{ "id": 1026041, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONNA BEACHEM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Beachem", "decision_date": "2000-11-08", "docket_number": "No. 1-99-0852", "first_page": "693", "last_page": "709", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 693" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "658 N.E.2d 445", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307263 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00a7 5" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 U.S. 12", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1105068 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript" }, { "parenthetical": "rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/351/0012-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167533 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at arraignment" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at arraignment" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at arraignment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/368/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 335", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765333 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at trial" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at trial" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 U.S. 353", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1765282 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel on appeal" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel on appeal" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/372/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 U.S. 368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6166505 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession" }, { "parenthetical": "rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession" }, { "parenthetical": "rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/378/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767501 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty" }, { "parenthetical": "rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty" }, { "parenthetical": "rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 5", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307343 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel" }, { "parenthetical": "rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0005-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 2", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11307292 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing" }, { "parenthetical": "rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0002-01" ] }, { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224783 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 N.E.2d 102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223616 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "418" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "713 N.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 840", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208048 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 51, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "2351" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "446" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "2358" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2363" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" }, { "page": "496-97" }, { "page": "458-59" }, { "page": "2366" }, { "page": "476-77" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355-56" }, { "page": "484" }, { "page": "451" }, { "page": "2359" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "473" }, { "page": "2379", "parenthetical": "Thomas, J., concurring" }, { "page": "494" }, { "page": "457" }, { "page": "2365" }, { "page": "476" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "2355" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "447-48" }, { "page": "2356" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "2366" }, { "page": "497" }, { "page": "459" }, { "page": "2366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 U.S. 323", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6170963 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States" }, { "parenthetical": "rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States" }, { "parenthetical": "rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/398/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531962 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6202354 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "892 F.2d 1541", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532284 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979), holding burden-shifting jury instructions were unconstitutional" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/892/1541-01" ] }, { "cite": "913 F.2d 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10535444 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for a trial court decision holding unconstitutional the statute under which the defendant was convicted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/913/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 367", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6217594 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4898 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "961 F.2d 448", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1863233 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/961/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 U.S. 508", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 634223 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/495/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "963 F.2d 342", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11298162 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "retroactive application for Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990), holding double jeopardy prohibits a subsequent prosecution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/963/0342-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 U.S. 400", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11319062 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/499/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 960", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991), holding a criminal defendant may raise a Batson issue even though the defendant and the excused juror do not share the same race" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477007 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991), holding a criminal defendant may raise a Batson issue even though the defendant and the excused juror do not share the same race" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11730774 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), holding the defendant can inquire into venirepersons' opinions in support of the death penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801351 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), holding the defendant can inquire into venirepersons' opinions in support of the death penalty" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12787 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "486 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6222614 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/486/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 407", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5098 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in a separate investigation" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in a separate investigation" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in a separate investigation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 484", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4970 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "905 P.