{ "id": 1025874, "name": "PAUL GERSHAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLENE J. FEIGN et al., Defendants-Appellants; ARTHUR HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant; ALLEN PRODEHL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHY PAPADIMITRIOU et al., Defendants-Appellants; DAWN E. SAVAGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELVIN EPSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant; ROBERT J. DENZEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAM SAPP, Defendant-Appellant; KEITH ELLISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER OMIOTEK, Defendant-Appellant; BETHZAIDA SOTOMAYOR et al., Indiv. and as Parents and Next Best Friends of Enely Sotomayor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DAVID S. REED et al., Defendants-Appellants; ELIZABETH PENA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHAH POPAL, Defendant-Appellant; THERESA FERNANDEZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAY L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant; STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Olivia Waggoner, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUTH EVA SCHMIDT, Incorrectly Sued as Rosi Schmidt, Defendant-Appellant; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP as Subrogee of South Holland Metal Finishing, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY J. LOVATO, Defendant-Appellant; HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Frank Merino, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GAWRYS, Defendant-Appellant; FRANCES ESTRADA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. VICTORIO DAYRIT, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Gershak v. Feign", "decision_date": "2000-09-26", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-98-2855, 1-98-3285, 1-98-3286, 1-98-3481, 1-98-3561, 1-98-3712, 1-98-3912, 1-98-3919, 1-98-3923, 1-98-4022, 1-98-4040, 1-98-4056 and 1-98-4468 cons.", "first_page": "14", "last_page": "26", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 14" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2882996 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "625 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 1072", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 1023", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336139 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1028" }, { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576586 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 413", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 938", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2851222 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0938-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 923", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182742 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0923-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3378516 ], "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/243/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "25 N.E. 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1890, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5437830 ], "year": 1890, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/134/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 L. Ed. 1085", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "case_ids": [ 3377230 ], "year": 1878, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1086" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/97/0581-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 N.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill. 2d 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2858819 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 N.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "failure to serve proper notice of judicial sale under section 12 - 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 12 - 115) did not render judicial sale void or voidable" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5795852 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "failure to serve proper notice of judicial sale under section 12 - 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 12 - 115) did not render judicial sale void or voidable" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 1052", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "failure to serve notice under Supreme Court Rule 104(d) renders an order based on the motion voidable, not void" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411622 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557", "parenthetical": "failure to serve notice under Supreme Court Rule 104(d) renders an order based on the motion voidable, not void" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 318", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 Ill. App. 3d 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 75388 