{ "id": 1096598, "name": "EARL D. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Bailey v. Allstate Development Corp.", "decision_date": "2000-09-29", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-0225", "first_page": "949", "last_page": "962", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 949" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "307 Ill. App. 3d 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 173506 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166-67", "parenthetical": "summary judgment affirmed because construction and installation of a subway system were not \"construction of an improvement to real property\" within the meaning of section 13 - 214(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/307/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182730 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305", "parenthetical": "criticizing State Farm court's refusal to follow St. Louis despite the fact that State Farm court conceded spray-on fireproofing material was an \"improvement\" under the supreme court's definition in St. Louis" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 F.3d 955", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10511890 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/24/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4739062 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4-5" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "4-5" }, { "page": "3" }, { "page": "3-5" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "4" }, { "page": "4-5" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 Ill. 2d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5603065 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/152/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801347 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224798 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2921174 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "873-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0870-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 Ill. 2d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2696160 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/3/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599792 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" }, { "page": "196, 200" }, { "page": "194-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821410 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3201960 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "287" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/121/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 943", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186514 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "950" }, { "page": "950" }, { "page": "950-52", "parenthetical": "successor judge's reconsideration of venue ruling upheld where court ultimately determined that prior judge's ruling on venue issue was legally erroneous" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0943-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 Ill. 2d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5440905 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/73/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75267 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "successor judge's dismissal of plaintiffs action on statute of limitations grounds did not revise or modify order entered by prior judge because statute of limitations issue was left undecided by prior judge" }, { "page": "214" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 Ill. App. 3d 730", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5211088 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/230/0730-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 1018", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456213 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1023" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 110", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0110-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5437170 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/65/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3106798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" }, { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/94/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. App. 3d 215", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3524257 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/128/0215-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57332 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385" }, { "page": "385" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0378-01" ] }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536033 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411629 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0246-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1089, "char_count": 33125, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0320363051316297e-07, "percentile": 0.5483711598629881 }, "sha256": "14ad46d98587093f1880647bec2cdc9eaba5419bed7c1a34b3b29dc3d1ea282a", "simhash": "1:1a6afd4233084c79", "word_count": 5305 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:10:00.608787+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "EARL D. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COHEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Earl Bailey, filed a first amended complaint against defendants Allstate Development Corporation and Allstate Insurance Company (hereinafter referred to collectively as Allstate or defendants) seeking damages for injuries sustained when plaintiff fell from a ledge while washing windows at Allstate\u2019s corporate office building in North-brook, Illinois. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the grounds that plaintiffs original complaint was filed more than two years after the occurrence and thus outside the statute of limitations period generally applicable to personal injury claims. