{ "id": 279677, "name": "LEROY WALICZEK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Waliczek v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago", "decision_date": "2000-11-09", "docket_number": "No. 1-99-4128", "first_page": "32", "last_page": "37", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 32" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 67", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2871427 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70" }, { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3111336 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3127156 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" }, { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0143-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179946 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35382 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1065" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/1055-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352922 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "825" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 295827 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/175/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 909", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456135 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "912" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0909-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 515, "char_count": 11619, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4382363599689902e-07, "percentile": 0.6526222185154424 }, "sha256": "a827c7d6820d56406b76f269f029089ad0cf5e8eafe6ec5feefcaf03ae3e4f34", "simhash": "1:3c0fb38e18e68def", "word_count": 1877 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:02:38.722215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LEROY WALICZEK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ZWICK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiffs Leroy and Dolores Waliczek appeal from an order of the circuit court on administrative review which upheld the determination of the Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (Board) that section 6 \u2014 142(f) of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 142(f) (West 1998)) will prevent Dolores, as Leroy\u2019s current spouse, from receiving a widow\u2019s annuity pursuant to section 6 \u2014 141.1(c) of the Code (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 141.1(c) (West 1998)) if Leroy should predecease her. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that section 6 \u2014 141.1(c), enacted subsequent to section 6 \u2014 142(f), is controlling, and in the event that Leroy should predecease Dolores, Dolores would be entitled to receive a widow\u2019s annuity pursuant to section 6 \u2014 141.1(c).\nLeroy Waliczek had been employed as a fireman by the Chicago fire department (CFD) for almost 30 years when in 1981 he went on medical leave following lung surgery. In 1982 the Board awarded Leroy an occupational disease disability benefit. While Leroy was receiving disability benefits, he married Dolores. In 1988, Leroy resigned from the CFD and, as a result, he became eligible for and received a monthly age and service retirement annuity, which replaced his disability benefits. At the same time, the Board also refunded several thousand dollars that Leroy had contributed in spousal contributions \u201con account of no spouse,\u201d despite Leroy\u2019s contention that he notified the Board of his marriage to Dolores.\nIn 1998, Leroy asked the Board for a determination regarding whether Dolores would be eligible to receive a widow\u2019s annuity pursuant to section 6 \u2014 141.1(c) of the Code. Section 6 \u2014 141.1 in pertinent part provides:\n\u201cNotwithstanding the other provisions of this Article, the widow of a fireman who dies on or after June 30, 1984, while receiving a retirement annuity or while an active fireman with at least IV2 years of creditable service, may elect to have the amount of widow\u2019s annuity calculated in accordance with this Section.\n(c) If the deceased fireman was receiving a retirement annuity at the time of his death, the widow\u2019s annuity shall be equal to 50% of the amount of such retirement annuity at the time of the fireman\u2019s death.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 141.1 (West 1998).\nThe Board informed plaintiffs that Dolores would not be entitled to receive any benefits if Leroy should predecease her based on section 6 \u2014 142(f) of the Code. Section 6 \u2014 142 in pertinent part provides;\n\u201cThe following wives or widows have no right to annuity from the fund:\n* * *\n(f) A wife or widow who married the fireman while he was in receipt of disability benefit or disability pension from this fund, unless he returned to the service subsequent to the marriage and remained therein for a period or periods aggregating one year, or died while in service.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 142 (West 1998).\nPlaintiffs subsequently requested a hearing before the Board.\nAt the hearing, plaintiffs did not dispute that Dolores and Leroy were married while Leroy was receiving disability benefits. They also did not dispute that if Leroy had predeceased Dolores while he was still receiving disability benefits, section 6 \u2014 142(f) would have prevented Dolores from receiving a widow\u2019s annuity. However, plaintiffs contended that because Leroy no longer received disability benefits, but received an age and service annuity, Dolores was entitled to receive a widow\u2019s annuity in accordance with section 6 \u2014 141.1(c).\nAfter the hearing, the Board determined that section 6 \u2014 142(f) prevented Dolores from receiving a widow\u2019s annuity if Leroy predeceased her.\nLeroy filed a complaint for administrative review contending that the Board\u2019s decision was clearly erroneous and against the manifest weight of the evidence because section 6 \u2014 141.1(c) entitled Dolores to receive a widow\u2019s annuity if Leroy predeceased her. The circuit court affirmed the Board\u2019s decision and held that Dolores was not entitled to receive a widow\u2019s annuity because she was barred by section 6 \u2014 142(f).\nPlaintiffs now appeal contending that section 6 \u2014 141.1, enacted subsequent to section 6 \u2014 142, is controlling and would entitle Dolores to receive a widow\u2019s annuity in accordance with section 6 \u2014 141.1(c). Plaintiffs further contend that the language in section 6 \u2014 141.1, which begins \u201cNotwithstanding the other provisions of this Article\u201d (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 141.1(a) (West 1998)), evidences the legislature\u2019s intent that this section is controlling over the other sections in Article 6, namely section 6 \u2014 142(f).\nOn review, the findings of fact of an administrative agency are prima facie true and correct and will not be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Chicago Transit Authority v. Doherty, 291 Ill. App. 3d 909, 912 (1997). However, an issue of statutory construction raises a question of law subject to de novo review. Lucas v. Lakin, 175 Ill. 2d 166, 171 (1997). An agency\u2019s interpretation of statutory language and application of undisputed facts to that language are generally given deference, because of the experience and expertise gained through enforcement of the statute involved. National School Bus Service, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 302 Ill. App. 3d 820, 825 (1998). Finally, we review the administrative decision rather than the circuit court\u2019s decision. Calabrese v. Chicago Park District, 294 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 1065 (1998).\nThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the legislature. Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 341 (1987). Courts should look first to the language of the statute itself as the best indication of the intent of the drafters. County of DuPage v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151 (1985). The words of the statute are to be given their ordinary and popularly understood meaning. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 215 (1983). When the language chosen by the legislature is clear and unambiguous, the statute must be enforced as enacted and the court will not resort to outside sources to construe its meaning. County of Du Page, 109 Ill. 2d at 151.\nPlaintiffs\u2019 argument relies significantly on Toner v. Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 259 Ill. App. 3d 67 (1994), in which this court construed a provision similar to section 6 \u2014 141.1 in the Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund (Policemen\u2019s Fund) of the Code. In Toner, the plaintiff was seeking review of the calculation of her widow\u2019s annuity made by the Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Fund. This court considered whether section 5 \u2014 136.1 (40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 136.1 (West 1998)) controlled over other conflicting provisions in the Code. Section 5 \u2014 136.1 states in pertinent part:\n\u201cNotwithstanding the other provisions of this Article, the widow of a policeman (1) who retires on or after January 1, 1986, and subsequently dies while receiving a retirement annuity *** may in lieu of any other widow\u2019s annuity have the amount of widow\u2019s annuity calculated in accordance with this Section.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5\u2014 136.1 (West 1998).\nThis court determined that \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d meant \u201cin spite of\u2019 and, therefore, section 5 \u2014 136.1 was an exception to all other sections in Article 5 and controlled over other sections of Article 5 with which it conflicted. Toner, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 70. This court concluded that because plaintiff satisfied each of the requirements of section 5 \u2014 136.1 and because that section controlled over other conflicting sections, the plaintiff was entitled to have her widow\u2019s annuity calculated in accordance with that section. Toner, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 71.\n\u20223 We are persuaded by plaintiffs\u2019 reliance on Toner and determine that Dolores would be entitled to receive a widow\u2019s annuity pursuant to section 6 \u2014 141.1(c). Section 6 \u2014 141.1 (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 141.1 (West 1998)) begins with \u201c[n]otwithstanding the other provisions of this Article,\u201d as does section 5 \u2014 136.1 in Toner. Interpreting this section in accordance with this court\u2019s interpretation in Toner, \u201cnotwithstanding\u201d means \u201cin spite of\u2019 and therefore is an exception to all other sections in Article 6 and controls over any other section of Article 6 with which it conflicts.\nThe legislature could have easily worded the beginning of section 6 \u2014 141.1 to read \u201cnotwithstanding the other provisions of this section,\u201d instead of \u201c[n] otwithstanding the other provisions of this Article.\u201d If the statue had used \u201csection\u201d instead of \u201c[ajrticle,\u201d section 6 \u2014 141.1 would have been an exception only to section 6 \u2014 141, and not for all the sections in Article 6. Because the legislature chose to use the word \u201c[ajrticle,\u201d we can only presume that it intended section 6 \u2014 141.1 to be an exception to other sections in Article 6 with which it may conflict.\nWe must also determine whether section 6 \u2014 141.1 applies to plaintiffs. In the event that Leroy predeceases Dolores, Dolores will be the widow of a fireman who died on or after June 30, 1984, while receiving a retirement annuity. Because Dolores will satisfy each of the requirements of section 6 \u2014 141.1 if Leroy predeceases her, she would be entitled to receive a widow\u2019s annuity calculated in accordance with that section. The Board\u2019s determination to the contrary is not supported by the statutory language.\nWe are unpersuaded by the Board\u2019s argument that section 6 \u2014 141.1 is an amendment to section 6 \u2014 141 (40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 141 (West 1998)) of the Code and merely changes the calculation of a widow\u2019s annuity from 40% to 50%. The Board argues that section 6 \u2014 141.1 should be read as a continuation of section 6 \u2014 141 and not as an exception to all other sections in Article 6, because the legislature did not intend such a fundamental change in the law. The Board points to the legislative comments when Bill 164 was introduced for approval in the Illinois House. See 84th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 164, 1985 Sess. The bill was introduced as \u201cprovid[ing] technical corrections for a widow\u2019s formula for the Chicago firefighters.\u201d 84th III. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 24, 1985, at 285 (statements of Representative Terzich). We cannot construe this sole statement as encompassing the legislature\u2019s intent for the entire section of 6 \u2014 141.1 because the statute does more than merely change the calculation of widow\u2019s annuity from 40% to 50%. Had the legislature adopted section 6 \u2014 141.1 to read \u2018\u2018notwithstanding the other provisions of this section,\u201d instead of \u201c[ajrticle,\u201d we would agree with defendant\u2019s interpretation. However, if we are to give the words of the statute their ordinary and popularly understood meaning, we must reject defendant\u2019s proposed interpretation. Interpreting section 6 \u2014 141.1 as such does not effectively repeal section 6 \u2014 142(f), as the Board contends. Section 6 \u2014 142(f) will still apply to individuals who marry firemen who receive disability benefits and become widows while the firemen continued to receive disability benefits.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.\nReversed.\nCAMPBELL, EJ., and O\u2019BRIEN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ZWICK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sugarman & Horwitz, of Chicago (Stephen B. Horwitz, of counsel), for appellants.", "Burke, Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago (Lawrence E. Flood and Mary Patricia Burns, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LEROY WALICZEK et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE FIREMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201499\u20144128\nOpinion filed November 9, 2000.\nRehearing denied November 30, 2000.\nSugarman & Horwitz, of Chicago (Stephen B. Horwitz, of counsel), for appellants.\nBurke, Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., of Chicago (Lawrence E. Flood and Mary Patricia Burns, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0032-01", "first_page_order": 52, "last_page_order": 57 }