{ "id": 1026053, "name": "DONALD G. WILSON, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION et al., Defendants-Appellants", "name_abbreviation": "Wilson v. Department of Professional Regulation", "decision_date": "2000-10-19", "docket_number": "No. 1-00-0152", "first_page": "57", "last_page": "67", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 57" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 885", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "85 Ill. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5469434 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "551-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/85/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 Ill. 2d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5543260 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/116/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141089 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 N.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257178 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2529493 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515625 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-01" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88-89" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 N.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the essence of procedural due process is notice and the meaningful opportunity to be heard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 1003", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208030 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1009", "parenthetical": "the essence of procedural due process is notice and the meaningful opportunity to be heard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/1003-01" ] }, { "cite": "387 N.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2990985 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/75/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 64", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2510539 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 N.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3192693 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "428" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/119/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "707 N.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 682", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352863 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0682-01" ] }, { "cite": "21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 331", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 866, "char_count": 22075, "ocr_confidence": 0.763, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.9393390366317e-08, "percentile": 0.5010641547055447 }, "sha256": "192c3362913a336629c48098c80262ea92b0473ee948034bcbe05503f9f2ca17", "simhash": "1:d8e25c8d279d4f45", "word_count": 3542 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:30.528913+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "DONALD G. WILSON, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION et al., Defendants-Appellants." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Leonard Sherman, Director of the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (Director), signed an order suspending the pharmacy license of the plaintiff, Donald G. Wilson, Jr., for 9 months followed by probation for 27 months, and revoking the license of Ablin Pharmacy (Ablin), which was owned and operated by Wilson. This order (also referred to herein as the Department\u2019s Decision) imposed a harsher sanction against Wilson than had been recommended by the Illinois State Pharmacy Board (Board) and constituted a final decision of the Department of Professional Regulation. Wilson sought administrative review before the circuit court, which reversed the order and remanded the case with directions that the Board\u2019s recommended sanction be imposed. The disciplinary action taken against Ablin was not contested. The Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (Department) and the Director (collectively referred to as the defendants) filed this timely appeal. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and confirm the Department\u2019s Decision.\nWilson and several other pharmacists were indicted as a result of a federal investigation which became known as \u201cOperation Goldpill.\u201d Wilson pled guilty to the felony of receipt of misbranded drugs through interstate commerce in violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 331(c), 333(a)(2) (1988)). He was placed on probation for a period of one year and ordered to perform 200 hours of community service, which he successfully completed.\nAs a result of Wilson\u2019s conviction, the Department filed a complaint against him and Ablin pursuant to section 30 of the Pharmacy Practice Act of 1987 (Pharmacy Act) (225 ILCS 85/30(a)(2), (a)(14) (West 1996)), seeking to revoke or suspend their licenses. The Department\u2019s complaint referred to Wilson\u2019s admission in his plea agreement that, on three different occasions in June 1992, he knowingly purchased up to seven different types of misbranded drugs.