{ "id": 1527792, "name": "RACHELL GARNER, Indiv. and as Mother and Next Friend of Kimberly Garner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellants (Edward M. Burke, Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Garner v. City of Chicago", "decision_date": "2001-01-30", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 99\u20140280", "first_page": "255", "last_page": "269", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 255" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "504 N.E.2d 84", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 Ill. 2d 337", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3179946 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/115/0337-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 N.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 Ill. 2d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3238606 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/141/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 1111", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 N.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588592 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 N.E.2d 1120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 Ill. 2d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 198921 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/166/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "618 N.E.2d 609", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same language as Snyder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 Ill. App. 3d 451", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2945306 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457-58", "parenthetical": "same language as Snyder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/248/0451-01" ] }, { "cite": "634 N.E.2d 756", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[e]ach word, clause, or sentence [of a statute] must not be rendered superfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 Ill. App. 3d 986", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5374697 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989-90", "parenthetical": "\"[e]ach word, clause, or sentence [of a statute] must not be rendered superfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/261/0986-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 N.E.2d 937", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same language as Kraft, Inc." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 Ill. 2d 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3126692 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "same language as Kraft, Inc." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/109/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "561 N.E.2d 656", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "\"A statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 N.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 Ill. App. 3d 841", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 150237 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/281/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 N.E.2d 1202", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 488", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3609351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0488-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 N.E.2d 343", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 Ill. App. 3d 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2927283 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549-50" }, { "page": "549-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/11/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 1024", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35342 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1026" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/1024-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1044, "char_count": 32389, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.9984213249313e-08, "percentile": 0.42286519407116013 }, "sha256": "8565bcfa787e5ee7ce4433f19b4dbf22aa80459b598cdea7a0a675470f07615a", "simhash": "1:b66df06dc9062c47", "word_count": 5366 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:43:10.227950+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "RACHELL GARNER, Indiv. and as Mother and Next Friend of Kimberly Garner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellants (Edward M. Burke, Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McBRIDE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal involves the interpretation of a Chicago municipal ordinance which provides benefits to family members of slain police officers. Plaintiffs-appellees, Rachell and Kimberly Garner (collectively the Garners), are the widow and child of Sergeant Michael Garner (Decedent). Decedent, a police officer employed by the City of Chicago, died on July 12, 1997. Defendants-appellants are the City of Chicago; the City of Chicago Board of Trustees of the Policemen\u2019s and Firemen\u2019s Death Benefit Fund (the Board); Matt L. Rodriguez, superintendent of the Chicago police department (the Superintendent); Edward Altman, commissioner of the City of Chicago fire department; and Whitney W. Addington, president of the City of Chicago board of health. Also named as a defendant is Edward M. Burke, a Chicago alderman and chairman of the City of Chicago committee on finance (Alderman Burke) (when addressed collectively, defendants-appellants will be referred to as the City). Alderman Burke, however, retained his own counsel and supports the Garners\u2019 position on the question to be decided by this court.