{ "id": 1527781, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFAYETTE CRUMP Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Crump", "decision_date": "2001-03-13", "docket_number": "No. 3 \u2014 99\u20140675", "first_page": "538", "last_page": "545", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 538" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "576 N.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5289221 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 N.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "51 Ill. App. 3d 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3386743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/51/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.E.2d 130", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 Ill. App. 3d 816", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2893965 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/45/0816-01" ] }, { "cite": "393 N.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "74 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3269841 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/74/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 N.E.2d 1181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 Ill. App. 3d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3114395 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/95/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "656 N.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906704 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 742", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 Ill. App. 3d 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 140326 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/314/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 709, "char_count": 16521, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.089844468940068e-08, "percentile": 0.46727338157552817 }, "sha256": "1ffb6769d6ede63d1962c2e506b63765ac40f5571f3a972a7a6b66728d8a9012", "simhash": "1:6aa0161e77d22c62", "word_count": 2736 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:43:10.227950+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFAYETTE CRUMP Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Lafayette Crump, was charged with two counts of domestic battery. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999). After a jury trial, he was found guilty on one of the counts. He was sentenced to an extended term of four years\u2019 imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) admitting in evidence the investigating police officer\u2019s statement that he believed the defendant committed the offense, (2) admitting a hearsay statement in evidence as a spontaneous declaration, (3) answering one of the jury\u2019s questions with its own instruction, and (4) sentencing the defendant to an extended term of four years\u2019 imprisonment. We reverse and remand for a new trial.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe events in question took place in Rock Island, Illinois, on May 30, 1999. The defendant and his girlfriend, Chandra Lewis, argued at Gloria Gibson\u2019s house during a Memorial Day barbeque. During the argument, Lewis attacked the defendant with a kitchen knife. Several people at Gibson\u2019s house attempted to restrain Lewis\u2019 arm. During the struggle, the defendant was cut on the left wrist by the knife. Gibson told the defendant that she was going to call the police. The defendant walked out of Gibson\u2019s house.\nGibson\u2019s mother, Mary Marbry, lived across the street from Gibson. At trial, Marbry testified that as she was sitting on her front porch, she heard a loud commotion coming from her daughter\u2019s house. She saw the defendant walking from behind Gibson\u2019s house. Gibson and Lewis were following the defendant, yelling at him.\nThe defendant crossed the street and got into his car. Marbry testified that Lewis continued to follow the defendant, yelling and screaming. The defendant testified that Lewis pulled a beer bottle from her pocket and attempted to hit the back window of his car.\nHe exited the car and pursued Lewis back toward Gibson\u2019s house. Marbry testified that she saw the defendant push Lewis from behind causing her to fall on the sidewalk. Lewis testified that all she remembered was that the defendant made contact with her as they were running and they both fell. The defendant testified that he tripped on Lewis\u2019 feet causing both Lewis and the defendant to fall. The defendant then walked to his car and drove away.\nMarbry testified that her granddaughter (presumably Gibson\u2019s daughter) called the police. Marbry ran across the street and helped Lewis into Gibson\u2019s house. Marbry could smell alcohol on Lewis. Marbry testified that Lewis had abrasions on her elbows, knees, and chest.\nRock Island police officer Jeff Collins responded to a call that a man and woman were fighting with a butcher knife at Gibson\u2019s address. Because the call concerned a knife fight, the officer arrived at Gibson\u2019s house within a minute of the call.\nCollins testified that upon his arrival, he entered Gibson\u2019s house and attempted to find Lewis. Collins said that Lewis came out of a bathroom covered in dirt. Her elbows and knees were bloody. He testified that her left cheek was red with what appeared to be a hand print. He described Lewis as hysterical.\nAt trial, Collins testified that without being questioned by him, Lewis immediately said, \u201cYou gotta get him. He just beat my ass.\u201d He testified that he asked her who did it.\nAfter the officer asked Lewis to calm down, she said the defendant had done it. He asked her where it had occurred. Collins and Lewis walked out the back door, where she told him that the defendant hit her twice on the face. She said that she ran in the house, the defendant kicked in the door, she ran outside, and the defendant pushed or struck her from behind. She did not know how it happened, but the defendant made contact with her and she fell.\nDuring the trial, the following exchange took place among the prosecutor, Collins, defense counsel, and the judge.\n\u201cQ. Through the course of your investigation, Officer, did you have reason to believe that the defendant in this case committed this offense?\nA. Yes, I did.\nMR. HOFFMAN [defense counsel]: Objection.\nTHE COURT: What\u2019s the point of that? Where are you going?