{ "id": 279655, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TYREZ TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Taylor", "decision_date": "2000-12-22", "docket_number": "No. 1-99-1253", "first_page": "464", "last_page": "477", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 464" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "694 N.E.2d 630", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222680 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801351 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "696 N.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 735", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222573 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0735-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 N.E.2d 541", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Ill. 2d 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5476013 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/82/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "378 F.2d 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2025684 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422-23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/378/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5639150 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/50/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 N.E.2d 755", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5415030 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/60/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "534 N.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2606927 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "637 N.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 976", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" }, { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0976-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1370", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55995 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 951", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221424 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "957" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0951-01" ] }, { "cite": "455 N.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660452 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 N.E.2d 56", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 887", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5799588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "889-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0887-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 N.E.2d 154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2560280 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" }, { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/206/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 962", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35407 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "965-66" }, { "page": "973" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0962-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 1078", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant retained an ownership interest in the dwelling and, as a joint tenant of the property, did not fall within the scope of the home invasion statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159576 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107", "parenthetical": "defendant retained an ownership interest in the dwelling and, as a joint tenant of the property, did not fall within the scope of the home invasion statute" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 1156", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant did not commit home invasion when he murdered the victim in an apartment they jointly rented and the apartment was still being rented by the defendant at the time of the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801356 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "316-17", "parenthetical": "defendant did not commit home invasion when he murdered the victim in an apartment they jointly rented and the apartment was still being rented by the defendant at the time of the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "623 N.E.2d 1361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "157 Ill. 2d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 778581 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "254" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/157/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 N.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 Ill. 2d 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4810080 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/155/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 N.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ill. 2d 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477041 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "141" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/164/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "318-19" }, { "page": "573-74" }, { "page": "2788-89" }, { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3228708 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/128/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 N.