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 1998). The trial court rejected plaintiffs argument that his cause of action was governed by the extended four-year statute of limitations period set forth in the construction section of the Limitations Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)). In ruling, the trial court did not address plaintiffs argument that a prior judge\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss precluded a subsequent grant of summary judgment on the same issue. We affirm the circuit court and find that: (1) a successor judge\u2019s grant of summary judgment is proper, absent a change in facts or circumstances, when a prior judge\u2019s order denying a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was not a ruling on the merits, and (2) plaintiffs cause of action is governed by the two-year statute of limitations generally applicable to personal injury claims because, as a matter of law, the performance of window washing services does not constitute the \u201cconstruction of an improvement to real property\u201d within the meaning of the Limitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)).\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn July 11, 1991, Earl Bailey sustained severe injuries when he fell from the window ledge of an Allstate corporate office building. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was employed by Standard Window Cleaning Company/Millard Maintenance Service (Millard), which had contracted with defendants to perform window washing services on certain buildings owned and operated by defendants in Northbrook, Illinois. In order to perform his work, plaintiff was req\u00faired to wet down windows while standing on an outdoor ledge. After the window was wet, plaintiffs coworker squeegeed the window to remove the water. Neither plaintiff nor his coworker was wearing a safety belt at the time of the accident. Defendants specifically required safety belts to be worn by all persons performing window washing work on outdoor ledges.\nPlaintiffs original complaint was filed in 1995, almost four years after plaintiff was injured. On May 4, 1995, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint against defendants which alleged a violation of the Structural Work Act (740 ILCS 150/0.01 et seq. (West 1994)) in count I and negligence in count II. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that safety belts, owned by defendants, were available on the Allstate premises but that defendants failed to provide workers with adequate access to them. Plaintiff further alleged that defendants knowingly allowed workers to stand on outdoor ledges while washing building windows without using any safety equipment.\nOn July 10, 1995, defendants filed a motion to dismiss count II of plaintiffs first amended complaint on the pleadings. In their motion, defendants argued that plaintiffs negligence action was time-barred pursuant to section 13 \u2014 202 of the Limitations Act because it was filed after the two-year statute of limitations had expired. 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014 202 (West 1998). In response, plaintiff asserted that his first amended complaint alleged a cause of action arising out of a construction-related activity and was therefore governed by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in the construction section of the Act (735 ILCS 5/13\u2014 214(a) (West 1998)). Defendants replied that the four-year statute of limitations did not apply to plaintiffs cause of action because the construction-related activities outlined in section 13 \u2014 214(a) do not encompass the performance of window washing services. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998). Neither party cited any case law or relied on affidavits or other evidentiary material in support of its arguments. On September 15, 1995, the assigned motion judge denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and directed defendants to file an answer to plaintiffs first amended complaint within 28 days.\nOn January 26, 1996, the motion judge granted defendants\u2019 motion for leave to file an answer to plaintiffs first amended complaint and affirmative defenses instanter. Defendants\u2019 first affirmative defense asserted \u201c[pjlaintiffs complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.\u201d On February 6, 1996, plaintiff filed a answer which denied, generally, the allegations contained in defendants\u2019 first affirmative defense. On September 13, 1999, defendants filed an amended motion for summary judgment in which they argued that the activities governed by section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Limitations Act do not include the performance of window washing services under Illinois case law. Plaintiff filed a response to defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment asserting that the phrase \u201cconstruction of improvement to real property\u201d has been liberally construed under Illinois case law and that this statutory provision should be read broadly to include plaintiffs window washing activities. Plaintiff also filed a surreply alleging that the motion judge\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss could not be reversed by the successor judge granting a motion for summary judgment, absent a change in facts or circumstances that would warrant a reversal of the court\u2019s prior position.\nOn December 15, 1999, the successor judge hearing the summary judgment motion entered a written decision and order granting defendants\u2019 motion on the grounds that the applicable two-year statute of limitations was expired at the time plaintiff filed his original complaint. The successor judge found, as a matter of law, that window washing is not within the realm of construction-related activities contemplated by section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Limitations Act. 735 ILCS 13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998). The successor judge\u2019s decision did not address plaintiffs argument that the motion judge\u2019s order denying defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss precluded a successor judge from granting summary judgment on the same issue, absent a change in facts or circumstances. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe issue on appeal is whether the successor judge erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Allstate. Although summary judgment is considered a drastic remedy, it is a proper method of disposing of a cause if the pleadings, depositions, admissions on file and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Allstate Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d 246, 251 (1999); 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 1998). A triable issue of fact exists only where there is a dispute as to a material fact or where, although the facts are not in dispute, reasonable minds might differ in drawing inferences from those facts. Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Illinois, Inc., 188 Ill. 2d 17, 31 (1999). In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists or whether the trial court erred in its application of the law, all evidence is construed strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the respondent. Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 385 (1996). Because the propriety of the trial court\u2019s order granting summary judgment involves a question of law, the standard of review is de novo. Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 385.\nA. MOTION JUDGE\u2019S DENIAL OF DEFENDANTS\u2019 MOTION TO DISMISS\nPlaintiffs first argument on appeal is that the successor judge erred in granting defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion because she did not take into consideration the fact that the motion judge had previously denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss, although both motions raised the statute of limitations as a defense. Plaintiff concedes that the successor judge was not required to follow the original motion judge\u2019s ruling. However, plaintiff argues that the successor judge was not at liberty to ignore the motion judge\u2019s order because this ruling had already disposed of the statute of limitations issue. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites several cases which hold that a successor judge should not reverse the discretionary ruling of a prior judge unless there is a change of circumstances or additional facts that warrant such action. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Beker Industries, Inc., 128 Ill. App. 3d 215, 222 (1984), citing Balciunas v. Duff, 94 Ill. 2d 176, 188 (1983); People ex rel. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Gitchoff, 65 Ill. 2d 249, 257 (1976). Accordingly, plaintiff argues that the successor judge\u2019s ruling should be reversed because defendants\u2019 summary judgment motion did not raise any new facts or case law that would warrant modification of the trial court\u2019s previous position on the statute of limitations issue. Plaintiff further notes that a circuit judge who simply disregards the order of a prior circuit judge \u201cdiminishfes] respect for and public confidence in our judiciary.\u201d Phillips Petroleum, 65 Ill. 2d at 257.\nDefendants respond that the successor judge\u2019s summary judgment ruling was appropriate because the motion judge\u2019s ruling on their motion to dismiss was not on the merits. Defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss did not specify whether relief was sought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 615 or 2 \u2014 619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 615, 2 \u2014 619 (West 1998)). However, defendants note that, although the statute of limitations constitutes affirmative matter which is typically raised in a section 2 \u2014 619 motion, there was no affidavit or other evidentiary material relied upon and that' their motion only attacked the sufficiency of the complaint. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619 (West 1998). Accordingly, defendants contend that the motion judge\u2019s order denying their motion to dismiss could not have been on the merits.\nDefendants further argue that the procedural history of the case demonstrates that neither the parties nor the court considered the motion judge\u2019s September 15, 1995, order a ruling on the merits. First, defendants note that, on January 26, 1996, without any objection from plaintiff, the motion judge granted defendants leave to file their affirmative defenses instanter, which raised the statute of limitations as a defense. Also, on February 6, 1996, plaintiff filed an answer to defendants\u2019 affirmative defenses as opposed to filing a motion to strike defendants\u2019 first affirmative defense, which raised the statute of limitations as a bar to plaintiffs action. We agree with defendants\u2019 arguments.\nIn Makowski v. City of Naperville, 249 Ill. App. 3d 110, 118 (1993), plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on certain affirmative defenses because the trial court had previously denied a motion to dismiss that raised the same affirmative defenses. The reviewing court rejected plaintiffs argument and held that the trial court\u2019s denial of a motion to dismiss that is not an adjudication on the merits does not preclude a defendant from raising the same affirmative defense in a subsequent motion for summary judgment. The court based its holding on the following provisions of section 2 \u2014 619(d) of the Code:\n\u201cThe raising of any of the foregoing matters by motion under this [s]ection does not preclude the raising of them subsequently by answer unless the court has disposed of the motion on its merits; and a failure to raise any of them by motion does not preclude raising them by answer.