\nThe trial court granted the Garners\u2019 request for declaratory relief, and the dispute between the parties on appeal centers around the trial court\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 of the Chicago Municipal Code (section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040). Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 (1999). Section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, in conjunction with other provisions in the ordinance, provides benefits to family members of police officers or firefighters who are killed while in the line of duty.\nSection 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 of the Chicago Municipal Code states, in pertinent part:\n\u201cIt shall be the duty of the superintendent of police in the case of a policeman, and of the fire commissioner in the case of a fireman, upon the occurrence of any injury in the performance of duty, to have immediate medical care and hospital treatment given to such injured policeman or fireman, to make or cause to be made a complete and careful investigation of all facts surrounding the occurrence, to obtain the statements of all material witnesses, and to present the said report without delay to the said board of trustees for consideration and action thereon, including the determination as to whether or not such injury arose from violence or other accidental cause and was received by the deceased policeman or fireman while he was in the performance of his duty. Such report shall show the actual date and hour of the injury, the place of occurrence, the names and addresses of witnesses and the apparent nature and extent of the injury.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014 040 (1999).\nIn their complaint for declaratory judgment, the Garners asserted that Decedent was killed while in the performance of his duty. The Garners also claimed that under section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 the Superintendent is required to conduct an investigation whenever a police officer is killed in the performance of his duty. They also argued that, under section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, the Superintendent must submit the results of the investigation to the Board, which then makes the decision as to whether or not the family members are entitled to benefits. After the Superintendent refused to issue a report concerning Decedent\u2019s death, the Garners filed the instant declaratory judgment action in the circuit court. The circuit court held that the Superintendent acted in violation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 by not issuing a report and ordered the Superintendent to conduct an investigation concerning the death of Decedent. The circuit court also ordered that the results of the Superintendent\u2019s investigation be submitted to the Board. The record reveals the following facts.\nDecedent died of multiple gunshot wounds on the evening of July 12, 1997. That evening Decedent had been in a tavern with Cindalyn Meadows (Meadows), a woman with whom he was having an affair. After drinking at the tavern, Decedent and Meadows drove their own automobiles to the 7000 block of South Bell Street, Chicago, Illinois. After they both parked, Meadows got into Decedent\u2019s car.\nMeadows, an eyewitness to the shooting, indicated that while they sat together in Decedent\u2019s automobile, another car stalled near Decedent\u2019s car. At one point, one of the men gathered around the stalled car approached Decedent\u2019s vehicle. The man, later identified as Stanley Wofford (Wofford), appeared to be gesturing to Decedent like he was asking if Decedent wanted any drugs. Decedent then indicated that he did not want to communicate with Wofford and \u201cwaved him away.\u201d Wofford walked away but, soon thereafter, approached Decedent\u2019s automobile again to inquire if Decedent had any jumper cables to start the stalled car. Decedent responded that he had no jumper cables and Wofford, again, walked away.\nA few minutes later, a black two-door automobile pulled up alongside Decedent\u2019s car. According to Meadows, the driver of the black car was Wofford, who asked Decedent: \u201cWhere do you come from?\u201d and \u201cWhat do you want?\u201d Wofford then exited the black vehicle with an automatic handgun in his hand. In response, Decedent exited his automobile carrying his own handgun. A physical altercation ensued between Decedent and Wofford. During the struggle, Decedent was shot multiple times and was pronounced dead on the morning of July, 12, 1997.\nAfter investigating the incident, the Superintendent found that Decedent was not acting in the performance of his duty at the time of death. Further, the Superintendent concluded, pursuant to section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, that he did not have to report the circumstances of Decedent\u2019s death to the Board. The Garners thereafter filed their complaint for declaratory, injunctive and other relief in the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the original complaint and allowed the Garners to replead their declaratory judgment count. The Garners filed an amended complaint in which they requested a declaration that section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 required the Superintendent to conduct an investigation concerning Decedent\u2019s death and to submit the results of that inquiry to the Board. At the hearing before the circuit court, the Garners orally moved for judgment on the pleadings concerning the above declaration. The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings and as indicated earlier ordered the Superintendent to conduct an investigation concerning the Decedent\u2019s death and to submit a report to the Board for review. This appeal followed.