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/279/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 286", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 112", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821416 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0112-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 171", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173-74" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "173" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "175" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 1078", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847591 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1080-81" }, { "page": "1080-81" }, { "page": "1080-81" }, { "page": "1081" }, { "page": "1083" }, { "page": "1083" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/1078-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1248, "char_count": 27879, "ocr_confidence": 0.731, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.964794191478955e-08, "percentile": 0.46306831016016764 }, "sha256": "7e9717114eb205b253eb0d461ed9b9f1dd7a3e3a5b6d340f93aa6a8cffd5d1a3", "simhash": "1:eba391ccff5e9d7e", "word_count": 4693 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:30.528913+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PAUL GERSHAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLENE J. FEIGN et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014ARTHUR HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014ALLEN PRODEHL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHY PAPADIMITRIOU et al., Defendants-Appellants,\u2014DAWN E. SAVAGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELVIN EPSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant.-ROBERT J. DENZEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAM SAPP, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014KEITH ELLISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER OMIOTEK, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014BETHZAIDA SOTOMAYOR et al., Indiv. and as Parents and Next Best Friends of Enely Sotomayor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DAVID S. REED et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014ELIZABETH PENA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHAH POPAL, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014THERESA FERNANDEZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAY L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Olivia Waggoner, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUTH EVA SCHMIDT, Incorrectly Sued as Rosi Schmidt, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP as Subrogee of South Holland Metal Finishing, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY J. LOVATO, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Frank Merino, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GAWRYS, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014FRANCES ESTRADA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. VICTORIO DAYRIT, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nWe review a trial court order that barred rejection of arbitration awards in 122 cases because the notices of rejection were not personally signed by an attorney of record. The notices were filed under Supreme Court Rule 95 (134 Ill. 2d R. 95), 1 of 10 supreme court rules (Supreme Court Rules 86 through 95) that govern mandatory arbitration of civil actions exclusively for money in an amount or of a value not in excess of the monetary limit authorized by the supreme court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 86. In most of the cases, the notices of rejection were signed in the name of a law firm entered on the rejection forms by someone who was not an attorney. In others, the notices contained the name of a lawyer but the names were entered on the forms by someone, not an attorney, who placed his or her initials above the name of the lawyer.\nRelying on our decision in Bachmann v. Kent, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 689 N.E.2d 171 (1997), plaintiffs filed motions to bar rejection of the awards as a sanction, some citing Supreme Court Rule 95 (134 Ill. 2d R. 95) or Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), or both. The trial court consolidated the cases for hearing and argument on the motions. All cases were set for oral argument on February 24, 1998. In the words of the trial court: \u201cThe court heard arguments first from plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys with multiple motions or unique circumstances, with all other plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys *** given the opportunity to offer any additional comments. Each of the involved defense offices then answered and plaintiffs\u2019 attorneys then replied.\u201d\nOn April 23, 1998, the trial court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting plaintiffs\u2019 motions. In the trial court\u2019s dispositive words: \u201cThe rejections of the awards are stricken, and judgments are entered on the awards in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the amounts of the awards, plus costs.