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(d) (West 1998).\nThe Makowski court also relied on the fact that the trial court\u2019s order denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss did not expressly state that it was a ruling on the merits. The Makowski court declined to accept plaintiffs argument that, if silent, the reviewing court must assume that the trial court\u2019s ruling was on the merits. The appellate court stated:\n\u201cHere, the record does not indicate whether the trial court disposed of defendant\u2019s section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss on the merits. Because a court may deny such a motion without reaching the merits, such as when it cannot determine with reasonable certainty that the alleged defense exists or because it concludes the motion may involve disputed factual issues [citation], we conclude that the denial of such a motion, without more, does not show that the court disposed of the motion on its merits.\u201d Makowski, 249 111. App. 3d at 118.\nIn the case at bar, the motion judge\u2019s September 15, 1995, order does not indicate whether it was a ruling on the merits. Based on our review of the record, it is unlikely that a ruling on the applicability of the four-year statute of limitations in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Limitations Act was contemplated by the parties or the trial court. Significantly, defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss made no reference to section 13 \u2014 214(a) and made no arguments regarding the proper scope of this section. Defendants\u2019 motion merely asserted that plaintiffs complaint sounded in negligence and that the two-year statute of limitations prescribed for negligence claims had expired.\nIn light of the limited issue raised in defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss and the parties\u2019 failure to cite any case law in support of their respective positions, we hold that the motion judge\u2019s ruling determined only whether plaintiffs complaint sufficiently alleged that his accident arose out of a construction-related activity. Although plaintiff referenced section 13 \u2014 214(a) in his response and defendants briefly attempted to distinguish this section in their reply, the record is devoid of any indication that the motion judge conducted a substantive analysis of the statutory provisions in section 13 \u2014 214(a), which would be required for a ruling on the merits. See 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998). Therefore, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(d) of the Code, we hold that defendants were not precluded from raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in a subsequent motion for summary judgment as the motion judge\u2019s September 15, 1995, order was not a ruling on the merits.\nPlaintiff further argues that Makowski is not applicable in \u201cthe special situation of one judge sitting in review of another judge\u2019s determination.\u201d Plaintiffs argument is misplaced. Section 2 \u2014 619(d) makes it clear that a defendant is entitled to raise affirmative defenses in a motion for summary judgment if a prior motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619 was not decided on the merits. See 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(d) (West 1998). Logically sound, section 2 \u2014 619(d) recognizes that when a prior judge\u2019s ruling is not on the merits, the issue is technically left \u201cunconsidered\u201d and \u201cundecided.\u201d People v. Rowe, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1018, 1023 (1997), citing People v. Giles, 230 Ill. App. 3d 730, 733 (1992). As such, an order entered by a successor judge that disposes of a substantive issue does not amount to a \u201creversal\u201d of the prior judge\u2019s order. In these circumstances, the cases cited by plaintiff that address a successor judge\u2019s modification of a prior judge\u2019s discretionary rulings are simply not applicable. See Ericksen v. Village of Willow Springs, 279 Ill. App. 3d 210, 215 (1995) (successor judge\u2019s dismissal of plaintiffs action on statute of limitations grounds did not revise or modify order entered by prior judge because statute of limitations issue was left undecided by prior judge).\nIt should be noted that, even if this court determined that the motion judge\u2019s order which denied defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss was a ruling on the merits, the result would be the same. The trial court\u2019s denial of a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order that is not final and appealable. Ericksen, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 214. An interlocutory order may be modified or revised by a successor court at any time prior to final judgment. Ericksen, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 214, citing Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113 (1978); Balciunas v. Duff, 94 Ill. 2d 176, 185 (1983). However, in circumstances where the interlocutory order involved the exercise of a prior judge\u2019s discretion, the successor judge may overturn the order only where new facts or circumstance warrant such action and there is no evidence of \u201cjudge shopping.\u201d Lake County Riverboat, L.P. v. Illinois Gaming Board, 313 Ill. App. 3d 943, 950 (2000), citing McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 121 Ill. 2d 278, 287 (1988). A noteworthy exception to this rule exists where the successor judge finds that the previous interlocutory order is erroneous as a matter of law. In such a case, the successor judge has the power to correct the previous order regardless of the existence of new matter. Lake County, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 950, citing Towns v. Yellow Cab Co., 73 Ill. 2d 113, 121 (1978).