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 Ill. App. 3d 775", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2468597 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/199/0775-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1304, "char_count": 32790, "ocr_confidence": 0.721, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2553018896394889e-07, "percentile": 0.6111574458588126 }, "sha256": "7a401a03de2164772ab1af9bf5d57a9e8e36f73fe5df84d6ddacadf40ffd1242", "simhash": "1:b357bc4d53671702", "word_count": 5371 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:02:38.722215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TYREZ TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt a jury trial, defendant Tyrez Taylor was found guilty of home invasion, armed robbery, and residential burglary, but was found not guilty of first degree murder. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 24 years of imprisonment on the charges of armed robbery and home invasion, and four years on the charge of residential burglary.\nOn appeal, defendant claims that (1) his conviction on the home invasion charge must be vacated because the crime was not committed in the \u201cdwelling place of another\u201d or, in the alternative, because the victim gave a codefendant permission to enter the apartment; (2) his conviction on the residential burglary charge must be vacated because his codefendant was a resident of the apartment involved and because the apartment was no longer a \u201cdwelling place\u201d after the victim was dead; (3) the jury\u2019s verdicts were legally inconsistent where the jury acquitted him of first degree murder but found him guilty of armed robbery; and (4) his sentence is disproportionate, in violation of fundamental fairness, where an equally culpable codefendant pled guilty to a more serious offense and received a lesser sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the residential burglary and armed robbery counts and reverse the judgment of the trial court as to the home invasion count.\nThe only account of the events occurring in the early morning hours of August 15, 1995, was presented to the jury from a statement given by defendant while he was in custody at the Area Two police station and published through Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Sharon Opryszek at trial. According to defendant\u2019s statement, early in the morning on Tuesday, August 15, 1995, defendant was sitting on the front porch of his girlfriend Jackie\u2019s apartment at 10749 South Prairie with Jackie, Edward Cap\u00edes, and Shanika, the mother of Cap\u00edes\u2019 child. At approximately 4:30 a.m., Brian Heath joined defendant and the others on the porch and began complaining that Raymond Winters had accused Heath of stealing from him. In his statement, defendant indicated that he knew that Heath had been \u201cstaying with\u201d Winters at 10810 South Calumet \u201cfor a while.\u201d Heath showed defendant and Cap\u00edes a .38-caliber revolver, which was loaded with five rounds, and defendant watched Heath put the revolver in the waistband of his pants. Heath, Cap\u00edes, and defendant then went to Winters\u2019 apartment building at 10810 South Calumet.\nWhen the men arrived at Winters\u2019 apartment building, defendant and Cap\u00edes stood outside an apartment located behind Winters\u2019 apartment. Heath, however, walked to Winters\u2019 bedroom window and called out Winters\u2019 name. Moments later, Winters, who was nude, opened the door and let Heath into the apartment. According to defendant\u2019s statement, after a minute or two, defendant and Cap\u00edes heard the sound of a gunshot coming from inside Winters\u2019 apartment and both men ran to a second-floor apartment at 10748 South Prairie.\nThree to five minutes after defendant and Cap\u00edes arrived at 10748 South Prairie, Heath also arrived there and rang the bell to gain entrance into the building. Defendant and Cap\u00edes went down the stairs to open the door for Heath, who entered the stairwell and stated, \u201cI told you niggers I ain\u2019t no ho. I\u2019m wild hundreds.\u201d Defendant\u2019s statement indicated that \u201cwild hundreds\u201d was understood by defendant to mean \u201ccrazy.\u201d According to the statement, Heath was laughing and smiling. Once the men entered the apartment, Heath took a watch, a gold neck chain with an \u201cS\u201d medallion, a ring, and some cash out of his pockets. Heath gave the neck chain to defendant and the ring to Cap\u00edes, then gave the two men some of the cash. Heath then began bragging that Winters was naked when he answered the door and that Heath pointed the gun at Winters\u2019 head and pulled the trigger. Heath further boasted that he took Winters\u2019 money and jewelry from a table and used a shirt to cover the doorknob so he would not leave fingerprints when he left. After Heath made these statements, the three men slept on the floor of the apartment for \u201ca couple of hours.\u201d\nAccording to defendant\u2019s statement, when the men awoke they went back across the street to Jackie\u2019s front porch, where defendant told Jackie that the three men were going to Evergreen Plaza on 95th and Western. The statement reads that Heath bought new clothes for everyone at Evergreen Plaza, then Heath bought some alcoholic beverages, and all three men returned to the apartment at 10748 South Prairie. At the apartment, defendant, Heath, and Cap\u00edes drank, showered and changed their clothes. Then, they walked around outside for a while before returning to 10748 South Prairie.\nIn the statement, defendant indicated that early Wednesday morning, August 16, 1995, Heath left to get Winters\u2019 car, a beige Chevy Impala. Defendant, Cap\u00edes, and two other individuals were standing in front of Jackie\u2019s apartment when Heath drove past them in Winters\u2019 car. When Heath returned, he left the car and went to a party with an individual referred to as \u201cChubby.