{ "id": 132426, "name": "In re B.D. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. J.T., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. J.T.", "decision_date": "2001-03-23", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201400\u20140084", "first_page": "161", "last_page": "167", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 161" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "283 Ill. App. 3d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 182762 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "trial court properly held that minor's burns were not accidental when no contrary expert medical evidence was presented" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/283/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910204 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1097" }, { "page": "1097" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/1089-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980668 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2599999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "it is error for the court to \"second-guess medical experts\"" }, { "page": "889-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293563 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 Ill. App. 3d 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2710777 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "\" 'wide discretion is vested in the trial judge to an even greater degree than any ordinary appeal to which the familiar manifest weight principle is applied' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/31/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 177", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5238888 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0177-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 1095", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906759 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1100", "parenthetical": "trial court vested with significant discretion in child custody matters" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 859", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" }, { "page": "865" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "66 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5463503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" }, { "page": "520" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/66/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" }, { "page": "207" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801353 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0184-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 682, "char_count": 15172, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.317852702137001e-08, "percentile": 0.4346624069588613 }, "sha256": "3acccf437d00f99c9e35e2d52e5c14cd651999e765e3abc1c31289366bb88aa2", "simhash": "1:b72aa006034dc6fc", "word_count": 2398 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:01.734981+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re B.D. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. J.T., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found that the minor Briana D. had been physically abused and the minor Brian D. had been neglected while in the care and custody of their mother, respondent Joyce T. After a dispositional hearing, the minors were placed in the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Respondent contends on. appeal that the minors should be returned to her custody because the trial court\u2019s finding that she was unable to care for them was against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThis cause originated from events occurring on December 11, 1998. Respondent left the minors with her husband, Aaron T. When respondent returned that evening, Briana began complaining of a stomachache. Respondent took the minor to the hospital. The minor was transferred to another hospital where surgery was performed to repair her duodenal intestine, which had ruptured. The hospital performed a victim-sensitive interview during which the minor said Aaron T. had kicked her in the stomach. Citing the high potential for fatality from such an injury, the hospital diagnosed the minor as having been physically abused.\nSubsequent investigation revealed that Aaron T. had four prior reports of child abuse registered against him with DCFS. Petitions for adjudication of wardship for both minors were filed. An adjudicatory hearing was held on July 8, 1999. The trial court found that Briana had been physically abused and that Brian had been neglected, having been placed in an injurious environment by respondent.\nThe trial court held a dispositional hearing on November 29, 1999. Dr. Michael Fernando, the medical director of clinical services of the agency to which respondent was assigned, was qualified as a psychiatric expert at this hearing. He testified that respondent\u2019s caseworker requested he do a full diagnostic evaluation of respondent due to the caseworker\u2019s observations of depression. After their first meeting, Dr. Fernando initially evaluated respondent as possibly having bipolar II disorder, cyclothymie disorder and major depressive disorder recurrent with psychosis. He prescribed mood stabilizing medication; respondent refused to take it, insisting there was nothing wrong with her. One month later, Dr. Fernando conducted a second psychiatric status interview with respondent. He testified that respondent had not taken any of the prescribed medication. During the interview, respondent would describe symptoms she was experiencing, including daily anxious and nervous episodes, but would then deny she had such symptoms. Dr. Fernando\u2019s final diagnosis concluded respondent had bipolar II disorder and he again recommended medication, the primary treatment for this disorder.\nSidney St. Leger, a clinical psychologist for 18 years, also testified. He conducted a psychological evaluation of respondent for the agency in order to determine whether she could provide competent care for the minors. St. Leger testified respondent did not believe Briana had really been injured, but rather the hospitals caring for her were participating in a cover-up; respondent showed no remorse and did not assume any responsibility for the minor\u2019s injuries. St. Leger evaluated respondent as \u201cvery angry and suspicious,\u201d diagnosing her with borderline personality disorder. He determined that she was not competent to provide independent parenting for the minors because she lacked skills, maturity and the ability to protect them. He did not order unsupervised visits and instead recommended respondent complete both a program of parenting skills and therapy, followed by a reevaluation.