\nThe sole question on appeal concerns the interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040. Specifically, under the facts of this case, could the Superintendent, in conformity with section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, unilaterally determine whether or not the Decedent, a police officer, was injured while in the performance of his duty as opposed to reserving that decision for the Board. As the question involves the construction of a municipal ordinance, a question of law, this court\u2019s standard of review is de novo. Daley v. American Drug Stores, Inc., 294 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1026, 691 N.E.2d 846 (1998).\nThe language at issue in section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 has been set out above and will not be repeated here. We note however that the language of sections 3 \u2014 8\u2014030 and 3 \u2014 8\u2014050 is also relevant in construing section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040. Section 3 \u2014 8\u2014030 states, in pertinent part: \u201cA board composed of four members shall constitute a board of trustees authorized to carry out *** provisions dealing with the policemen\u2019s *** death benefit fund, and shall be charged with the duty of administering that fund.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014030 (1999). Section 3 \u2014 8\u2014050 states, in relevant part:\n\u201cNo such award or payment shall be made unless satisfactory proof shall have been presented to the board of trustees that death occurred within one year from the date of injury, that such injury arose from violence or other accidental cause, that such injury was received while in the performance of duty, and that such injury was the direct cause of death. The amount of the award shall be determined by order of court, entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, declaring heirship.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014 050 (1999).\nThe Garners contend that they properly alleged that Decedent was injured while \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d in paragraph 10 of their amended complaint, which states:\n\u201cOn July 12, 1997, Michael Garner [Decedent] was assigned by the Chicago Police Department to work narcotics as a plain clothes officer and was parked in an unmarked City of Chicago police vehicle, at which time he was in possession of his department issued radio, cellular phone, badge, identification Chicago Police baseball cap and was armed with an approved and registered handgun.\u201d\nThe amended complaint additionally provides in Paragraph 19: \u201cSergeant Garner\u2019s [Decedent\u2019s] actions in confronting Wofford and attempting to disarm, subdue and arrest him were actions in the performance of his duty as a Chicago police officer.\u201d Moreover, the Garners claim that because Wofford was carrying a firearm upon a public street, Decedent had a duty to apprehend Wofford under the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, and thus, Decedent was injured while in the performance of a police duty when he was killed. 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 16 (West 1998). Based upon the allegations contained in the amended complaint and the language of the statute, the Garners argue that it is the Board\u2019s function to determine whether an officer is fatally injured while in the performance of his duty.\nIn response, the City claims it was the Superintendent\u2019s function to determine whether an injury occurred while in the performance of duty and that it was reasonable for the Superintendent to have determined that Decedent was not injured in the line of duty because: (1) he was drinking in a private car; (2) he was with a woman; and (3) he \u201cwound up in\u201d an altercation that was unrelated to his duties. The record demonstrates however that the Superintendent never explained what factors he relied upon in determining that Decedent was not injured while in the performance of his duty at the time he was killed.\nWe make no determination as to whether or not Decedent was actually injured while \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d at the time of his death as that is not the issue on appeal; we only decide whether the Superintendent had the authority to unilaterally determine that Decedent was not injured while in the performance of his duty. We conclude that under the statute at issue only the Board could make that determination and that the Garners were entitled to declaratory relief.\nFirst, the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure provides the following:\n\u201cIt is the duty of every *** policeman, *** when a criminal offense or breach of the peace is committed or attempted in his or her presence, forthwith to apprehend the offender and bring him or her before a judge, to be dealt with according to law; to suppress all riots and unlawful assemblies, and to keep the peace, ***.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 16 (West 1998).\nGiven the fact that the Garners alleged that Decedent, at the time of this occurrence, was attempting to disarm Wofford, who was unlawfully carrying a firearm, we conclude the allegations of the complaint raised a question of whether or not Decedent was injured while \u201cin the performance of duty\u201d at the time of his death.\nSecond, Illinois courts have interpreted the language \u201cthe performance of duty\u201d very broadly as noted by the comment below:\n\u201cThe nature of a policeman\u2019s job is that he be fit and armed at all times, whether on or off duty, and subject to respond to any call to enforce the laws and preserve the peace. *** [Citation.] However, since he is always obligated to attempt to prevent the commission of crime in his presence, any action taken by him toward that end, even in his official off-duty hours, falls within the performance of his duties as a police officer.