\u201d Although the individual attorneys offered to sign the notices of rejection in response to plaintiffs\u2019 motions, the trial court, in its discretion, refused to allow them to do so. All defendants filed timely notices of appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.\nThe trial judge did not make clear in his order and memorandum opinion whether he imposed sanctions under Rule 95 or Rule 137, but he relied heavily on Bachmann. The Bachmann trial court relied on Rule 95, but also held that the signature of a nonattorney on the notice of rejection violated Rule 137. In Bachmann, the defendant failed to attend the arbitration hearing, despite the plaintiffs request in a request to produce that he do so. We affirmed the trial court in Bachmann. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 689 N.E.2d 171.\nOn February 24, 1999, the chairman of the executive committee of this court conducted a prehearing conference under Supreme Court Rule 310 (134 Ill. 2d R. 310) to expedite resolution of the 122 appeals. On March 26, 1999, the executive committee entered an order finding that the issues raised in the 122 cases were similar. Eleven cases were consolidated for briefing (two more were later added), and the remaining appeals were stayed, pending resolution of the consolidated appeals or until further order of this court. We now reverse the order of the trial court and remand the consolidated and stayed appeals for dispositions consistent with this opinion.\nThe standard of review of sanctions imposed under a supreme court rule is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 120, 692 N.E.2d 286, 289 (1998). But we must first address three issues raised by the pleadings and briefs, for which the standard of review is de novo. First, in the trial court\u2019s memorandum and opinion the court suggests that the notices of rejection filed by defendants were \u201cvoid\u201d for lack of an attorney\u2019s signature, without explaining why it believed this to be so. Second, defendants argue on appeal that the underlying arbitration awards are \u201cvoid\u201d for failure of the arbitrators to execute an oath before each arbitration hearing, as required by Supreme Court Rule 87. 134 Ill. 2d R. 87. Third, some defendants argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over some of the cases for various reasons: In one case (No. 1\u201498\u20144040), the underlying action had been settled and dismissed more than 30 days before the motion for sanctions was filed. In others (not identified by number in the briefs), the actions had proceeded to trial and judgment more than 30 days before the motions for sanctions were filed. In yet another (No. 1\u201498\u20144056), the action was on the military calendar and stayed at the time the motion for sanctions was filed. Challenges to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and issues raised as to whether an order is void are reviewed de novo. Margaret Manor, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 279 Ill. App. 3d 776, 779, 665 N.E.2d 318, 320 (1996).\nWe first address the issue of whether the notices of rejection were \u201cvoid.\u201d\nThe trial court said:\n\u201cThis court finds that the notices of rejection are void. Supreme Court Rule 137 is violated by the signatures having been affixed by non-attorneys. Resultantly, valid notices of rejection in the form and manner as required by Supreme Court Rule 95 have not been filed in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 93 and the rejections must be stricken. 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 93, 95, 137.\u201d\nBut later, the court went on to say:\n\u201cAll parties to these motions seem to agree that this court has discretion to allow or disallow the rejection. To the extent that this is so and even if the notices of rejection are voidable and not void, this court is required to give the intended strength and purpose to the mandatory arbitration program and the administration of the court system.\u201d\nWhat, perhaps, the trial court intended to say was that a judicial order confirming rejection of arbitration awards based on the notices could be voidable because the notices were defective for lack of an attorney\u2019s signature.\nThe failure to serve proper notice on a nonmoving party has no effect on the notice itself, but affects only the order entered. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 104(d); Savage v. Pho, 312 Ill. App. 3d 553, 557, 727 N.E.2d 1052 (2000) (failure to serve notice under Supreme Court Rule 104(d) renders an order based on the motion voidable, not void). See also Illinois Service Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n v. Academy of St. James College Preparatory, 227 Ill. App. 3d 507, 592 N.E.2d 126 (1992) (failure to serve proper notice of judicial sale under section 12 \u2014 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 12 \u2014 115) did not render judicial sale void or voidable).