{ "id": 132430, "name": "VERNON ANDERSON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (East St. Louis Police Department, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Anderson v. Industrial Commission", "decision_date": "2001-04-30", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201400\u20140465WC", "first_page": "463", "last_page": "469", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 463" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "615 N.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 Ill. App. 3d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5385822 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/245/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "statements as to cause of injury or condition made by patient to physician from whom he seeks treatment fall within guarantee of truthfulness" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. 2d 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2800263 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388", "parenthetical": "statements as to cause of injury or condition made by patient to physician from whom he seeks treatment fall within guarantee of truthfulness" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/24/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594896 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 911", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "76 Ill. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2983182 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/76/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5473322 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/83/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "555 N.E.2d 1201", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "198 Ill. App. 3d 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2475149 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/198/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "241 Ill. App. 3d 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2433579 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/241/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 N.E.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5589261 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 N.E.2d 1005", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 Ill. 2d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5545084 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/117/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1971, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "49 Ill. 2d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2910912 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/49/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 66", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966425 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0066-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 685, "char_count": 13792, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.6922169990516086e-08, "percentile": 0.29371306975812106 }, "sha256": "d74b5e70190cead0a4df63036b9c9fed7c3cd293f9420e52bbeeaf97827480cc", "simhash": "1:943da1c9f5672ebc", "word_count": 2205 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:01.734981+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "VERNON ANDERSON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (East St. Louis Police Department, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe claimant, Vernon Anderson, filed an application for adjustment of claim under the Workers\u2019 Occupational Diseases Act (Act) (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 1992)), seeking benefits for a depressive disorder which he alleged arose out of and in the course of his employment with the East St. Louis police department (the Department). Following a hearing, an arbitrator awarded the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for 79 weeks and ordered the Department to pay $2,170 in medical expenses incurred by the claimant. The Industrial Commission (Commission) reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision and denied the claimant benefits under the Act. The claimant sought judicial, review of the Commission\u2019s decision in the circuit court of St. Clair County, which confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision. The claimant then filed this timely appeal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nThe following factual recitation is taken from the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing. The claimant joined the Department in 1977, advanced through the ranks, and was appointed an inspector in 1988. During this period of time, Alonzo Perron was one of the claimant\u2019s supervisors. In 1980, Perron was appointed assistant chief of the Department, and in May of 1991, he was appointed chief of police. According to the claimant\u2019s testimony, he had a number of \u201crun-ins\u201d with Perron, beginning as early as 1980. The claimant testified, though, that the incidents prior to 1989 \u201cnever amounted to anything.\u201d\nOn June 5, 1991, Perron issued an order reassigning the claimant from his position as an inspector to the position of sergeant in the Department\u2019s patrol division, a move that resulted in a $600 reduction in the claimant\u2019s annual salary. The claimant testified that Perron informed him of the reassignment during a closed-door meeting on June 9, 1991. According to the claimant, after Perron informed him that he and his fellow inspectors would be reassigned to patrol duties, Perron then stated that he was going to \u201cdestroy\u201d the claimant and told the claimant that he \u201cbetter take out some more insurance.\u201d The claimant stated that he interpreted Perron\u2019s statements to be a threat on his fife.\nThe claimant testified that he went home after his conversation with Perron but that, later that evening, he drove to Perron\u2019s home. According to the claimant, he \u201csat in [his] car for a while with a weapon.