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "508 U.S. 333", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11803 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 P.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 P.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 P.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/508/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 383", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 230324 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 U.S. 115", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1340327 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/514/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 152", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1730073 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 1079", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1480933 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/1079-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 518", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652446 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 154", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39205 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/0154-01" ] }, { "cite": "521 U.S. 151", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 915886 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility" }, { "parenthetical": "no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/521/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 L. Ed. 2d 837", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00a7 7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 461", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11925359 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478", "parenthetical": "addressing \"the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination in [a capital] sentencing proceeding\"" }, { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "addressing \"the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination in [a capital] sentencing proceeding\"" }, { "page": "903", "parenthetical": "addressing \"the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination in [a capital] sentencing proceeding\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 F.3d 8", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11243760 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/221/0008-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 F.3d 1281", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11239375 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/224/1281-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2255", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "West 1994 & Supp. 2000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 1102", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[although defendant neglected to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant's argument\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 535990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510", "parenthetical": "\"[although defendant neglected to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant's argument\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968) - the holding that a nontestifying codefendant's confession is inadmissible at a joint trial applies retroactively as required by \"fundamental fairness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2906071 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "213", "parenthetical": "adopting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968) - the holding that a nontestifying codefendant's confession is inadmissible at a joint trial applies retroactively as required by \"fundamental fairness\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "946 F.2d 982", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10525509 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "994" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/946/0982-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 6212322, 6930932 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding a nontestifying codefendant's interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial; applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0186-01", "/us/340/0147-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 U.S. 186", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6212322 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding a nontestifying codefendant's interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial; applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding" }, { "parenthetical": "holding a nontestifying codefendant's interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial; applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/481/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 1337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 649", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5296623 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0649-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 S. Ct. 2633", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "2640" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 L. Ed. 2d 231", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "472 U.S. 320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 358", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054393 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "1072" }, { "page": "361-62" }, { "page": "374" }, { "page": "1071" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 F. Supp. 2d 1059", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11240979 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064" }, { "page": "1064" }, { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/109/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6215013 