{ "id": 1527725, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK C. RUSH III, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Rush", "decision_date": "2001-03-02", "docket_number": "No. 2 \u2014 00\u20140105", "first_page": "34", "last_page": "41", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 34" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "267 Ill. App. 3d 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 333061 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "officer \"clearly\" had probable cause where defendant had a bloody face and slurred speech, smelled strongly of alcohol, admitted that he had been drinking, and failed two field sobriety tests" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/267/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453265 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" }, { "page": "614-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156882 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "Fifth District holds that \"[e]rratic driving, such as crossing the center line, is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5785380 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "696", "parenthetical": "Fourth District follows DiSpirito" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2494492 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" }, { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/195/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 149", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3648379 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151", "parenthetical": "stop invalid where \"defendant gave an unrefuted, reasonable explanation for his safe usage of the oncoming lane\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0149-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5294433 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64", "parenthetical": "a \"single, momentary crossing of the center line, without more, does not necessarily provide a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8498717 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430", "parenthetical": "affirming ruling that there were no \"reasonable grounds for a stop\"" }, { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "296 Ill. App. 3d 71", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 222591 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" }, { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/296/0071-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "1401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229707 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "applying Ornelas to ultimate question whether confession was voluntary" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "following Ornelas" }, { "parenthetical": "following Ornelas" }, { "parenthetical": "following Ornelas" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209968 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" }, { "page": "920" }, { "page": "1663" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 Ill. App. 3d 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5409608 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "601" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/249/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910188 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/0079-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 775, "char_count": 16600, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0541379676227665e-07, "percentile": 0.8561462463641702 }, "sha256": "0cae1d99def6bef0b03fa28eedaf07d1057287ad522a0a7efd7a0426d736a9a5", "simhash": "1:390e814e6746efb7", "word_count": 2721 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:43:10.227950+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK C. RUSH III, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE RAPP\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Mark C. Rush III, was arrested and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 1998)) and driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(1) (West 1998)). In addition, he was given notice that his driving privileges would be summarily suspended. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1 (West 1998). He moved to suppress the State\u2019s evidence, arguing that he was stopped and arrested in violation of the fourth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. IV). He also petitioned to rescind the summary suspension, contending that the arresting officer lacked \u201creasonable grounds\u201d to believe that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. See 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1(b) (West 1998). The trial court granted both the motion and the petition, and the State appeals, asserting that the stop and arrest were valid. We reverse and remand.\nFollowing a traffic stop, Brian Ketter, an Ogle County deputy sheriff, arrested defendant for DUI. He ticketed defendant for DUI, transporting alcohol illegally (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 502(a) (West 1998)), and driving in the wrong lane (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 701(a) (West 1998)). Defendant submitted to a chemical test that revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.11. As a result, he received the notice of summary suspension. Ketter stated on the notice that he had \u201creasonable grounds\u201d to arrest defendant for DUI. Ketter explained:\n\u201cRush was observed crossing center line once and fog line once. Rush had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, strong odor of alcohol and admitted consuming alcohol. Rush failed all field sobriety tests.