{ "id": 132481, "name": "JEFFREY JARMUTH, Adm'r of the Estate of Michael Garofalo, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH W. ALDRIDGE, Indiv., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc., et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Jarmuth v. Aldridge", "decision_date": "2001-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201499\u20144257", "first_page": "690", "last_page": "695", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 690" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "297 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "directed verdict for aircraft owner proper where aircraft was delivered to independent contractor for maintenance and repair and thus any negligence by independent contractor could not be imputed to owner" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 Ga. App. 469", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 595023 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471", "parenthetical": "directed verdict for aircraft owner proper where aircraft was delivered to independent contractor for maintenance and repair and thus any negligence by independent contractor could not be imputed to owner" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/164/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "234 Ill. App. 3d 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5187935 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/234/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Cal. Rptr. 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr.", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "445 P.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "69 Cal. 2d 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2304306 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-2d/69/0442-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5106992 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ga. App. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 829215 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" }, { "page": "696" }, { "page": "602" }, { "page": "696" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/210/0599-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 F. Supp. 719", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 172027 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "722" }, { "page": "723" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/847/0719-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 91.401", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 C.F.R. \u00a7 91.405", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 C.F.R. \u00a7 119.1", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq.", "parenthetical": "Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 C.F.R. \u00a7 121.1", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 C.F.R. \u00a7 121.363", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 734, "char_count": 13666, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.548627546539126e-08, "percentile": 0.2846164004156227 }, "sha256": "f7782297302d31b0feffe61d90db5e2f7edffff4d293e63bb9bb80ea72fad90a", "simhash": "1:12695501080e7fdd", "word_count": 2110 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:01.734981+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JEFFREY JARMUTH, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Michael Garofalo, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH W. ALDRIDGE, Indiv., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc., et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Jeffrey Jarmuth, appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants Kenneth W Aldridge, doing business as KWA Leasing, who was also sued as Utility Leasing (collectively, the Aldridge defendants), on plaintiffs negligence claim arising out of an airplane crash, which resulted in the death of the pilot, Michael Garofalo (decedent), and his passenger, Vito Garofalo.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, demonstrate that there is no issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2\u20141005(c) (West 1998). A reviewing court applies a de nova standard of review. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).\nThe relevant facts are undisputed. Decedent and Vito Garofalo were killed in an airplane accident on July 28, 1994, in Racine, Wisconsin. The plane was a restored World War II vintage Vultee BT 13-A training aircraft owned by the Aldridge defendants and piloted by decedent.\nSeveral years prior to the accident, decedent and James Skinner, employees of Waukegan Aero, Ltd. (WAL), found the Vultee in pieces in a barn in South Carolina. WAL purchased the salvaged parts and transported them to WAL\u2019s facilities where WAL\u2019s employees began the restoration process. KWA Leasing, Inc., purchased the Vultee from WAL in 1990. Thereafter WAL sent the Vultee\u2019s engine to Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc. (Covington), in pieces for an overhaul. Covington completed the engine overhaul and it was installed. WAL then performed a final restoration inspection and certified the Vultee as airworthy on May 11, 1992. Following an annual inspection, WAL again certified the Vultee as airworthy on June 4, 1993.\nIn June 1994, Kenneth Aldridge discovered a fuel leak from the Vultee\u2019s engine compartment and contacted Howard Siedlecki, a licensed mechanic working for Sunshine Aircraft Repair, to determine the cause of the leak and to repair it. Siedlecki examined the Vultee and discovered the fuel leak was the result of a cracked fitting that goes into the carburetor. Kenneth Aldridge told Siedlecki to repair the leak. Siedlecki removed the carburetor from the Vultee and attempted to effect the necessary repair but encountered difficulties when the carburetor threads came out of the carburetor along with the cracked fitting. Siedlecki, who did not feel competent to repair the carburetor threads, contacted Covington about the problem and was instructed to send the carburetor to Maynard & Maynard for repair work.\nMaynard overhauled the carburetor, performed a water leak test on the carburetor float, certified the carburetor float as airworthy, affixed the appropriate maintenance release tag to the carburetor, and shipped the part back to Sunshine Aircraft Repair. Siedlecki then reinstalled the part, performed the Vultee\u2019s annual inspection as required by Federal Aviation Association (FAA) regulations, and certified the aircraft as airworthy on July 25, 1994. Three days later, the plane crashed while decedent was flying it to Oshkosh, Wisconsin, where it was to be sold.