\u201d According to the statement, defendant later found out that Heath and \u201cChubby\u201d took the gun used to shoot Winters and threw it into a sewer.\nAfter Heath left, the statement indicates that defendant, accompanied by Cap\u00edes, drove the car to two different houses, then drove to 27th and Prairie to visit his cousins. Defendant, Cap\u00edes, and defendant\u2019s cousins got drunk together, then defendant drove one of his cousins and Cap\u00edes back to Jackie\u2019s apartment. There, defendant and Jackie argued and Jackie took Winters\u2019 chain from defendant and threw it in the bushes. Defendant, Cap\u00edes, and \u201cChubby\u201d left Jackie\u2019s apartment to put more gas in Winters\u2019 car, then defendant drove alone to a friend\u2019s house on Yates where he spent the night. According to defendant\u2019s statement, on Thursday, August 17,1995, at approximately 11:30 a.m., defendant left Winters\u2019 car in the alley behind the apartment at 10748 South Prairie.\nIshna Davis, who was dating Heath in August of 1995, testified that she saw Heath and defendant exiting Winters\u2019 apartment complex carrying bags of clothes at approximately 4 p.m. on either Tuesday, August 15, or Wednesday, August 16. Davis testified that Heath and defendant got into a four-door \u201cyellowish Chevy\u201d and put the bags in the car. When Davis approached Heath and defendant, she saw a beeper and a gold chain with an \u201cS\u201d on top of one of the bags. Approximately one-half hour later, Davis saw Heath and defendant in the same four-door Chevy at the intersection of Calumet and Forest Streets. Davis testified that Heath was driving the car and defendant was in the front passenger seat. Davis stated that she leaned into the car to talk to Heath and saw the brown handle of what might have been a gun sticking out from underneath the driver\u2019s seat. Davis also testified that she saw defendant putting on the gold chain with an \u201cS\u201d that she had seen on top of the bag earlier.\nWinters\u2019 sister and Winters\u2019 friend, Carol Winters and Anton Frankklin, respectively, gave substantially the same testimony regarding their discovery of Winters\u2019 body. At approximately 10 p.m. on Wednesday, August 16, Carol, Anton, and Anton\u2019s fianc\u00e9e, Pia, went to Winters\u2019 apartment because Carol had been unable to reach Winters for almost two days. When they arrived at Winters\u2019 apartment, they noticed that Winters\u2019 car was gone and that the window in Winters\u2019 living room was open. Carol had a key to the front door of Winters\u2019 apartment but she could not open the door, so she asked Anton to climb into the apartment through the open window. Once inside the apartment, Anton turned on the lights and discovered Winters\u2019 naked body lying facedown on the floor across the front door. When Carol heard Anton crying out Winters\u2019 name, she pushed the door until it opened a little and she was able to see that the door was blocked by Winters\u2019 body. The police were called and arrived about an hour later. Both Carol and Anton testified that Winters always wore a gold chain with a charm in the shape of an \u201cS.\u201d\nChicago police officer William Callahan testified that he was on routine patrol with his partner, Officer Maureen Sakalas, when he received a radio dispatch of shots fired at 10810 South Calumet. According to Officer Callahan, 10810 South Calumet was a \u201cfour-flat,\u201d which looked like \u201ckind of a road side motel type of building.\u201d The complex consisted of two two-story buildings with two apartments in each building. Officer Callahan approached the front of the building and saw two women standing on the sidewalk crying. The women told Officer Callahan that Winters was dead inside the apartment.\nChicago police detective Paul Alfini testified that, on August 18, 1995, he learned that Winters\u2019 car had been recovered in an alley at 10749 South Indiana. On August 23, 1995, Detective Alfini interviewed Ishna Davis. After interviewing Davis, Detective Alfini began to search for defendant, Heath, and Cap\u00edes. That same day, Detective Alfini interviewed a man named Edward Kelly. Detective Alfini testified that, after the interview, Kelly led him to the comer at 10758 South Forest and pointed to a sewer drain at that location. Detective Alfini then called the department of sewers and later recovered a silver-colored, .38-caliber revolver with a brown wooden handle from that location. Detective Alfini testified that the serial number had been filed off of the revolver and the revolver contained four five .38-caliber rounds.\nChicago police detective William Foster testified that at approximately 9:30 p.m. on September 5, 1995, he was doing follow-up work on the Winters homicide when Chicago police officers Cain and Bass brought defendant into the Area Two police station and placed defendant in an interview room. Chicago police detectives Foster and Filipiak then went into the interview room to interview defendant. However, Detective Foster testified that, after giving defendant his rights under Miranda, he felt that defendant was under the influence of alcohol and decided to interview defendant after he became sober.\nDetective Foster testified that at approximately 4 p.m., on September 6, 1995, he and Detective Filipiak returned to Area Two to interview defendant. Detective Foster testified that he brought defendant some food from McDonald\u2019s. While defendant was eating, the detectives gave defendant Miranda warnings again and asked him if he would discuss Winters\u2019 death with them. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Detective Foster returned to the interview room with Detective Alfini and again gave defendant Miranda warnings. Defendant and the detectives conversed at that time and defendant remained in custody. After this conversation with defendant, Detective Foster spoke with Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Sharon Opryszek. Detective Foster testified that he and Opryszek then gave defendant Miranda warnings again, interviewed defendant, took a handwritten statement from defendant, and reviewed defendant\u2019s statement with him.\nAssistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Sharon Opryszek testified that she interviewed defendant with Detective Foster at approximately 1 a.m. on September 7, 1995. Prior to the conversation, ASA Opryszek introduced herself as an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, explained to defendant that she was not his attorney, and read defendant Miranda warnings. She testified that the conversation lasted less than half an hour. After the conversation, ASA Opryszek asked Detectives Foster and Alfini to find Cap\u00edes so she could also interview him.\nDetectives Foster and Alfini arrested Cap\u00edes about half an hour later and brought him to Area Two, where he was interviewed by ASA Opryszek and Detective Alfini at approximately 2:30 a.m. ASA Opry-szek testified that after her conversation with Cap\u00edes she spoke with defendant, who was eating a hamburger and drinking a soft drink. ASA Opryszek told defendant that she had just spoken with Cap\u00edes and she refused defendant\u2019s request to be allowed to speak with Cap\u00edes. ASA Opryszek then left defendant and took a written statement from Cap\u00edes.\nASA Opryszek testified that after she finished taking Cap\u00edes\u2019 statement at approximately 5:15 a.m., she returned to speak with defendant. ASA Opryszek relayed to defendant what Cap\u00edes told her and defendant stated that he wanted to tell her the truth about what happened to Winters. ASA Opryszek and Detective Foster then took defendant to another room, where defendant gave his statement and ASA Opryszek recorded it in her handwriting. ASA Opryszek testified that she finished taking defendant\u2019s statement at approximately 6:30 a.m., then she reviewed defendant\u2019s written statement with defendant by reading it aloud with him and by having defendant read aloud portions of the statement alone. Corrections were made and signed by defendant, ASA Opryszek, and Detective Foster. ASA Opryszek testified that she, defendant, and Detective Foster also signed the bottom of each page after it was read aloud, indicating that the written statement was an accurate reflection of what defendant told ASA Opry-szek. The contents of defendant\u2019s statement as admitted into evidence at trial have already been discussed above and will not be repeated here.\nThe evidence showed that the Cook County medical examiner\u2019s office recovered a lead, medium-caliber bullet from Winters\u2019 brain and ruled that Winters died as a result of a gunshot wound to the head. The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, James Leacy, a firearms expert, would testify that he received a Taurus .38-caliber revolver, four five rounds, and the bullet recovered from Winters\u2019 brain. It was further stipulated that Leacy would testify that, due to the condition of the bullet that was recovered from the victim, he was unable to make an identification that the bullet came from a specific weapon. The parties also stipulated that if called to testify William Harris, a fingerprint expert, would testify that no fingerprints were recovered from the gun or bullets and that the fingerprints recovered from the door jamb of Winters\u2019 car and from the crime scene did not match the fingerprints of the defendant or the victim.\nDefendant did not present any additional evidence at trial. After defendant\u2019s motion for directed verdict was denied, defendant waived his right to testify and the defense rested. After hearing closing arguments, the jury received its instructions and retired to deliberate. The jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery, home invasion, and residential burglary, and found defendant not guilty of first degree murder.\nDefendant\u2019s sentencing hearing was held on December 17, 1998. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions for judgment of acquittal \u2022notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court said it had considered all the aggravating and mitigating factors and sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 24 years of imprisonment on the armed robbery and home invasion charges, and 4 years on the residential burglary charge. The court subsequently denied defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider sentence. This appeal followed.\nFirst, defendant argues that his conviction for home invasion must be vacated because the crime was not committed in the \u201cdwelling place of another\u201d and because the victim gave Heath permission to enter the apartment. We agree.\nWith respect to such an issue, \u201c \u2018 \u201cthe relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d \u2019 \u201d People v. Campbell, 199 Ill. App. 3d 775, 785, 557 N.E.2d 556 (1990), quoting People v. Young, 128 Ill. 2d 1, 49 (1989), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573-74, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979). Then, \u201c \u2018[o]nce a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder\u2019s role as the weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985), quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d at 573, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.