{ "id": 2796370, "name": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randy C. Ruegger (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ruegger", "decision_date": "1975-10-10", "docket_number": "No. 12914", "first_page": "765", "last_page": "772", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "32 Ill. App. 3d 765" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "311 N.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "19 Ill.App.3d 346", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2696978 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/19/0346-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.Ct. 1821", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 L.Ed.2d 663", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 U.S. 924", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1767535, 1767697, 1767358, 1767572, 1767669, 1767512, 1767419, 1767293, 1767582 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/391/0924-02", "/us/391/0924-01", "/us/391/0924-08", "/us/391/0924-04", "/us/391/0924-06", "/us/391/0924-03", "/us/391/0924-05", "/us/391/0924-09", "/us/391/0924-07" ] }, { "cite": "231 N.E.2d 424", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "38 Ill.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2863264 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/38/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.App.3d 312", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2853357 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0312-01" ] }, { "cite": "292 N.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill.App.3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2844970 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/9/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 N.E.2d 305", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill.App.3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2761533 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/8/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 N.E. 275", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 Ill. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5092006 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/307/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 N.E.2d 909", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "409 Ill. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5310360 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/409/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "31 Ill.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2833332 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/31/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 N.E. 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5010949 ], "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/302/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 N.E.2d 601", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "53 Ill.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2927578 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/53/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 U.S. 477", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6174724 ], "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/404/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "233 N.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "39 Ill.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2858633 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/39/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 12, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" }, { "page": "724" }, { "page": "1628" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "1630" }, { "page": "478" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "1630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 760, "char_count": 15553, "ocr_confidence": 0.729, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.619603787347416e-07, "percentile": 0.9482861742132457 }, "sha256": "4da0d965c2988ce07ee0534b66521142781243fc987f2b1b65d78f91402c790c", "simhash": "1:ca4a393c3561a98f", "word_count": 2559 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:14:58.460223+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randy C. Ruegger (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE GREEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Randy Ruegger was indicted by grand jury for the offenses of burglary, forgery, and criminal damage to property. The Circuit Court of Coles County entered an order suppressing defendant\u2019s confession, and the State has appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, eh. 110A, par. 604(a)(1)).\nDefendant was arrested shortly after midnight on March 13, 1974, in the Goodyear Tire Store in Mattoon. The Miranda warnings were read to him at the scene. A few minutes later defendant was taken to the police station where he was given a written form explaining his rights. That form, which was signed by defendant, states that defendant understood his right to counsel and right against self-incrimination and did not wish to answer any questions at that time. Defendant was then placed in lockup.\nAt approximately 10 a.m. the same day, defendant was taken to the office of Captain Robert O\u2019Dell of the Charleston Police Department, who is defendant\u2019s uncle. Detective Edward Kallis of the Charleston Police Department was present in the office with Captain O\u2019Dell and advised defendant that he was investigating a burglary of the Post Seed House in Charleston. Defendant was again given a form explaining his rights, and he stated that he did not want to answer any questions until he had talked to his attorney. There then occurred a 20-minute conversation involving defendant and Detective Kallis and Captain O\u2019Dell. At the end of the conversation defendant said he wanted to give a statement concerning everything he had been involved in. Whereupon defendant made a tape-recorded statement in which, in response to questions by Detective Kallis, he confessed to several burglaries and related offenses, including the burglary of the Post Seed House.\nDetective Kallis, Captain O\u2019Dell, and defendant all testified at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the confession. Although their testimony is in agreement that no definite promises were made to defendant in exchange for his confession, there is disagreement whether inducements were offered to defendant to encourage him to confess. Defendant testified that during the conversation he talked mostly with Kallis and that after defendant had refused to answer any questions Kallis said that he knew that defendant had committed the Post Seed House burglary and showed defendant some checks allegedly taken in the burglary and forged by defendant. Defendant also testified that Kallis told him that he (Kallis) had gotten probation for one of defendant\u2019s friends who had pled guilty and that other people who had made statements had received probation. Defendant recalled that Kallis had said that \u201cif I would keep my nose clean that he couldn\u2019t really promise anything but he would go to bat for me.