{ "id": 1026028, "name": "WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN AND DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT GAYLORD, Defendant-Appellant (Virginia Gaylord, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon v. Gaylord", "decision_date": "2000-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 1-99-4301", "first_page": "590", "last_page": "607", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 590" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55982 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680608 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 764", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159496 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0764-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3520677 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/116/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2491518 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "979" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/196/0974-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073608 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "153" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415308 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "145" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "142" }, { "page": "143" }, { "page": "144" }, { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0139-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 Ill. 2d 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5328220 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" }, { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/18/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 898", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5154877 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0898-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 Ill. App. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2601202 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/58/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3415323 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" }, { "page": "643" }, { "page": "642" }, { "page": "643", "parenthetical": "although attorney testified that he kept no records, testimony that he expended 150 hours, multiplied by the usual and customary fee of $60 per hour, supported award of $9,000 total fee" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "642" }, { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. App. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2541636 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/81/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. App. 3d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3337907 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308" }, { "page": "306-10" }, { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to justify the hours spent and the resulting fee" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "310" }, { "page": "308" }, { "page": "306-10" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/63/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2959480 ], "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/59/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443111 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Ill. App. 2d 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2602377 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "\"fee-shifting\" provision in the divorce act gives trial court discretion in awarding attorney fees incurred by petitioner in the prosecution of the suit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/59/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 1060", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2569305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/1060-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2488498 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" }, { "page": "707" }, { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/41/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5109726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 Ill. 2d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2970579 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/62/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 Ill. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3103175 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/93/0231-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 Ill. App. 3d 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3639797 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/137/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 1040", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073634 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/1040-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 681", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680653 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685", "parenthetical": "trial court awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees pursuant to \"fee-shifting\" provision in lease" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0681-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2942666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067-68", "parenthetical": "trial court awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and costs in foreclosure action pursuant to provision in trust deed" }, { "page": "1072" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2880417 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687-89", "parenthetical": "trial court awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1998))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. App. 3d 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2630394 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658-59", "parenthetical": "trial court granted lessor's fee petition pursuant to fee-shifting provision in lease" }, { "page": "661-62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/183/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 978", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3581931 