{ "id": 1527716, "name": "In re M.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. M.C., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. M.C.", "decision_date": "2001-02-28", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 99\u20140703", "first_page": "713", "last_page": "721", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 713" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "645 N.E.2d 1035", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 Ill. App. 3d 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 365846 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/269/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 U.S. 282", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178615 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94", "parenthetical": "changes in the state's death penalty procedures \"simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed\"" }, { "page": "356", "parenthetical": "changes in the state's death penalty procedures \"simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed\"" }, { "page": "2298", "parenthetical": "changes in the state's death penalty procedures \"simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/432/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "664 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57335 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 1090", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 395", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152559 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0395-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 N.E.2d 700", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Whether a person is tried in juvenile or criminal court is a matter of procedure rather than jurisdiction\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5596066 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "\"Whether a person is tried in juvenile or criminal court is a matter of procedure rather than jurisdiction\"" }, { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/145/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 N.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256644 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801342 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229" }, { "page": "230" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "668 N.E.2d 1052", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 794", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159545 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "801" }, { "page": "800-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0794-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 N.E.2d 6", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725033 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "680 N.E.2d 790", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596937 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224814 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0080-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 745, "char_count": 15705, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.265208136299195e-08, "percentile": 0.3865763988556862 }, "sha256": "270ee41ef432f14550cff5d8dbb458f16cc092cebb2de970b20d3e9849cc06e8", "simhash": "1:e82b030cde108499", "word_count": 2618 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:43:10.227950+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re M.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. M.C., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThere are two issues to decide in this case. First, whether the new transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 applies to this case. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805 (West Supp. 1999) (added by the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998 (Pub. Act 90 \u2014 590, eff. January 1, 1999)). The trial court held it did not. Second, whether the trial court erred when it denied the State\u2019s motion to transfer the minor respondent (M.C.) to the criminal division. We reverse and remand.\nOn August 13, 1998, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship charging M.C. was delinquent because he committed the offenses of aggravated battery with a firearm, aggravated discharge of a firearm, aggravated battery, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of cannabis. The petition alleged M.C. shot a young man in the foot and a young woman in the stomach on August 12, 1998.\nThe State also filed a motion to transfer M.C. from the juvenile division to the criminal division pursuant to section 5 \u2014 4(3.3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the 1996 transfer provision) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 4(3.3) (West 1996)).\nThe 1996 transfer provision, section 5 \u2014 4(3.3)(a), provided: If the State\u2019s Attorney files a motion to prosecute a minor, 15 years of age or older, in criminal court, and the State\u2019s Attorney\u2019s wardship petition charges the minor with, inter alia, aggravated discharge of a firearm or aggravated battery with a firearm\n\u201cand, if the juvenile judge designated to hear and determine motions to transfer a case for prosecution in the criminal court determines that there is probable cause to believe that the allegations in the petition and motion are true, there is a rebuttable presumption that the minor is not a fit and proper subject to be dealt with under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, and that, except as provided in paragraph (b), the case should be transferred to the criminal court.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 4(3.3)(a) (West 1996).\nParagraph (b) provides:\n\u201cThe judge shall enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws of Illinois unless the judge makes a finding based on evidence that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment, and training programs available through the facilities of the juvenile court based on an evaluation of the following:\n(i) The circumstances and gravity of the offense alleged to have been committed by the minor.\n(ii) The age of the minor.\n(iii) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the minor.\n(iv) Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction.\n(v) The minor\u2019s previous history of delinquency.\n(vi) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, premeditated or calculated manner.\n(vii) Whether there are sufficient facilities available to the juvenile court for the treatment and rehabilitation of the minor.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 4(3.3)(b) (West 1996).\nOn January 25, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on the prosecution\u2019s transfer motion. Dr. Golden Shultz, a psychologist at the department of forensic services, testified for M.C. Probation officer Tanya Kira testified for the prosecution.