\u201d Banks v. City of Chicago, 11 Ill. App. 3d 543, 549-50, 297 N.E.2d 343 (1973).\nWe note that this proposition has been qualified to exclude an officer\u2019s conduct that \u201cwas entirely in pursuit of personal goals.\u201d Wolf v. Liberis, 153 Ill. App. 3d 488, 493, 505 N.E.2d 1202 (1987). In this case, the City argues that Decedent was in the pursuit of personal goals. We disagree.\nIn Wolf, the officer was following his intoxicated fianc\u00e9e home in his own vehicle. The fianc\u00e9e was intoxicated to the point where she drove her car through a store-front window. Upon witnessing this incident, the officer backed his fianc\u00e9e\u2019s auto from the store front and instructed her to remain there while he went to call the police. The officer then attempted to exit the scene in his own vehicle. Several onlookers attempted to prevent him from leaving the scene and the officer replied that he was \u201con duty.\u201d The onlookers grabbed the officer\u2019s steering wheel in an attempt to thwart him from leaving. When this occurred, the officer lost control of his vehicle and ran head-on into another automobile, killing the decedent. Wolf, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 492.\nUnlike Wolf, Decedent\u2019s conduct in this case cannot be characterized as \u201centirely in pursuit of personal goals\u201d as the amended complaint alleges that Decedent was attempting to disarm Wofford. Although there is some dispute between the parties regarding the interpretation of the facts leading to the shooting, there is apparently no dispute that Wofford was brandishing a weapon on a public street at the time of this occurrence. We also recognize that Banks and Wolf did not involve the interpretation of the ordinance at issue and instead involved the question of whether liability could be imposed against a municipality for the tortious acts of a police officer in the scope of employment. Nonetheless, these cases are instructive for understanding the meaning of the phrase \u201cin the performance of duty.\u201d For purposes of this case, we conclude that the Garners\u2019 amended complaint raised a question of whether Decedent was injured while \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d at the time of this occurrence because it alleged that a crime was being committed in Decedent\u2019s presence, the unlawful use of a weapon, and that Decedent was attempting to disarm the offender. Thus, under Banks and section 107 \u2014 16 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Decedent was obligated to attempt to disarm Wofford and \u201cany action taken by him toward that end, even in his official off-duty hours, falls within the performance of his duties as a police officer.\u201d Banks, 11 Ill. App. 3d at 549-50; 725 ILCS 5/107 \u2014 16 (West 1998).\nThird, we point out that at the hearing on November 13, 1998, the trial judge interpreted section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 by reading sections 3 \u2014 8\u2014 030, 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 and 3 \u2014 8\u2014050 together and determined that, where a question is raised concerning a line-of-duty death, the Board must be charged with evaluating whether the death occurred within the performance of the officer\u2019s duty. The trial court also concluded that the Superintendent\u2019s duty was to complete a report and to submit such report to the Board for a determination as to whether the death occurred while in the performance of duty.\nThe City claims that the trial court\u2019s construction of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014 040 was erroneous because the plain meaning of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 limits the Board\u2019s discretion to confer benefits in cases where the Superintendent has first determined that an officer was killed in the performance of duty. According to the City, section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 establishes the Superintendent as a \u201cgatekeeper,\u201d where he is charged with unilaterally determining whether or not an officer is killed while in the performance of duty. We disagree.\nAs noted by the Garners: \u201cUnder the well-established rules of statutory construction, the words used in a statute must be given their ordinary and popularly understood meaning, and the relevant language must be read within the context of the entire provision of which it forms an integral part.\u201d Illinois Wood Energy Partners, L.P. v. County of Cook, 281 Ill. App. 3d 841, 850, 667 N.E.2d 477 (1995). In our view, sections 3 \u2014 8\u2014030, 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 and 3 \u2014 8\u2014050 must be read together to determine the intent of the ordinance as a whole. We note that the second part of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 is particularly instructive, where the ordinance\u2019s language states the following:\n\u201cIt shall be the duty of the superintendent of police *** to present the said report without delay to the said hoard of trustees for consideration and action thereon, including the determination as to whether or not such injury *** was received by the deceased policeman *** while he was in the performance of his duty.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 (1999).\nThis section clearly delegates the determination of whether or not the injury occurred \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d to the Board, not the Superintendent. Further, section 3 \u2014 8\u2014050, the following provision in the ordinance states, in pertinent part: \u201cNo such award or payment shall be made unless satisfactory proof shall have been presented to the board of trustees that death occurred *** while in the performance of duty, and that such injury was the direct cause of death.