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "981-82", "parenthetical": "lease provision required lessee to pay \"all costs and expenses\" of lessor including attorney fees" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "986" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "984" }, { "page": "983-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0978-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1427, "char_count": 40242, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5835736757761477e-07, "percentile": 0.8174403218102677 }, "sha256": "2f78e76e096c226563ea26f9c859b48c75d6264898674c03161544e57b129622", "simhash": "1:1dbbbc163a08c425", "word_count": 6504 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:30.528913+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN AND DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT GAYLORD, Defendant-Appellant (Virginia Gaylord, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COHEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon (Wildman) filed a breach of contract action against defendants Robert and Virginia Gay-lord to recover attorney fees. Plaintiffs sought $56,869.34 in attorney fees and $1,553.34 in costs for legal services rendered on behalf of defendants in the areas of estate planning and corporations law. After a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment against defendant Robert Gaylord in the amount of $43,316 for attorney fees and $529.09 in costs. No judgment was entered against defendant Virginia Gay-lord, who was deceased at the time of trial. Robert Gaylord now appeals the trial court\u2019s judgment order of September 22, 1999, contending that the trial court: (1) \u201cabused its discretion\u201d by awarding attorney fees without following the dictates of controlling case law; and (2) erred in awarding Wildman an amount that was not supported by the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment and find that: (1) during a bench trial, the trial judge sits as the trier of fact and does not exercise broad discretionary powers when determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; (2) \u201cmanifest weight of the evidence\u201d is the sole standard of review when a judgment awarding attorney fees follows a trial on the merits; (3) an attorney-plaintiff seeking to recover fees from his own client pursuant to a breach of contract or quantum meruit theory is not required to present \u201cdetailed contemporaneous time records\u201d in order to sustain his burden of establishing that the attorney fees sought are reasonable; and (4) the trial court\u2019s judgment was supported by the manifest weight of the competent evidence.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant Robert Gaylord initially contacted Stewart Dixon, a partner in the Wildman firm, in January 1989 regarding the possible dissolution of his marriage. Dixon consulted with Gaylord about his financial standing and legal rights in the event he decided to proceed with a divorce. Dixon\u2019s review of Gaylord\u2019s tax returns, financial statements and business records indicated that he was a man of substantial wealth. Instead of instituting divorce proceedings on Gaylord\u2019s behalf at this time, Dixon encouraged Gaylord to attempt a reconciliation.\nGaylord contacted Dixon again in July 1991 indicating that he wanted to meet and discuss \u201curgent\u201d matters. At their initial meeting on July 18, 1991, Gaylord advised Wildman attorneys of a certain corporate action that was scheduled to be taken within the next 10 days by the board of directors of the Robelm Holding Company, Inc. (Robelm). At that time, Robelm\u2019s only holding was approximately 30% of the stock in Ingersoll International Inc. (Ingersoll), a closely held family machine tool business. Gaylord owned shares in Ingersoll directly and also possessed beneficial interests in various trusts that held Ingersoll shares. Gaylord\u2019s brothers, Edmon and Clayton, sought to maintain control over the voting stock in Ingersoll by creating a voting trust with their combined shares. The actions threatened by Gaylord\u2019s brothers would have effectively frozen Gaylord out of control over Ingersoll for 30 years. These actions would also have had a material impact on Ingersoll dividends, a substantial source of Gaylord\u2019s income.\nAt the close of the July 18, 1991, meeting, Gaylord orally entered into a contract for legal representation, with the Wildman firm and agreed to be billed for legal services at Wildman\u2019s customary hourly rates. Over the course of the next three months, Wildman performed extensive legal services on Gaylord\u2019s behalf in the areas of corporations law, estate planning and taxation. In October 1991, Wildman sent Gaylord a billing statement seeking payment of $56,869.34 in attorney fees and $1,553.34 in costs for legal services rendered on Gay-lord\u2019s behalf. Gaylord refused to pay the Wildman bill. After several unsuccessful demands for payment, Wildman filed an action for breach of contract in the circuit court of Cook County. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Wildman for $43,316 in attorney fees and $529.09 in costs. Defendant appeals.\nII. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nThe initial issue that we must address is the applicable standard of review when a trial court\u2019s judgment awarding attorney fees is challenged. In determining the proper standard of review, it is critical that we first isolate the procedural mechanism through which plaintiff sought relief. In the case at bar, the judgment for attorney fees followed a bench trial on Wildman\u2019s breach of contract action. Wildman sought legal fees for services performed on behalf of defendants pursuant to a contract for legal representation.\nOn appeal, both plaintiff and defendant argue that the trial judge \u201cexercised his discretion\u201d when determining reasonable attorney fees and that the judgment should be reversed if we find an abuse of discretion. The parties\u2019 assertions are misguided. Preliminarily, it should be noted that the cases cited by the parties on this point are inapposite. Unlike the case at bar, a breach of contract action brought by an attorney-plaintiff, the cases cited by the parties as authority involve fee petitions brought in the context of an underlying action in which the attorney performing legal services was not a party. Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 981-82 (1987) (lease provision required lessee to pay \u201call costs and expenses\u201d of lessor including attorney fees); Fitzgerald v. Lake Shore Animal Hospital, Inc., 183 Ill. App. 3d 655, 658-59 (1989) (trial court granted lessor\u2019s fee petition pursuant to fee-shifting provision in lease); Prior Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Hagins, 258 Ill. App. 3d 683, 687-89 (1994) (trial court awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1998))); Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1067-68 (1993) (trial court awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees and costs in foreclosure action pursuant to provision in trust deed); Heller Financial, Inc. v. Johns-Byrne Co., 264 Ill. App. 3d 681, 685 (1994) (trial court awarded plaintiff reasonable attorney fees pursuant to \u201cfee-shifting\u201d provision in lease).\nIn each of the above-cited cases, petitioners were parties to an underlying lawsuit who sought an award of attorney fees against an opposing party pursuant to a \u201cfee-shifting\u201d agreement or statutory provision. See Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d 978. \u201cFee-shifting\u201d provisions are exceptions to the long-standing general rule that the unsuccessful litigant in a civil action is not responsible for the payment of the opponent\u2019s attorney fees. Storm & Associates, Ltd. v. Cuculich, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1048 (1998); Chicago Title & Trust Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d at 1072; Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 983.\nIn fee petition cases, the trial judge\u2019s familiarity with the underlying litigation allows him to independently assess the necessity and reasonableness of the legal services rendered. In re Estate of Healy, 137 Ill. App. 3d 406, 411 (1985). Significantly, if a trial court denies a petition seeking fees pursuant to a \u201cfee-shifting\u201d clause, the successful litigant\u2019s attorney is still entitled to payment from his own client. For these reasons, when ruling on a fee petition, the trial court has broad discretionary powers in awarding the attorney fees sought and its decision will not be reversed unless the court has abused its discretion. Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 984; In re Estate of Healy, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 411; Lurie v. Canadian Javelin Ltd., 93 Ill. 2d 231, 239 (1982); Leader v. Cullerton, 62 Ill. 2d 483, 488 (1976).\nThe parties\u2019 misapprehension regarding the proper standard of review likely stems from the fact that two Illinois cases cite \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d as the applicable standard of review of a trial court\u2019s judgment awarding attorney fees without regard to the critical fact that the procedural vehicle chosen by plaintiffs to recover attorney fees in those cases was a civil trial on the merits rather than a fee petition. Muller v. Jones, 243 Ill. App. 3d 711, 714 (1993); Neville v. Davinroy, 41 Ill. App. 3d 706, 711 (1976).\nIn Muller, a Fourth District case, a discharged attorney filed a civil action against its former client seeking recovery of attorney fees on a quantum meruit theory. Prior to his discharge, the plaintiff-attorney had performed legal services on behalf of defendant in a personal injury action. Following a bench trial on the merits, the trial judge awarded plaintiff $2,500 in attorney fees, plus $72.20 in court costs. Muller, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 712.\nRelying on Mars v. Priester, 205 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (1990), and Kaiser v. MEPC American Properties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978 (1987), the Muller court held that the trial court\u2019s judgment resulted from an \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d because the evidence and testimony presented by defendant at trial were not sufficiently specific to justify the trial judge\u2019s award. Accordingly, the appellate court reduced the trial court\u2019s judgment to $485.45 in attorney fees, plus $72.20 in court costs. The Muller court quoted the following passage from Mars as the applicable standard of review governing a judgment awarding attorney fees:\n\u201cIn all cases where an award of attorney fees is appropriate, only those fees which are reasonable will be allowed, the determination of which is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Mars v. Priester, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 1064-65, citing Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d 978.\nIn Neville, a Fifth District case, a plaintiff-attorney filed an action alleging breach of an express oral contract for legal representation against his former client for legal services rendered at the contractual rate of $35 per hour in 10 different matters over a four-year period. The trial court, sitting as trier of fact in a bench trial, found that there was \u201can oral contract for services rendered with no mention of price involved.\u201d Neville, 41 Ill. App. 3d at 707. The Neville court further stated, \u201c[i]n the allowance of attorney fees, courts may exercise their independent judgment and the amount thereof rests in their sound discretion.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Neville, 41 Ill. App. 3d at 711, citing Richheimer v. Richheimer, 59 Ill. App. 2d 354, 365 (1965) (\u201cfee-shifting\u201d provision in the divorce act gives trial court discretion in awarding attorney fees incurred by petitioner in the prosecution of the suit). Similar to the Muller court\u2019s reliance on Kaiser, the Neville court relies on Richheimer to support its proposition that \u201cabuse of discretion\u201d is the proper standard of review for all cases where attorney fees are the subject of the dispute. We disagree.