{ "id": 279595, "name": "SACRAMENTO CRUSHING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CORRECT/ALL SEWER, INC., et al., Defendants (Correct/All Sewer, Inc., Cross-Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. E.A. Cox Company, Cross-Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Sacramento Crushing Corp. v. Correct/All Sewer, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-12-29", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-99-0882, 1-00-2313 cons.", "first_page": "571", "last_page": "582", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 571" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336123 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "56 Ill. App. 3d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3413612 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/56/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. App. 3d 785", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2482764 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/197/0785-01" ] }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 420", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381873 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 941", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2981223 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0941-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725037 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 622", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2604197 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 606", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156771 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333141 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2942978 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906783 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568" }, { "page": "568" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. App. 3d 1044", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2605817 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1049-50", "parenthetical": "Welch, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/213/1044-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 720", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847526 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "724" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0720-01" ] }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 885", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140061 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" }, { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0885-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 520986 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/287/0465-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 961, "char_count": 26633, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.1713082768233492e-07, "percentile": 0.5864477040939452 }, "sha256": "9cb327c776d639d8f9bb969934bbd3d043acff4691d212cd9a76c39c2ca1d4cc", "simhash": "1:aafac9464e8e9c6c", "word_count": 4298 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:02:38.722215+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "SACRAMENTO CRUSHING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CORRECT/ALL SEWER, INC., et al., Defendants (Correct/All Sewer, Inc., Cross-Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. E.A. Cox Company, Cross-Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COHEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant-appellee E.A. Cox Company (Cox) served as general contractor on a road construction project (the project) for the City of Chicago Department of Transportation (the City). Defendant-appellant Correct/All Sewer, Inc. (Correct/All), was Cox\u2019s sewer subcontractor for the project. Defendant Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland (Fidelity) provided Cox\u2019s surety bond. Nine subcontractors and/or material suppliers filed complaints against Cox and Correct/All for mechanics\u2019 liens against public funds pursuant to section 23 of the Mechanics Lien Act (770 ILCS 60/23 (West 1998)) and for bond claims against Fidelity and Cox pursuant to section 1 of the Public Construction Bond Act (30 ILCS 550/1 (West 1998)). The trial court consolidated all nine cases into Sacramento Crushing Corp. v. Correct/All Sewer, Inc., No. 96 CH 198. Once consolidated, no order of severance was ever entered with respect to any of these cases.\nCorrect/All cross-claimed against Cox and Fidelity, asserting mechanics\u2019 hen and bond claims. Cox moved to reduce the amount of Correct/AIl\u2019s lien, seeking a summary determination under section 2 \u2014 1005(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(d) (West 1998)) that Correct/All was not entitled to a separate pay item of $170,025.75 for \u201cspoil removal\u201d (waste hauling). In an order dated December 3, 1997 (the summary determination order), the trial court granted Cox summary determination as to the spoil removal issue. Correct/All\u2019s motion for reconsideration of the summary determination order was denied. Cox and Fidelity then moved for summary judgment under section 2 \u2014 1005(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, requesting a ruling that Correct/All was owed nothing further on the project. On September 3, 1998, the trial court granted their motion (the first summary judgment order), finding that Correct/All was owed nothing further on the road construction project and ruling that Correct/All had no valid mechanics\u2019 lien or bond claims. On January 28, 1999, the trial court entered a Rule 304(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding with respect to the first summary judgment order. Correct/All filed its timely notice of appeal on March 2, 1999.