\u201d After a period of time, the claimant left and went to a vacant house, where he sat until his father and brother found him approximately four hours later.\nOn the following day, the claimant saw his personal physician, Dr. William Juergens. In his note of that visit, Dr. Juergens indicated that the claimant suffered from \u201cjob stress\u201d and was to remain off work until he could be seen by Dr. Robert Hicks.\nDr. Hicks, a psychiatrist, evaluated the claimant on June 11, 1991. According to Dr. Hicks\u2019 record of that evaluation, the claimant reported that he had recently been demoted to the rank of sergeant by the chief of police. The claimant reported a rivalry between himself and the chief and stated his belief that the chiefs actions toward him were a political reprisal designed to harass him into quitting the police force. In his record, Dr. Hicks went on to state that the claimant \u201chas recently been obsessed by the idea of shooting the police chief, though he thinks this would be an irrational move and would result in his death or incarceration.\u201d As a result of that evaluation, Dr. Hicks was of the impression that the claimant suffered from \u201cprobable major depression with secondary obsessional thinking.\u201d On that same day, Dr. Hicks signed a note stating that the claimant was medically unable to work.\nThe claimant continued to treat with Dr. Hicks after his initial evaluation. His treatment consisted of anti-obsessional and antidepressant drugs and psychotherapy. Dr. Hicks did not authorize the claimant to return to work until December 15, 1992. In a letter dated September 11, 1998, and addressed to the claimant\u2019s attorney, Dr. Hicks opined that, although the claimant\u2019s work environment was not totally responsible for his condition, it was a \u201cmajor factor in' the intensity, severity, and duration of his illness.\u201d\nPerron testified that one of his job duties was to discipline members of the Department, including the claimant, and that there was nothing unique about his relationship with the claimant. Perron denied ever having harassed the claimant and specifically denied threatening the claimant or telling the claimant that he needed to obtain insurance.\nThe medical records of Drs. Juergens and Hicks were received into evidence. These records contain absolutely no reference to any confrontation between the claimant and Perron on June 9, 1991, nor do they reflect that the claimant told either physician that Perron had threatened him. Additionally, Dr. Juergens\u2019 medical records indicate that he had been periodically prescribing Valium for the claimant\u2019s \u201canxiety\u201d since 1976.\nAfter the hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision finding that the claimant established that he sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Department and that his condition was causally related to that occupational disease. The arbitrator found the claimant to be credible and held that Perron\u2019s threat to the claimant\u2019s well-being was \u201cbeyond the common and necessary stresses of employment.\u201d The arbitrator relied on Dr. Hicks\u2019 letter in support of her finding that a causal relationship existed between the depression from which the claimant suffered and his employment. Based upon those findings, the arbitrator awarded the claimant 79 weeks of TTD benefits for the period from June 11, 1991, through December 15, 1992, and ordered the Department to pay $2,170 in medical expenses incurred by the claimant.\nThe Department sought a review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision. The Commission issued a decision in which it reversed the arbitrator\u2019s decision and denied the claimant benefits under the Act. The Commission determined that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment. Unlike the arbitrator, the Commission found that the claimant\u2019s testimony that he had been threatened by Perron was not credible. It noted that the claimant\u2019s version of the events of June 9, 1991, is wholly uncorroborated and finds no support in the records of his treating physicians. Additionally, the Commission found that the conditions under which the claimant worked were \u201cnot so outside the norm in terms of everyday employment stresses occasioned by employees in general so as to warrant compensability.\u201d On review, the circuit court of St. Clair County confirmed the Commission\u2019s decision.\nOn appeal, the claimant attacks the Commission\u2019s finding that he did not prove that he sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment. He first contends that the Commission erroneously based this finding on the fact that his testimony regarding Perron\u2019s alleged threat was uncorroborated. He further argues that the Commission\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree on both counts.\nThe claimant in an occupational disease case has the burden of proving both that he suffers from an occupational disease and that a causal connection exists between the disease and his employment. The question of whether such a causal relationship exists is one of fact for the Commission to decide. Payne v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 61 Ill. 2d 66, 69, 329 N.E.2d 206 (1975).\nIn deciding questions of fact, it is the function of the Commission to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicting evidence, and draw whatever reasonable conclusions and inferences might be warranted by the evidence. General Steel Industries v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 49 Ill. 2d 552, 555, 276 N.E.2d 290 (1971). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the Commission on a factual issue unless the Commission\u2019s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Orsini v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44, 509 N.E.2d 1005 (1987).