\nContrary to the facts presented in Muller and Neville (bench trials on the merits), both Kaiser and Richheimer involved fee petitions brought as collateral proceedings to underlying actions. In ruling, the Muller and Neville courts failed to address the critical fact that there are fundamental differences between the standard of review and burden of proof applicable in cases where a party to an underlying action files a \u201cfee petition\u201d seeking a discretionary award of fees against the losing party and those cases where an attorney-plaintiff files a \u201ccivil action for breach of contract\u201d seeking payment of fees from a former client. In light of this critical distinction, we find that the Muller and Neville courts erred in their application of the law. We decline to follow their analyses.\nWhen deciding whether to grant a fee petition, trial courts have broad discretionary powers, may exercise their independent judgment and are not limited to the evidence presented by the parties in arriving at a reasonable fee. In re Estate of Healy, 137 Ill. App. 3d at 411. A trial court has the discretion to independently review and consider the contents of the entire court file in determining whether a party is entitled to fees and whether the fees requested are reasonable. Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 986. It should be noted that an additional policy consideration in cases involving \u201cfee-shifting\u201d provisions is that the attorney for the successful litigant has no individual right to seek payment from the losing party. Stricter scrutiny by the trial court is warranted in these circumstances because the attorney submitting billing statements for approval by the trial court has no fiduciary relationship with the party ultimately liable for payment of the fees.\nIn Kaiser, the appellate court recognized the need for heightened scrutiny in fee petition cases. The court stated that a \u201cpetition for fees must specify the services performed, by whom they were performed, the time expended thereon and the hourly rate charged therefor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 984, citing Fiorito v. Jones, 72 Ill. 2d 73 (1978). The Kaiser court further stated that \u201c[bjecause of the importance of these factors, it is incumbent upon the petitioner [in a fee petition case] to present detailed records maintained during the course of the litigation containing facts and computations upon which the charges are predicated.\u201d Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 984, citing Flynn v. Kucharski, 59 Ill. 2d 61 (1974).\nUnlike findings in a fee petition case, which rest in the sound discretion of the trial judge, the reasonableness of attorney fees in a common law breach of contract action presents a question to be resolved by the trier of fact, following a fair and impartial trial. Laff v. Chapman Performance Products, Inc., 63 Ill. App. 3d 297, 308 (1978). In civil actions brought by attorney-plaintiffs to recover compensation for professional services performed under an alleged contract, the usual rules governing breach of contract actions apply because \u201c[t]he liability to pay for legal services stands upon the same footing as other agreements.\u201d Sokol v. Mortimer, 81 Ill. App. 2d 55, 64 (1967). However, a reviewing court is free to set aside an oppressive verdict for attorney fees as it would \u201cany other verdict which is contrary to the manifest weight of the competent evidence.\u201d Slater v. Jacobs, 56 Ill. App. 3d 636, 643 (1977); Sullivan v. Fawver, 58 Ill. App. 2d 37, 45 (1965). The law is clear. \u201cIt is not the province of this court to substitute its judgment for that of a jury\u201d in a breach of contract action seeking attorney fees unless there is a \u201cpatent error wherein the weight of the evidence demands a contrary conclusion.\u201d Sokol, 81 Ill. App. 2d at 64; Sullivan, 58 Ill. App. 2d at 44; Slater, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 643; Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 306-10.\nThe fact that a judgment is rendered after a bench trial with the judge sitting as the \u201ctrier of fact\u201d as opposed to a jury does not alter this standard of review. A trial judge\u2019s conclusions on factual issues are entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict. Johnson v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 238 Ill. App. 3d 898, 905 (1992); Brown v. Zimmerman, 18 Ill. 2d 94, 102 (1959). Moreover, when a judge sits as the \u201ctrier of fact\u201d in a bench trial, the judge is presumed to have considered only competent evidence presented by the parties at trial. Buckner v. Causey, 311 Ill. App. 3d 139, 145 (1999). A court\u2019s consideration of matters outside the trial record is prejudicial error which can result in a reversal of its judgment. Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 145.\nIn determining the reasonableness of attorney fees in a bench trial, the judge does not exercise \u201cbroad discretionary powers.\u201d A trial judge cannot abuse his discretion by determining that attorney fees are reasonable in a civil trial on the merits because \u201cdiscretion has nothing to do with the issue.\u201d Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 142. To hold otherwise would result in a different standard of review in breach of contract actions depending on whether plaintiff filed a jury demand or proceeded with a bench trial. This result, defying common sense, is not supported by the case law. Accordingly, as in any other civil breach of contract action, we hold that the sole question on review is whether the trial court\u2019s judgment for attorney fees and costs was against the \u201cmanifest weight of the evidence.\u201d Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 142; Brody v. Finch University of Health Sciences/Chicago Medical School, 298 Ill. App. 3d 146, 153 (1998).