\u201d According to defendant, the officers showed him the statute book designating the penalties for various offenses and told him that if he confessed to everything he would b\u00e9 charged with only some of the offenses. They also told him they would help him get released on a recognizance bond. When asked by the court why he had given the statement defendant answered that \u201cThey offered to help me out, and that\u2019s what I wanted. I had a lot better chance not admitting to anything and keeping my mouth shut, but they said they would help me out * * * on aggravation and mitigation.\u201d\nDetective Kallis testified that after defendant had refused to answer any questions, he told defendant that he (Kallis) could not talk to defendant any further. Defendant then asked Kallis what would happen if he made a statement. Kallis testified that he explained the court procedures and possible penalties to defendant, and Captain O\u2019Dell gave defendant die statute book to refer to. Kallis, however, denied offering to help defendant or telling defendant that he had helped others in the past. After defendant indicated that he wished to make a statement Kallis again advised him of his rights. Kallis recalled that \u201c I said, you know if you were to call Mr. Tulin [defendant\u2019s attorney] now that he would tell you to shut your mouth and not say anything\u2019, and [defendant] said, \u2019that\u2019s right\u2019, and he still wanted to go ahead and make this statement.\u201d\nCaptain O\u2019Dell testified that the conversation was initiated by defendant after defendant had stated that he did not want to answer any questions. O\u2019Dell recalled that most of the conversation was between Kallis and defendant and that defendant had asked about court appearances and what would happen to him if he were charged with other crimes. O\u2019Dell also testified that he told defendant that he \u201ccouldn\u2019t do him any good.\u201d Although he testified that he could not remember all of the conversation, O\u2019Dell did not believe that he had told defendant that he would help him get a recognizance bond. He could not recall whether or not Kallis had said anything about it. He also could not recall whether Kallis had said anything about \u201cgoing to bat\u201d for defendant.\nThe trial court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress on the basis that the State had not met its burden of showing that defendant\u2019s confession was not a product of compulsion exerted on him during the 20-minute conversation in the form of offers of assistance by the police officers.\nThe State bases its contention that it was improper for the trial court to suppress defendant\u2019s confession on the argument that the record shows the confession was freely and voluntarily given after defendant\u2019s rights were fully explained and understood and on the alternative argument that the confession falls within the \u201cvolunteered statement\u201d exception of the Miranda decision.\nThe basic guidelines for determining whether a statement has been given voluntarily were set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, In Miranda the Court stated that a statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence is admissible. However, the Court also made it clear that it was setting a high standard for determining voluntariness in the context of custodial interrogation without the presence of counsel and that \u201ca heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.\u201d (Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 475, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 724, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1628.) If a defendant challenges the voluntariness of his statement, the State must first show that the defendant was adequately warned of his right to counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination before being interrogated. Where this requirement has not been met, the statement is per se inadmissible. Where the warnings are found to be adequate or, as in the instant case, their adequacy is not disputed, the court \u201cmust make an ad hoc determination of the specific facts bearing on voluntariness since no per se rule has yet been adopted to govern this problem.\u201d (People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125, 131, 233 N.E.2d 367, 371.) In determining whether the State has sustained its burden of demonstrating that the evidence as a whole shows that a statement was made voluntarily, the trial court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and its finding will not be disturbed on review unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 30 L.Ed.2d 618, 92 S.Ct. 619; People v. Prim, 53 Ill.2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601.\nThe Illinois courts have long recognized that offers of leniency are a factor to be considered in determining whether a statement is voluntary. In People v. Heide, 302 Ill. 624, 627, 135 N.E. 77, 79 (1922), the supreme court stated that it was the rule in Illinois that \u201ca confession becomes incompetent whenever any degree of influence has been exerted by any person having authority over the charge against the prisoner or over his person, tending to cause duress or hope of leniency * * In the decision the court held that it was prejudicial error to admit the defendants\u2019 confessions where there was uncontradicted testimony that police officers had told the defendants that it would be better for them to tell the truth, that if they told the truth they would be taken to tire state\u2019s attorney and allowed to make a statement, and that the state\u2019s attorney might show them leniency. The court concluded that although the pohce officers testified that they made no direct promises of leniency, their statements were such as to raise hopes of leniency in the defendants\u2019 minds.\nCases decided since Heide indicate that although in some jurisdictions the mere suggestion of the advisability of telling the truth is sufficient to render a statement involuntary, such is not the rule in Illinois, (People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill.2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33; People v. Pugh, 409 Ill. 584, 100 N.E.2d 909; People v. Klyczek, 307 Ill. 150, 138 N.E. 275.)