\nCox counterclaimed against Correct/All to recover certain \u201cback-charges\u201d (i.e., money that Cox had spent on Correct/AIl\u2019s behalf). Cox moved for summary judgment against Correct/All on the issue of back-charges. On May 2, 2000, the trial court granted Cox\u2019s motion, entering judgment in favor of Cox in the amount of $312,346.02 plus costs (the second summary judgment order). The court also entered a Rule 304(a) finding with respect to this order. Correct/All\u2019s motion to reconsider was denied. The same day, the trial court entered an order dismissing with prejudice all claims and causes of action filed in the nine consolidated cases that had not been disposed of by prior order. Correct/AlTs motion to reconsider the second summary judgment order was denied. Correct/All filed its second timely notice of appeal on July 13, 2000.\nCorrect/AlTs first appeal, case No. 1\u201499\u20140882, is from the trial court\u2019s summary determination order and the first summary judgment order. Correct/AlTs second appeal, case No. 1\u201400\u20142313, is from the second summary judgment order and the denial of its motion to reconsider. Cox has moved on appeal for sanctions against Correct/All and its counsel, Mr. Lamont Cranston Strong (Strong). Cox has also moved for the reconsideration of our previous order consolidating this case with Correct/AlTs second appeal. Cox\u2019s motions are taken with the case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court, deny Cox\u2019s motion for reconsideration and grant Cox\u2019s motion for sanctions.\nI. Summary Determination, Summary Judgment and the Motion to Reconsider\nWe note as a preliminary matter that there is currently an order of this court on file, dated October 3, 2000, consolidating this case (Correct/AlTs appeal under Rule 304(a) from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary determination and summary judgment in favor of Cox and against Correct/All on Correct/All\u2019s amended cross-claim) with case No. 1\u201400\u20142313 (Correct/AlTs appeal from the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of Cox and against Correct/All on Cox\u2019s counterclaim for backcharges and from the denial of Correct/AlTs motion to reconsider). Cox has moved for reconsideration of the order granting consolidation. Case No. 1\u201499\u20140882 has already been fully briefed, and the issues in the two appeals are nearly identical. No briefs have yet been filed in case No. 1 \u2014 00\u20142313; however, we require no briefs from the parties to guide our decision. As we will further discuss, the record on appeal in the second case, standing alone, affords us a sufficient basis to rule on Correct/AlTs second appeal. Cox\u2019s motion for reconsideration is denied.\nAlthough the trial court entered no Rule 304(a) finding with respect to the summary determination order of December 3, 1997, that order was a step in the procedural progression leading to the summary judgment order of September 3, 1998. Therefore, Correct/AlTs notice of appeal was sufficient to grant this court jurisdiction over the summary determination order. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); Ruane v. Amore, 287 Ill. App. 3d 465, 470 (1997).\nOur review of the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment is de novo. Natale v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 314 Ill. App. 3d 885, 888 (2000). Summary judgment is properly granted \u201cwhere the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and exhibits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Natale, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 888. In its first appeal, Correct/All argues that the trial court\u2019s summary determination order reducing its claimed hen violated both an unspecified section of the Chicago Municipal Code and the separation of powers doctrine. Correct/All also argues that in entering the first summary judgment order in favor of Cox, the trial court further violated an unspecified section of the Chicago Municipal Code by assigning to one O\u2019Malley (as a subcontractor of Correct/All) a portion of the funds owed to Correct/All by Cox. Correct/All has indicated in its second notice of appeal that it wishes to appeal the trial court\u2019s entry of the second summary judgment order in favor of Cox, as well as the denial of its motion to reconsider that ruling.