\nThe parties appeared before an administrative law judge (AU) for an evidentiary hearing. The AU admitted Wilson\u2019s federal plea agreement into evidence. In that agreement, Wilson admitted that he purchased drugs which he knew to be \u201cdiverted\u201d since they had been removed from their packages, the safety seals had been broken, and the manufacturers\u2019 labels had been removed. He further admitted in the plea agreement that he had intended to sell the drugs at retail prices without disclosing that they had been \u201cdiverted\u201d and that he had, in fact, sold some of the drugs to the public.\nAt the hearing, Wilson testified that he had been a pharmacist for over 20 years and that he never had legal problems before this incident. He explained that he was having financial difficulties when a vendor from whom he had purchased goods over the years offered to sell him some drugs that the vendor claimed came from pharmacies that had closed. Despite the admissions contained in his federal plea agreement, at the hearing, Wilson denied that he sold any of these drugs to the public, stating that the Federal Bureau of Investigation confiscated them during a raid shortly after he purchased them. He also denied that he purchased the quantities of drugs listed in the plea agreement, stating that he signed the agreement on the advice of his attorney. However, Wilson did acknowledge that what he did was wrong and stated that he understood how his conduct could be viewed as endangering the public. Wilson also presented the testimony of several character witnesses and letters of recommendation from community members who attested to his integrity and their trust in him.\nAfter the hearing, the AU issued a report and recommendation in which she found that: (1) the Department proved that Wilson was convicted of a felony based on a violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and that his conviction was a basis for disciplinary action under section 30 of the Pharmacy Act (225 ILCS 85/30(a)(2), (a)(14) (West 1996)); (2) Ablin, although not convicted, had aided and abetted Wilson in the felony, conduct which also provided grounds for disciplinary action under section 30 of the Pharmacy Act (225 ILCS 85/30(a)(2), (a)(5) (West 1996)); and (3) Wilson was a credible witness, acknowledged his misconduct, and had not been previously disciplined by the Department. Based on these findings, the ALJ recommended that Ablin\u2019s license be revoked and that, among other things, Wilson\u2019s license be suspended for three months followed by probation for nine months. The ALJ stated that she had considered certain factors in mitigation, including: the type and length of Wilson\u2019s criminal sentence; the fact that the wrongdoing had occurred five years prior and that Wilson had been released from probation one year before the hearing; the absence of any wrongdoing since June 1992; community support; a lack of prior disciplinary history; and Wilson\u2019s sincere remorse. The ALJ stated her belief that the discipline recommended was appropriate and \u201cconsistent with other Departmental cases.\u201d Subsequently, the Board adopted the ALJ\u2019s findings of fact and recommended the same sanction in its written report filed pursuant to section 35.6 of the Pharmacy Act (225 ILCS 85/35.6 (West 1996)).\nThe Department filed a motion entitled \u201cMotion for Contrary Action by the Director or Motion for Reconsideration,\u201d asking for the imposition of a sanction against Wilson greater than that recommended by the Board or that the case be remanded to the Board for it to reconsider its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. The Department argued that the record reflected that Wilson failed to accept responsibility and that the recommended sanction was too lenient in comparison to other pharmacists convict\u00e9d in \u201cOperation Goldpill.\u201d In response, Wilson argued, inter alia, that the Department was without authority to file such a motion. On July 16, 1998, Nikki M. Zollar, the Director\u2019s predecessor, remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration, stating, among other things, that she did not have sufficient information to support the conclusion that Wilson\u2019s sanction was consistent with recommendations made in cases in which similar violations had occurred.\nOn remand, the Board issued a recommendation to the Director in which it stated that it \u201cdetermines that its original recommendation for a three (3) month suspension followed by a nine (9) month probation pertaining to [the] pharmacist license of Donald G. Wilson, Jr. is consistent with recommendations made in cases in which similar violations occurred and hereby stands by its original recommendation.\u201d Thereafter, the Department filed a second motion entitled \u201cMotion for Contrary Action by the Director,\u201d asking the Director to impose a more severe sanction. Wilson again argued that the Department was without authority to file such a motion.