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242" }, { "page": "2831" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "2827" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "2832" }, { "page": "244" }, { "page": "2832" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/497/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "401 U.S. 667", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11714690 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "692", "parenthetical": "Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "420", "parenthetical": "Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "1180", "parenthetical": "Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/401/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 674", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576736 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237" }, { "page": "236-37" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0218-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 288", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12032050 ], "weight": 18, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "1075" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "1076" }, { "page": "313" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "1077" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Generally, decisions which announce 'new rules' are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317119 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "\"Generally, decisions which announce 'new rules' are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132408 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Illinois' consecutive sentencing provision (730 ILCS 5/5 - 8-4(a) (West 1996)) violates Apprendi" }, { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "311" }, { "page": "1215", "parenthetical": "Stevens, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1628, "char_count": 37873, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.859281844096908e-07, "percentile": 0.932754380660803 }, "sha256": "7703a8877914cfaa7c7fb82f49c779b795c9f861619ad05f804b8099478c6b2d", "simhash": "1:78f11b2ecb1cd38f", "word_count": 6280 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:16:30.528913+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONNA BEACHEM, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), the United States Supreme Court issued a decision that penetrates the constitutional foundation of this state\u2019s extended-sentencing procedures. In this appeal from a summary dismissal of her postconviction petition, Dionna Beachem (Beachem) challenges the constitutionality of the extended sentence of 90 years she received for first degree murder. The most serious question before us is whether Apprendi reaches beyond a direct appeal to an appeal of the dismissal of a timely filed postconviction petition. We hold that it does.\nFACTS\nOn December 5, 1994, Annie Jones (Jones), a 77-year-old woman living alone on Chicago\u2019s south side, was fatally beaten in her apartment. That day, Beachem was arrested and subsequently released on bond for attempting to use Jones\u2019 newly issued credit card at a suburban mall jewelry store. Two days later, Jones\u2019 landlord discovered her body.\nBeachem was charged with and convicted of residential burglary, home invasion, robbery, and first degree murder. Though the trial court found her eligible for the death penalty, Beachem was sentenced to an extended term of 90 years of imprisonment for the murder conviction, 30 years for the home invasion conviction, 15 years for the residential burglary conviction, and 6 years for the robbery conviction, all sentences running concurrently.\nBeachem appealed her convictions and sentences. We affirmed. People v. Beachem, No. 1 \u2014 96\u20143260 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nBeachem then filed a pro se postconviction petition. In a 23-page \u201cMEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER,\u201d the trial court dismissed Beachem\u2019s petition. This appeal followed.\nDECISION\nBeachem raises two issues in her initial brief.\nFirst, Beachem contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the allegation in her postconviction petition that her trial attorney failed to advise her of a plea-bargain offer. Beachem\u2019s petition said: \u201cAfter my sentencing, 8-26-96 my attorney told my aunt *** and my mother *** that the state offered me 20 years and I turned it down. This offer was never brought to my attention. If the state told me that they were offering me 20 years, it was my attorney\u2019s job to discuss that issue with me.\u201d\nThe trial judge found Beachem failed to provide the gist of a constitutional claim, which is all that is required at the first stage of a postconviction proceeding. See People v. Frieberg, 305 Ill. App. 3d 840, 847, 713 N.E.2d 210 (1999). The petition should be dismissed if it is frivolous and patently without merit. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d 102 (1996).\nHere, Beachem\u2019s petition alleged her attorney should have discussed any offer made by the prosecution directly to her. Assuming Beachem is contending her attorney failed to advise her, this allegation lacks any record support. Beachem relies on a sworn February 5, 1999, handwritten statement from her mother. But this statement was addressed \u201cTo the Appellate Court\u201d nearly a month after the trial court dismissed Beachem\u2019s petition. The trial judge did not have it.\nIn exercising our de novo review (People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 322, 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000)), we agree with the trial court: Beachem\u2019s plea-bargain offer allegation was \u201cfrivolous or *** patently without merit.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 1996). It was pure unsupported conclusion.\nSecond, Beachem contends the trial court erred in summarily dismissing her allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. Because Beachem\u2019s petition contained no such allegations, this claim is waived. 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 3 (West 1996).\nIn a supplemental brief, Beachem raises another, more substantial issue never addressed in the trial court. Beachem contends her extended-term sentence was unconstitutional.\nIn Beachem\u2019s first appeal, we held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 90-year extended-term sentence. The court found two statutory aggravating factors, \u201cthat the crime was exceptionally brutal and heinous, indicative of wanton cruelty, and based on the fact that the victim was over 60 years of age.\u201d These findings triggered the extended-term sentence provision of the Unified Code of Corrections. See 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20142(a)(1) (West 1996).\nAfter Beachem\u2019s direct appeal, and after the denial of her postcon-viction petition, the United States Supreme Court decided Apprendi.