\nThe Commission exercises original, rather than appellate, jurisdiction and is in no way bound by the arbitrator\u2019s findings. Paganelis v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 132 Ill. 2d 468, 483, 548 N.E.2d 1033 (1989). We reject, as we have in the past, the argument that an extra degree of scrutiny must be applied to a decision of the Commission which reverses the decision of an arbitrator. Wagner Castings Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 241 Ill. App. 3d 584, 594, 609 N.E.2d 397 (1993).\nIn this case, the claimant testified that Perron threatened him on June 9, 1991. The arbitrator found the claimant to be credible and held that the incident was \u201cbeyond the common and necessary stresses of employment.\u201d The arbitrator also found that the \u201c[t]emporal relationship\u201d between the confrontation which the claimant claimed had occurred and the diagnosis of major depressive disorder was a \u201csubstantial factor\u201d in her decision. In contrast, the Commission did not find the claimant to be credible and, instead, believed Perron\u2019s testimony denying that he ever threatened the claimant. The Commission also noted that none of the claimant\u2019s medical records make reference to Perron\u2019s alleged threats on June 9, 1991.\nAt the outset, we reject the claimant\u2019s argument that the Commission erred as a matter of law by basing its determination that he did not sustain a compensable injury on the fact that his testimony was uncorroborated. It is true, as the claimant asserts, that a recovery under the Act can be based upon an injured employee\u2019s uncorroborated testimony. Old Ben Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 485, 492, 555 N.E.2d 1201 (1990). That does not, however, mean that uncorroborated testimony will always support a benefit award. Rather, the Commission and reviewing courts can, and frequently do, take into consideration the fact that a claimant\u2019s testimony is uncorroborated in resolving issues of fact and making credibility determinations. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 83 Ill. 2d 213, 414 N.E.2d 740 (1980); Walden v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 76 Ill. 2d 193, 390 N.E.2d 911 (1979); Gallentine v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 201 Ill. App. 3d 880, 559 N.E.2d 526 (1990).\nThe Commission based its determination that Perron did not threaten the claimant on June 9, 1991, in part, on the fact that the claimant\u2019s testimony of those events was uncorroborated. The Commission also relied on the contrary testimony of Perron and on the fact that the records of the claimant\u2019s treating physicians contain no reference to the alleged threats (see Jensen v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 24 Ill. 2d 383, 388, 182 N.E.2d 211 (1962) (statements as to cause of injury or condition made by patient to physician from whom he seeks treatment fall within guarantee of truthfulness)). Additionally, as the Commission noted, the claimant\u2019s original application for adjustment of claim alleged a date of accident \u201capproximately on and after October 1989.\u201d It was not until the arbitration hearing in September 1998 that the claimant amended the date of accident to June 9, 1991, the date of Perron\u2019s alleged threats. Based upon the record before us, we are unable to find that the Commission\u2019s determination that the claimant\u2019s testimony regarding a threat by Perron was not credible is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe Commission also found that the claimant \u201coffered no evidence of any unique aspect of his employment that one could reasonably and objectively describe as anything people in the general workforce are not commonly exposed to.\u201d As this court stated in Runion v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 245 Ill. App. 3d 470, 473, 615 N.E.2d 8 (1993):\n\u201cRecovery for nontraumatically induced mental disease is limited to those who can establish that: (1) the mental disorder arose in a situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees must experience; (2) the conditions exist in reality, from an objective standpoint; and (3) the employment conditions, when compared with the nonemployment conditions, were the \u2018major contributory cause\u2019 of the mental disorder.\u201d\nAccepting, as we must, the Commission\u2019s determination that Perron did not threaten the claimant, there is nothing in the record before us to support the proposition that the claimant\u2019s employment exposed him to any greater stress or tension than one could reasonably and objectively expect to encounter as a member of the general workforce. The claimant himself stated that, other than the alleged incident of June 9, 1991, the \u201crun-ins\u201d he claimed to have had with Perron \u201cnever amounted to anything.\u201d\nFor these reasons, we hold that the Commission\u2019s finding that the claimant failed to prove that he sustained an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Department and its denial of his claim for benefits under the Act are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of St. Clair County confirming the Commission\u2019s decision in this matter.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and O\u2019MALLEY, HOLDRIDGE, and RARICK, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Patricia A. Zimmer, of George Ripplinger & Associates, of Belleville, for appellant.", "William R Hardy and Dennis J. Graber, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VERNON ANDERSON, Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (East St. Louis Police Department, Appellee).\nFifth District (Industrial Commission Division)\nNo. 5\u201400\u20140465WC\nOpinion filed April 30, 2001.\nPatricia A. Zimmer, of George Ripplinger & Associates, of Belleville, for appellant.\nWilliam R Hardy and Dennis J. Graber, both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0463-01", "first_page_order": 481, "last_page_order": 487 }