\nOn June 10, 1999, the Director signed the order suspending Wilson\u2019s license for 9 months to be followed by a 27-month period of probation. On June 22, 1999, Wilson filed the instant administrative review proceeding. After finding, inter alia, that the Pharmacy Act does not authorize the Department to file posthearing motions and that the Department\u2019s Decision increasing Wilson\u2019s sanction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the circuit court reversed the Department\u2019s Decision and remanded the matter with directions to impose the sanction recommended by the Board. This appeal followed.\nIn urging reversal of the circuit court\u2019s order, the defendants argue that: (1) the Department has the authority to file posthearing motions of the type filed in this case and, in any event, the Director and his predecessor acted pursuant to explicit grants of authority set forth in the Pharmacy Act; and (2) the sanction against Wilson ordered by the Director was not an abuse of discretion. We will address, the defendants\u2019 contentions relating to the Department\u2019s right to file motions for rehearing or reconsideration separately from those relating to its right to file a motion requesting that the Director take action contrary to the Board\u2019s recommendation.\nConsiderable portions of the parties\u2019 briefs are devoted to arguments addressing the Department\u2019s right to seek either a rehearing or an order directing the Board to reconsider its recommendation. For its part, the circuit court found that the Department was not authorized to seek such relief. However, for the reasons that follow, we need not resolve the issue.\nSection 35.9 of the Pharmacy Act (225 ILCS 85/35.9 (West 1996)) specifically authorizes a Director to order the Board to rehear a case \u201c[w]henever [he or she] is satisfied that substantial justice has not been done,\u201d and section 35.8 authorizes a respondent to file a motion seeking a rehearing (225 ILCS 85/35.8 (West 1996)). Although nothing in the Pharmacy Act specifically authorizes the Department to file either a motion for rehearing or a motion for reconsideration, the defendants argue that sections 1110.210(a)(8) and 1110.240(g) of the Illinois Administrative Code (68 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a7 1110.210(a)(8), 1110.240(g) (1996)) authorize the Department to file motions seeking either form of relief. However, even assuming for the sake of analysis that Wilson is correct in his assertion that a Director is not authorized by statute to remand a matter to the Board with instructions to reconsider its recommendation and the Department is not authorized to request such relief, we fail to see how the Department\u2019s motion seeking an order upon the Board to reconsider its recommendation or Zollar\u2019s order of July 16, 1998, could be grounds for reversing the Department\u2019s Decision. On reconsideration, the Board did not retreat from its initial recommendation; rather, it confirmed it. Even assuming that the matter never should have been remanded for reconsideration, the fact that it was did not change the Board\u2019s initial recommendation and Wilson cannot, therefore, claim any prejudice.\nNext, we address the significance of the Department having filed a motion requesting that the Director take action contrary to the Board\u2019s recommendation. Section 35.10 of the Pharmacy Act (225 ILCS 85/35.10 (West 1996)) contemplates that a Director may take action contrary to the recommendations of the Board and provides a procedure to be employed when he or she does so. However, there is no statutory authority for the Department to file a motion seeking such relief. Wilson argues that the absence of such statutory authority means that the procedure is unauthorized. We disagree.\nAn administrative agency exercises purely statutory powers, and any power exercised by the agency must come from the provisions of the statute the agency enforces. See County of Cook v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board, 302 Ill. App. 3d 682, 686-87, 707 N.E.2d 176 (1998). However, an express grant of power or duty to an agency or one of its officers carries with it the grant of power to do all things that are reasonably necessary to execute that power or duty. Lake County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 119 Ill. 2d 419, 427, 519 N.E.2d 459 (1988). As was held in Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Board of Trustees, 191 Ill. App. 3d 769, 774, 548 N.E.2d 64 (1989): Administrative agencies are given wide latitude in fulfilling their duties. Lake County Board of Review, 119 Ill. 2d at 428.\n\u201cThis authority need not always be exercised through a process of formal rulemaking. We decline to adopt the plaintiffs reasoning which suggests every action which an administrative agency takes, not made subsequent to a formal rule, may be challenged as outside the legal authority of that agency.\u201d\nThe purpose of the Pharmacy Act is the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare through regulation of the practice of pharmacy. Miller v. Department of Registration & Education, 75 Ill. 2d 76, 81-82, 387 N.E.2d 300 (1979). Both the ALJ and the Board found that Wilson was convicted of receiving misbranded drugs through interstate commerce in violation of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, a felony related to the practice of pharmacy, of which an essential element is dishonesty (see 225 ILCS 85/30(a)(14) (West 1996)). The Pharmacy Act vests the Department with such powers and duties necessary for effectuating its purpose (225 ILCS 85/11 (West 1996)), including the power to take disciplinary action against a pharmacist (225 ILCS 85/30(a) (West 1996)). Although the Department is not authorized to exercise its disciplinary power except upon the action and report of the Board, its Director is authorized to take action contrary to the Board\u2019s recommendation. 