\nWhile we later hold in this opinion that notices of rejection must be signed by an attorney, the orders allowing the rejections are, at most, voidable, if it can be shown that the notices giving rise to the orders were defective. People ex rel. Hamer v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 360, 371-72, 235 N.E.2d 589, 596 (1968). There is no evidence in these records or in the briefs that the lack of an attorney\u2019s signature on the notices of rejection .hampered the appearance of the plaintiffs or denied them an opportunity to be heard. Plaintiffs were, in fact, served with notices of rejection in each case and were aware that defendants intended to reject the awards. To refer to the notices of rejection as \u201cvoid\u201d was incorrect and interjected a jurisdictional issue where none existed. The inference in the trial court order that a properly served and docketed notice lacking an attorney\u2019s signature may invalidate subsequent orders entered by a court is one unsupported by any case we could find.\nWe next address defendants\u2019 jurisdictional argument. Defendants maintain that the failure of the arbitrators to execute an oath before each hearing, as required by Supreme Court Rule 87 (134 Ill. 2d R. 87), rendered the arbitration awards void. We disagree. This issue has arisen before and was ably reviewed in a trial court memorandum and opinion, which is cited and appended to some of the appellee briefs in this case. Governmental Employees Insurance Company v. Sheppard, Nos. 96 \u2014 Ml\u201401999, 96 \u2014 Ml\u2014304736, 96 \u2014 Ml\u2014306055, 96 \u2014 Ml\u2014307491, 96 \u2014 Ml\u2014301866 cons. (August 11, 1998). We agree with the reasoning in the cited trial court memorandum opinion and order and briefly summarize its research.\n\u201cThe objection that the arbitrators were not sworn was waived by the plaintiff in error by appearing and going to trial without requiring an oath to be administered.\u201d Newcomb v. Wood, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 581, 583, 24 L. Ed. 1085, 1086 (1878).\n\u201c[Sjilence ought to be regarded as acquiescence. If the objection that the oath has not been administered is made in apt time, it may be cured, and time and expense may be saved. It is not sufficient for the defendants to say they did not know of the failure to take the oath until after the report was filed. They knew, or were bound to know, what the law was. The law required the [arbitrator] to be sworn before he entered upon his duties. If they intended to insist upon a compliance with this requirement, they should have made known their intention before the duties were entered upon.\u201d Pardridge v. Ryan, 134 Ill. 247, 255, 25 N.E. 627 (1890).\n\u201c[I]f the parties proceeded to a hearing before unsworn arbitrators without objection, they will be deemed to have waived that requirement.\u201d City of Carlyle v. Village of Beckemeyer, 243 Ill. App. 460, 463-64 (1927).\nHere, none of the parties objected before or during the arbitra-tions to the arbitrators\u2019 failure to take an oath. As in Pardridge, the parties\u2019 silence is a waiver of their right to insist that the arbitrators be sworn.\nWhile we agree that arbitrators are required to comply with Rule 94 and sign an oath before each hearing, we believe the issue has been waived in the cases before us.\nLast, we agree with defendants that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over cases that were settled and dismissed pursuant to settlement (No. 1 \u2014 98\u20144040) or in which a judgment had been entered more than 30 days before the motions for sanctions were filed. The trial court lost jurisdiction over these cases 30 days after judgment or entry of the dismissal orders. In re Marriage of Stufflebeam, 283 Ill. App. 3d 923, 671 N.E.2d 55 (1996). A final and appealable order is not subject to modification unless the trial court reacquires jurisdiction. Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Rosewell, 262 Ill. App. 3d 938, 635 N.E.2d 413 (1992). But we do not agree that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the stayed case placed on the military calendar (1 \u2014 98\u20144056). Although it is unusual for the trial court to lift a stay of a case on the military calendar without a showing that the defendant will not be prejudiced thereby (see section 521 of the Soldiers\u2019 and Sailors\u2019 Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.A. app. \u00a7 521 (West 1990))), it is an issue that implicates the discretion of the court, but not its jurisdiction.\nSection 2 \u2014 1401 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure allows relief from final orders more than 30 days old under petitions filed consistent with that section. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 1996). Plaintiffs here filed a petition for sanctions under Rule 137. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. The petition did not meet the requirements of a section 2 \u2014 1401 petition reinvesting the court with jurisdiction to modify or vacate the final order. Rule 137 petitions (and its predecessor, section 2 \u2014 611 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2 \u2014 611 (repealed 1990)) are generally not considered posttrial motions directed at the judgment. See Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 462, 563 N.E.2d 459, 462 (1990); Brown & Kerr, Inc. v. American Stores Properties, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1028, 715 N.E.2d 804 (1999).\nWe now turn to the substantive issues.\nPlaintiffs generally rely on Bachmann v. Kent, 293 Ill. App. 3d 1078, 699 N.E.2d 171 (1997), to support their argument that the notices of rejection at issue here were not signed in compliance with Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) and do not comply with Rule 93 (166 Ill. 2d R. 93). It is clear that the trial court relied on Bachmann as well. We disagree. Bachmann is distinguishable from the cases before us.\nIn Bachmann, the defendant\u2019s absence at an arbitration hearing was unexcused and in violation of Supreme Court Rule 237 (166 Ill. 2d R. 237). Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1080-81, 689 N.E.2d at 173-74. The plaintiff filed a motion to strike the defendant\u2019s notice of rejection based on her unexcused absence. The plaintiff later amended the motion to strike, adding the additional ground that the rejection notice was not signed by an attorney, relying on Supreme Court Rule 137. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1080-81, 689 N.E.2d at 173. The trial court granted the motion to strike based on the unexcused absence, but also said that the lack of an attorney signature was \u201c[a]n additional ground\u201d for debarment. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1080-81, 689 N.E.2d at 173. The trial court did not elaborate on this ruling.\nOn appeal, we noted the paucity of the record: \u201c[W]e note that the record consists only of the common law record and one two-page supplemental record consisting only of plaintiffs motion to compel defendant\u2019s deposition.\u201d Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1081, 689 N.E.2d at 173.\nWe then reasoned that the defendant\u2019s unexcused absence at the arbitration hearing in violation of Rule 237 empowered the trial court to debar the defendant from rejecting the award under Rule 90(g) (145 Ill. 2d R. 90(g)) and that the sanction was not an abuse of discretion. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1083, 689 N.E.2d at 175. We went on to say that the trial court\u2019s rejection under Rule 137 as an additional reason was proper. Bachmann, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 1083, 689 N.E.2d at 175. It is this part of our holding that plaintiffs emphasize in support of their argument. We reject it.\nThe Bachmann court had to assume, faced with a sparse record, that the trial court acted within the scope of Rule 137 in imposing sanctions. The case can be read as standing for the proposition that, in an appropriate case, Rule 137 may be relied upon to impose sanctions. The appellant in Bachmann did not give us a record we could explore to test the trial court\u2019s reasoning against an abuse of discretion standard. The trial court may have concluded that the nonappearance of the defendant in Bachmann, in violation of Rules 90(g) and 237, in itself a ground for sanctions, was exacerbated by the filing of a notice of rejection in a case where the defendant forfeited the right to rejection by failing to appear at the arbitration. It is conceivable that a notice of rejection, under certain circumstances, could be found to have been filed for an improper purpose within the meaning of Rule 137 in such a case.\nHere, the record is complete, and we have a 10-page opinion in which the trial court gives us its reasons. The trial court appears to have read Bachmann as investing it with the discretionary power to debar a rejection based on the absence of an attorney\u2019s signature without further inquiry. We reject this analysis for the following reasons.\nRule 137\u2019s penal character requires us to strictly construe the rule against the movant \u2014 not, as some plaintiffs seem to suggest in their briefs, the other way around. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 487, 693 N.E.2d 358, 372 (1998). The rule is invoked only in those cases falling strictly within its terms. In re Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 419, 615 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1993). The party seeking to impose sanctions bears the burden of establishing a violation of the rule. Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc., 133 Ill. 2d 458, 467, 551 N.E.2d 1319, 1323 (1990).