\nMarla Lawrence, the agency supervisor assigned to the case, testified on respondent\u2019s behalf. Lawrence reviewed respondent\u2019s case file for a few weeks and discussed it with three other workers. Lawrence testified that respondent had been \u201csubstantially compliant\u201d in completing the recommended services, visited- the minors and made progress in therapy. Lawrence also testified that she felt the tension between Dr. Fernando and respondent had colored Dr. Fernando\u2019s evaluation of respondent and considered sending respondent to another doctor for a second opinion. Lawrence recommended returning the minors to respondent\u2019s care. However, Lawrence admitted on cross-examination that she knew Dr. Fernando diagnosed respondent with bipolar II disorder and prescribed necessary medication which respondent refused to take. Moreover, Lawrence knew respondent had not completed the therapy recommended by St. Leger, and Lawrence had not received any evaluations from respondent\u2019s therapist. Lawrence did not know where or with whom respondent lived, never visited respondent\u2019s home and had never seen respondent interact with the minors. Lawrence never sent respondent to a second doctor, as she contemplated. Finally, Lawrence testified that one factor in the agency\u2019s determination of whether to return a minor to the parent\u2019s care is whether the parent accepts responsibility for how the minor was injured. Lawrence admitted that for the first seven months of this case, respondent denied Briana\u2019s injury and refused to accept any responsibility.\nThe trial court\u2019s dispositional order found respondent unable to care for the minors, made them wards of the court and appointed a DCFS guardian with the right to place them. In its decision, the court stated that it was \u201cvery upset\u201d that \u201cthere would be a recommendation of return home\u201d in light of the evidence presented. The court found Dr. Fernando to have been very credible. He was the only medical doctor to testify, he was the medical director of the very agency in charge of evaluating respondent and respondent never presented any medical evidence to contradict his medical opinion.\nRespondent does not challenge the determination of abuse and neglect. Instead, the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court\u2019s finding that respondent could not care for the minors was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent contends that the minors should be returned to her care and custody because the trial court ignored Lawrence\u2019s \u201cunrebutted\u201d testimony that respondent is fit and able to care for the minors, improperly relied on Dr. Fernando\u2019s opinion and violated the best interests of the minors by removing them. We disagree.\nIn an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court has the opportunity to hear and see the witnesses testifying before it and is \u201cin the best position to determine the credibility and weight of the witnesses\u2019 testimony.\u201d In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 204 (1997). The court is also in the best position to determine the best interest of a minor (In re Marriage of Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d 198, 207 (1999)), the central standard in cases such as the instant one (In re Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d 515, 521 (1977)). A minor\u2019s best interest stands independent of all other considerations, even that of a parent\u2019s right to custody. In re J.L., 308 Ill. App. 3d 859, 864 (1999).\nThe trial court is given \u201cbroad discretion\u201d (Stilley, 66 Ill. 2d at 520) and \u201cgreat deference\u201d (Marriage of Divelbiss, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 207) in matters involving minors. See In re Marriage of Valliere, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1100 (1995) (trial court vested with significant discretion in child custody matters); In re D.L., 226 Ill. App. 3d 177, 185 (1992), quoting In re Martin, 31 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293 (1975) (\u201c \u2018wide discretion is vested in the trial judge to an even greater degree than any ordinary appeal to which the familiar manifest weight principle is applied\u2019 \u201d). Accordingly, a dispositional order finding a parent unable to care for a minor will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062 (1991).\nUnder the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the trial court in a dispositional hearing determines whether it is in the minor\u2019s best interest to be made a ward of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2\u201422(1) (West 1998). The court also determines whether the minor\u2019s parent is fit to care for her (705 ILCS 405/2\u201427(1) (West 1998)) and whether custody of an abused or neglected minor should be restored to the parent (705 ILCS 405/2\u201423(l)(a) (West 1998)). As part of these determinations, the court must consider any qualified and competent medical testimony presented regarding the minor and her custodial situation. J.L., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 865. In fact, where such medical evidence is not offset or contradicted by other competent medical evidence, the court cannot disregard it. In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 890 (1991) (it is error for the court to \u201csecond-guess medical experts\u201d). Challenging medical expert testimony is the responsibility of its opponent. Adams v. Family Planning Associates Medical Croup, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 533, 550 (2000). The ultimate determination of weight afforded such testimony lies with the trier of fact. Adams, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 550.