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014050 (1999).\nIn addition, although section 3 \u2014 8\u2014060 of the ordinance was not considered by the trial court, that section further suggests that the Board, not the Superintendent, makes the determination of whether the officer\u2019s death occurred \u201cin the performance of his duty.\u201d Section 3 \u2014 8\u2014060 states, in relevant part, \u201cSaid board of trustees shall submit to the comptroller a report of its findings ***, stating that such [officer\u2019s] death was the result of injury received in the performance of duty, in all cases where such is the determination of the board ***.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014060 (1999). In our view, the language in section 3 \u2014 8\u2014060 also demonstrates that the intent of the city council was to grant the Board the power to determine whether or not an officer was fatally injured while in the performance of duty.\nReading the language of the above provisions together, we find that the intent of the city council was for the Superintendent to conduct an investigation and to submit his report to the Board for review. Thereafter, only the Board is charged with making the determination as to whether or not the officer was injured \u201cwhile he was in the performance of his duty.\u201d Although such a reading of the ordinance eliminates the unilateral decision by the Superintendent of a line-of-duty death, it allows for the determination of benefits to be made by the full Board. Only this interpretation gives meaning to the language of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 that a report be tendered without delay to the Board for \u201cconsideration and action thereon, including the determination as to whether or not such injury was received while the officer was in the performance of his duty.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014 040 (1999).\nBeyond its own interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, the City offers no authority in support of its construction. The City does cite several cases on statutory interpretation: Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990) (\u201cA statute should be construed so that no word or phrase is rendered superfluous or meaningless\u201d); Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 365, 487 N.E.2d 937 (1985) (same language as Kraft, Inc.); Snyder v. Olmstead, 261 Ill. App. 3d 986, 989-90, 634 N.E.2d 756 (1994) (\u201c[e]ach word, clause, or sentence [of a statute] must not be rendered superfluous but must, if possible, be given some reasonable meaning\u201d); and Kaszubowski v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 248 Ill. App. 3d 451, 457-58, 618 N.E.2d 609 (1993) (same language as Snyder). However, we do not find these cases persuasive as they represent only general propositions of statutory construction. In this case, as noted above, we are most persuaded by the proposition that the ordinance\u2019s provisions must be read together for purposes of understanding the overall objective of the statute.\nAs we interpret the statute, the duties of the Superintendent are: (1) \u201cto have immediate medical care *** given to such injured policeman\u201d; (2) \u201cto make or cause to be made a complete and careful investigation of all facts surrounding the occurrence\u201d; (3) \u201cto obtain the statements of all material witnesses\u201d; and (4) \u201cto present the said report without delay to the said board of trustees for consideration and action thereon.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 (1999). Although the City claims that these duties are triggered \u201cupon the occurrence of any injury in the performance of duty,\u201d there is no language in this section directing the Superintendent to first determine whether or not such injury was received while in the performance of duty. This specific charge is delegated only to the Board by the language \u201cincluding the determination as to whether or not such injury *** was received *** in the performance of his duty.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 (1999).\nThe most compelling argument advanced by the City is that the Garners\u2019 interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 creates a \u201ccould have been\u201d standard that is not expressly drawn in the ordinance. Under the Garner\u2019s interpretation, the City claims that the Superintendent\u2019s function would be to conduct an investigation and to report it to the Board in every case where it is alleged that the death \u201ccould have been\u201d received \u201cin the performance of duty.\u201d\nFurther, the City claims that Alderman Burke\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 creates another standard that is not expressly contemplated in the ordinance. According to Alderman Burke, there are three sets of circumstances where every fatal injury or death of a police officer could be appropriately categorized. First, there are situations where the officer was clearly not \u201cin the performance of duty,\u201d such as the off-duty officer who suffers a heart attack in his home. Second, there are situations where the officer is clearly on duty, such as the on-duty officer who responds to a police dispatch and is killed or injured in a shoot-out. Third, there are situations where \u201creasonable minds might differ\u201d as to whether the officer\u2019s fatal injury occurs \u201cin the performance of duty,\u201d such as \u201cwhen a police officer has chosen to act as a police officer when off-duty and suffers a fatal injury.