\u201d\nAt a hearing, the trial court first took up defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Defendant testified that, on October 24, 1999, about 1:30 a.m., he was driving alone in his Dodge pickup truck. He noticed that a vehicle was following him \u201cvery closely.\u201d The vehicle \u201cmade [him] a little nervous so [he] kept an eye on it.\u201d After following him for about 4Va miles, the vehicle activated its emergency lights, revealing that it was a police car. Defendant pulled over and was ultimately arrested. He never saw a warrant for his arrest.\nOn cross-examination, defendant testified that he admitted to the officer that he had consumed \u201cfive to six beers\u201d since the previous evening. He added later that he had consumed \u201ca couple\u201d of beers with his dinner. Defendant did not believe that he had committed any traffic violation.\nThe court found that the burden on the motion had shifted to the State. The State called Ketter, who testified as follows. On October 24, he was driving his vehicle behind a Dodge. He saw the Dodge \u201ccross the yellow center line twice\u201d and \u201ccross the white fog line.\u201d He stopped the Dodge and spoke with defendant, the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Ketter told defendant why he had stopped him. Ketter noticed that defendant \u201chad slurred speech\u201d and emitted \u201ca strong odor of alcohol.\u201d Defendant admitted that he had consumed \u201cfive to six beers\u201d since the previous evening. Defendant also said that \u201can open can of beer\u201d was \u201con the passenger\u2019s seat.\u201d\nKetter asked defendant to exit the vehicle so that he could perform some field sobriety tests. Defendant complied, telling Ketter that no disabilities prevented him from standing, walking, or counting. Ketter directed defendant to a \u201cnice, level area,\u201d where he performed the tests.\nFirst, Ketter asked defendant to put his arms at his sides, stand on one leg, and count to 30. Ketter demonstrated the test, and defendant said that he understood. Because defendant \u201craised his arms\u201d and \u201cdropped his foot to the ground five *** times,\u201d he failed the test.\nSecond, Ketter asked defendant to take nine steps, heel to toe, back and forth along the white fog line. Ketter demonstrated the test, and defendant had no questions. Because defendant stepped off the line \u201cseveral times,\u201d failed \u201cto touch heel to toe,\u201d and \u201craised his hands\u201d for balance, he failed the test.\nThird, Ketter asked defendant to close his eyes, tip his head back, and touch his nose with a finger on each hand. Although defendant\u2019s movements were \u201cslow and deliberate,\u201d he passed the test.\nFourth, Ketter administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test. He noticed that, as defendant\u2019s eyes were following a pen, they \u201cdid not follow the pen smoothly back and forth, they were jerking.\u201d Defendant also \u201chad an onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees.\u201d\nFinally, Ketter administered a portable breath test (PBT), which indicated an alcohol level of 0.07. Based on his tests, Ketter believed that defendant was under the influence of alcohol. Defendant then told Ketter that he had consumed \u201cseven or eight beers\u201d since the previous afternoon.\nOn cross-examination, Ketter testified that he followed defendant\u2019s vehicle for about four miles. He was \u201cthree to four car lengths\u201d behind defendant\u2019s vehicle. Defendant did not exceed the speed limit, disregard any traffic control devices, or impede any other vehicles. Ketter acknowledged that, on the notice of summary suspension, he wrote that defendant had crossed the center line only once. Ketter maintained that defendant actually crossed it twice.\nAfter Ketter followed defendant for about two miles, defendant\u2019s left tires crossed the center line entirely \u201cfor a matter of seconds.\u201d Next, his right tires \u201crode the white fog line for a matter of several seconds.\u201d Finally, less than a minute after he first crossed the center line, his left tires \u201ctouched and rode the center line.\u201d Ketter effected the stop because he believed that defendant may have been intoxicated. When Ketter activated his emergency lights, defendant pulled over promptly and properly.\nKetter asked d\u00e9fendant for his driver\u2019s license, which he produced without difficulty. Ketter did not ask defendant to count backward from 80 to 60 while still in the vehicle. Defendant exited the vehicle without difficulty. His clothes were not disheveled. His speech, though slurred, was understandable. On the walk-and-turn test, he timely started and stopped, he took the required number of steps, and he made a proper turn. Because defendant passed the finger-to-nose test, Ketter erred in writing on the notice of summary suspension that defendant had failed all the tests. In general, defendant\u2019s balance was good, and he was very cooperative.