\nJustice Stevens\u2019 opinion for a 5 to 4 majority of the Court framed the issue:\n\u201cThe question presented is whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison sentence for an offense *** be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 442, 120 S. Ct. at 2351.\nThe Court then said:\n\u201cOur answer to that question was foreshadowed by our opinion in Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227[, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 119 S. Ct. 1215] (1999), construing a federal statute. We there noted that \u2018under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 [Citation.] The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a state statute.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 446, 120 S. Ct. at 2355.\nNoting the constitutional founders would have recognized no distinction between an element of a felony offense and a so-called \u201csentencing factor,\u201d the Court offered an historical overview of the principle that a criminal defendant is entitled to a jury determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on every element of the charged offense. The Court assured, however, \u201cnothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges to exercise discretion \u2014 taking into consideration various factors relating both to offense and offender \u2014 in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 449, 120 S. Ct. at 2358.\nThe Court did not provide legislatures any leeway. The fact that the New Jersey legislature intended racial hatred to be an enhanced-sentencing provision, not part of the crime of possessing weapons, was of no significance:\n\u201c \u2018It is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2363, quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 252-53, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 311, 119 S. Ct. at 1215 (Stevens, J., concurring).\nThe Court said it again: \u201cOther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63.\nApprendi calls into question parts of Illinois\u2019 sentencing scheme (see People v. Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d 707 (2000) (Illinois\u2019 consecutive sentencing provision (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20144(a) (West 1996)) violates Apprendi)), including the extended-term provision used by the trial court here. But before proceeding to the merits of Beachem\u2019s Apprendi claim, we must answer a threshold question: Does Apprendi apply to cases on collateral review? We limit our consideration of this question to timely, first postconviction petitions. We make no comment on untimely or successive postconviction petitions.\nTo determine whether Apprendi reaches back to a timely post-conviction petition, we have to weigh the public\u2019s interest in the finality of criminal judgments against its interest in the fairness and integrity of criminal trials. This balance usually tips toward nonretroactivity. See People v. Moore, 177 Ill. 2d 421, 430, 686 N.E.2d 587 (1997) (\u201cGenerally, decisions which announce \u2018new rules\u2019 are not to be applied retroactively to cases pending on collateral review\u201d).\nBut a plurality decision by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334,109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d 218, 237, 561 N.E.2d 674 (1990), established two exceptions to this general principle.\nFirst, \u201ca new rule should be applied retroactively if it places \u2018certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.\u2019 \u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 109 S. Ct. at 1075, quoting Makey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692, 28 L. Ed. 2d 404, 420, 91 S. Ct. 1160, 1180 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because Apprendi did not address primary, private behavior, this first exception does not apply.\nSecond, \u201ca new rule should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of \u2018those procedures that... are \u201cimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty\u201d \u2019 [citation].\u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 356, 109 S. Ct. at 1076.\nHow broad would this second exception be? The Court:\n\u201c[W]e believe *** concerns about the difficulty in identifying both the existence and the value of accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the second exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.\nBecause we operate from the premise that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic due process have yet to emerge.\u201d Teague, 489 U.S. at 313, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358, 109 S. Ct. at 1077.\nIn a subsequent case the Court explained:\n\u201cIt is *** not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this [second] exception must not only improve accuracy, but also \u2018 \u201calter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements\u201d * essential to the fairness of a proceeding [citation].\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242, Ill L. Ed. 2d 193, 211, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990).\nMuch depends on how we describe the holding in Apprendi. If we were to say Apprendi reaches only a portion of a noncapital sentence, not its underlying conviction, it would be difficult, but not impossible, to make a case for the existence of procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, per Teague and Flowers. But analysis by label or category \u2014 sentence or conviction \u2014 is not a principled methodology. The question is how far a certain procedure reaches into the constitutional fabric of a fundamentally fair trial and conviction. Does it reach \u201cbedrock\u201d?\nOne federal trial court has answered this question. In United States v. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (D. Minn. 2000), the court insisted Apprendi \u201ccompels a radical shift in criminal procedure\u201d because it requires a jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, on facts previously found by a judge under a lesser standard of proof. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1064, citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496-97, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 458-59, 120 S. Ct. at 2366. The court also noted the vital role the reasonable doubt standard plays in reducing the risk of erroneous convictions. Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1064, citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072 (1970). The court concluded:\n\u201cThere can be little doubt that the sweeping new requirement announced by the Court in Apprendi is so grounded in fundamental fairness that it may be considered of watershed importance. Accordingly, the court concludes that the Apprendi decision falls under the second exception to the Teague nonretroactivity principle ***.\u201d Murphy, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 1064.