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found the State had met its burden of providing sufficient evidence to support the charges against M.C. The court entered a finding of probable cause and found \u201cthere is a rebuttable presumption that the minor is not a fit and proper subject for adjudication in Juvenile Court.\u201d The court proceeded to analyze M.C.\u2019s case under the section 5 \u2014 4(3.3)(b) factors.\n1. Circumstances and gravity of the offense\nThe court found M.C.\u2019s alleged conduct \u201ccertainly is a grave offense.\u201d But, the court added, \u201cneither one of these people [the victims] were seriously injured.\u201d The court noted the young man was shot in the foot, and the young woman was not shot since the bullet passed through her clothing.\n2. Age of minor\nThe court found M.C.\u2019s age at the time of his alleged offense, 16 years and 11 months, was obviously \u201con the high scale of the juvenile age bracket.\u201d But, the court observed, \u201ctiming is everything in life. The fact that he wasn\u2019t (17) when this occurred is something I can consider.\u201d The court summarized: \u201c[W]hile I could look at it as a mark against him that he was almost (17) when he\u2019s charged with this offense, I can also look at it that he wasn\u2019t (17); and he was meant to be charged as a juvenile and that\u2019s the way I choose to look at it today based on the totality of the evidence ***.\u201d\n3. Degree of criminal sophistication\nThe court candidly acknowledged, \u201cI\u2019m not quite sure what that term means, *** and I\u2019m not sure how that differentiates significantly from No. (Five), which is the previous history of the minor ***.\u201d The court found M.C. had a criminal record, including delinquency adjudications for stolen car possession and drug possession, as well as four station adjustments.\n4. Reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation before age 21\nThe court found M.C. had responded favorably to the structure and the services of the juvenile home since his detention. The court also found M.C. successfully completed probation after his conviction for stolen car possession. The court added M.C.\u2019s parents \u201c[were] extremely interested in his well being; have stuck by him in spite of the fact that he has caused so much agony up to this point in time.\u201d\n5. Previous history of delinquency\nThe court did not discuss this factor independent of M.C.\u2019s \u201ccriminal sophistication.\u201d\n6. Aggressive, premeditated, or calculated offense\nThe court found M.C.\u2019s alleged conduct was aggressive and said, \u201cit appears to be premeditated or it\u2019s just more of a gang drive-by, stupid incident. I\u2019m not sure how it came about *** so premeditation is just a little hard to assess ***.\u201d\n7. Sufficient treatment and rehabilitation facilities\nThe court found \u201cthere are juvenile facilities available in order to treat him \u2014 the Juvenile Department of Corrections offers, has education and rehabilitation and counseling on a mandatory basis.\u201d\nIn denying the prosecution\u2019s motion to transfer, the court concluded:\n\u201cBased on the totality of the circumstances, I don\u2019t believe that this young man nor society will benefit from his being tried as an adult as such. I believe the Defense has in fact rebutted the presumption. I believe that this young man is a fit and proper subject to be adjudicated in the Juvenile Court as such.\u201d\nFollowing the presumptive transfer hearing, the State appealed to this court. On appeal, M.C. contended the 1996 transfer provision\u2014 section 5 \u2014 4(3.3), as added to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 by the Safe Neighborhood Act (Pub. Act 88 \u2014 680, eff. January 1, 1995)\u2014 violated the \u201csingle subject rule\u201d of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IM \u00a7 8(d)). M.C. was right. See People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 723 N.E.2d 265 (1999).\nWe noted, however, section 5 \u2014 4(3.3) had been repealed before Cervantes. Its replacement, section 5 \u2014 805(2), became effective on January 1, 1999. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (West Supp. 1999). Paragraph (b) of the new statute provides:\n\u201cThe judge shall enter an order permitting prosecution under the criminal laws of Illinois unless the judge makes a finding based on clear and convincing evidence that the minor would be amenable to the care, treatment, and training programs available through the facilities of the juvenile court based on an evaluation of the following:\n(i) The seriousness of the alleged offense-,\n(ii) The minor\u2019s history of delinquency;\n(iii) The age of the minor;\n(iv) The culpability of the minor in committing the alleged offense-,\n(v) Whether the offense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner;\n(vi) Whether the minor used or possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense-,\n(vii) The minor\u2019s history of services, including the minor\u2019s willingness to participate meaningfully in available services-,\n(viii) Whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the minor can be rehabilitated before the expiration of the juvenile court\u2019s jurisdiction;\n(ix) The adequacy of the punishment or services available in the juvenile justice system.\nIn considering these factors, the court shall give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor\u2019s prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in this subsection.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(b) (West Supp. 1999).\nOn January 25, 1999, after the effective date of the new transfer provision, the trial court denied the prosecution\u2019s motion.\nWe remanded this case to allow the parties to argue, and the court to determine, whether section 5 \u2014 805(2) applies and, if so, what effect it has on the court\u2019s decision to reject the prosecution\u2019s transfer motion. In re M.C., No. 1 \u2014 99\u20140703 (1999) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nThe State disagrees with the trial court\u2019s finding that the new transfer provision of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the 1999 transfer provision) (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (West Supp. 1999)) does not apply retroactively, and it contends the court erred when it refused to transfer M.C.\nWhether the 1999 transfer provision applies to this case involves a question of law, and the standard of review is de novo. People v. Saunders, 288 Ill. App. 3d 523, 525, 680 N.E.2d 790 (1997). Whether the trial court properly evaluated statutory factors when it denied the motion to transfer M.C. to the criminal division is a question of fact, and the standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. People v. Fuller, 292 Ill. App. 3d 651, 658, 686 N.E.2d 6 (1997); In re J.E., 282 Ill. App. 3d 794, 801, 668 N.E.2d 1052 (1996).