\n\u201cMere exhortation to tell the truth wHI not make a confession afterward made inadmissible, but the statement that it is better to tell the truth may be made under such circumstances as to make a confession afterwards made incompetent. If there is coupled with the advice a suggestion of a benefit in the particular case, a confession by reason of such advice and suggestion is incompetent.\u201d (307 Ill. 150, 154, 138 N.E. 275, 277.)\nIn Hartgraves, the most recent of these decisions, the court stated that \u201ca mere suggestion of the advisability of making a statement does not in itself render a confession involuntary.\u201d (31 Ill.2d 375, 381, 202 N.E.2d 33, 36.) There the court upheld the trial court\u2019s finding that a confession was voluntary where a police officer had commented to the defendant that \u201cit would go easier on him in court if he made a statement\u201d but there was no testimony by the defendant nor any other evidence that defendant\u2019s confession had been induced by hopes of leniency.\nAH of the above cases were decided prior to Miranda, however, and do not recognize that the issue of voluntariness involves waiver of the right to counsel as well as the priv\u00fcege against self-incrimination. The only post-Miranda decision discussing offers of leniency as a factor affecting the voluntariness of a statement is People v. Jones, 8 Ill.App.3d 849, 291 N.E.2d 305, where the court upheld the trial court\u2019s suppression of a statement where t\u00edrete was evidence that the defendant was offered probation if he made a statement.\nSince voluntariness is to be determined from the totality of the circumstances other factors such as the age, intelligence, and experience of the defendant, the length and intensity of the interrogation, and prior refusals to answer questions may also be considered. (People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367; People v. Baker, 9 Ill.App.3d 654, 292 N.E.2d 760; People v. Clemens, 9 Ill.App.3d 312, 292 N.E.2d 232.) In the instant case, at the time the confession was made defendant was 18 years old, was in the last year of high school, and was familiar with the criminal process. There was no lengthy interrogation nor any indication of physical coercion. Defendant had, however, twice clearly indicated that he did not wish to answer any questions.\nSince none of the above factors appear decisive, the issue before us is whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the defendant, indicates that the police officers did not merely suggest that it would be advisable for defendant to tell the truth but persuaded him that if he made a statement he would be treated more leniently. Although it is undisputed that the police officers made no definite promises to defendant, defendant\u2019s version of the conversation was that the police officers conveyed to him the impression that they would \u201cgo to bat\u201d for him on such matters as a recognizance bond and probation if he confessed to everything. In addition, the unusual factor that defendant was interrogated by a relative may have added an element of subtle compulsion to confess. At any rate the trial judge, who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses, is in a far better position than we to weigh the evidence. We therefore conclude that the trial court\u2019s finding that the State had not sustained its burden of showing that defendant\u2019s confession was voluntary and not the result of compulsion is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In so ruling we note that the trial court filed a memorandum containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. We found the memorandum most helpful and wish to commend this practice.\nThe State also offers the alternative argument that defendant\u2019s confession falls within the \u201cvolunteered statement\u201d exception of Miranda:\n\u201cThere is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.\u201d (384 U.S. 436, 478, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630.)\nWe find this argument without merit. As the Miranda decision makes clear, this exception is limited to statements which were not made in response to custodial interrogation. (In Re Orr, 38 Ill.2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 924, 20 L.Ed.2d 663, 88 S.Ct. 1821; People v. Baer, 19 Ill.App.3d 346, 311 N.E.2d 418.) Indeed the whole thrust of the Miranda decision is that:\n\u201c* * * when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege * * (384 U.S. 436, 478, 16 L.Ed,2d 694, 726, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630.)\nThe only case cited by the State in support of this argument is People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125, 233 N.E.2d 367. In Hill, where there was evidence that the defendant called back a police officer after interrogation had ceased and, before the officer could say anything, admitted involvement in a crime, the court stated that although the argument that the defendant\u2019s statement fell within the \u201cvolunteered statement\u201d exception had some merit, it preferred to decide the case on other grounds. However, even if the \u201cvolunteered statement\u201d exception is applicable to the facts of Hill, it would not be applicable to the case before us. Here defendant\u2019s statement was made in the form of tape-recorded answers to questions put to him by a police officer while defendant was in police custody. All of the characteristics of formal interrogation were present. In order to apply the \u201cvolunteered statement\u201d exception to the facts of the instant case it would be necessary to ignore the holding of the Miranda decision.\nFor the reasons stated above, the order of the trial court suppressing defendant\u2019s statement is affirmed.\nJudgment affirmed.\nCRAVEN, J., concurs; TRAPP, P. J., concurs in the result.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE GREEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Bobby F. Sanders, State\u2019s Attorney, of Charleston (James R. Mc-Cracken, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and G. Michael Prall, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People.", "Richard J. Wilson and Robert E. Davison, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Officer, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "The People of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Randy C. Ruegger (Impleaded), Defendant-Appellee.\n(No. 12914;\nFourth District\nOctober 10, 1975.\nBobby F. Sanders, State\u2019s Attorney, of Charleston (James R. Mc-Cracken, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, and G. Michael Prall, of Illinois State\u2019s Attorneys Association, of counsel), for the People.\nRichard J. Wilson and Robert E. Davison, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Officer, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0765-01", "first_page_order": 791, "last_page_order": 798 }