\nThe rights affirmed in Apprendi are at the core of our criminal justice system. Justice Stevens\u2019 majority opinion:\n\u201cAt stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without \u2018due process of law,\u2019 Arndt. 14, and the guarantee that \u2018[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury\u2019 Arndt. 6. Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a criminal defendant to \u2018a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d Ap-prendi, 530 U.S. at 476-77, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355-56.\nThe right to a jury trial, and particularly its companion right to a jury verdict proved beyond a reasonable doubt, stand, inviolable, for what the Apprendi Court termed \u201ccogent reasons\u201d related to accuracy:\n\u201cProsecution subjects the criminal defendant both to \u2018the possibility that he may lose his liberty upon conviction and ... the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction.\u2019 [Citation.] We thus require this [reasonable doubt standard], among other, procedural protections in order to \u2018provid[e] concrete substance for the presumption of innocence,\u2019 and to reduce the risk of imposing such-deprivations erroneously. [Citation.] If a defendant faces punishment beyond that provided by statute when an offense is committed under certain circumstances but not others, it is obvious that both the loss of liberty and the stigma attaching to the offense are heightened; it necessarily follows that the defendant should not \u2014 at the moment the State is put to proof of those circumstances \u2014 be deprived of protections that have, until that point, unquestionably attached.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 451, 120 S. Ct. at 2359.\nThe argument for extending Apprendi to collateral proceedings relies on the conclusion that the operative fact \u2014 the fact that leads to an enhanced sentence \u2014 becomes an element of the offense. The Supreme Court warned against a restrictive use of labels when analyzing the two factors at issue in Apprendi\u2019s sentencing \u2014 unlawful possession of a weapon and selection of victims to intimidate them because of their race: \u201cMerely using the label \u2018sentence enhancement\u2019 to describe the latter [selecting victims according to race as a factor to exceed the maximum sentence] surely does not provide a principled basis for treating them differently.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355.\nIn a footnote, the Court observed an increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence \u201cis the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury\u2019s guilty verdict. Indeed, it fits squarely within the usual definition of an \u2018element\u2019 of the offense.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457 n.19, 120 S. Ct. at 2365 n.19; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 521, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 473, 120 S. Ct. at 2379 (Thomas, J., concurring) (\u201cIf a fact is by law the basis for imposing or increasing punishment \u2014 for establishing or increasing the prosecution\u2019s entitlement \u2014 it is an element [of the crime]\u201d). But the Court again cautioned against placing form over substance: \u201cDespite what appears to us the clear \u2018elemental\u2019 nature of the factor here, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect \u2014 does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury\u2019s guilty verdict?\u201d (Emphasis added.) Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457, 120 S. Ct. at 2365.\nWe take Apprendi to mean that once the defendant serves the prescribed maximum sentence, he or she remains in prison on a charge never made and never proved. And if we acknowledge the defendant remains in prison on a charge never made or proved, we have impugned the integrity of our criminal justice system. It is as if the sentencing judge actually said to the defendant: \u201cI have convicted you of a charge never made against you and never heard by the jury, and I have done it based on the preponderance of the evidence.\u201d Such a conviction, and its concomitant sentence, are repugnant to our notions of fundamental fairness.\nSince Teague, no United States Supreme Court or Illinois Supreme Court case has found a new rule qualifies for retroactivity under the second Teague exception. But these decisions either do not involve fundamental rights or do not directly implicate accuracy. They are not \u201cbedrock\u201d pronouncements.\nFor example, in Sawyer, the Court held Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231,105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985), which prohibited a capital sentence if the prosecution misled the jury to believe the ultimate sentencing decision rested elsewhere, did not apply retroactively. The Court recognized the false information outlawed in Caldwell \u201cmight produce \u2018substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences\u2019 \u201d (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 233, Ill L. Ed. 2d at 205, 110 S. Ct. at 2827, quoting Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330, 86 L. Ed. 2d at 240, 105 S. Ct. at 2640), but the Court felt Caldwell provided merely \u201can additional measure *** against error\u201d beyond that afforded by another case (Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 244, Ill L. Ed. 2d at 212, 110 S. Ct. at 2832). That is:\n\u201cThe Caldwell rule was designed as an enhancement of the accuracy of capital sentencing, a protection of systemic value for state and federal courts charged with reviewing capital proceedings. But given that it was added to an existing guarantee of due process protection against fundamental unfairness, we cannot say this systemic rule enhancing reliability is an \u2018absolute prerequisite to fundamental fairness\u2019 [citation], of the type that may come within Teague\u2019s second exception.\u201d Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 244, Ill L. Ed. 2d at 212-13, 110 S. Ct. at 2832.\nApprendi not only safeguards fundamental fairness; its reasonable doubt standard provides the only measure of accuracy in extended sentencing. Where a new rule secures both \u201cthe accuracy of the truth-finding function\u201d and \u201cthe fairness and the constitutional integrity of a criminal proceeding,\u201d courts have held it applies retroactively. People v. Kubik, 214 Ill. App. 3d 649, 657, 573 N.E.2d 1337 (1991), citing Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 95 L. Ed. 2d 162, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987) (holding a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s interlocking confession inadmissible at a joint trial; applied retroactively to a postconviction proceeding); accord Graham v. Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 994 (2d Cir. 1991); see also People v. Ikerd, 47 Ill. 2d 211, 213, 265 N.E.2d 120 (1970) (adopting Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1100, 88 S. Ct. 1921 (1968) \u2014 the holding that a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession is inadmissible at a joint trial applies retroactively as required by \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d).