\u201d\nThe City responds by claiming that there is absolutely no language in section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 where a \u201ccould have been\u201d in the performance of duty standard or a \u201creasonable minds might differ\u201d standard has been adopted. In effect, the City contends that the Garners and Alderman Burke are reading a summary judgment standard into section 3 \u2014 8\u2014 040 that does not exist. According to the City, section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 does not require that, when there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether or not the officer was killed \u201cin the performance of duty,\u201d the Board, instead of the Superintendent, is charged with making a determination on the question. The City warns that an adoption of the Garners\u2019 or Alderman Burke\u2019s interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 would lead to considerable litigation concerning officers in \u201cclose cases\u201d or cases where \u201creasonable minds might differ\u201d as to whether or not the officer was \u201cin the performance of duty.\u201d\nAlthough one could argue that the first portion of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014 040 is ambiguous because the language has yielded two different interpretations concerning who has the authority to determine whether the fatal injuries occurred while in the performance of duty, in these instances our supreme court has stated:\n\u201c[T]he language of the statute is the best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent [citation]. Where the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language itself, the court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils the law was designed to remedy. [Citation.]\u201d Wagner v City of Chicago, 166 Ill. 2d 144, 149, 651 N.E.2d 1120 (1995).\nSection 3 \u2014 8\u2014010 of the ordinance establishes that the purpose of the enactment is \u201cfor the payment of allowances of money to the family or dependents of any policeman *** of the city of Chicago in case he is killed or fatally injured while in the performance of his duties.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014010 (1999). Section 3 \u2014 8\u2014030 authorizes the Board to carry out the provisions of the death benefit fund and to administer that fund. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014 030 (1999). To that end, we determine that under the language of the statute the Board, not the Superintendent, is properly charged with making the determination of whether or not an officer was injured \u201cwhile in the performance of his duty.\u201d\nAs earlier recognized, the City maintains that the plain language of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 assigns a threshold determination of whether the officer\u2019s death or injury occurred \u201cin the performance of duty\u201d to the Superintendent. The City also claims that the ordinance must be construed as a whole. Specifically, it refers to the second part of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 referred to by this court above. The City\u2019s interpretation of the latter half of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 is that the responsibilities of the Board are only triggered in the event the Superintendent first determines the officer died or was injured \u201cin the performance of his duty.\u201d Thus, the City\u2019s construction of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 as a whole is that the Superintendent is charged with making a unilateral determination as to whether or not the officer was injured while \u201cin the performance of duty.\u201d Until such determination has been made, the Board has no responsibilities under section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040.\nAs stated above, we disagree with the City\u2019s construction of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 in this case. Construing the statute as a whole we have reached the opposite conclusion. Again, we point out that the language of the statute nowhere states the Superintendent shall first determine whether or not an officer\u2019s death occurred \u201cin the performance of duty.\u201d This determination has been clearly delegated to the Board by the language in the latter part of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, which states, in relevant part, \u201cincluding the determination as to whether or not such injury *** was received by the deceased policeman *** while he was in the performance of his duty.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 (1999). We conclude that the city council intended that only the Board make the determination as to whether or not a police officer was injured while \u201cin the performance of his duty.\u201d This interpretation is consistent with elementary principles of statutory construction set forth by controlling case law. \u201cGenerally, in construing municipal ordinances, the same rules are applied as those which govern the construction of statutes. [Citations.]\u201d In re Application of the County Collector, 132 Ill. 2d 64, 72, 547 N.E.2d 107 (1989). Our supreme court also stated in Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992), in relevant part:\n\u201cThe primary rule of statutory interpretation is that a court should ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. The legislative intent should be sought primarily from the language used in the statute. [Citation.] The statute should be evaluated as a whole; each provision should be construed in connection with every other section. [Citation.]