\nThe record reveals that there were no new facts or circumstances presented by defendants that would warrant modification of the motion judge\u2019s order. Thus, assuming the motion judge\u2019s denial of defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss was a ruling on the merits, modification by the successor judge would only be appropriate if the motion judge\u2019s order was legally erroneous. Plaintiff contends that the successor judge erred because, in ruling, she did not discuss either defendant\u2019s earlier motion to dismiss or the motion judge\u2019s September 15, 1995, order denying that motion. Essentially, plaintiffs argument assumes that the successor judge\u2019s failure to make an express finding that the motion judge\u2019s order was erroneous as a matter of law is grounds for reversal. Plaintiffs argument fails.\nIn determining whether the trial court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law, the trial court\u2019s reasoning for its decision is not binding on this court, as we must conduct a de novo review of the record. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 483 (1998). Furthermore, although not an ideal circumstance for effective appellate review, it is not reversible error for a trial court to omit findings of fact or law when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Makowski, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 115. \u201cWhile such a failure can leave the nonprevailing party in a quandary as to exactly why the trial court ruled as it did, it is the ruling [that] is being appealed, not the reasons for the ruling.\u201d Makowski, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 115. Accordingly, we hold that the successor judge\u2019s failure to specifically mention the motion judge\u2019s September 15, 1995, order in her summary judgment ruling is not itself grounds for reversal.\nDespite the successor judge\u2019s failure to mention the motion judge\u2019s prior order in her decision, summary judgment must be upheld if the original motion judge\u2019s order was, in fact, erroneous as a matter of law. See Lake County, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 950-52 (successor judge\u2019s reconsideration of venue ruling upheld where court ultimately determined that prior judge\u2019s ruling on venue issue was legally erroneous). Thus, our focus turns to the ultimate issue on appeal: Was plaintiff engaged in a \u201cconstruction-related\u201d activity when he was injured, thus affording plaintiff the benefit of the extended four-year statute of limitations in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Limitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)).\nB. STATUTES OF LIMITATION\nUnder the Limitations Act, as set forth in the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code), the statute of limitations for personal injury claims requires that causes of action arising from such injuries be commenced within two years of the date on which the cause of action accrued. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 1998). However, section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Act provides an extended four-year limitations period when a cause of action arises from an act or omission \u201cin the design, planning, supervision, observation or management of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014 214(a) (West 1998).\nOur supreme court has held that \u201c \u2018[wjhere there are two statutory provisions, one of which is general and designed to apply to cases generally, and the other is particular and relates to only one subject, the particular provision must prevail.\u2019 \u201d Hernon v. E.W. Corrigan Construction Co., 149 Ill. 2d 190, 195 (1992), quoting Bowes v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 175, 205 (1954). Accordingly, where plaintiff\u2019s personal injury claim arises out of a construction-related activity, the more specific four-year limitations provision in section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Limitations Act will control and plaintiffs case will not be time-barred for failure to file within the two-year period set forth in section 13 \u2014 202 of the Act. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 196, 200; 735 ILCS 5/13\u2014 202, 13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998). Thus, the issue on appeal narrows. The question becomes whether plaintiff was engaged in the \u201cconstruction of an improvement to real property\u201d within the scope of section 13\u2014 214(a) such that his cause of action is governed by the extended four-year limitations period. Estate of Herington v. County of Woodford, 250 Ill. App. 3d 870, 873-75 (1993).\nC. CONSTRUCTION NEGLIGENCE STATUTE/SECTION 13 \u2014 214(a)\nWhether plaintiffs performance of window washing services qualifies as the \u201cconstruction of an improvement to real property\u201d within the meaning of section 13 \u2014 214(a) of the Limitations Act is a question of statutory interpretation. The standard of review is de novo. King v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 189 Ill. 2d 167, 171 (2000). The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true meaning and intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). When construing a disputed statutory provision, the court must first consider the statutory language. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Yapejian, 152 Ill. 2d 533, 541 (1992). Where the language employed by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, \u201ca court is not at liberty to depart from the plain language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations or conditions that the legislature did not express.\u201d Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990). Further, in ascertaining the meaning of a statutory provision, courts should avoid an interpretation that would render any particular word or phrase superfluous or meaningless. Kraft, 138 Ill. 2d at 189.