{ "id": 132374, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICKEY E. GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Griffin", "decision_date": "2001-04-26", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201400\u20140237", "first_page": "425", "last_page": "429", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 425" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "737 N.E.2d 169", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453266 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" }, { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 N.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317126 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "558-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 Ill. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1224814 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/189/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "1994 Ill. Laws 2772", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1994 Ill. Laws 2750", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 456, "char_count": 8540, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.4349951632981766e-07, "percentile": 0.6520154263820014 }, "sha256": "dad7d58c53ecd25d273837da8a5ca20f30d7deb4ac6f2aaecf672c7777e13971", "simhash": "1:fb229c335c8e946b", "word_count": 1380 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:01.734981+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICKEY E. GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 1999, defendant, Rickey E. Griffin, pleaded guilty to driving while his license was revoked (DWR) (subsequent offense felony) (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303(d) (West 1998)), and the trial court sentenced him to six years in prison. The court also ordered him to pay a $200 reimbursement fee for the services of the public defender pursuant to section 113\u20143.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Procedural Code) (725 ILCS 5/113\u20143.1 (West 1998)).\nIn December 1999, defendant filed a document entitled \u201cpetition for relief from judgment,\u201d which the trial court treated as a postconviction petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122\u20141 through 122\u20148 (West 1998)). The court subsequently dismissed defendant\u2019s petition, finding that it was frivolous and patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122\u20142.1(2) (West 1998).\nDefendant appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by ordering him to pay the $200 reimbursement fee without first conducting a hearing to determine his ability to pay. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn October 1998, defendant was indicted on the DWR charge, and the trial court appointed the public defender to represent him. The court also then entered an \u201cinitial reimbursement order for court-appointed counsel,\u201d requiring defendant to pay an initial sum of $200 in $20 monthly installments. Defendant posted a cash bond and secured his release from custody. In February 1999, defendant made a $20 payment pursuant to the reimbursement order.\nIn July 1999, defendant pleaded guilty to DWR and to two other unrelated charges in exchange for the State\u2019s dismissing three other unrelated charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison pursuant to the plea agreement and deducted the remaining $180 defendant owed pursuant to the reimbursement order from defendant\u2019s cash bond.\nIn December 1999, defendant filed his postconviction petition, alleging that the DWR charge to which he pleaded guilty, a Class 4 felony, was unconstitutionally enhanced by Public Act 88\u2014680 (Pub. Act 88\u2014680, art. 20, \u00a7 20\u2014900, eff. January 1, 1995 (1994 Ill. Laws 2750, 2771-72)). Specifically, defendant contended that Public Act 88\u2014 680 violated the single-subject rule of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV \u00a7 8(d)). That act contained a provision amending section 6\u2014303(d) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/6\u2014303(d) (West Supp. 1993)) by providing that a person convicted of a second or subsequent DWB, commits a Class 4 felony if the original revocation or suspension was for a statutory summary suspension. See Pub. Act 88\u2014680, art. 20, \u00a7 20\u2014900, eff. January 1, 1995 (1994 Ill. Laws 2772)). In People v. Cervantes, 189 Ill. 2d 80, 98, 723 N.E.2d 265, 274 (1999), the supreme court voided Public Act 88\u2014 680, also known as the \u201cSafe Neighborhoods Law.\u201d\nIn January 2000, the trial court dismissed defendant\u2019s petition, noting that defendant was charged and convicted under an enhancement provision of section 6\u2014303(d) of the Vehicle Code that existed prior to the enactment of Public Act 88\u2014680. See 625 ILCS 5/6\u2014 303(d) (West Supp. 1993) (making a second or subsequent DWB conviction a Class 4 felony if the original revocation or suspension was for a violation of section 11\u2014401 or 11\u2014501 of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11\u2014401 (West 1992); 625 ILCS 5/11\u2014501 (West Supp. 1993))). The court therefore determined that defendant had not suffered an increase in penalty pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.\nIn February 2000, defendant filed a petition to reconsider. In neither defendant\u2019s initial postconviction petition nor in his petition to reconsider did he challenge the $200 reimbursement order. The trial court later denied the petition to reconsider, and this appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nDefendant\u2019s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by entering the $200 reimbursement order without first conducting a hearing to determine his ability to pay. 725 ILCS 5/113\u20143.1(a) (West 1998); see People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550, 563, 687 N.E.2d 32, 38 (1997). In response, the State contends that defendant has forfeited any issue concerning the reimbursement order by not raising the matter until this appeal from the court\u2019s denial of his postconviction petition. We agree with the State.\nIn People v. Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d 437, 464, 737 N.E.2d 169, 184 (2000), the supreme court discussed proceedings under the Act as follows:\n\u201cThe [Act] provides a mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert that their convictions were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. See 725 ILCS 5/122\u20141 (West 1994). An action for post-conviction relief is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence. [Citations.] In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, a defendant must establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the judgment being challenged.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nNothing in Love changes established precedent regarding the Act. Love involved a defendant who raised the appropriateness of her reimbursement order on direct appeal, and the supreme court concluded that the trial court proceedings did not comply with the statutory requirements of section 113\u20143.1 of the Procedural Code (725 ILCS 5/113\u20143.1 (West 1998)). Love, 177 Ill. 2d at 563, 687 N.E.2d at 38. The supreme court held that section 113\u20143.1 of the Procedural Code required the trial court to (1) conduct a hearing into a defendant\u2019s financial circumstances, and (2) find an ability to pay before the court ordered the defendant to pay reimbursement for appointed counsel. Love, 177 Ill. 2d at 563, 687 N.E.2d at 38. Although the supreme court indicated that the legislature may have included this provision in the statute because of constitutional concerns (Love, 177 Ill. 2d at 558-59, 687 N.E.2d at 36), the court did not state that a trial court\u2019s failure to comply with the procedural requirements of section 113\u20143.1 of the Procedural Code constituted a violation of either the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution.\nThis latter point is significant because, as the supreme court pointed out in Haynes, the Act exists to permit defendants to file post-conviction petitions to establish \u201ca substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights.\u201d Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d at 464, 737 N.E.2d at 184. A trial court\u2019s failure to comply with the provisions of section 113\u20143.1 of the Procedural Code violates Illinois statutory law but does not constitute any \u201cdeprivation of federal or state constitutional rights,\u201d much less a \u201csubstantial\u201d one.\nFurther, Haynes also explained that a defendant must not only establish a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights, but that the deprivation occurred \u201cin the proceedings that produced the judgment being challenged.\u201d Haynes, 192 Ill. 2d at 464, 737 N.E.2d at 184. The judgment being challenged, within the contemplation of the Act, is the judgment of conviction or sentence by means of which the defendant stands convicted and is either imprisoned or sitting on death row. Simply put, $200 reimbursement orders, like the one at issue in this case, are not cognizable under the Act because they are the result of ancillary proceedings.\nAlthough not necessary to our resolution of this case, we note an additional infirmity in defendant\u2019s appeal. Defendant purports to raise the constitutionality of the $200 reimbursement order for the first time in his appeal from the trial court\u2019s dismissal of his postconviction petition. Defendant does not cite, nor are we aware of, any case in which the Act has been construed as permitting a defendant to raise on appeal from the dismissal of a postconviction petition an issue he never raised in that petition. This court will not be the first to so hold.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nMYERSCOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Charles M. Schiedel and Lawrence Bapst, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Charles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RICKEY E. GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201400\u20140237\nOpinion filed April 26, 2001.\nCharles M. Schiedel and Lawrence Bapst, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nCharles G. Reynard, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten and Robert J. Biderman, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0425-01", "first_page_order": 443, "last_page_order": 447 }