\nRule 137 was adopted to discourage false and frivolous pleadings and to punish those who file groundless lawsuits. Cult Awareness Network v. Church of Scientology International, 177 Ill. 2d 267, 279, 685 N.E.2d 1347, 1353-54 (1997); Estate of Hoover, 155 Ill. 2d at 419, 615 N.E.2d at 743. See also Olsen v. Staniak, 260 Ill. App. 3d 856, 864, 632 N.E.2d 168, 175 (1994) (the purpose of imposing the sanction is to prevent abuse of the judicial process and punish a party who brings vexatious litigation predicated upon false statements). To this end, a Rule 137 petition must be specific enough to enable the responding party to respond to the allegations and enable the court to make a determination on the merits. See In re Marriage of Adler, 271 Ill. App. 3d 469, 476, 648 N.E.2d 953, 957 (1995). A hearing is generally necessary for the trial court to determine whether a Rule 137 violation occurred. Century Road Builders, Inc. v. City of Palos Heights, 283 Ill. App. 3d 527, 531, 670 N.E.2d 836, 838 (1996). Whether an evidentiary hearing should be held depends on the facts of each case. Olsen, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 632 N.E.2d at 174; Century, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 531, 670 N.E.2d at 839. Most importantly, in the context of the cases before us, summary imposition of sanctions or denial of relief is proper only where the presence or absence of a Rule 137 violation is apparent from the pleadings, trial evidence or other matters in the record. Shea, Rogal & Associates, Ltd. v. Leslie Volkswagen, Inc., 250 Ill. App. 3d 149, 154-55, 621 N.E.2d 77, 81 (1993); Olsen, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 632 N.E.2d at 171; Century, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 531, 670 N.E.2d at 838. Rule 137 does not authorize imposition of sanctions for all acts of misconduct, but only for the filing of pleadings, motions or other papers in violation of the rule itself. Marriage of Adler, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 476, 648 N.E.2d at 957. Rule 137 is a general sanction provision that is not properly used to sanction conduct where other, more specific, sanction rules apply. Diamond Mortgage Corp. v. Armstrong, 176 Ill. App. 3d 64, 71-72, 530 N.E.2d 1041, 1045 (1988).\nWith this history in mind, we turn to the memorandum and opinion of the trial court to determine whether discretion was abused in this case. We note that the trial court memorandum and opinion made no secret of the fact that \u201calmost all of the defendants are represented\u201d by two law firms, with one of the firms representing \u201capproximately seventy\u201d of the defendants in the cases before the court. At one point the trial court speaks of the \u201cmischief\u2019 that can be created by the rejection of an arbitration award and offers as an example a case not before it, where the award was rejected even though the amount awarded was subject to a setoff that exceeded it. \u201c[I]t strains credulity,\u201d the trial court writes, \u201cthat an attorney familiar with the case and able to certify the factual and legal correctness of pleadings and other papers looked at the award or gave the matter any thought at all.\u201d The court then identifies the lawyers involved in that case as those involved in \u201capproximately seventy\u201d of the cases before it.\nThe preface to this anecdote is a vigorous exposition of the mandatory arbitration program and the \u201cunique opportunity for the court system to move aggressively in its efforts to institute effective casefiow management and backlog reduction programs.\u201d Even a casual reader unfamiliar with the nuts and bolts of the mandatory arbitration program could not miss the trial court\u2019s point: some law firms appear to reject awards as a matter of course and, in the trial judge\u2019s words, never give \u201cthe matter any thought at all.\u201d\nThere is a problem with this reasoning: under Supreme Court Rule 95 (134 Ill. 2d R. 95), the rejection of an arbitration award does not require a reason for a rejection. An attorney need not reveal the thought process \u2014 or lack thereof \u2014 behind a rejection. So it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a Rule 137 inquiry would be relevant to explore the motive for filing a notice of rejection, unless some behavior or circumstance made clear that the rejection was filed for an improper purpose. We note again that in Bachmann the sparse record led us to assume that the trial court had a record before it that revealed an improper purpose behind the failure to affix a proper signature and justified Rule 137 sanctions. There is no evidence before us that the behavior or circumstances surrounding the rejection of the awards in these cases was an improper one within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 137.