\nUnder Illinois\u2019s statute, a person who is not a peace officer commits home invasion \u201cwhen without authority he or she knowingly enters the dwelling place of another when he or she knows or has reason to know that one or more persons is present\u201d and he or she \u201c[ijntentionally causes any injury to any person or persons within such dwelling place.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12\u201411(a)(2) (West 1998). The State concedes that defendant could only be guilty of home invasion and armed robbery based on the theory of accountability for the actions of codefendant Heath. A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when \u201c[ejither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote.or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/5\u20142(c) (West 1998). In determining a defendant\u2019s legal accountability, the trier of fact may consider the defendant\u2019s presence during the commission of the offense, the defendant\u2019s continued close affiliation with other offenders after the commission of the crime, the defendant\u2019s failure to report the crime, and the defendant\u2019s flight from the scene. People v. Taylor, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141, 646 N.E.2d 567 (1995).\nThe gravamen of a home invasion offense is unauthorized entry. Campbell, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 786. The State argues that we should apply the \u201climited authority doctrine,\u201d which holds that when a defendant comes to a private residence and is invited in by the occupant, the authorization to enter is limited and criminal actions exceed this limited authority. People v. Peeples, 155 Ill. 2d 422, 487, 616 N.E.2d 294 (1993). Under the limited authority doctrine, where the defendant enters with an innocent intent, that entry is authorized and criminal actions thereafter engaged in by the defendant do not change the status of the entry. People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 254, 623 N.E.2d 1361 (1993). Thus, under the limited authority doctrine, the determination of whether an entry is unauthorized depends on whether the defendant possessed the intent to perform a criminal act therein at the time of entry. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d at 254.\nDefendant argues that Heath\u2019s authority to enter the apartment at 10810 South Calumet was not limited because Heath lived at the apartment with Winters. Thus, argues defendant, Heath did not commit a home invasion by entering the \u201cdwelling place of another\u201d for which defendant could be held accountable. See People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 316-17, 688 N.E.2d 1156 (1997) (defendant did not commit home invasion when he murdered the victim in an apartment they jointly rented and the apartment was still being rented by the defendant at the time of the murder); People v. Moulton, 282 Ill. App. 3d 102, 107, 668 N.E.2d 1078 (1996) (defendant retained an ownership interest in the dwelling and, as a joint tenant of the property, did not fall within the scope of the home invasion statute).\nGiven the facts of the cause before this court, we hold that the limited authority doctrine does not apply. Here, there was evidence that Heath had been staying with Winters on a regular basis as an overnight guest. This fact distinguishes this case from the facts in Peeples, where the evidence supported the inference that defendant gained access to the victim\u2019s apartment through trickery and deceit, under the pretense of borrowing a cup of sugar. Likewise, in another case cited by the State, People v. Hill, 294 Ill. App. 3d 962, 965-66, 691 N.E.2d 797 (1998), the elderly victim allowed the defendant into her home for the limited purpose of loaning him $10 and upon entry the defendant cut her throat.\nAlthough the State on appeal asserts that Heath was not actually staying in Winters\u2019 apartment, this assertion is belied by defendant\u2019s statement. According to that statement, which was written by an assistant State\u2019s Attorney, on the night in question, Winters gave Heath authority to enter Winters\u2019 apartment not only as an invited guest, but Heath had also been \u201cstaying with\u201d Winters \u201cfor a while.\u201d Based on this uncontradicted evidence, we find Winters\u2019 apartment was also Heath\u2019s dwelling place and his actions inside the apartment did not change his status as a resident.\nSince Heath did not enter the \u201cdwelling place of another,\u201d we hold that the facts in the present case would not allow a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of home invasion based on an accountability theory. Thus, we vacate defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence on the charge of home invasion.\nSecond, defendant argues that his conviction for residential burglary must be vacated because Heath was a resident of the apartment involved and because the apartment was no longer a \u201cdwelling place\u201d after Winters was dead for purposes of the residential burglary statute. We disagree.\nUnder Illinois\u2019s statute, \u201ca person commits residential burglary who knowingly and without authority enters the dwelling place of another with the intent to commit therein a felony or theft.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/19\u20143 (West 1998). For purposes of the residential burglary statute, \u201cdwelling\u201d means \u201ca house, apartment, mobile home, trailer, or other living quarters in which at the time of the alleged offense the owners or occupants actually reside or in their absence intend within a reasonable period of time to reside.