225 ILCS 85/35.10 (West 1996). We fail to see any reason why the Department is not authorized to request its Director to take action contrary to the Board\u2019s recommendation as an incident to: (1) its duty to effectuate the purpose of the Pharmacy Act; and (2) its power to discipline. We hold, therefore, that the circuit court erred in finding that the Department lacked the authority to file a motion requesting that the Director take action contrary to the Board\u2019s recommendation. Further, since Wilson was afforded an opportunity to respond to the Department\u2019s motion and the Director considered his response along with the record before taking action contrary to the Board\u2019s recommendation, he cannot claim that he was denied due process. See Stillo v. State Retirement Systems, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1003, 1009, 714 N.E.2d 11 (1999) (the essence of procedural due process is notice and the meaningful opportunity to be heard).\nHaving determined that the filing of the Department\u2019s posthear-ing motions and Zollar\u2019s order of July 16, 1998, provide no basis to reverse the Department\u2019s Decision, we will now address the questions of: (1) whether the Department\u2019s Decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (2) whether the sanction imposed on Wilson was an abuse of discretion.\nThe factual findings of an administrative agency are held to be prima facie true and correct (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 1998)) and will not be disturbed on review unless against the manifest weight of the evidence. Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992). It is the final decision of the agency that is reviewed in an administrative review proceeding, and it is the agency\u2019s findings of fact that are entitled to deference, not the findings of a hearing officer or an ALJ. Starkey v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 97 Ill. 2d 91, 100-01, 454 N.E.2d 265 (1983); Pundy v. Department of Professional Regulation, 211 Ill. App. 3d 475, 486-87, 570 N.E.2d 458 (1991). This is true even when the agency\u2019s findings differ from those of the ALJ and the agency has not had the opportunity to observe the witnesses. Starkey, 97 Ill. 2d at 101; Schmeier v. Chicago Park District, 301 Ill. App. 3d 17, 30, 703 N.E.2d 396 (1998).\nIn reversing the Department\u2019s Decision, the circuit court found that the decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In making this finding, the circuit court observed that the Director: (1) rejected the Board\u2019s finding that the passage of five years since Wilson committed the acts that gave rise to his conviction should be viewed as a mitigating factor; (2) rejected the Board\u2019s finding that its recommended sanction was consistent with recommendations made in similar cases; and (3) unilaterally increased the sanction. We will address each of these observations separately.\nThere is no question but that Wilson committed the offense that gave rise to the Department\u2019s disciplinary proceedings five years prior to the time that the ALJ issued her report and recommendation, which the Board adopted. The Director took issue with the ALJ\u2019s reliance on this fact in mitigation, stating in his order: \u201cI also do not find that the length of time elapsed since the misconduct mitigates the seriousness of the offense, and disagree with the Board and the Administrative Law Judge that such factor should be accorded significant weight as mitigation.\u201d\nWhether the passage of time should or should not have been accorded significant weight as mitigation under the circumstances of this case is not a fact; rather, it is a judgment as to the weight to be accorded a certain uncontested fact in determining a penalty. Although the Pharmacy Act states that the Board\u2019s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations \u201cshall be the basis for the Department\u2019s order\u201d (225 ILCS 85/35.6 (West 1996)), the statute does not require the Director to adopt the Board\u2019s findings. In point of fact, as we have noted earlier, the statute contemplates that the Director may disagree with the Board and take contrary action. 225 ILCS 85/35.10 (West 1996). That is not to say that the Director may completely disregard the Board\u2019s report. We hold only that the weight to be accorded to a fact is a matter within the province of the administrative agency (Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 513, 475 N.E.2d 879 (1985)), and the fact that one might find, as the Board did, that the passage of time should be accorded more weight than the Director assigned to it does not render his determination against the manifest weight of the evidence (see Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88-89).