\nWe need not address the substance of these arguments on appeal. The function of a reviewing court on appeal from a grant of summary judgment is limited to determining whether the trial court correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact was raised and, if none was raised, whether judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered. Malanowski v. Jabamoni, 293 Ill. App. 3d 720, 724 (1997). The record is quite clear that Cox supported both its summary determination and first summary judgment motions against Correct/All with detailed affidavits. The record is equally clear that, in response to Cox\u2019s motion for summary determination, Correct/All filed a document purporting to be an affidavit from Mr. George Fed, the president of Correct/All, addressing the spoil removal issue only. However, that document was not signed by Mr. Fed, nor was it notarized; therefore, that document was not a valid affidavit and was not sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for purposes of summary judgment. In re Marriage of Lewis, 213 Ill. App. 3d 1044, 1049-50 (1991) (Welch, J., dissenting). The record reflects that Correct/All filed no affidavits\u2014 sufficient or otherwise \u2014 in response to Cox\u2019s first motion for summary judgment. The suggestion that an issue of material fact exists, without supporting evidence, is insufficient to create one. In re Marriage of Palacios, 275 Ill. App. 3d 561, 568 (1995). In the face of supporting affidavits from the moving party, the nonmovant must submit counter-affidavits (or refer to depositions or admissions on file) in order to raise an issue of fact sufficient to survive summary judgment. Werckenthein v. Bucher Petrochemical Co., 248 Ill. App. 3d 282, 288 (1993). Failure to file counteraffidavits in opposition to a summary judgment motion supported by affidavits is fatal. Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 267 Ill. App. 3d 386, 391 (1994). Therefore, Correct/All failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact before the trial court in response to either the summary determination or the first summary judgment motion.\nSimilarly, the record in Correct/All\u2019s second appeal reveals that Cox\u2019s second summary judgment motion was also supported by detailed affidavits. The record is clear that although Correct/All eventually moved for reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s entry of summary judgment in favor of Cox, Correct/All again filed no response to the second summary judgment motion. As with its first appeal, Correct/All failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact before the trial court. Fitzpatrick, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 390.\nOur determination that Correct/All failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact in response to these motions does not conclude our analysis. We must now determine whether judgment as a matter of law in favor of Cox was correctly entered. Malanowski, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 724. \u201cA court of review\u2019s determination as to whether the record supports a grant of summary judgment is one of law *** and may be based on any grounds called for by the record. [Citation.]\u201d In re Marriage of Palacios, 275 Ill. App. 3d 561, 568 (1995). Uncontested, sworn affidavits submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment must be accepted as true for purposes of deciding the motion, contrary assertions in an opponent\u2019s pleadings notwithstanding. Soderlund Brothers, Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 278 Ill. App. 3d 606, 614 (1995). Cox\u2019s affidavits, accepted as true, clearly demonstrate that Correct/All had been fully paid under the terms of its subcontract. The trial court first determined that, under the terms of its subcontract with Cox, Correct/ All was not entitled to a separate pay item for spoil removal. By its own terms, the subcontract states that final payment to Correct/All would be made \u201con [the] quantities allowed in the final estimate by the [City].\u201d The City\u2019s final pay estimate included no separate line-item term for spoil removal. In fact, the specifications of the subcontract specifically state that compensation to Correct/All for spoil removal was to be paid under line items 4, 37 through 49, 52 through 67 and 70 through 76, all of which were included in the City\u2019s final pay estimate. All of these line items were included among the agreed items of work under the subcontract; therefore, spoil removal was included among the items of work that Correct/All agreed to perform, and Correct/All was not entitled to separate payment. The trial court correctly entered summary determination in favor of Cox on this issue.\nAccepting as true the total amount that Correct/All claimed that it had earned, the trial court then subtracted from that figure the remaining credits due Cox, including certain payments made by Cox on Correct/All\u2019s behalf and payments of the hen claims of Correct/All\u2019s sub-subcontractors and material suppliers. This calculation showed that Correct/All was owed nothing further on the project. The court concluded that Cox was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is ample support in the record for the trial court\u2019s conclusion. The trial court\u2019s grant of the summary determination and first summary judgment motions in favor of Cox is affirmed.