\nPlaintiff argues that the successor judge\u2019s summary judgment ruling was erroneous because she performed an incomplete analysis and failed to consider all of the relevant factors when applying the law to the present case. Plaintiff contends that a proper analysis of whether an activity is an \u201cimprovement\u201d under section 13 \u2014 214(a) must take into consideration each of the factors outlined in St. Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 1 (1992). In St. Louis, our supreme court stated:\n\u201cRelevant criteria for determining what constitutes an \u2018improvement to real property\u2019 include: whether the addition was meant to be permanent or temporary, whether it became an integral component of the overall system, whether the value of the property was increased, and whether the use of the property was enhanced.\u201d St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4-5.\nPlaintiff notes that the trial court must also take into consideration Black\u2019s Law Dictionary\u2019s definition of \u201cimprovement,\u201d adopted by the supreme court in St. Louis, which provides that an \u201cimprovement\u201d is \u201c[a] valuable addition made to property (usually real estate) or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement, costing labor or capital, and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes.\u201d St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4, citing Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 682 (5th ed. 1979).\nPlaintiff further argues that the successor judge\u2019s decision neglected to mention either State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co. \u2014 Conn., 24 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1994), or Krueger v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 300 (1996), which \u201cwere arguably the most important cases for the court to consider.\u201d Plaintiff contends that these two cases, when read together, establish that the factors set forth in St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d 1, have been so liberally construed that window washing activities are properly within the realm of the statute\u2019s application. See Krueger, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 305 (criticizing State Farm court\u2019s refusal to follow St. Louis despite the fact that State Farm court conceded spray-on fireproofing material was an \u201cimprovement\u201d under the supreme court\u2019s definition in St. Louis). Plaintiff also contends that certain findings in the successor judge\u2019s decision were inconsistent with controlling case law. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the successor judge\u2019s determination that window washing is not an \u201cimprovement\u201d under section 13 \u2014 214(a), despite her finding that \u201cclean windows make a building more attractive,\u201d was erroneous because the definition of \u201cimprovement\u201d in St. Louis includes \u201cameliorations in the condition of real property, intended to enhance the beauty of the property.\u201d\nDefendants respond that a commonsense analysis of the activity of window washing demonstrates that the successor judge\u2019s summary judgment ruling was proper. First, defendants argue that the phrase \u201cconstruction of an improvement to real property\u201d in section 13\u2014 214(a) must be read together as a whole and not separately as construction or improvement. Defendants assert that when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 194-95. Defendants note that Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cconstruct\u201d as:\n\u201cMo build; erect; put together; make ready for use. To adjust and join materials, or parts of, so as to form a permanent whole. *** \u2018Construct\u2019 is distinguishable from \u2018maintain,\u2019 which means to keep up, to keep from change, to preserve.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 312 (6th ed. 1990).\nDefendants argue that application of the plain meaning of \u201cconstruct\u201d as distinguished from \u201cmaintenance,\u201d along with application of the \u201cimprovement\u201d factors outlined in St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4-5, indicates that window washing is merely a maintenance activity that is not within the scope of construction-related activities contemplated by the legislature in section 13 \u2014 214(a). Again, we agree with defendants\u2019 arguments.\nIn St. Louis, the supreme court held that whether an activity constitutes an \u201cimprovement to real property\u201d is a question of law. St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 3. Although its resolution is grounded in fact, where there are no material facts in dispute, summary judgment on this issue is proper. St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 3-5; Bank of Ravenswood v. City of Chicago, 307 Ill. App. 3d 161, 166-67 (1999) (summary judgment affirmed because construction and installation of a subway system were not \u201cconstruction of an improvement to real property\u201d within the meaning of section 13 \u2014 214(a)).\nThe undisputed facts in this case are that plaintiffs injury occurred while performing routine window washing services at an Allstate corporate office building in Northbrook, Illinois. Plaintiff was not engaged in washing windows as part of a construction project. Rather, plaintiffs employer, Millard, had contracted with defendants to clean both the exterior and interior of all the windows on the stated office buildings at least once a month. Pursuant to this agreement, Millard was to provide defendants with weekly reports detailing the work done and the areas cleaned in a given week. When cleaning interior windows, Millard employees were required to take care not to spill any dirty water on drapes, carpet or furniture.\nOur analysis begins with reference to the definition of \u201cimprovement\u201d adopted by the supreme court in St. Louis. A commonsense, practical application of the law indicates that the performance of window washing services is not \u201c[a] valuable addition made to property .