\nAshley K. and In re Marcus H., 297 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1097 (1998), are illustrative of these legal principles. In Ashley K., two psychiatrists testified that the minor involved required continuing psychotherapy and visitation with her foster parents. However, the minor\u2019s therapist disagreed with these qualified experts. The trial court accepted the therapist\u2019s testimony and ordered the minor to cease therapy and visitation. However, finding that competent expert medical evidence cannot be refuted by nonmedical testimony, this court held that rejecting such medical testimony was error. Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d at 889-90. Similarly, in Marcus H., this court found error where a doctor\u2019s competent expert medical opinion that the minor\u2019s burns were the result of abuse was disregarded absent medical evidence to the contrary. Marcus H., 297 Ill. App. 3d at 1097; see also People v. Cooper, 283 Ill. App. 3d 86, 93 (1996) (trial court properly held that minor\u2019s burns were not accidental when no contrary expert medical evidence was presented).\nThe instant case is very similar to Ashley K. and Marcus H. The trial court found Dr. Fernando, who was qualified as a psychiatric expert at the dispositional hearing, to have been very credible. Significantly, respondent presented absolutely no competent medical testimony or evidence to contradict the testimony of Dr. Fernando, his diagnosis that respondent has bipolar II disorder or his recommendation that she take necessary medication prescribed to her, the primary treatment for this disorder.\nRespondent claims that the trial court improperly relied on Dr. Fernando\u2019s opinion because he was not a parenting expert, he did not contradict Lawrence\u2019s testimony of respondent\u2019s fitness and St. Leger diagnosed respondent as having a different disorder not requiring medication. First, the purpose of Dr. Fernando\u2019s evaluation of respondent was not to determine her parenting skills. Instead, as a psychiatrist, he was asked by her caseworker to complete a personal psychiatric evaluation because respondent was exhibiting signs of depression. Whether Dr. Fernando is a parenting expert is not relevant to his psychiatric diagnosis of respondent or to this cause.\nSecond, Lawrence\u2019s testimony did not directly contradict Dr. Fernando\u2019s medical opinion; Lawrence testified as to respondent\u2019s fitness to care for the minors (contradicted by St. Leger) while Dr. Fernando testified as to respondent\u2019s general need to be on medication. Though Lawrence disagreed with Dr. Fernando\u2019s diagnosis, this is the only testimony in the entire record in such disagreement. Moreover, this testimony is nonmedical. Lawrence was respondent\u2019s caseworker, not a medical doctor, and therefore does not have the credentials to refute the expert medical opinion of Dr. Fernando. Moreover, Lawrence reviewed respondent\u2019s case file for only a few weeks. She knew respondent needed medication and was not taking it. She never sent respondent to a second doctor when she felt personal tensions had colored Dr. Fernando\u2019s diagnosis. She knew respondent was supposed to complete therapy but had not. She never spoke to respondent\u2019s therapist or requested any reports. She knew respondent denied for several months that Briana was injured. Lawrence has never seen respondent interact with the minors and does not even know respondent\u2019s address or with whom she lives.\nFinally, Dr. Fernando\u2019s opinion was not contradicted by St. Leger as respondent claims. St. Leger\u2019s psychological evaluation had a different purpose, that is, to assess whether respondent could provide competent care for the minors, which he found she could not. St. Leger is not of the same medical discipline as Dr. Fernando. But while his diagnosis may have been different, it was not contradictory. It was, however, in direct contradiction to Lawrence\u2019s opinion of fitness. Though St. Leger is not a medical doctor and cannot prescribe medication, he has been a psychologist for 18 years. He recommended respondent complete parenting classes and therapy and be reevaluated before return of the minors to her custody could even be considered. Lawrence, who lacks qualifications similar to those of St. Leger, admitted respondent did not comply completely with these recommendations.\nThe trial court did not ignore Lawrence\u2019s testimony, as respondent argues. The court found that her nonmedical testimony, to the extent it contradicted the \u201cvery credible\u201d expert medical testimony of Dr. Fernando and the qualified testimony of St. Leger, had no bearing. Simply put, respondent presented no competent testimony to contradict that of Dr. Fernando and St. Leger.\nThe trial court exercised its wide discretion in this custody matter after having observed the witnesses and considering uncontradicted expert medical testimony. In light of the record, the court\u2019s holding that it was in the best interest of Briana D. and Brian D. to become wards of the court, as respondent was unable to care for them, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we find no reason to disturb these findings on appeal.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN and GALLAGHER, JJ., concur.\nBriana D. is a female born on June 30, 1995, and was four years old at the time of the hearing.\nBrian D. is a male born on February 24, 1993, and was six years old at the time of the hearing. He is the brother of Briana D. Both minors were born of the same natural parents, respondent Joyce T. and Brian D., Sr., who was incarcerated in Texas at the time of this cause.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BUCKLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Rita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Dennis E. Urban, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Grauer Kisicki, and Mary P. Needham, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Patrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Amino Saeed, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re B.D. et al., Minors (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. J.T., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201400\u20140084\nOpinion filed March 23, 2001.\nRita A. Fry, Public Defender, of Chicago (Dennis E. Urban, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Renee Goldfarb, Nancy Grauer Kisicki, and Mary P. Needham, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nPatrick T. Murphy, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Amino Saeed, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0161-01", "first_page_order": 179, "last_page_order": 185 }