\nIn the absence of evidence in each case before us of some behavior or circumstance from which it could be inferred that the rejections were unsigned for an improper purpose, we believe it was error for the trial court to refuse to allow the attorneys to cure the defective pleadings by signing the notices of rejection when the error was brought to their attention. Rule 137 clearly provides for such a cure. The trial court\u2019s distinction between a blank notice and one that has been signed by someone other than an attorney is unpersuasive\u2014 unless it can be shown by credible evidence that the signature of the nonattorney was affixed for an improper purpose. The trial court\u2019s approach to the failure to affix an attorney\u2019s signature to a notice of rejection creates, in effect, an irrebuttable presumption of improper purpose. The analysis overlooks the penal nature of the rule. Yassin, 133 Ill. 2d at 467, 551 N.E.2d at 1323; Reyes v. Compass Health Care Plans, 252 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1079, 625 N.E.2d 246, 251 (1993). Here, over 120 defendants were deprived of their day in court because the trial court concluded that a defective signature on the notice of rejection was, on its face, conclusive evidence that the pleading was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. The point of Rule 137 \u2014 to discourage false and frivolous pleadings \u2014 would be defeated were we to hold that a nonattorney\u2019s signature on a notice of rejection is sanctionable conduct per se. There is ammunition enough in a trial judge\u2019s arsenal to deal with lawyers who obfuscate and delay, without resorting to a tortured analysis of an admittedly defective signature. Generally, we agree with the holding in Hernandez v. Williams, 258 Ill. App. 3d 318, 321, 632 N.E.2d 49 (1994), that, absent evidence of an improper purpose that meets the test of Rule 137, a signature defect in a notice of rejection is de minimis. We note here that in a case subsequent to Bachmann, Brown & Kerr, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 715 N.E.2d at 810, we allowed the attorney to cure a defective signature on a notice of rejection where there was no evidence of an intent to violate the spirit of the rule. We note that, even though a debarment may not be appropriate, the trial court may in its discretion, under appropriate circumstances, award fees to the plaintiff for being forced to bring a Rule 137 motion to compel the defense attorney to individually sign the motion.\nRule 93 gives an absolute right to reject an arbitration award so as not to run afoul of a litigant\u2019s constitutional right to a trial by jury. We believe that, absent evidence that a notice of rejection was filed without an attorney\u2019s signature for an improper purpose, Rule 137 cannot be used to defeat an otherwise proper notice of rejection. Where, as here, the notice of rejection is signed by a nonattorney, the proper remedy is to allow the attorney to sign the notice when the defect is brought to his attention, as provided by the plain language of Rule 137. 134 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nOn remand, we direct the dismissal of case No. 1 \u2014 98\u20144040 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although this is the only case specifically identified in the briefs, there is mention of some cases tried to a jury verdict. It is also clear from the record and the briefs that the trial court failed to address the question of jurisdiction, even when brought to its attention. On remand, we direct the trial court to examine its jurisdiction in all remaining cases. In those where the court finds jurisdiction, we direct it to allow the attorneys of record to sign the notices of rejection, unless evidence is offered by the movant that the signature of a nonattorney was affixed for an improper purpose within the meaning of Supreme Court Rule 137. A hearing should be held in each case where such evidence is presented.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nCERDA and BURKE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE CAHILL" } ], "attorneys": [ "Parrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago (Keely Truax, Michael J. O\u2019Halloran, and Clifford M. Panek, of counsel), for appellants Marlene J. Feign, Kelly Feign, Sam Sapp, Christopher Omiotek, Ruth Eva Schmidt, Jeffrey J. Lovato, John Gawrys and Victorio Dayrit.", "Frank C. Stevens and John R. Adams, both of Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnangle & Merletti, of Chicago, for appellants Donna Murphy, Kathy Pa-padimitriou and Peter Papadimitriou.", "Beermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin & Barezky, of Chicago (Alvin R. Becker, Howard A. London, and Gabriel B. Antman, of counsel), for appellants David S. Reed, David L. Reed and Ray L. Brown.", "John C. Steward, of Thomas L. Burdelik & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant Shah Popal.", "Stride, Craddock & Stride, of Chicago, for appellant Melvin Epstein.", "William J. Turner, of Evins, Friend & Sklare, Ltd., of Chicago, for appel-lee Allen Prodehl.", "Howard Bernstein, of Bernstein & Rochell, Ltd., of Buffalo Grove, for ap-pellee Dawn E. Savage.", "Milton M. Blumenthal, of Chicago, for appellee Robert J. Denzel.", "Kathleen Walsh, of Kaep & Ellis, of Chicago, for appellee Keith Ellison.", "Glyn Rostoker, of Mathein & Rostoker, of Chicago, for appellee State Farm Insurance Company and Hanover Insurance Company.", "Gary B. Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees Bethzaida and Valentin Sotomayor.", "Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Isaacson, of Chicago, for appellees Elizabeth and Armando Pena.", "Alvin W. Block & Associates of Chicago, for appellees Theresa Fernandez and Alfred Zuccarrello.", "Cavenaugh & Matek, EC., of Chicago, for appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.", "Benjamin, Berneman & Bruesch, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees Frances and Joseph Estrada, Luis Maldonado, and Jonathan Brito.", "Law Offices of Joseph Younes, of Chicago, for appellee Arthur Heniy." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PAUL GERSHAK, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MARLENE J. FEIGN et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014ARTHUR HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONNA MURPHY, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014ALLEN PRODEHL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KATHY PAPADIMITRIOU et al., Defendants-Appellants,\u2014DAWN E. SAVAGE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MELVIN EPSTEIN, Defendant-Appellant.-ROBERT J. DENZEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SAM SAPP, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014KEITH ELLISON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER OMIOTEK, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014BETHZAIDA SOTOMAYOR et al., Indiv. and as Parents and Next Best Friends of Enely Sotomayor, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. DAVID S. REED et al., Defendants-Appellants.\u2014ELIZABETH PENA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SHAH POPAL, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014THERESA FERNANDEZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. RAY L. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Olivia Waggoner, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUTH EVA SCHMIDT, Incorrectly Sued as Rosi Schmidt, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE GROUP as Subrogee of South Holland Metal Finishing, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEFFREY J. LOVATO, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, as Subrogee of Frank Merino, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOHN GAWRYS, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014FRANCES ESTRADA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. VICTORIO DAYRIT, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNos. 1-98-2855, 1-98-3285, 1-98-3286, 1-98-3481, 1-98-3561, 1-98-3712, 1-98-3912, 1-98-3919, 1-98-3923, 1-98-4022, 1-98-4040, 1-98-4056 and 1-98-4468 cons.\nOpinion filed September 26, 2000.\nModified on denial of rehearing November 7, 2000.\nParrillo, Weiss & O\u2019Halloran, of Chicago (Keely Truax, Michael J. O\u2019Halloran, and Clifford M. Panek, of counsel), for appellants Marlene J. Feign, Kelly Feign, Sam Sapp, Christopher Omiotek, Ruth Eva Schmidt, Jeffrey J. Lovato, John Gawrys and Victorio Dayrit.\nFrank C. Stevens and John R. Adams, both of Taylor, Miller, Sprowl, Hoffnangle & Merletti, of Chicago, for appellants Donna Murphy, Kathy Pa-padimitriou and Peter Papadimitriou.\nBeermann, Swerdlove, Woloshin & Barezky, of Chicago (Alvin R. Becker, Howard A. London, and Gabriel B. Antman, of counsel), for appellants David S. Reed, David L. Reed and Ray L. Brown.\nJohn C. Steward, of Thomas L. Burdelik & Associates, of Chicago, for appellant Shah Popal.\nStride, Craddock & Stride, of Chicago, for appellant Melvin Epstein.\nWilliam J. Turner, of Evins, Friend & Sklare, Ltd., of Chicago, for appel-lee Allen Prodehl.\nHoward Bernstein, of Bernstein & Rochell, Ltd., of Buffalo Grove, for ap-pellee Dawn E. Savage.\nMilton M. Blumenthal, of Chicago, for appellee Robert J. Denzel.\nKathleen Walsh, of Kaep & Ellis, of Chicago, for appellee Keith Ellison.\nGlyn Rostoker, of Mathein & Rostoker, of Chicago, for appellee State Farm Insurance Company and Hanover Insurance Company.\nGary B. Friedman, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees Bethzaida and Valentin Sotomayor.\nLaw Offices of Jeffrey M. Isaacson, of Chicago, for appellees Elizabeth and Armando Pena.\nAlvin W. Block & Associates of Chicago, for appellees Theresa Fernandez and Alfred Zuccarrello.\nCavenaugh & Matek, EC., of Chicago, for appellee Liberty Mutual Insurance Company.\nBenjamin, Berneman & Bruesch, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees Frances and Joseph Estrada, Luis Maldonado, and Jonathan Brito.\nLaw Offices of Joseph Younes, of Chicago, for appellee Arthur Heniy." }, "file_name": "0014-01", "first_page_order": 34, "last_page_order": 46 }