\nSeveral federal circuit court cases have considered the retroactivity of Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583, 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182, 113 S. Ct. 2078 (1993), and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 112 L. Ed. 2d 339, Ill S. Ct. 328 (1990), which held jury instructions diluting the reasonable doubt standard were unconstitutional. These cases held Cage and its progeny fall within Teague\u2019s, second exception because \u201c[t]he reasonable doubt standard guards against conviction of the innocent by ensuring the systemic accuracy of the criminal system\u201d and \u201cuse of a lower standard of proof frustrates the jury-trial guarantee.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 1994) (Cage applied retroactively); accord Gaines v. Kelley, 202 F.3d 598 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cage applied retroactively); Humphrey v. Cain, 138 F.3d 552 (5th Cir. 1998) (era banc), aff\u2019g 120 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1997) (Victor/Cage applied retroactively); Harmon v. Marshall, 69 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1995) (Sullivan applied retroactively); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 1994) (Sullivan applied retroactively); see also Nevius v. Sumner, 105 F.3d 453, 462 (9th Cir. 1996) (prima facie showing the Supreme Court made Cage retroactive to habeas corpus cases); cf. Ivan V. v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 32 L. Ed. 2d 659, 92 S. Ct. 1951 (1972) (Winship, holding the reasonable doubt standard governs juvenile delinquency proceedings, applied retroactively).\nFlowers can be distinguished. In Flowers, the Illinois Supreme Court held People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184, 526 N.E.2d 141 (1988), did not apply to cases on collateral review. The Reddick court had found unconstitutional jury instructions which erroneously stated the burden of proof for voluntary manslaughter mitigating mental states. The Flowers court recognized Reddick involved a \u201cgrave\u201d jury instruction error \u201cof constitutional dimension\u201d (Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 236-37), but declined to place a Reddick error within Teague\u2019s second exception: \u201cThis exception must be narrowly construed and we do not believe that the Reddick rule established such a component of basic due process so as to fall within it.\u201d Flowers, 138 Ill. 2d at 242.\nReddick discussed the constitutional obligation of the jury to follow the trial judge\u2019s instructions (see People v. Jenkins, 69 Ill. 2d 61, 66-67, 370 N.E.2d 532 (1977)), but, unlike Victor, Cage, Sullivan, or now Apprendi, it did not implicate the right to a jury verdict beyond a reasonable doubt and, consequently, the fundamental fairness and accuracy concerns inherent in the second Teague exception.\nApprendi tells us we deal with \u201cconstitutional protections of surpassing importance.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447, 120 S. Ct. at 2355. The reasonable doubt standard \u201creflect[s] a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 447-48, 120 S. Ct. at 2356, quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-62, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 374, 90 S. Ct. at 1071. Our jury tradition is \u201can indispensable part of our criminal justice system.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 459, 120 S. Ct. at 2366. How, then, could we say we do not deal with procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty? Have we not reached \u201cbedrock\u201d?\nWe view the gravity of an Apprendi violation within the narrow window of retroactivity established by the courts. Finding retroactivity never should be lightly done. Can we say the likelihood of an accurate conviction in this case is seriously diminished? If we conclude there is a certainty of inaccurate conviction since Beachem was convicted of a crime never charged or proved, it follows that Beachem\u2019s imprisonment beyond the maximum sentence violates established principles of fundamental fairness.\nWe understand the implications of extending Apprendi to collateral review. But we do what we believe the law requires. Our constitutional history teaches us we best survive when we hew to the line drawn by the rule of law. Because, under Teague, we conclude Apprendi implicates procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, we find Apprendi applies to a timely filed postconviction petition.\nBecause Apprendi applies, we turn to the merits of Beachem\u2019s claim that her sentence is unconstitutional.\nThe State initially contends Beachem waived this issue when she failed to include it in her postconviction petition. But Apprendi was decided nearly 18 months after the trial court denied her petition. Beachem instead raised Apprendi in a supplemental brief before this court shortly after it was decided. Beachem did not forfeit her right to review of her extended sentence in light of Apprendi. People v. Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 578 (2000); Clifton, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 725; see People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d 500, 510, 722 N.E.2d 1102 (1999) (\u201c[although defendant neglected to raise this issue before the circuit court, the constitutional dimension of the question permits this court to address defendant\u2019s argument\u201d).\nThe State also contends Apprendi does not apply here because Beachem\u2019s 90-year sentence did not exceed the maximum penalties for first degree murder \u2014 death or life imprisonment. See 720 ILCS 5/9\u2014 1(b) (West 1996); 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b), (a)(1)(c) (West 1996).\nThis argument misreads the statutory scheme.\nSection 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:\n\u201c(a) Except as otherwise provided in the statute defining the offense, a sentence of imprisonment for a felony shall be a determinate sentence set by the court under this Section, according to the following limitations:\n(1) for first degree murder,\n(a) a term shall be not less that 20 years and not more than 60 years!.]\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) (West 1996).\nUnder section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) of the sentencing code, Beachem could receive natural life imprisonment if \u201cthe court finds that the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty or, except as set forth in subsection (a)(1)(c) of this Section, that any of the aggravating factors listed in [the death penalty statute] are present.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(b) (West 1996).