\nThe State contends the 1999 transfer provision does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const., art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 9,10; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 16. These constitutional provisions restrain Congress and the state legislatures from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation and assure that statutes give fair warning of their effect. Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill. 2d 225, 229, 688 N.E.2d 635 (1997). A law is ex post facto if it is both \u201cretroactive\u201d and \u201cdisadvantageous\u201d to the defendant. Fletcher, 179 Ill. 2d at 230. A law disadvantages a defendant if it (1) criminalizes an act that was innocent when done, (2) increases the punishment for a previously committed offense, or (3) alters the rules of evidence by making a conviction easier. People v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 107, 552 N.E.2d 743 (1990).\nThe Juvenile Court Act\u2019s transfer provision is a procedural mechanism used to determine what division of the circuit court a respondent will be tried in. People v. P.H., 145 Ill. 2d 209, 222, 582 N.E.2d 700 (1991) (\u201cWhether a person is tried in juvenile or criminal court is a matter of procedure rather than jurisdiction\u201d). The 1999 transfer provision does not constitute any kind of \u201cpunishment.\u201d\nThe legislature has determined that certain minors are not eligible for continuation in the administrative scheme of the juvenile court. People v. J.S., 103 Ill. 2d 395, 402, 469 N.E.2d 1090 (1984). Minor defendants do not have a constitutional right to be treated as juveniles, and, because the juvenile system is statutory, the legislature has the authority to define the limits of the juvenile system. See P.H., 145 Ill. 2d at 223.\nBecause the decisions persuade us the transfer hearing is procedural in nature, we do not see the 1999 transfer provision reaching back to \u201cinterfere with vested rights.\u201d First of American Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282, 289, 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996). See also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94, 53 L. Ed. 2d 344, 356, 97 S. Ct. 2290, 2298 (1977) (changes in the state\u2019s death penalty procedures \u201csimply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed\u201d).\nIn this case, the 1999 transfer provision is not \u201cdisadvantageous,\u201d and application of the 1999 transfer provision does not implicate ex post facto analysis. A presumption of transfer arose when the juvenile court found probable cause to believe that the allegations against M.C. were true. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (a) (West Supp. 1999). The judge was required to enter a transfer order unless he found, by \u201cclear and convincing evidence,\u201d that M.C. was amenable to treatment and care in the juvenile system based on an analysis of the statutory factors. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2)(b) (West Supp. 1999).\nThe State did not have to show all statutory factors weigh against the minor to justify transfer to adult court. In re J.O., 269 Ill. App. 3d 287, 289, 645 N.E.2d 1035 (1995). The State had to present enough evidence to persuade the juvenile court to grant the motion to transfer. In re J.E., 282 Ill. App. 3d at 800-01. It would take \u201cclear and convincing evidence\u201d to defeat the transfer. See 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (b) (West Supp. 1999).\nM.C., just short of age 17, while a passenger in a moving car, fired five shots at a group of people, striking one boy in the foot and grazing the clothing of a 10-year-old girl. He is a regular in the juvenile justice system, gang affiliated, with two delinquency findings and four station adjustments. His probation officer recommended that he be tried as an adult.\nDr. Schultz, the psychologist who testified on M.C.\u2019s behalf, agreed that the respondent\u2019s criminal activity was becoming more serious as he grew older, noting that the current charge is the \u201cmost serious yet.\u201d He would not take a position and did not recommend against transfer. He said he was \u201cnot making a recommendation regarding transfer explicitly.\u201d Although the court found a reasonable likelihood that M.C. could be rehabilitated before age 21, the court made this finding despite Dr. Schultz\u2019s admission he could not substantiate his claims that M.C. responded well to punishment, and M.C.\u2019s criminal activity was getting progressively worse as he got older.\nAlthough there are crimes perpetrated by juveniles where the lack of premeditation and calculation may be relevant factors that weigh against transfer, the facts of this case \u2014 a drive-by shooting \u2014 do not defeat a presumption that M.C. should be tried as an adult. The trial court did not look to the plain language of the statute, requiring the court to determine \u201cthe seriousness of the alleged offense,\u201d \u201cwhether the offense was committed in an aggressive or premeditated manner,\u201d \u201cwhether the minor used or possessed a deadly weapon when committing the alleged offense,\u201d and, in considering these factors, whether the court gave \u201cgreater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and the minor\u2019s prior record of delinquency than to the other factors listed in\u201d section 5 \u2014 805(2) (b). 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 805(2) (b) (West Supp. 1999). We have done so.\nApplying the 1999 transfer provision to the facts of this case, we conclude the trial court erred when it declined to transfer M.C. to the criminal division. We reverse the order denying transfer and remand this case to the juvenile court with directions to transfer the case to the criminal division.\nReversed and remanded.\nCAHILL, RJ., and BURKE, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland, and Douglas E Harvath, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the Feople.", "Joseph R. Lopez and Marc W. Martin, both of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re M.C., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellant, v. M.C., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee).\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 99\u20140703\nOpinion filed February 28, 2001.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Mary L. Boland, and Douglas E Harvath, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the Feople.\nJoseph R. Lopez and Marc W. Martin, both of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0713-01", "first_page_order": 731, "last_page_order": 739 }