\nIn rebuttal, defendant testified that he did not cross any line or commit any traffic violation. Nevertheless, when Ketter stopped him, Ketter told him that he had crossed the lines. Ketter did ask him to count backward from 80 to 60, and defendant complied without difficulty. Defendant was not athletic or coordinated and was unable to stand on one leg for 30 seconds. However, on the walk-and-turn test, he stayed on the line and walked heel to toe.\nAfter arguing the motion to suppress, the parties stipulated that the evidence on the petition to rescind would be the same. In a written order, the trial court stated as follows:\n\u201c1. That the Defendant *** was stopped *** and the officer did not have an arrest warrant ***.\n2. The officer testified that *** the Defendant crossed the center-line twice and the fog line once and in the officer\u2019s warning to motorist wrote that the Defendant crossed the center line once and the fog line once.\n3. The officer did not indicate any other erratic driving and did not indicate any weaving by the Defendant other than the momentary crossing of the center line.\nIT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Defendant\u2019s Motion to *** Suppress Evidence is granted and the Defendant\u2019s Petition to Rescind Statutory Summary Suspension is granted for no reasonable grounds.\u201d\nThe State appealed.\nInitially, we note that defendant\u2019s motion and petition raised overlapping issues. In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that Ketter lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him and probable cause to arrest him. In his petition to rescind, he claimed that Ketter lacked \u201creasonable grounds\u201d to arrest him. See 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1(b) (West 1998). In this context, \u201creasonable grounds\u201d is synonymous with \u201cprobable cause.\u201d People v. Fortney, 297 Ill. App. 3d 79, 87 (1998). Therefore, as the trial court did, we shall consider the motion and the petition together.\nIn general, a ruling on a motion to suppress or a petition to rescind will be reversed only if it is manifestly erroneous. People v. Scott, 249 Ill. App. 3d 597, 601 (1993). However, because defendant\u2019s motion and petition turned on questions of reasonable suspicion and probable cause, we must apply a different standard of review. In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996), the Supreme Court stated:\n\u201c [D] eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. *** [However,] a reviewing court should take care both to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers.\u201d Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S. Ct. at 1663.\nSee People v. Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 311 (1998), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000) (following Ornelas).\nThus our review will consist of two steps. First, we will reverse the trial court\u2019s factual findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Second, we will review de novo the ultimate questions whether reasonable suspicion justified the stop and whether probable cause (or \u201creasonable grounds\u201d) justified the arrest. See In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37, 50 (2000) (applying Ornelas to ultimate question whether confession was voluntary).\nAlthough the trial court\u2019s ruling was terse and did not set forth specific findings of fact, it clearly was based on the determination that \u201cthe momentary crossing of the center line\u201d was insufficient to support the stop. Therefore, we surmise that the court must have believed Deputy Ketter, at least to the extent necessary to find that the officer observed defendant cross the center line and the fog line. Because that finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must determine whether that \u201cmomentary crossing\u201d supported the stop.\nA traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or an occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 673, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979); People v. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d 71, 74 (1998). Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts; a mere hunch is insufficient. Brodack, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 74. Here we point out that the language in the trial court\u2019s ruling suggests that it found \u201cno reasonable grounds\u201d for the stop. If that was the court\u2019s conclusion, the court invoked the wrong standard. Again, \u201creasonable grounds\u201d means \u201cprobable cause,\u201d and a stop requires not probable cause but only reasonable suspicion. We note that even the appellate court has confused \u201creasonable grounds\u201d with \u201creasonable suspicion.\u201d See, e.g., People v. Decker, 181 Ill. App. 3d 427, 430 (1989) (affirming ruling that there were no \u201creasonable grounds for a stop\u201d). In this context, however, the terms are distinctly different.\nDistricts of the appellate court have split over whether reasonable suspicion may stem from a defendant\u2019s brief crossing of the center line. The Third District has at least implied that a \u201cnonhazardous, momentary crossing of the center line,\u201d standing alone, does not support a valid stop. Decker, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 430; see also People v. Faletti, 215 Ill. App. 3d 61, 64 (1991) (a \u201csingle, momentary crossing of the center line, without more, does not necessarily provide a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop\u201d); People v. Collins, 154 Ill. App. 3d 149, 151 (1987) (stop invalid where \u201cdefendant gave an unrefuted, reasonable explanation for his safe usage of the oncoming lane\u201d). \u2022\nThis court, however, has disagreed. In Village of Lincolnshire v. DiSpirito, 195 Ill. App. 3d 859, 864 (1990), the defendant \u201ccross[ed] over the center line for a brief moment.