\nFurther, Beachem could receive the death penalty only upon a unanimous jury finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, of at least one statutory aggravating factor. 720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(b), (f), (g) (West 1996). And Beachem could receive life imprisonment under section 5 \u2014 8\u2014 1(a)(1)(c) only in cases where the death penalty is not imposed, and only if she was a previously convicted murderer or if she was found guilty of murdering certain individuals, such as police officers or firefighters. 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 8\u2014l(a)(l)(c)(i) through (a)(l)(c)(vi) (West 1996). Jury trial and reasonable doubt protections are preserved in these death penalty sections.\nBut Beachem was not sentenced under section 5 \u2014 8\u20141. She was sentenced under section 5 \u2014 8\u20142, \u201cExtended Term,\u201d which provides:\n\u201c(a) A judge shall not sentence an offender to a term of imprisonment in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by Section 5 \u2014 8\u20141 for the class of the most serious offense of which the offender was convicted unless the factors in aggravation set forth in paragraph (b) of Section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2 were found to be present. Where the judge finds that such factors were present, he may sentence an offender to the following:\n(1) for first degree murder, a term shall be not less than 60 years and not more than 100 years!.]\u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5\u2014 8 \u2014 2(a)(1) (West 1996).\nSection 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b) provides:\n\u201cThe following factors may be considered by the court as reasons to impose an extended term sentence under Section 5 \u2014 8\u20142 upon any offender:\n(2) When a defendant is convicted of any felony and the court finds that the offense was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or\n(4) When a defendant is convicted of any felony committed against:\n(ii) a person 60 years of age or older at the time of the offense!].] \u201d (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b) (West 1996).\nUnder section 5 \u2014 8\u20142(a), the trial court cannot exceed the section 5 \u2014 8\u20141(a)(1)(a) 20- to 60-year range and impose an extended term without finding a section 5 \u2014 5\u20143.2(b) aggravating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. We view 60 years as the prescribed maximum sentence for first degree murder in this state.\nHere, the trial court found the murder was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior, as well as being committed against a victim at least 60 years old. We now must determine whether these findings violated Apprendi.\nThe facts on which the trial court relied to increase Beachem\u2019s murder sentence \u2014 \u201cbrutal or heinous behavior\u201d and a victim at least 60 years of age \u2014 were never charged in the first degree murder counts. Beachem\u2019s robbery count, however, did charge Beachem took personal property \u201cFROM THE PERSON OF ANNIE JONES A PERSON SIXTY YEARS OF AGE OR OVER.\u201d\nThe extended-term facts were not submitted to the jury in the court\u2019s first degree murder issues instruction. But the court\u2019s robbery issues instruction did say the prosecution must prove \u201c[t]hat the person from whom the defendant took property was 60 years of age or over.\u201d\nNone of the extended-term facts appeared on the jury\u2019s first degree murder or robbery verdict forms.\nThe robbery count and the robbery issues instruction concerning the victim\u2019s age might support an extended-term sentence for first degree murder, an issue we do not now decide. But the trial court\u2019s \u201cexceptionally brutal and heinous\u201d finding clearly offends Apprendi. If Beachem\u2019s extended sentence rested on that ground, it could not stand.\nIn Apprendi, the Court did not say the New Jersey statute was void on its face. The Court referred to an unconstitutional \u201cprocedure.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 459, 120 S. Ct. at 2366. We take that to mean the statute was unconstitutionally applied to Apprendi. That is the course we take in this case.\nCONCLUSION\nBecause the postconviction hearing judge did not have the opportunity to consider the impact of Apprendi in the sentencing court, we believe the best course is to remand this cause to the trial court for consideration of Beachem\u2019s sentence in light of the views we express in this opinion. We affirm the trial judge\u2019s summary dismissal of the other issues raised by Beachem in her postconviction petition.\nAffirmed in part; vacated and remanded in part.\nHALL, EJ., and BURKE, J., concur.\nSeveral federal circuit courts have addressed the related question whether Apprendi applies to a second collateral review petition under 28 U.S.C.A. \u00a7 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000). These courts have replied with a uniform no. See Rodgers v. United States, No. 00 \u2014 2916 (8th Cir. October 16, 2000); Talbot v. Indiana, Nos. 00 \u2014 3080, 00 \u2014 3085 cons. (7th Cir. September 7, 2000); In re Joshua, 224 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2000); Hernandez v. United States, No. 00 \u2014 3048 (7th Cir. August 18, 2000); Sustache-Rivera v. United States, 221 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2000).\nBecause \u201ca criminal judgment necessarily includes the sentence imposed upon the defendant\u201d (Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 358 n.2, 109 S. Ct. at 1077 n.2), Teague\u2019s accuracy concerns may be implicated by sentencing procedures, as well as by trial procedures. See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260, 277, 113 S. Ct. 892, 903 (1993) (addressing \u201cthe likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination in [a capital] sentencing proceeding\u201d); see generally G. Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court\u2019s views as to retroactive effect of its own decisions announcing new rules as to sentencing in criminal cases, 122 L. Ed. 2d 837, \u00a7 7 (1997).\nThe Seventh Circuit has observed:\n\u201cPrisoners seem to think that Apprendi reopens every sentencing issue decided by a federal court in the last generation. It does not. All Apprendi holds is that most circumstances increasing a statutory maximum sentence must be treated as elements of the offense \u2014 and, if the defendant has demanded a jury trial, this means that they must be established beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury\u2019s satisfaction.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Talbot, slip op. at 3.