\nMR. TERRONEZ [prosecutor]: Just to lay foundation for what happened.\nMR. HOFFMAN: I don\u2019t care what he believes, Your Honor. I object to him giving his opinion. It\u2019s for a jury, not him.\nTHE COURT: OK, I think the purport of this is not that he\u2019s the finder of fact. You\u2019re the finder of fact. I think he\u2019s trying to show why the policeman did what he did next. If he\u2019s not doing that, then it\u2019s inadmissible.\nQ. (BY MR. TERRONEZ) Was there \u2014 was Mr. Crump, the defendant, in the area at that time?\nA. No, he wasn\u2019t.\nQ. And did you put out an attempt to locate him?\nA. I put out a probable cause pickup for his arrest.\nMR. TERRONEZ: I have no further questions, then.\nTHE COURT: Cross.\u201d\nOfficer Donald Schaver testified that he pulled the defendant\u2019s car over after hearing the probable cause call. He took the defendant into custody and later took him to a hospital. Collins testified that he later heard from Schaver that the defendant\u2019s wrist wound might have been up to three inches long and was closed with two staples.\nThe defendant was charged with two counts of domestic battery. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 3.2(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999). Count I alleged that he punched Lewis about the face with his hands and fists. Count II alleged that he shoved Lewis in the back with his hands and caused her to fall. The jury found the defendant not guilty of count I but guilty of count II. The judge sentenced the defendant to four years\u2019 imprisonment with one year of mandatory supervised release. The defendant appealed.\nSTANDARD OF REVIEW\nReviewing courts consider evidentiary rulings to determine whether an abuse of discretion occurred. People v. Hall, 314 Ill. App. 3d 688, 732 N.E.2d 742 (2000).\nANALYSIS\nWhether the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Admitting in Evidence Officer Collins\u2019 Opinion Testimony.\nAt trial, Collins answered affirmatively in response to the prosecutor\u2019s question concerning whether, during the course of the investigation, he had reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense. The defendant argues that Collins\u2019 statement was inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to establish the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Nyberg, 275 Ill. App. 3d 570, 656 N.E.2d 65 (1995). Collins\u2019 testimony concerned his out-of-court \u201creason to believe that the defendant committed the offense\u201d rather than an out-of-court statement. Therefore, Collins\u2019 testimony concerning the reason for his belief was not hearsay.\nThe Random House Dictionary of the English Language defines the noun \u201creason\u201d as \u201ca basis or cause, as for some belief.\u201d Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1608 (2d ed. 1987). Random House defines \u201cbelief\u2019 as \u201csomething believed; an opinion or conviction.\u201d Random House Dictionary of the English Language 190 (2d ed. 1987). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201copinion evidence\u201d as \u201c[a] witness\u2019s belief, thought, or inference about a disputed fact.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 579 (7th ed. 1999). Clearly, a belief is synonymous with an opinion.\nAt trial, defense counsel objected that Collins\u2019 testimony was inadmissible as improper opinion testimony that was a matter for the jury. The proper issues then are (1) whether Collins\u2019 testimony was inadmissible opinion testimony, and if so, (2) whether the opinion testimony was prejudicial to the defendant\u2019s case and, thus, reversible error.\nA lay witness may not express an opinion or draw inferences from the facts. People v. Stokes, 95 Ill. App. 3d 62, 419 N.E.2d 1181 (1981). As a general rule, a witness\u2019 opinion is not admissible in evidence because testimony must be confined to statements of fact of which the witness has personal knowledge. People v. Sprinkle, 74 Ill. App. 3d 456, 393 N.E.2d 94 (1979).\nThere are exceptions, however, to this general rule. Sprinkle, 74 Ill. App. 3d 456, 393 N.E.2d 94. Lay witnesses may express opinions on questions of intoxication based on their personal observation and experience. People v. Beller, 45 Ill. App. 3d 816, 360 N.E.2d 130 (1977). Improper opinion testimony is not necessarily prejudicial where the conclusion or testimony adduced is an obvious one. People v. Sepka, 51 Ill. App. 3d 244, 367 N.E.2d 138 (1977). A lay witness may express an opinion based upon his or her observations where it is difficult to reproduce for the jury the totality of the conditions perceived and where the opinion given is one that persons in general are capable of making and understanding. Stokes, 95 Ill. App. 3d 62, 419 N.E.2d 1181.\nLay witness testimony is especially improper and prejudicial when it goes to the ultimate question of fact that is to be decided by the jury. People v. McClellan, 216 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 576 N.E.2d 481 (1991). A police officer is a figure of authority whose testimony may be prejudicial if the officer informs the jurors that they should believe a portion of the prosecution\u2019s case. Sepka, 51 Ill. App. 3d 244, 367 N.E.2d 138.\nIn the instant case, the record reflects that Officer Collins was not qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness. Therefore, he was a lay witness.\nThe prosecutor\u2019s question to Collins did not concern facts about which the officer had personal knowledge. When the prosecutor asked Officer Collins whether, at any point during the investigation, he had reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense, the prosecutor was asking about the basis of the officer\u2019s past belief. It is immaterial whether the prosecutor was asking the officer about the basis of his current belief or the basis of his past belief. The prosecutor\u2019s question called for Collins to state the basis of his belief about the ultimate disputed fact in the case, i.e., whether the defendant committed the offense. Therefore, the prosecutor\u2019s question asking Officer Collins for the basis of his belief called for opinion testimony from the officer.