{
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  "name": "In re L.M., a/k/a L.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. W.B., Respondent-Appellant)",
  "name_abbreviation": "People v. W.B.",
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    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "In re L.M., a/k/a L.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. W.B., Respondent-Appellant)."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McLAREN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, W.B., a/k/a K.B., appeals from an order finding his daughter, L.M., a/k/a L.B., neglected. The dispositional order provided that respondent was not to have any contact with L.M. or the minor\u2019s mother, M.M. Respondent argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it denied respondent\u2019s motion for a directed finding and found that the neglect petition was proved by a preponderance of the evidence. We reverse.\nRespondent was 26 years old when he began dating M.M., who was 16 years old. Nine months after respondent started dating M.M., L. M. was conceived. L.M. was born on March 30, 1999. On July 14, 1999, respondent was convicted of five counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of M.M. (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 16(d) (West 1998)), and he was ordered not to have any contact with M.M. On July 15, 1999, M.M. left L.M. in respondent\u2019s care. Because L.M. was left in respondent\u2019s care, the State filed a petition on July 16, 1999, to adjudicate L.M. neglected. The petition was filed against both respondent and M.M. The basis for the neglect petition was that L.M. had been left in an injurious environment. The State claimed that L.M.\u2019s environment was injurious to her welfare because she was left in respondent\u2019s care and respondent was an untreated sex offender, having been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse of M.M. on July 14, 1999.\nOn August 27, 1999, respondent was sentenced to 36 months\u2019 probation for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and he was ordered to obtain a sex offender evaluation within 30 days and follow all recommendations. The probation order also provided, among other things, that respondent must support his dependents, not have contact with M. M. for 12 months, and refrain from any contact with nonrelated females who are between 12 and 18 years old.\nOn November 4, 1999, the adjudication hearing was held. At the hearing, Detective Mark Ross Corbett testified that on July 15, 1999, he participated in a surveillance of respondent\u2019s home. The officer conducted the surveillance because a warrant for defendant\u2019s arrest had been issued for an unrelated matter. When Officer Corbett arrived at respondent\u2019s house, he stayed in his car and did not see anyone around the house. However, within 10 minutes he saw respondent exit his house carrying an infant. Officer Corbett approached respondent, apprehended respondent on the warrant, and took protective custody of the infant, L.M. On cross-examination, Officer Corbett testified that he did not see respondent harm L.M. in any way, and the officer stated that he could not remember whether respondent told him that there was someone in the house who could care for L.M. after Officer Corbett took respondent into custody.\nTim Rossi testified that on July 15, 1999, he was an investigator with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services. Rossi was called on that date because L.M. had been taken into protective custody by the police and was in need of placement. During his investigation, Rossi talked with M.M. M.M. told Rossi that on July 15, 1999, she took L.M. to see respondent for an indefinite period of time because L.M. needed to bond with respondent. M.M. knew that respondent had been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse on July 14, 1999, but M.M. did not believe that respondent posed a risk to either her or L.M. Rossi testified that he did not speak with respondent, and Rossi stated that he did not believe that respondent had sought treatment as a sex offender.\nRespondent moved for a directed finding, arguing that the State failed to prove that L.M.\u2019s environment was injurious to her welfare. The court denied the motion, finding that respondent was a sex offender at the time he was caring for L.M.\nRespondent testified that M.M. brought L.M. to his house on July 15, 1999. Respondent\u2019s 17-year-old cousin and respondent\u2019s barber were in the house when M.M. arrived. At around 4 p.m., respondent was walking outside with L.M. when the police arrested him. Respondent\u2019s cousin was in the house at that time, and respondent testified that he told a detective that the cousin could watch L.M. until respondent\u2019s sister came home from work.\nThe court found that the petition to adjudicate L.M. a neglected minor had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, the court stated that L.M. was neglected because she was left in respondent\u2019s care and respondent was an untreated sex offender, having been convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse the day before L.M. was taken into protective custody.\nRespondent filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the State failed to prove the allegation of neglect by a preponderance of the evidence and that the trial court erred when it denied respondent\u2019s motion for a directed finding. The trial court denied the motion, adjudicated L.M. neglected, and ordered respondent not to have contact with L.M. or M.M. until the court entered a contrary order. Respondent filed a motion to reconsider, raising the same issues he presented in his motion for a new trial. The trial court denied respondent\u2019s motion, and the court awarded M.M. the guardianship of L.M. This timely appeal followed.