\nNext, we address the issue of whether the Director\u2019s conclusion, that a suspension of Wilson\u2019s license for a period of 9 months followed by 27 months\u2019 probation would be \u201cmore consistent with similar cases\u201d than the Board\u2019s recommended sanction, is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOn administrative review, courts are not at liberty to substitute their judgment for that of the agency. The findings and conclusions of an administrative agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88.\nIn order to find that the Director\u2019s determination as to the consistency of the Board\u2019s recommended sanction with the sanctions imposed in similar cases is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we need look no further than Wilson\u2019s own \u201cExhibit V\u201d which was admitted into evidence by the ALJ. Exhibit V reflects that, up to the time of Wilson\u2019s hearing, the minimum sanction imposed by the Department on any of the other pharmacists convicted as a result of the \u201cOperation Goldpill\u201d investigation was a nine-month suspension followed by three years\u2019 probation. This sanction was imposed against a pharmacist convicted of mail fraud. Exhibit V also reveals that another pharmacist, Jay Pines, who was convicted of the same charge as Wilson, receipt of misbranded drugs, received a 12-month suspension followed by 24 months\u2019 probation.\nThe final issue to be addressed relates to the sanction imposed upon Wilson. The Board recommended that he be suspended for three months followed by nine months\u2019 probation. The Director declined to follow that recommendation and imposed a 9-month suspension followed by 27 months\u2019 probation. The circuit court found that the lesser sanction recommended by the Board was more appropriate, stating: \u201cAlthough the conviction of this felony is a serious violation, in light of the mitigating factors, it is clear that the unilateral decision of the Director to increase the penalty against the plaintiff is against the manifest weight of the evidence presented in the record.\u201d We disagree.\nIn determining whether an administrative finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence, consideration must be given to the severity of the sanction imposed. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 99. However, courts defer to the expertise and experience of the administrative agency in determining what sanction is appropriate to protect the public interest. Massa v. Department of Registration & Education, 116 Ill. 2d 376, 388, 507 N.E.2d 814 (1987). Penalties imposed by an administrative agency should not be reversed unless they are arbitrary or unreasonable. Department of Mental Health & Developmental Disabilities v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 85 Ill. 2d 547, 551-52, 426 N.E.2d 885 (1981).\nFor the reasons previously given, the Director was not obligated to accept the Board\u2019s recommended sanction. We find that the Director\u2019s sanction set forth in the Department\u2019s Decision is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, nor is it overly harsh or unrelated to the purposes of the Pharmacy Act. It is uncontested that Wilson was convicted of a felony involving dishonesty and related to the practice of pharmacy. Further, the sanction imposed upon him is clearly consistent with the suspensions imposed upon a number of other pharmacists convicted as a result of the \u201cOperation Goldpill\u201d investigation. As Wilson\u2019s own hearing exhibit reflects, his suspension of 9 months followed by 27 months\u2019 probation is on the low end of the range. Consequently, we find that the circuit court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the Director by determining an appropriate sanction in this case and reversing the Department\u2019s Decision.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the order of the circuit court, and confirm the Department\u2019s Decision in this case.\nCircuit court judgment reversed; Department Decision confirmed.\nSOUTH and BARTH, JJ., concur.\nthough the caption of the complaint filed in this case designates both Wilson and Ablin as plaintiffs, the complaint seeks relief in favor of Wilson only.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "James E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Marcia L. McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.", "Goldberg, Zulkie & Frankenstein, Ltd., of Chicago (Gerald G. Goldberg and Robert A. Bauerschmidt, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DONALD G. WILSON, JR., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION et al., Defendants-Appellants.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1-00-0152\nOpinion filed October 19, 2000.\nJames E. Ryan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Joel D. Bertocchi, Solicitor General, and Marcia L. McCormick, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellants.\nGoldberg, Zulkie & Frankenstein, Ltd., of Chicago (Gerald G. Goldberg and Robert A. Bauerschmidt, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0057-01", "first_page_order": 77, "last_page_order": 87 }