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/2\u20146(b) (West 1998).\nDefendant cites to People v. Moore, 206 Ill. App. 3d 769, 565 N.E.2d 154 (1990), to support the proposition that the State must prove that the owner of the place that was burglarized intends to return and use it as a dwelling. Defendant also cites to People v. Bonner, 221 Ill. App. 3d 887, 583 N.E.2d 56 (1991), to support his argument that a residence where the owner has died is not a \u201cdwelling place\u201d within the meaning of the residential burglary statute.\nWe find that defendant\u2019s reliance on these cases is misplaced. In Bonner, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90, the court did not address the issue of whether the victims\u2019 house was a \u201cdwelling place\u201d because the parties had already agreed that it was not. The house in Bonner had not been occupied for seven years prior to the burglary.\nAdditionally, this court\u2019s decision in Moore actually supports the position of the State. In Moore, the occupant of the burglarized house had been in Mississippi looking for a job for about a month. He left the house fully furnished but disconnected the electricity, gas, and telephone service before he left. The defendants claimed that the house was not inhabited at the time of the burglary and that the occupant had no intention of returning to it.\nHowever, this court found that even though the occupant was absent at the time of the burglary and intended to sell the house upon his return to Chicago, the house was still a \u201cdwelling place.\u201d Moore, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 774. The court stated that \u201c[t]he residential burglary statute applies to burglaries of structures intended for use as residences, regardless of whether the structure was being actively used as a residence at the time of the burglary.\u201d Moore, 206 Ill. App. 3d at 773. The Moore court also cited to People v. Sexton, 118 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1000, 455 N.E.2d 884 (1983), where this court stated that the \u201clegislative purpose of deterring residential burglaries would not be served by making the application of the statute dependent upon the wholly fortuitous circumstance of whether a structure intended to be used as a residence was actually being used as a residence at the time the burglary was committed.\u201d We follow the reasoning of this court in Sexton and Moore.\nWe find that, despite the fact that Winters was lying dead in his apartment at the time of the burglary, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the apartment was a \u201cdwelling place\u201d for purposes of the residential burglary statute. It was undisputed in this case that the apartment at 10810 South Calumet was intended for use as a residence. Evidence was presented to the jury that the apartment was being used as a residence by Winters at the time of his death and that his body remained in the apartment until well after the burglary had been completed. There was also testimony that the apartment was part of a larger building used solely for residential purposes.\nDefendant next argues that, as Heath was \u201cstaying with\u201d Winters, Heath could not be found guilty of residential burglary and, consequently, defendant could not be found guilty of residential burglary based on accountability. However, the evidence demonstrated that defendant\u2019s conviction for residential burglary was not based solely on an accountability theory. Ishna Davis testified that she saw defendant exiting Winters\u2019 apartment complex carrying bags of clothes and the victim\u2019s necklace on the day of the shooting or the following day. Defendant responds that, because Heath had permission to be in Winters\u2019 apartment, Heath could give defendant permission to enter the residence. Any permission that Heath had to be in Winters\u2019 apartment certainly ended when Heath killed Winters. See Hill, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 973. The deceased victim could not then authorize Heath to allow defendant to enter the residence and steal his possessions. Therefore, we find that defendant was properly convicted of residential burglary.\nFor purposes of his appeal on the armed robbery count, defendant has conceded that he is accountable for Heath\u2019s conduct but argues that the jury\u2019s verdicts were legally inconsistent where the jury acquitted him of first degree \u2018murder but found him guilty of armed robbery. We disagree.\nIllinois cases recognize two types of inconsistencies in verdicts: logical inconsistency and legal inconsistency. People v. Rhoden, 299 Ill. App. 3d 951, 957, 702 N.E.2d 209 (1998). As a general rule, verdicts that acquit and convict a defendant of crimes composed of different elements, but arising out of the same set of facts, are not legally inconsistent. People v. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d 270, 274, 665 N.E.2d 1370 (1996). Logically inconsistent verdicts may stand, while legally inconsistent verdicts cannot. Klingenberg, 172 Ill. 2d at 274.\nAn acquittal of a murder charge does not preclude an armed ( robbery conviction, nor would such a verdict be legally inconsistent. People v. Austin, 264 Ill. App. 3d 976, 980, 637 N.E.2d 585 (1994). This is true even where the jury acquits the defendant of felony murder based on armed robbery and it is unclear whether the taking occurred before or after the killing. See People v. Clemons, 179 Ill. App. 3d 667, 534 N.E.2d 676 (1989); see also People v. Hill, 294 Ill. App. 3d 962, 691 N.E.2d 797 (1998). In the case at bar, the jury\u2019s verdicts cannot be considered legally inconsistent because its resolution of one charge did not preclude an opposite resolution on the other charge. See Austin, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 980.