\nRespondent argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a directed finding and found that the State proved neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. Because these issues are intricately related, we will address the issues together. When a motion for a directed finding is made, the trial court must determine whether the plaintiff (State) has made out a prima facie case and then weigh the evidence, including the evidence that favors the defendant (respondent). Orbeta v. Gomez, 315 Ill. App. 3d 687, 690 (2000). If the trial court finds after weighing the evidence that the plaintiffs prima facie case has been negated, the court should grant the defendant\u2019s motion for a directed finding and enter a judgment for the defendant. Orbeta, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 690. On appeal, the reviewing court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Orbeta, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 690. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the facts clearly show that the trial court should have reached the opposite result. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2000).\nIn a proceeding to adjudicate a minor neglected, the State must establish neglect by a preponderance of the evidence, which is proof that any finding of neglect is more probably true than not true. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 343. An injurious environment is a basis for a finding of neglect (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(b) (West 1998)), and the term \u201cinjurious environment\u201d is an amorphous concept that cannot be defined specifically. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346. However, courts have interpreted \u201cinjurious environment\u201d to include a breach of the parents\u2019 duty to provide a safe and nurturing shelter for their children. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346. Because rulings in cases involving neglect and injurious environment are fact-driven, a reviewing court will only reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment if the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 346.\nHere, the trial court found that L.M. was a neglected minor because she was left in respondent\u2019s care on July 15, 1999. When L.M. was left in respondent\u2019s care, respondent, having had a sexual relationship with L.M.\u2019s minor mother, was considered a sex offender. At the hearing, no evidence was presented that respondent harmed L.M. in any way. Thus, the only basis upon which the trial court found neglect was the fact that respondent was a sex offender and was caring for L.M. We determine under the circumstances presented in this case that respondent\u2019s status as a sex offender alone, in the absence of other factors, does not establish an injurious environment. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s ruling denying respondent\u2019s motion for a directed finding and its order adjudicating L.M. neglected should be reversed.\nWe note in reaching this conclusion that courts in other jurisdictions have found that a father\u2019s sex offender status without more cannot form the sole basis for restricting the father\u2019s parental rights. See State v. Coreau, 651 A.2d 319, 320 (Me. 1994) (father who committed heinous sex crime against nonrelated 14-year-old girl could not be prohibited contact with his minor children as a condition of his probation); In re Cruz, 164 Or. App. 178, 188, 990 P.2d 922, 927 (1999) (reviewing court determined that the father, who was a sex offender and had affairs with teenage girls, was not a threat to his minor daughters). Moreover, courts have recognized that the mere fact that an adult male fathers a child with a minor cannot be the only basis for denying the father contact with that child. See In re Brandie W., 157 Cal. App. 3d 110, 114, 203 Cal. Rptr. 537, 540 (1984) (the best interests of the child are served when an adult father, who could have been prosecuted for statutory rape against the minor mother, is allowed visitation with the child that was born because of the affair); cf. E.R. v. D.T., 77 Misc. 2d 242,_, 353 N.Y.S.2d 612, 615 (1974) (reviewing court recognized a father\u2019s right to visit a child born out of wedlock but denied the 61-year-old father visitation given the father\u2019s age and the animosity between the 61-year-old father and the parents of the 13-year-old mother).\nThe State argues that the trial court\u2019s order should be affirmed because evidence that respondent sexually abused another minor, M.M., is sufficient to establish an injurious environment. The cases the State relies on in making its argument are clearly distinguishable from the facts presented in this case. Specifically, the cases the State cites involved the father abusing children who were under the father\u2019s care. See In re M.D.H., 297 Ill. App. 3d 181, 189-90 (1998) (minor\u2019s environment could be injurious based solely on the fact that father molested the minor\u2019s brother for whom the father cared); In re M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 827 (1995) (when father abuses his own children the court need not wait until other children under the father\u2019s care are harmed before removing the other children from the father\u2019s home); In re A.D.W., 278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 482 (1996) (father\u2019s daughter\u2019s environment was injurious based on fact that father had fondled the breasts of his stepdaughter). Here, in contrast to the cases cited by the State, respondent did not sexually abuse a minor in his care. Rather, respondent was convicted of sexually abusing a minor to whom he was not related, with whom he did not live, and with whose care he was not entrusted. Given these distinguishing facts, we determine that the State\u2019s argument lacks merit.\nFor the reasons given, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed.\nReversed.\nGEIGER and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McLAREN"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Elliot A. Pinsel, of Daniels, Long & Pinsel, of Waukegan, for appellant.",
      "Michael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "In re L.M., a/k/a L.B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. W.B., Respondent-Appellant).\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 00\u20140501\nOpinion filed April 5, 2001.\nElliot A. Pinsel, of Daniels, Long & Pinsel, of Waukegan, for appellant.\nMichael J. Waller, State\u2019s Attorney, of Waukegan (Martin P Moltz and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People."
  },
  "file_name": "0865-01",
  "first_page_order": 883,
  "last_page_order": 888
}