\nSimilarly, Cox\u2019s affidavit in support of its second summary judgment motion, accepted as true, shows that the total amount due to Correct/All under the subcontract for line-item work and contract extras was $743,665.93. The trial court subtracted from this figure the sum of $1,056,011.95, which was the total of all past payments to Correct/All from Cox, all of the backcharges due to Cox from Correct/ All (for material, labor and union pension benefits) and all of the mechanic\u2019s lien claims against Cox by Correct/All\u2019s subcontractors. The trial court calculated that Correct/All had been overpaid and that there was a balance due from Correct/All to Cox in the amount of $312,346.02. The trial court then entered summary judgment in favor of Cox in this amount. The record clearly supports the trial court\u2019s conclusion. The trial court\u2019s grant of Cox\u2019s second summary judgment motion is affirmed.\nWith respect to Correct/All\u2019s motion to reconsider, we have held:\n\u201cThe purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court\u2019s attention newly discovered evidence which was not available at the time of the hearing, changes in the law or errors in the court\u2019s previous application of existing law. [Citation.] As a general rule a motion to reconsider is addressed to the trial court\u2019s sound discretion. [Citation.] But a motion to reconsider an order granting summary judgment raises the question of whether the judge erred in his previous application of existing law. Whether the court has erred in the application of existing law is not reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.\u201d Korogluyan v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 622, 627 (1991).\nAs with any question regarding the application of existing law, we review the denial of such a motion de novo. Joel R. v. Board of Education of Mannheim School District 83, 292 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613 (1997). Correct/All\u2019s motion to reconsider fails to offer any newly discovered evidence which was not available at the time of hearing. The motion mentions no changes in the law subsequent to the entry of summary judgment. The motion simply asserts error on the part of the trial court in its application of existing law in granting the second summary judgment motion. \u201c[A] trial court is not required to consider documents attached to a [defendant\u2019s] motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling where the [defendant] had failed to file the documents in *** response to the [plaintiff\u2019s] motion for summary judgment.\u201d McCullough v. Gallaher & Speck, 254 Ill. App. 3d 941, 947 (1993). Neither are we required to do so on appeal, leaving for our consideration only the unsubstantiated allegations of error in Correct/ All\u2019s motion. As we have already determined that the trial court did not err in its findings that Correct/All failed to establish any genuine issue of material fact and that Cox was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we hold that the trial court committed no error in denying Correct/All\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nII. Cox\u2019s Motion for Sanctions\nThe following excerpts from Correct/All\u2019s briefs set forth Correct/ All\u2019s remaining argument on appeal:\n\u201cTHE TRIAL COURT\u2019S ORDER OF DECEMBER 3, 1997, AND ALT, ORDERS PREDICATED UPON THE DECEMBER 3, 1997 ORDER REDUCING CORRECT/ALL\u2019S LIEN CLAIM IN THE AMOUNT OF $170,025.75 ARE VOID BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT\u2019S JUDGMENT WAS PROCURED BY FRAUD.\n\u00edj\u00bb # %\nIn its efforts to reduce Correct/All\u2019s lien, Cox presented to the Court an altered Schedule C form.\n*\nBy causing the Court to rely upon a document that was altered, Cox procured the December 3, 1997 order by fraud.\n*\nOn the face of the record, it clearly appears that the Schedule \u2018C\u2019 Form that Cox submitted to the Court, and that the Court apparently relied upon to reduce Correct/All\u2019s lien, may not have been a\ngenuine Schedule C document, contrary to any aversion otherwise.\n* * *\nCox\u2019s deception becomes clear.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAs clearly illustrated by the above emphatic quotations, Correct/ All charges Cox with perpetrating a fraud on the trial court and engaging in \u201cdeception\u201d in order to obtain the summary determination order of December 3, 1997. Correct/All asserts that this order and all subsequent orders predicated thereon (including the summary judgment order of September 3, 1998) are therefore void as a matter of law. A void order can be attacked \u201cat any time, in any court, either directly or collaterally.\u201d People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington, 268 Ill. App. 3d 420, 424 (1994). Correct/All bases its claim of fraud on an alleged discrepancy between a contract schedule contained in the general contract between Cox and the City of Chicago and what Correct/All claims to be an \u201caltered\u201d copy of that same contract schedule in the subcontract between Cox and Correct/All. The disputed contract schedule in the general contract, schedule C, is a list estimating the amount per item of work that Cox would pay to Correct/All as a subcontractor. This list contains a notation (without any numbered line item) for spoil removal in the amount of $170,025.75. This is the amount by which the trial court reduced Correct/All\u2019s hen claim in its summary determination order of December 3, 1997. The schedule C contained in the subcontract is different from that appended to the general contract in that the subcontract schedule C lacks a separately listed item for spoil removal.