\nIn People v. Dawson, 60 Ill. 2d 278, 326 N.E.2d 755 (1975), the supreme court held that there was no inconsistency where a defendant was acquitted of murder and felony murder but convicted of armed robbery. Citing the court\u2019s reasoning in Dawson, the appellate court later found that \u201cthe salutary principle of leaving the jury \u2018free to exercise its historic power of lenity\u2019 forbids allowing an acquittal on one charge to affect a simultaneous conviction.\u201d People v. Rudolph, 50 Ill. App. 3d 559, 565, 365 N.E.2d 930 (1977), quoting United States v. Carbone, 378 F.2d 420, 422-23 (2d Cir. 1967).\nA person commits armed robbery when he or she \u201ctakes property *** from the person or presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force\u201d (720 ILCS 5/18\u20141(a) (West 1998)) and \u201c(1) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm; or (2) he or she carries on or about his or her person or is otherwise armed with a firearm.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/18\u20142(a) (West Supp. 1999).\nA person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts that cause the death: (1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or (2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder. 720 ILCS 5/9\u20141(a) (West 1998).\nAccording to the evidence from the record, and in consonance with existing Illinois law, we do not find the jury\u2019s verdicts in this case to be legally inconsistent because a comparison of the essential statutory elements of first degree murder and of armed robbery shows that the elements are distinct. Thus, we uphold defendant\u2019s armed robbery conviction.\nFinally, defendant argues that his 24-year sentence is disproportionate, in violation of fundamental fairness, where Cap\u00edes, an equally culpable codefendant, pled guilty to the more serious crime of murder and received only a 20-year sentence. We disagree.\nThe standard of review as to the issue of an excessive sentence is whether the trial court abused its discretion. People v, Cox, 82 Ill. 2d 268, 275, 412 N.E.2d 541 (1980). Additionally, we recognize that the trial court is in the best position to determine the appropriate punishment, and its decision is entitled to great weight and deference. People v. Modrowski, 296 Ill. App. 3d 735, 751, 696 N.E.2d 28 (1998).\nThe general rule as to the question of whether defendant\u2019s sentence was unfairly disparate is that arbitrary and unreasonable disparity between the sentences of similarly situated codefendants is impermissible. People v. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d 205, 216, 688 N.E.2d 658 (1997). However, the mere disparity of sentences does not, by itself, establish a violation of fundamental fairness. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 216.\nA sentence imposed on a codefendant who pleaded guilty as part of a plea agreement does not provide a valid basis of comparison to a sentence entered after a trial. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 217. Dispositional concessions are properly granted to defendants who plead guilty when the interest of the public in the effective administration of criminal justice would thereby be served. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 218.\nIn Caballero, the supreme court found that the codefendant who pled guilty (1) acknowledged his guilt and showed willingness to assume responsibility for his conduct; (2) made a public trial unnecessary; and (3) gave cooperation which resulted in the successful prosecution of another offender engaged in equally serious or more serious criminal conduct. 179 Ill. 2d at 218. As a result, the supreme court found that the defendant could not establish that the disparate treatment of himself and his codefendant was unreasonable or unwarranted. Caballero, 179 Ill. 2d at 218. Similarly, in this case, we find that defendant cannot establish that the disparate treatment of himself and Cap\u00edes was unreasonable or unwarranted.\nBased on the record before this court, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant to 24 years\u2019 imprisonment. In addition, because the 24-year term of imprisonment for the home invasion conviction was to run concurrently with the 24-year term of imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, we find that there is no need to remand this cause for resentencing despite the fact that the home invasion conviction has been vacated. People v. Curry, 296 Ill. App. 3d 559, 569, 694 N.E.2d 630 (1998).\nFor all of the foregoing reasons, we vacate defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence for home invasion. We also uphold defendant\u2019s armed robbery and residential burglary convictions and defendant\u2019s sentence of 24 years\u2019 imprisonment.\nAffirmed in part and vacated in part.\nGREIMAN and REID, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Timothy J. Leeming, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and William Jason Gatzulis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TYREZ TAYLOR, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201499\u20141253\nOpinion filed December 22, 2000.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Timothy J. Leeming, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Alan J. Spellberg, and William Jason Gatzulis, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0464-01", "first_page_order": 484, "last_page_order": 497 }