the invasion (Pettit, 101 Ill. 2d at 313, 461 N.E.2d at 993); but, again, Pettit did not involve a situation where the victim was fleeing the dwelling. Certainly, there cannot be a home invasion where the dwelling place is truly empty at the time of the entry, but the requirement that a person be \u201cpresent\u201d at the time of the entry is satisfied when the victim, fleeing the invasion, happens to be outside the dwelling at the moment of defendant\u2019s entry.\nThe nonpattern issues instruction given by the trial court accurately stated the law, as set out in Kolls, and was appropriately given. The State does not have to prove that the injury occurred within the dwelling, although that is not adequately explained in the existing pattern instructions. A nonpattern instruction should be used if a pattern instruction does not contain an accurate instruction on the subject that the jury should be instructed upon. People v. Nutall, 312 Ill. App. 3d 620, 633-34, 728 N.E.2d 597, 608-09 (2000). Defendant\u2019s proposed instruction, requiring that the injured person was within the dwelling at the precise moment that the unauthorized entry was made, did not accurately state the law and was properly refused. The trial court properly instructed the jury in accordance with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 11.54 (4th ed. 2000), \u201cthat when the defendant entered the dwelling place he knew or had reason to know that one or more persons was present.\u201d\nFinally, we conclude that the evidence, which included the testimony of the victim, was sufficient to support defendant\u2019s conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nGASMAN and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Scott A. Sabin (argued) and Richard Kim, both of Metnick, Cherry & Frazier, of Springfield, for appellant.", "William G. Workman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lincoln (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LEONARD MATA, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-99-0910\nArgued September 13, 2000.\n\u2014 Opinion filed October 20, 2000.\nScott A. Sabin (argued) and Richard Kim, both of Metnick, Cherry & Frazier, of Springfield, for appellant.\nWilliam G. Workman, State\u2019s Attorney, of Lincoln (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0849-01", "first_page_order": 869, "last_page_order": 875 }