\nIII. BURDEN OF PROOF\nPreliminarily we note that much of defendant\u2019s argument on appeal centers around the trial court\u2019s failure to apply the standards outlined in Kaiser and Fitzgerald to the case at bar when ruling on the reasonableness of attorney fees. Kaiser, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 983-84; Fitzgerald, 183 Ill. App. 3d at 661-62. As we hold that the rules of law espoused in Kaiser and Fitzgerald are limited to cases involving \u201cfee petitions,\u201d defendant\u2019s arguments that the trial court abused its discretion in this regard are without gravitas. Accordingly, we also reject defendant\u2019s argument that plaintiffs burden of proof in a common law action seeking attorney fees pursuant to a breach of contract or quantum meruit theory includes \u201cdetailed, contemporaneous time records\u201d with the heightened level of specificity required by Kaiser and Fitzgerald.\nIn an action for attorney fees based on a breach of contract or quantum meruit theory, the plaintiff-attorney\u2019s prima facie case includes proof of the following: (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) the nature of the services rendered, (3) the amount of time expended, and (4) the result, if any, obtained for the client. Greenbaum & Browne, Ltd. v. Braun, 88 Ill. App. 3d 210, 213-14 (1980); Ross v. Wells, 6 Ill. App. 2d 304, 308 (1955). A plaintiff-attorney must also furnish sufficient facts and computations to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the services rendered were necessary and that the amount of fees sought is fair, just and reasonable. Greenbaum, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 215; Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 308 (plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to justify the hours spent and the resulting fee).\nIn a civil trial, the necessity of legal services performed and the reasonableness of the amount charged are questions of fact. Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 308; Slater, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 642. The trial judge, sitting as the trier of fact, decides these issues based on the weight of the competent evidence. Evidence sufficient to support a civil judgment for attorney fees may be comprised solely of witness testimony. Slater, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 643 (although attorney testified that he kept no records, testimony that he expended 150 hours, multiplied by the usual and customary fee of $60 per hour, supported award of $9,000 total fee).\nIV TRIAL COURT\u2019S AWARD IS SUPPORTED BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE\nThe next issue we address is whether the trial court\u2019s judgment in favor of Wildman was supported by the evidence. A trial court\u2019s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence when its findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence. Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 143, quoting Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1995). On appeal, the reviewing court must take questions of testimonial credibility as resolved in favor of the prevailing party and must draw from the evidence all reasonable inferences in support of the judgment. H&H Press, Inc. v. Axelrod, 265 Ill. App. 3d 670, 679 (1994). A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court\u2019s decision if different conclusions can be drawn from contradictory testimony unless an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 144, citing DeLong v. Cabinet Wholesalers, Inc., 196 Ill. App. 3d 974, 979 (1990).\nWe must give great deference to the trial court\u2019s findings because the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in a superior position to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, to judge their credibility and to determine the weight their testimony and other evidence should receive. Buckner, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 144; Brody, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 153. Where the determination of the case depends largely upon the facts found in the record, the findings and judgment of the trial court \u201cwill not be disturbed by the reviewing court if there is any evidence in the record to support such findings.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Schioniger v. County of Cook, 116 Ill. App. 3d 895, 899 (1983); Brown v. Zimmerman, 18 Ill. 2d at 102. In order to warrant reversal, \u201cthe appellant must present evidence that is so strong and convincing as to overcome, completely, the evidence and presumptions, if any, existing in the appellee\u2019s favor.\u201d Raclaw v. Fay, Conmy & Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 764, 767 (1996). Moreover, this court may affirm the judgment upon any ground warranted, regardless of whether it was relied on by the trial court and regardless of whether the reasons given by the trial court are correct. Cronin v. McCarthy, 264 Ill. App. 3d 514, 523 (1994). With these standards as our guide, we address Gaylord\u2019s arguments on appeal.\nDefendant contends that the billing statements presented by Wild-man at trial demonstrate that the amount of the trial court\u2019s award was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court awarded Wildman three-fourths of the $56,869.34 sought in its complaint despite the fact that the trial judge made an express finding that litigation was never authorized by Gay-lord and that any fees related solely to litigation would not be awarded. As unauthorized litigation-related activities accounted for approximately two-thirds of the billing entries, defendant argues that a proper award of fees could only include $14,282.50, at most.\nDefendant also maintains that the judgment entered in this case was against the manifest weight of the evidence because Wildman\u2019s billing statement collectively listed all tasks performed by individual attorneys on a given date. As the billing statement gives a daily total for time spent on all tasks as opposed to a calculation of time spent on each individual task, defendant contends that the trial court had no accurate method of discerning the amount of time spent on noncom-pensable, litigation-related activities. Defendant further argues that the trial court erred by entering a judgment for less than the full amount claimed without making a ruling on each separate billing entry.