\nIn its less-than-artful briefs, Correct/All claims that it prepared the version of schedule C that included the separate spoil removal item and submitted it to Cox for incorporation into Cox\u2019s bid proposal to the City. Correct/All further claims that Cox\u2019s estimate then became binding, requiring Cox to pay to Correct/All the sum of $170,025.75 for spoil removal. Cox responds by agreeing that the schedule C attached to the szzdcontract does lack a numbered spoil removal item. However, Cox argues, the schedule C submitted by Cox along with its bid proposal to the City of Chicago was a nonbinding estimate. No \u201cline-item number\u201d accompanied the spoil removal notation in the schedule C submitted with the bid.\nCox further notes that had Correct/All disagreed with the numbered items of work listed in the subcontract schedule C, Correct/ All had the option simply to refuse to sign the contract as written. Correct/All freely signed the subcontract containing the allegedly altered schedule C without disputing any of its terms. Correct/All does not argue that it signed the subcontract on other than a level playing field, nor is there evidence in the record of coercion.\nCox\u2019s motion for sanctions is framed in terms of Supreme Court Rule 137, which governs proceedings in the trial court. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. However, Rule 375 is the appropriate basis for sanctions in the appellate court for improper conduct on appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 375. A motion for sanctions that is improperly brought in the appellate court pursuant to Rule 137 may be treated as properly brought under Rule 375 and considered on its merits. Kennedy v. Miller, 197 Ill. App. 3d 785, 788-89 (1990).\nRule 375 allows this court to impose sanctions when \u201can appeal or other action [is] not taken in good faith.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b). Despite Correct/AU\u2019s assertion on appeal that Cox obtained both the summary determination and first summary judgment orders by deceptively \u201caltering\u201d the schedule C appended to the subcontract, the record reveals that Correct/All itself had previously admitted before the trial court the authenticity of the allegedly altered document on no fewer than three separate occasions. First, Correct/All attached a copy of the subcontract to its cross-claim against Cox without disputing the authenticity of the attached schedule C. Correct/All itself therefore submitted the allegedly altered document to the trial court. Second, Correct/All filed an answer to Cox\u2019s counterclaim, in which Correct/All admitted that the copy of the subcontract attached to Cox\u2019s counterclaim, including schedule C, was true and correct. Finally, Correct/All filed an answer to Cox\u2019s motion for summary judgment, in which Correct/All admitted that the copy of the subcontract attached to Cox\u2019s motion, including schedule C, was true and correct.\nBecause Correct/All repeatedly admitted the authenticity of the subcontract schedule C before the trial court, and despite Mr. Strong\u2019s vehement protests to the contrary, Correct/All\u2019s challenge of the document on appeal as \u201cfraudulent\u201d cannot be said to have been made \u201cin good faith\u201d within the meaning of Rule 375.\nWe fail to see the relevance of Mr. Strong\u2019s contention, in Correct/ All\u2019s response to Cox\u2019s motion for sanctions, that he was not of record during trial but was retained for purposes of appeal only. Rule 375 imposes upon Mr. Strong, and every other appellate counsel, a good-faith duty to thoroughly investigate the trial record and to refrain from making arguments before this court that are clearly contradicted by that record. \u201c[C]onduct [on appeal] will be found to be improper if a reasonable prudent attorney would not have engaged in such conduct.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b), Committee Comments. In Correct/All\u2019s response to Cox\u2019s motion for sanctions, Mr. Strong insists that \u201creasonable inquiry was made\u201d and that \u201cthe facts set forth above are warranted by existing law.\u201d Even a cursory examination of the operant facts belies this specious representation. A reasonable prudent attorney would have made a thorough investigation of the trial record and refrained, in the face of multiple admissions by his client of the authenticity of a document, from accusing an opposing party and its counsel of fraud predicated on the alleged alteration of that same document. We find that this argument was \u201cimproper\u201d within the meaning of Rule 375.\nThe committee comments to Rule 375 state that when conduct on appeal is found to be improper, \u201cthe subjective nature of the conduct is then important to determine the appropriate nature and amount of the sanction.