\nThe State agrees that Collins\u2019 testimony was not hearsay because Collins did not relate an out-of-court statement during this testimony. The State, however, then cites a statutory exception to the hearsay rule as justification for the judge to admit Collins\u2019 statement. The statute that the State relies upon says that a statement is not rendered inadmissible by the hearsay rule if (a) the declarant testifies at the trial, (b) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and (c) the statement is one of identification of a person made after perceiving him. 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 12 (West 1998).\nFirst, this statute, which is an exception to the hearsay rule, cannot be a justification for the judge to admit Collins\u2019 statement to explain why the officer did what he did next because, as the State admits, Collins\u2019 statement was not hearsay. An exception to the hearsay rule cannot be the justification for admission of testimony that is not hearsay. Second, even if Collins\u2019 statement had been hearsay, the statement did not concern identification of a person. Therefore, this evidentiary statute is not a justification for the judge\u2019s ruling that Collins\u2019 statement was admissible.\nIn response to the defendant\u2019s objection that Collins\u2019 statement was opinion testimony, the judge merely told the jury that the police officer was not the trier of fact but, rather, that the jury was the trier of fact. The judge did not properly admonish the jury that it was to disregard the officer\u2019s past belief that the defendant committed the offense. The judge allowed Collins\u2019 testimony to come in if it was \u201cto show why the policeman did what he did next.\u201d\nAs discussed above, a hearsay statement may be admitted in evidence to show why a police officer did what he or she did next if the statement concerns identification of a person made after perceiving him. This court, however, has not identified any exception permitting lay opinion testimony to be admitted in evidence to show why a police officer did what he or she did next. Collins\u2019 testimony does not fall within any of the exceptions this court has discovered that permit lay opinion testimony to be admitted in evidence. Therefore, the judge\u2019s admonition to the jury that Collins\u2019 opinion testimony was admissible \u201cto show why the policeman did what he did next\u201d was an improper admonition.\nAt trial, the prosecutor argued that his question about the officer\u2019s belief was necessary to lay a foundation for what the officer did next. This is not true. In order to establish that the officer put out a probable cause radio call, it was not necessary for the prosecutor to elicit testimony from Collins that the officer believed the defendant committed the offense. Under Stokes and Sprinkle, proper foundational questions would have concerned matters within the scope of the officer\u2019s personal knowledge such as whether the defendant was in the area, and if not, who arrested the defendant and how that arrest came about. The officer then could have stated that he put out a probable cause call on the radio without the necessity of expressing his belief that the defendant committed the offense.\nUnder McClellan, whether the defendant committed the offense was the ultimate question of fact to be decided by the jury. According to Sepka, the officer\u2019s statement was especially prejudicial because, as an authority figure, he was informing the jury that it should believe a portion of the prosecution\u2019s case. We hold, therefore, that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting in evidence the officer\u2019s statement that he believed the defendant committed the offense.\nAccordingly, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial. Because the case is reversed and remanded based on the admission of Collins\u2019 improper opinion testimony in evidence, we do not reach the other issues raised by the defendant on appeal.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand to the Rock Island County circuit court for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nSLATER, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER,\ndissenting:\nThe majority holds that Officer Collins\u2019 testimony \u2014 that he had reason to believe the defendant committed the offense \u2014 was improperly admitted as \u201copinion testimony.\u201d The fallacy in the majority\u2019s analysis is twofold.\nFirst, the majority fails to properly take into account the admonishment given by the trial court immediately following the testimony. The court instructed the jury that Officer Collins\u2019 testimony was only relevant to show why he did what he did during his investigation. Otherwise, the court informed the jury the testimony was inadmissible. Thus, the court gave a proper limiting instruction.\nSecond, the majority misconstrues the testimony at issue as \u201copinion testimony.\u201d Officer Collins was not asked if the defendant committed the offense. Nor was he asked if he believed the defendant committed the offense. Officer Collins was simply asked whether, in the course of his investigation, he had reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense, in other words, whether the defendant was a suspect in the crime. In this context, I do not think the testimony can be fairly construed as opinion testimony in the first place.\nAs I find no other grounds in the record for reversing the defendant\u2019s conviction, I would affirm it. I would, however, vacate the defendant\u2019s sentence as it clearly violates the rule articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed maximum term of imprisonment for that crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an extended term of four years in violation of Apprendi. Accordingly, I would remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing in order that the trial court might, impose a sentence within the one- to three-year statutory range for a Class 4 felony.", "type": "dissent", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Elaine Spiliopoulos, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Marshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Dawn D. Duffy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LAFAYETTE CRUMP Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 99\u20140675\nOpinion filed March 13, 2001.\nElaine Spiliopoulos, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nMarshall E. Douglas, State\u2019s Attorney, of Rock Island (John X. Breslin and Dawn D. Duffy, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0538-01", "first_page_order": 556, "last_page_order": 563 }