\nFinally, defendant argues that the judgment for attorney fees is against the manifest weight of the evidence because (1) the total 310.25 hours billed by Wildman reflects a duplication of effort by multiple attorneys; (2) the services performed by Wildman were of no benefit to Gaylord; and (3) Wildman did not meet its burden of establishing that the services performed by various attorneys were fair, just and reasonable. Defendant\u2019s arguments fail.\nAt trial, attorney Dixon testified that Gaylord orally entered into a contract for legal services with the Wildman firm. Dixon further testified that Gaylord agreed to be billed for legal services at Wild-man\u2019s customary hourly rates. Dixon informed Gaylord that hourly rates ranged from his rate of $248 per hour down to $70 per hour for paralegals and law clerks, depending on the skill or expertise of the individual. While stating that the best practice is to have a written attorney-client agreement, the trial judge accepted Dixon\u2019s testimony that it was not the practice of the Wildman firm to memorialize representation agreements. The trial judge\u2019s ruling indicates that he concluded, after hearing conflicting testimony, that Gaylord consented to representation by the Wildman firm. Therefore, despite Gaylord\u2019s testimony to the contrary, we find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial judge\u2019s determination that an express contract existed between Gaylord and Wildman.\nWhere an attorney and client enter into an express contract for representation, the terms of the express contract control the compensation due the attorney. Greenbaum, 88 Ill. App. 3d at 213; Slater, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 638. Unlike fee petitions and claims for quantum meruit fees, in which the trial court makes an independent valuation of reasonable attorney fees, where an express contract governs the compensation due an attorney, the hourly rate agreed to by the parties is the starting point of the court\u2019s analysis. \u201cClearly, when an express contract exists, a resort to quantum 'meruit principles is unnecessary because the attorney and client have already agreed on the value of the services.\u201d Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 310. Nevertheless, compensation due an attorney pursuant to an express contract must still satisfy certain professional standards. See Nottage v. Jeka, 172 Ill. 2d 386, 397 (1996). Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct requires that all fees for legal services be reasonable. 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a). Thus, no matter what procedural mechanism is used to recover attorney fees, the following factors should be considered in determining the reasonableness of the fees sought:\n\u201c(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;\n(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;\n(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;\n(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;\n(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;\n(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;\n(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and\n(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.5(a).\nWe next address whether there is \u201cany\u201d evidence in the record to support the trial judge\u2019s determination that $43,316 was the amount owed to Wildman pursuant to its contract for legal representation with Gaylord. Defendant argues that Wildman failed to meet its burden of establishing that the charges were reasonable. We disagree. Considering the factors outlined in Rule 1.5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, we find that the record is replete with evidence that the attorney fees awarded pursuant to the terms of the express contract were fair, just and reasonable.\nDixon testified that he had been an attorney in Illinois since 1957 and was a founding partner of the Wildman firm. Wildman is a general practice firm employing 180 attorneys. Dixon testified that the corporate issues that Gaylord hired the Wildman firm to resolve were \u201ctime sensitive,\u201d \u201cenormously complex\u201d and involved \u201cmillions of dollars.\u201d\nDixon further testified that Gaylord\u2019s estate planning issues were equally complex. Upon his death, Gaylord\u2019s interests in Ingersoll would yield an estate valued at approximately $40 million. Without proper planning, the tax liability on Gaylord\u2019s estate could have been up to $10 million. Dixon testified that the valuation of Gaylord\u2019s Ingersoll shares for estate tax purposes was directly affected by the resolution of the corporate actions that were soon to be undertaken by Gaylord\u2019s siblings.\nDixon conceded that Gaylord elected not to file the complaint prepared by Wildman that sought to enjoin the impending corporate action by the Robelm board of directors. Dixon also conceded that neither Gaylord nor his wife ever executed the wills drafted by Wildman. However, Dixon maintained that Gaylord received \u201cfirst rate\u201d legal representation on complex issues requiring a high degree of knowledge and skill. Gaylord also received the benefit of an expert evaluation of his legal position.\nDixon testified that all of the legal work performed by Wildman attorneys was necessary and reasonable. Dixon denied that Wildman\u2019s billing statement included any duplication of effort by multiple attorneys. Dixon stated that Wildman\u2019s fees were actually lower than the fees customarily charged by attorneys in Chicago at that time. Dixon further testified that Gaylord terminated his representation agreement with the Wildman firm sometime after October 31, 1991, when he received a billing statement indicating that his charges were $56,869.34 in attorney fees and $1,553.34 in costs for legal services rendered to date. Gaylord repeatedly refused to pay the amount owing Wildman under their contract for legal representation, which resulted in Wildman instituting the instant action. Dixon testified that Wild-man had never before sued a client to recover fees.