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 375(b), Committee Comments. We find Correct/All and Mr. Strong\u2019s conduct in this regard to be egregious. The decision to accuse an opposing party or its counsel of perpetrating a fraud on the court is a momentous one. When the decision is made to go forward on such a charge, one would hope that the charging party was solidly armed with competent, clear, and convincing evidence supporting his theory. .\nWe are particularly disturbed that Mr. Strong chose to accuse fellow officers of the court of an offense meriting disbarment for the sole purpose of attempting to gain an advantage in litigation, as his statement in Correct/All\u2019s response to Cox\u2019s motion for sanctions clearly demonstrates:\n\u201cAlso, because the order that reduced the lien was entered in 1997, it was this writer\u2019s opinion that attacking that order in the manner that it was attacked was the best proper legal avenue under the circumstances.\u201d\nMr. Strong would do well to remember his duty under the Rules of Professional Conduct not to \u201cassert *** an issue [in any proceeding], unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 3.1. Not only did these charges lack any semblance of substance, they were both spurious and embarrassingly silly.\nUpon careful review of the record on appeal, the parties\u2019 briefs and all motions filed in this matter, this court hereby grants Cox\u2019s motion for sanctions against Correct/All and its counsel, Mr. Lamont Cranston Strong. We order Correct/All and Mr. Strong to pay to Cox both the reasonable costs of these appeals and any other expenses incurred by Cox in defending these appeals. These expenses shall include reasonable attorney fees in an amount to be determined, subject to counsel for Cox submitting to this court, within 14 days after the filing of this judgment, an affidavit setting forth such expenses and fees.\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed, with sanctions.\nMcNULTY, EJ:, and O\u2019MARA FROSSARD, J., concur.\nIn light of the foregoing, we conclude that we are justified in deciding the merits of Correct/All\u2019s second appeal without separate briefs from the parties. This court has previously held that briefs are for the convenience of the court, for the purpose of presenting the parties\u2019 arguments to the court in a coherent manner. 47th & State Currency Exchange, Inc. v. B. Coleman Corp., 56 Ill. App. 3d 229, 232 (1977). Correct/All\u2019s second notice of appeal refers solely to the order entering the second summary judgment motion in favor of Cox, as well as the denial of Correct/All\u2019s motion to \u201cvacate\u201d that order (actually a motion to reconsider). \u201c \u2018It is well established that an appellate court has jurisdiction only of those matters which are raised in the notice of appeal.\u2019 \u201d Steinberg v. System Software Associates, Inc., 306 Ill. App. 3d 157, 166 (1999), quoting Lewanski v. Lewanski, 59 111. App. 3d 805, 815 (1978); 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2). Therefore, these are the only matters properly before us in Correct/ All\u2019s second appeal.\nAs discussed earlier, we are limited on appeal from summary judgment to determining whether a genuine issue of material fact was raised and, if not, whether judgment as a matter of law was correctly entered. Malanowski, 293 111. App. 3d at 724. Therefore, any argument Correct/All might raise in its second appeal would necessarily be limited to one of these avenues of consideration. We have found that through its failure to file any affidavits in opposition to Cox\u2019s motions, Correct/All failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact before the trial court. No argument Correct/All makes in an additional brief will alter this finding. We have also closely scrutinized the record in Correct/All\u2019s second appeal and determined that the trial court correctly entered judgment in favor of Cox on the second summary judgment motion and Correct/All\u2019s motion to reconsider. Again, no matter what argument Correct/All might make before us, the fact remains that, accepting Cox\u2019s affidavits as true, Cox was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Under these circumstances, we can conceive of no argument Correct/All might make that would be sufficient to alter the outcome of our analysis. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy, we decide Correct/All\u2019s second appeal on the record only.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COHEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lament Cranston Strong, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Thomas G. Moffitt, of McCracken, Walsh, deLavan & Hetler, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "SACRAMENTO CRUSHING CORPORATION, Plaintiff, v. CORRECT/ALL SEWER, INC., et al., Defendants (Correct/All Sewer, Inc., Cross-Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. E.A. Cox Company, Cross-Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNos. 1\u201499\u20140882, 1\u201400\u20142313 cons.\nOpinion filed December 29, 2000.\nRehearing denied February 5, 2001.\nLament Cranston Strong, of Chicago, for appellant.\nThomas G. Moffitt, of McCracken, Walsh, deLavan & Hetler, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0571-01", "first_page_order": 591, "last_page_order": 602 }