\u201d\nDeferring to the cases cited above concerning statutory construction, the intent and purpose of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 appear to be carried out by granting the Board the authority to determine whether the officer was or was not injured while in the performance of his duty.\nAdditionally, if the statute is interpreted as the City suggests, the language that authorizes the Board to determine whether or not the officer\u2019s injuries occurred while in the performance of duty is rendered meaningless because the Superintendent would make this determination. Section 3 \u2014 8\u2014030 would also be rendered meaningless because it would not be the Board that would carry out the provisions of the ordinance, but essentially the Superintendent. \u201cStatutes are to be construed in a manner that avoids absurd or unjust results.\u201d Croissant v. Joliet Park District, 141 Ill. 2d 449, 455, 566 N.E.2d 248 (1990); Stewart v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 115 Ill. 2d 337, 341, 504 N.E.2d 84 (1987). We conclude that a construction of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 that would effectively eliminate the purpose of the Board would yield such an unjust and absurd result.\nThe City\u2019s argument, that section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 does not contain language requiring the Superintendent to tender the Board cases where a police officer \u201ccould have been\u201d killed in the performance of his duty, is accurate. In addition, section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 does not contain any language adopting a \u201creasonable minds might differ\u201d standard. Yet, we remain with interpreting the language of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 and are charged with providing it practical meaning.\nWe conclude that, in this case, it is reasonable that such a decision should be made by the Board as opposed to being a unilateral one made by the Superintendent. Accordingly, we hold that under section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, the Superintendent should have: (1) provided immediate medical care and hospital treatment to the Decedent; (2) made a complete and careful investigation of all facts surrounding the occurrence; (3) obtained statements of all material witnesses; and (4) presented that report without delay to the Board for consideration and action thereon. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 (1999).\nFurthermore, our interpretation of section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040, granting the Board the authority to decide whether Decedent was or was not \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d eliminates the stigma of, or any actual partiality, bias or favoritism that could be associated with the Superintendent making a unilateral decision. Further, the confusion and litigation that the City warns of do not appear to be of considerable magnitude. In sum, in a situation like this one, where the complaint raises a question of whether or not the officer was fatally injured \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d based upon factual allegations which include, among other things, that a crime was being committed in the officer\u2019s presence, the Superintendent must conduct an investigation and report his findings to the Board. In our view, the purpose of the ordinance and of the Board, itself, was and is to render decisions conferring death benefits to families and beneficiaries of deceased police officers fatally injured while in performance of police duty.\nAs an ancillary matter, we reject the arguments made by the Garners and by Alderman Burke that section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 is \u201cakin\u201d to the pension laws in this state. After reviewing applicable sections of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1998)) -and relevant case law, we conclude that the pension laws are distinguishable from the ordinance in this case. Given our conclusion on the question to be decided, we find it unnecessary to engage in any discussion comparing and contrasting section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 with the Illinois pension laws.\nFinally, we offer no opinion as to whether or not Decedent was killed \u201cin the performance of his duty\u201d under section 3 \u2014 8\u2014040 for the purpose of entitlement to benefits; we have only determined that the Garners were entitled to declaratory relief based upon the allegations contained in their amended complaint. A decision of whether or not Decedent\u2019s injuries arose from violence or other accidental course and whether those injuries were received while Decedent was in the performance of his duty will properly be made by the Board upon tender of the required investigative report by the Superintendent.\nThe decision of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGORDON and SOUTH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McBRIDE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Joseph H. Kim, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.", "Dennis E. Both, of Edward R. Vrdolyak, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "RACHELL GARNER, Indiv. and as Mother and Next Friend of Kimberly Garner, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellants (Edward M. Burke, Defendant).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 99\u20140280\nOpinion filed January 30, 2001.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Joseph H. Kim, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellants.\nDennis E. Both, of Edward R. Vrdolyak, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0255-01", "first_page_order": 273, "last_page_order": 287 }