\nBy agreement of the parties, the evidence deposition of Richard Thies was presented at trial in lieu of his appearance. Thies testified that he was a partner in the Wildman firm and had been associated with Wildman since 1988. Thies specialized in estate planning and closely held corporations since hi\u2019s graduation from law school. Thies billed Gaylord at an hourly rate of $215, which at the time was 10% to 15% less than the rates charged by other Chicago attorneys for similar services. Thies testified that the estate planning issues he handled on Gaylord\u2019s behalf were difficult and complicated. Theis\u2019 involvement in Gaylord\u2019s representation included: drafting wills for Gaylord and his wife; analyzing a 1967 trust agreement created by Gaylord\u2019s deceased father; and evaluating potential estate taxes in the event of Gaylord\u2019s death. Thies further testified that the Gaylords could have saved $500,000 if they had followed the recommendations made by Wildman regarding their estate plans.\nJohn McGovern testified that he was a partner in the Wildman firm at the time Gaylord was a client. McGovern had a high degree of skill in the areas of securities and corporate law. McGovern billed Gay-lord at a rate of $210 per hour, which was on \u201cthe low side\u201d compared to the rates charged by other Chicago area lawyers for similar services. McGovern testified that the 53 hours he billed on the Gaylord file were reasonable both in scope and the amount of time expended in light of the complex corporate issues presented.\nMcGovern testified that the legal matters Gaylord sought to resolve were multifaceted corporate law issues. McGovern characterized the actions that were going to be taking by the Robelm board of directors as a classic corporate \u201csqueeze-out.\u201d Gaylord\u2019s brothers owned enough shares in both Robelm and Ingersoll to give them a \u201cswing\u201d vote once those shares were combined into a voting trust. Such a \u201csqueeze-out\u201d would have been detrimental to Gaylord\u2019s interests as he faced losing voting control over Ingersoll for 30 years under this scenario. McGovern testified that the work he performed on Gaylord\u2019s behalf included: researching and reviewing the charters and bylaws of both Robelm, a New York corporation, and Ingersoll, a Delaware corporation; researching the relevant statutes and the large body of case law regarding corporate \u201csqueeze-outs\u201d; evaluating whether a remedy existed in equity based on the self-dealing nature of the transactions initiated by Gaylord\u2019s brothers; and evaluating the effect on Gaylord\u2019s legal interests in the event that the \u201csqueeze-out\u201d could not be avoided.\nMcGovern further testified that the Robelm board of directors met at the end of July 1991 and effected the anticipated changes to the corporate structure of Ingersoll. At this point, the focus of the Wild-man attorneys shifted from trying to prevent this transaction to evaluating Gaylord\u2019s options in light of his minority shareholder status. On September 17, 1991, Wildman attorneys met with Gaylord and his wife to review their legal options. Wildman proposed filing a lawsuit in equity to void the transactions conducted by the Robelm board of directors. Wildman also proposed an \u201cexit strategy\u201d whereby Gaylord and his immediate family could negotiate a sale of their In-gersoll stock at a fair price to either the corporation itself or Gaylord\u2019s siblings. Finally, McGovern testified that Gaylord did not take any actions on Wildman\u2019s recommendations and subsequently terminated his representation agreement with the Wildman firm.\nGaylord was the sole defense witness. Gaylord testified that in 1983 he retired from Ingersoll, a family-owned machine tool business started by Gaylord\u2019s grandfather in 1887. Gaylord began his employment at Ingersoll in 1939 and worked there for the majority of his adult life. Gaylord\u2019s educational background included: private grade school in Rockford, Illinois; high school diploma from Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire; a bachelor of arts degree in economics from Cornell University; and one year of postgraduate study in engineering at Purdue University.\nGaylord further testified that he was referred to Stewart Dixon in 1989 by a circuit court judge. Gaylord\u2019s primary legal concerns at that time were an update of his will and estate planning. Gaylord also informed Dixon that he was presently experiencing marital discord and asked Dixon for advice regarding a potential divorce. Gaylord testified that he had only one conversation with Dixon regarding attorney fees and costs, although he could not recall whether this discussion was at his initial meeting in 1989 or at a later meeting in July 1991. Dixon advised Gaylord that his hourly rate for legal services was $225. Dixon also explained to Gaylord that the cost of representation \u201cdepends on how much we do and how long it takes.\u201d Gaylord testified that Dixon further stated, \u201cI would estimate it would not run over $2,500.\u201d\nGaylord testified that his involvement with attorneys, prior to Wildman, included a lawsuit regarding a failed travel agency in which he was represented by three attorneys from Rockford, Illinois. Gaylord stated that the travel agency lawsuit was instituted in 1980 and was disposed of by the appellate court in 1990. Over the course of his 10-year representation by Rockford attorneys, Gaylord was billed at hourly rates ranging from $85 to $125 per hour. Gaylord testified that his total fees were $45,000 to one Rockford attorney and about $25,000 or $30,000 to another. Gaylord consulted with McDermott, Will & Emery attorneys regarding the travel agency matter but never retained their services.\nIn July 1991, Gaylord contacted Stewart Dixon to arrange a meeting to discuss Gaylord\u2019s will, which had not been updated since 1965. At his first meeting with Dixon in 1991, Gaylord recalled discussing the amount of his estate, the effect Robelm had on his estate, and his interest in a family trust agreement. In response to the trial judge\u2019s inquiry about his representation agreement with Wildman, Gaylord testified:\n\u201cI think I was very naive in not asking specifically how much each person was going to charge and how much he estimated the cost was going to run and to keep me abreast of it. I just sort of went along with it because I guess I went on faith. I wasn\u2019t very smart.