\u201d An officer stopped him and ultimately arrested him for DUI. The defendant moved to suppress the State\u2019s evidence, arguing that the stop was invalid. The trial court denied the motion, the defendant was convicted of DUI, and he appealed.\nWe noted that, in general, a driver is required by law to stay to the right of the center line. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 701(a) (West 1998). The law contains some exceptions, however, and the defendant claimed that he legally made a nonhazardous crossing to avoid an obstruction. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 701(a) (West 1998). Nevertheless, the officer did not see any obstruction, and the validity of a stop depends only on the facts that are available to the officer. Because the officer \u201cmerely saw the defendant\u2019s car drive out of the proper lane,\u201d his knowledge \u201cprovided [him] with sufficiently specific and articulable facts from which a reasonable person might conclude that a law was being broken.\u201d DiSpirito, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 864. On that basis, we validated the stop.\nThus, contrary to the Third District\u2019s implication, a driver\u2019s single, momentary crossing of the center line, without more, is a sufficient basis for a stop. The stop is invalid only if the officer knows additional facts that make it reasonably apparent that the crossing is legal. See also People v. Gerwick, 235 Ill. App. 3d 691, 696 (1992) (Fourth District follows DiSpirito); People v. Goestenkors, 278 Ill. App. 3d 144, 149 (1996) (Fifth District holds that \u201c[e]rratic driving, such as crossing the center line, is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop\u201d).\nHere, defendant presented no evidence to suggest that his crossing was legal. He suggested that, if he did cross, he made a nonhazardous crossing that stemmed from the closeness of Ketter\u2019s pursuit. However, the law does not permit a driver to cross the center line merely because he is being closely followed. See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 701(a) (West 1998). Therefore, it is clear that Ketter knew no facts to indicate that defendant\u2019s crossing was legal. Ketter had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed an offense, and his stop of defendant was valid.\nWe now address the validity of defendant\u2019s arrest for DUI. A warrantless arrest requires probable cause, which is equivalent to \u201creasonable grounds.\u201d People v. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d 592, 614 (2000); Fortney, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 87. Probable cause exists if an officer knows facts that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the arrestee has committed an offense. Although probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it requires more than mere suspicion. Sims, 192 Ill. 2d at 614-15.\nWe observe that the trial court expressed no findings about what occurred after the stop. However, defendant presented no evidence to dispute the following of Ketter\u2019s assertions: (1) defendant\u2019s speech, though understandable, was slurred; (2) defendant smelled strongly of alcohol; (3) defendant admitted that he had consumed several beers since the previous evening; (4) defendant had an open beer in his vehicle; (5) defendant failed the one-legged-stand test; (6) the HGN test revealed that defendant\u2019s eyes were \u201cjerking\u201d; and (7) the PBT indicated an alcohol concentration of 0.07. These uncontested facts leave no doubt that Ketter had probable cause to arrest defendant for DUI. Cf. People v. Crocker, 267 Ill. App. 3d 343, 346 (1994) (officer \u201cclearly\u201d had probable cause where defendant had a bloody face and slurred speech, smelled strongly of alcohol, admitted that he had been drinking, and failed two field sobriety tests).\nIn sum, we determine that Ketter had a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and probable cause (or \u201creasonable grounds\u201d) to arrest him. Therefore, we reverse the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to suppress and petition to rescind, and we remand the cause.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nGEOMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE RAPP" } ], "attorneys": [ "Douglas E Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.", "Robert T. Hanson, of Moehle, Smith, Nieman, Hanson & Hahn, EC., of Oregon, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARK C. RUSH III, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20140105\nOpinion filed March 2, 2001.\nDouglas E Floski, State\u2019s Attorney, of Oregon (Martin E Moltz and Gregory L. Slovacek, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People.\nRobert T. Hanson, of Moehle, Smith, Nieman, Hanson & Hahn, EC., of Oregon, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0034-01", "first_page_order": 52, "last_page_order": 59 }