\u201d See St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4. Defendants correctly assert that the phrase \u201caddition made to property\u201d necessarily implicates the definition of \u201cconstruct,\u201d which means \u201cto build,\u201d \u201cto erect\u201d or \u201cto put together.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 312 (6th ed. 1990). As no materials or products are being \u201cadded\u201d to the building or structure, we conclude that window washing cannot be a \u201cvaluable addition made to property.\u201d\nWe next determine whether window washing is \u201can amelioration in [the building\u2019s] condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement.\u201d St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4. Because window washing can reasonably be considered an \u201camelioration\u201d of the dirty condition of a building, the question becomes whether this activity is \u201cmore than mere repairs.\u201d To \u201crepair\u201d is to \u201crestore to a sound or good state.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1298 (6th ed. 1990). The performance of repairs contemplates \u201can existing structure or thing which has become imperfect, and means to supply in the original existing structure that which is lost or destroyed, and thereby restore it to the condition in which it originally existed.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1298 (6th ed. 1990). In this case, defendants contracted with Millard to restore Allstate\u2019s building windows to the clean condition in which they originally existed. Applying the plain and unambiguous language adopted by the supreme court in defining \u201cimprovement\u201d to the facts of this case, we hold that window washing is only a \u201crepair\u201d or \u201cmaintenance,\u201d nothing more.\nFurther support for our interpretation that window washing does not amount to an \u201cimprovement\u201d lies in the fact that many of the relevant criteria set forth in St. Louis cannot be rationally applied to the performance of window washing services. See St. Louis, 153 Ill. 2d at 4-5. Even plaintiff concedes that window washing, by its nature, is \u201ctemporary\u201d as illustrated by the parties\u2019 contract for monthly window washing service. Plaintiff further concedes that window washing does not become an \u201cintegral component of an overall system\u201d because, as noted above, no materials or products are being added to the building. It is clear that any \u201cincrease in the value\u201d to a corporate office building by virtue of having clean windows is de minimis, at best. Finally, the \u201cuse of the property\u201d is not enhanced. Common sense dictates that clean windows do not have an appreciable impact on the conduct of corporate business transactions. Therefore, after a thorough analysis, we hold that plaintiff\u2019s cause of action is governed by the two-year statute of limitations generally applicable to personal injury claims (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 202 (West 1998)) because, as a matter of law, the performance of window washing services does not constitute the \u201cconstruction of an improvement to real property\u201d within the meaning of the Limitations Act (735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998)).\nPlaintiff\u2019s additional argument that questions of fact remain regarding whether window washing is an \u201cimprovement\u201d within the meaning of section 13 \u2014 214(a) is without merit. Plaintiff contends that \u201cwindow washing might increase the value or utility of a building, depending on how contaminated the windows were; with what substances they were contaminated; and the use to which the building was being put.\u201d Plaintiff argues that summary judgment is inappropriate because these facts are not disclosed by the record. One can only wonder why these \u201cfacts\u201d are not of record if plaintiff is relying on them. Nevertheless, it is clear from the record that the buildings in question are office buildings located in Northbrook, Illinois, from which Allstate conducts its corporate business. As such, we find plaintiffs speculations unpersuasive and, indeed, patently .ridiculous. We note that to rule otherwise would be to invite an absurd situation whereby all routine \u201cmaintenance\u201d and \u201crepair\u201d activities (such as waxing floors, changing light fixtures and mowing lawns) would be considered \u201cconstruction-related\u201d activities within the ambit of section 13 \u2014 214(a) and thereby governed by an extended four-year statute of limitations. Nothing in the language of section 13 \u2014 214(a) indicates that the legislature intended such a bizarre, comprehensive and expansive result. 735 ILCS 5/13 \u2014 214(a) (West 1998).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Circuit Court of Cook County\u2019s order granting Allstate\u2019s summary judgment motion.\nAffirmed.\nMcNULTY, PJ, and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, J, concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COHEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel H. Streekert and Kirsten M. Dunne, both of Goldberg, Weisman & Cairo, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Paul Kralovec and Dean Barakat, both of Law Offices of Shehnerdeane A. Miller, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "EARL D. BAILEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ALLSTATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-00-0225\nOpinion filed September 29, 2000.\nDaniel H. Streekert and Kirsten M. Dunne, both of Goldberg, Weisman & Cairo, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nPaul Kralovec and Dean Barakat, both of Law Offices of Shehnerdeane A. Miller, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0949-01", "first_page_order": 969, "last_page_order": 982 }