\u201d\nGaylord acknowledged that he actively participated in Wildman\u2019s representation by attending several meetings and discussing alternate plans with Wildman attorneys. However, Gaylord maintained that his discussions with Wildman attorneys were limited to his estate plan and how his holdings would affect the form of his will.\nOn July 28, 1991, Gaylord attended his third meeting with Wild-man attorneys. Gaylord testified that at this meeting he realized Wild-man\u2019s representation was going beyond the scope of his initial intention, which was only to revise his will. Gaylord testified that he did not advise Wildman to terminate the representation at this point but that he knew he was in \u201cdeep trouble.\u201d Gaylord agreed with the trial judge\u2019s assessment that \u201cdeep trouble\u201d meant that he thought his legal bills were getting \u201cbigger than they ought to be.\u201d\nOn September, 17, 1991, Gaylord attended a final meeting with seven attorneys at the Wildman firm. Gaylord testified that, although he had been advised that litigation was an option, this meeting was the first time he became aware that Wildman had drafted a complaint. At the close of the meeting, Gaylord informed Wildman attorneys that he needed to think about whether he would file a lawsuit and discuss these issues alone with his wife. Later, Gaylord stated that this was actually a \u201cstalling tactic.\u201d When asked why he was using \u201cstalling tactics,\u201d Gaylord responded:\n\u201cBecause we had made up our mind we weren\u2019t going to go through with any legal action, and we were trying to figure out how we could worm our way out of this situation that had already gotten \u2014 the snowball had gotten so big; it had gotten out of hand.\u201d\nGaylord further testified that in October 1991, Dixon called him to find out how he wanted to proceed with his legal options. Gaylord told Dixon for the first time that he was \u201cnot going to go through with any legal action.\u201d Gaylord also informed Dixon that he thought the $58,000 bill for legal services he received from Wildman was \u201cgrossly overstated.\u201d Subsequently, Gaylord corresponded with Wildman\u2019s accounting department several times in order to get a reasonable explanation for the attorney fees charged to his account. Gaylord testified that he finally refused to pay the bill because he felt Wildman\u2019s assertion that \u201cthe bill was legitimate\u201d was an unsatisfactory explanation.\nAfter hearing the testimony of the witnesses and considering all the evidence presented, the trial judge found that Gaylord was both \u201ca brilliant man\u201d and \u201cof great wealth.\u201d The trial judge stated that it would have been \u201cpoor practice\u201d for the attorneys handling Gaylord\u2019s estate planning to have failed to consider the tax consequences implicated and that this case did not involve \u201ca simple drawing of a will.\u201d\nThe trial judge further determined that there was no meeting of the minds regarding the scope of Gaylord\u2019s representation as it related to the potential litigation. In ruling, the trial judge emphasized that Gaylord made it clear that he did not want to proceed with litigation under any circumstances. However, the trial judge also made a specific finding that Gaylord \u201cconsented to everything else\u201d that was handled and prepared by the Wildman firm. Accordingly, the trial judge struck only those portions of the attorney fees that he determined, based on his 35 years of practice, were solely related to litigation.\nThe trial judge acknowledged the difficulty in separating out the litigation-related fees in light of the fact that plaintiffs billing statement only gave aggregate totals for all tasks performed in a given day. However, in his ruling the trial judge stated that he erred on the side of defendant and did not award the attorney fees where he was unable to \u201cseparate out the detail.\u201d\nThe trial court\u2019s conclusions regarding the amount of time Wild-man expended on unauthorized litigation versus other legitimate tasks and the necessity and reasonableness of the legal services rendered are factual determinations. Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 308; Slater, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 642. As previously noted, it is the function of the trier of fact, be it judge or jury, to weigh contradictory evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, and draw ultimate conclusions as to the facts of a case. Sokol, 81 Ill. App. 2d at 64; Sullivan, 58 Ill. App. 2d at 44; Slater, 56 Ill. App. 3d at 643; Laff, 63 Ill. App. 3d at 306-10. The trial court\u2019s consideration of conflicting witness testimony and detailed review of Wildman\u2019s billing statement resulted in an award to plaintiffs of $43,316 in attorney fees and $529 in costs. We find that there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s award.\nV CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court of Cook County\u2019s judgment in favor of plaintiff Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon.\nAffirmed.\nMcNULTY, RJ., and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, J\u201e concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COHEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Terrance M. Heuel, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Arnold H. Landis, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILDMAN, HARROLD, ALLEN AND DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT GAYLORD, Defendant-Appellant (Virginia Gaylord, Defendant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-99-4301\nOpinion filed November 20, 2000.\nTerrance M. Heuel, of Chicago, for appellant.\nArnold H. Landis, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0590-01", "first_page_order": 610, "last_page_order": 627 }