\nSee O\u2019Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 138 L. Ed. 2d 351, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997) (no retroactive application for Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), holding a capital defendant can inform the jury about parole ineligibility); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 137 L. Ed. 2d 771, 117 S. Ct. 1517 (1997) (no retroactive application for Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 120 L. Ed. 2d 854, 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992), holding neither the jury nor the judge can weigh invalid aggravating circumstances in capital sentencing); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 135 L. Ed. 2d 457, 116 S. Ct. 2074 (1996) (no retroactive application for a proposed new rule regarding notice of evidence); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115, 131 L. Ed. 2d 152, 115 S. Ct. 1275 (1995) (per curiam) (no retroactive application for a federal circuit court rule regarding the dismissal of recaptured fugitive appeals); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 127 L. Ed. 2d 236, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994) (no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding double jeopardy in capital sentencing); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 124 L. Ed. 2d 306, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993) (no retroactive application for Falconer v. Lane, 905 P.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), holding the trial court must give a jury instruction on mitigating mental states); Graham, 506 U.S. 461, 122 L. Ed. 2d 260, 113 S. Ct. 892 (no retroactive application for Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 108 L. Ed. 2d 415, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (no retroactive application for U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding mitigating evidence during sentencing); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 108 L. Ed. 2d 347, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990) (no retroactive application for Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 704, 108 S. Ct. 2093 (1988), holding the fifth amendment bars police-instigated interrogation following a suspect\u2019s request for counsel in a separate investigation); Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 103 L. Ed. 2d 334, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (no retroactive application for Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986), holding the State may not exercise race-based peremptory challenges); People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 688 N.E.2d 658 (1997) (no retroactive application for Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992), holding the defendant can inquire into venirepersons\u2019 opinions in support of the death penalty); People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356, 647 N.E.2d 960 (1995) (no retroactive application for Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, Ill S. Ct. 1364 (1991), holding a criminal defendant may raise a Batson issue even though the defendant and the excused juror do not share the same race).\nOther post-Teague federal circuit court cases have held new rules apply retroactively under the second exception. See Johnson v. Howard, 963 F.2d 342 (11th Cir. 1992) (retroactive application for Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 109 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990), holding double jeopardy prohibits a subsequent prosecution); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1992) (retroactive application for McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990), and Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384, 108 S. Ct. 1860 (1988), holding a jury instruction requiring unanimity in finding mitigating evidence was unconstitutional); Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1990) (retroactive application for a trial court decision holding unconstitutional the statute under which the defendant was convicted); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (retroactive application for Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344, 105 S. Ct. 1965 (1985), and Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed. 2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979), holding burden-shifting jury instructions were unconstitutional).\nAdditionally, several pre-Teague, United States Supreme Court cases held new rules were retroactively applicable. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 26 L. Ed 2d 300, 90 S. Ct. 1757 (1970) (rule applying the double jeopardy prohibition to the States); McConnell v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2, 21 L. Ed. 2d 2, 89 S. Ct. 32 (1968) (rule requiring counsel at a probation revocation hearing); Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5, 21 L. Ed. 2d 5, 89 S. Ct. 35 (1968) (rule barring evidence of a guilty plea from a preliminary hearing without counsel); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968) (rule precluding dismissal of jurors who generally object to the death penalty); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 12 L. Ed. 2d 908, 84 S. Ct. 1774 (1964) (rule outlining judicial procedures for determining the voluntariness of a confession); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 9 L. Ed. 2d 811, 83 S. Ct. 814 (1963) (rule requiring counsel on appeal); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963) (rule requiring counsel at trial); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 7 L. Ed. 2d 114, 82 S. Ct. 157 (1961) (rule requiring counsel at arraignment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 100 L. Ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956) (rule providing an indigent defendant with a free transcript). See generally G. Chamberlin, Annotation, United States Supreme Court\u2019s Views as to Retroactive Effect of Its Own Decisions Announcing New Rules, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1219, \u00a7 5[d] (1980).\nBeachem attempts to shortcut this question, contending a sentence that does not conform to a statutory requirement is void. See People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107,113, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995). We find Ama does not apply. Beachem\u2019s sentence conformed to all statutory requirements. We must decide whether her sentence conformed to Apprendi\u2019s constitutional requirements.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Michael H. Orenstein, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine Cook, Alan J. Spellberg, William D. Carroll, and Michele Grimaldi Stein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DIONNA BEACHEM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1-99-0852\nOpinion filed November 8, 2000.\nModified opinion filed on denial of rehearing December 6, 2000.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Michael H. Orenstein, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Christine Cook, Alan J. Spellberg, William D. Carroll, and Michele Grimaldi Stein, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0693-01", "first_page_order": 713, "last_page_order": 729 }