\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged, inter alla, that the Aldridge defendants had a nondelegable duty to ensure the Vultee was airworthy, that the Aldridge defendants breached this duty when they failed to personally inspect the Vultee after it had already been inspected by a FAA-certified mechanic, and that this failure caused the death of decedent because a defect in the carburetor float allowed fuel to enter the mechanism causing the Vultee to crash. The issue is whether the facts and the law, when construed strictly against the Aldridge defendants and liberally in favor of plaintiff, create a duty to ensure the Vultee was airworthy, which could not be delegated to another.\nSection 424 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) provides:\n\u201cOne who by statute or by administrative regulation is under a duty to provide specified safeguards or precautions for the safety of others is subject to liability *** for harm caused by the failure of a contractor employed by him to provide such safeguards or precautions.\u201d\nFAA regulations impose certain duties upon owners of aircraft to ensure the safety of others. Section 121.363 provides:\n\u201c(a) Each certificate holder is primarily responsible for\u2014\n(1) The airworthiness of its aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, and parts thereof; and\n(2) The performance of maintenance, preventative maintenance, and alteration of its aircraft, including airframes, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, emergency equipment, and parts thereof, in accordance with its manual and the regulations of this chapter.\n(b) A certificate holder may make arrangements with another person for the performance of any maintenance, preventative maintenance, or alterations. However, this does not relieve the certificate holder of the responsibilities specified in paragraph (a) of this section.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 14 C.F.R. \u00a7 121.363 (1999).\nThis section clearly states that the duty imposed is nondelegable; the certificate holder is not absolved of responsibility for noncompliance even though the work to be performed thereunder may have been contracted out. However, section 121.363 applies to \u201cAir Carrier Certificate or Operating Certificate\u201d holders, such as major airlines (14 C.F.R. \u00a7 121.1(a) (1999); see also 14 C.F.R. \u00a7 119.1 et seq. (1999) (Certification: Air Carriers and Commercial Operators)), not to private owners.\nIn contrast, section 91.403 provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) The owner or operator of an aircraft is primarily responsible for maintaining that aircraft in an airworthy condition, including compliance with part 39 [Airworthiness Directives] of this chapter.\u201d 14 C.ER. \u00a7 91.403 (1999).\nAnd section 91.405 provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cEach owner or operator of an aircraft\u2014\n(a) Shall have that aircraft inspected as prescribed in subpart E of this part and shall between required inspections *** have discrepancies repaired ***;\n(b) Shall ensure that maintenance personnel make appropriate entries in the aircraft maintenance records indicating that the aircraft has been approved for return to service;\n(c) Shall have any inoperative instrument or item of equipment *** repaired, replaced, removed, or inspected at the next required inspection; and\n(d) When listed discrepancies include inoperative instruments or equipment, shall ensure that a placard has been installed as required by Section 43.11 of this chapter.\u201d 14 C.F.R. \u00a7 91.405 (1999).\nSections 91.403 and 91.405 apply to noncommercial aircraft owners. 14 C.F.R. \u00a7\u00a7 91.401(a), (b) (1999). The use in section 91.403 of the term \u201cprimary\u201d responsibility clearly contemplates \u201csecondary\u201d responsibility, thus negating an implication that the duty to ensure the safety of a privately owned aircraft is nondelegable. Moreover, section 91.403 contains no specific language on par with that in section 121.363 regarding an owner\u2019s retention of legal responsibility. The absence of such language indicates the FAA intended no such restriction on the owner\u2019s delegation of a section 91.403 duty. Because the Vultee owned by the Aldridge defendants did not fall within the class of aircraft governed by section 121.363 but, rather, into the class of aircraft governed by sections 91.403 and 91.405, the Aldridge defendants were entitled to delegate the duty to ensure the Vultee was airworthy to FAA-qualified mechanics and inspectors. Because the Aldridge defendants\u2019 duty under sections 91.403 and 91.405 was delegable, the Aldridge defendants are not hable pursuant to section 424 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.\nAlthough there are no Illinois cases directly on point, this conclusion is supported by Cosgrove v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co., 847 F. Supp. 719 (D. Minn. 1994), and White v. Orr Leasing, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 599, 436 S.E.2d 693 (1993).\nIn Cosgrove, a helicopter pilot was forced to land when fatigue failure caused the helicopter\u2019s drive shaft to be severed. The pilot, Cosgrove, the owners, and the lessee of the helicopter sued McDonnell Douglas, successor in interest to the manufacturer of the helicopter. The jury allocated fault in varying amounts to McDonnell Douglas, the owners, the lessee, and the inspector. In a posttrial motion, McDonnell Douglas requested reapportionment of damages by allocating the inspector\u2019s share of fault to the helicopter owners. McDonnell Douglas contended that section 91.403 and 91.405 duties were nondelegable and, as a consequence, the owners were liable pursuant to section 424 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court rejected this argument, finding that the express language of section 91.403 imposes upon an aircraft owner a \u201cnon-exclusive\u201d duty. Other portions of the regulations \u201cimpose a plethora of requirements, largely expressed in obligatory \u2018shalls,\u2019 \u201d (Cosgrove, 847 F. Supp. at 722), upon operators and mechanics as well as others. That the section rests \u201cprimary\u201d responsibility for \u201cmaintenance of aircraft is not so singularly a duty of the owner or operator that public policy dictates that it may not be delegated to others.\u201d Cosgrove, 847 F. Supp. at 723.\nIn White, the plaintiffs asserted that section 91.403 \u201ccreates a nondelegable duty to passengers and would make [defendant owner] absolutely liable for any negligent inspection.\u201d White, 210 Ga. App. at 602, 436 S.E.2d at 696. The court, without comment on the regulation, stated, \u201cno authority is cited by plaintiffs for the proposition that allowing a mechanic licensed by the FAA to conduct the inspection makes the owner of the plane liable for any failure of inspection as a matter of negligence per se.\u201d White, 210 Ga. App. at 602, 436 S.E.2d at 696. Summary judgment for the aircraft owners was affirmed.\nMoreover the Illinois case Van Steemburg v. General Aviation, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 299 (1993), appeal denied, 151 Ill. 2d 578 (1993), suggests that an aircraft owner discharges his FAA-mandated maintenance duty by having such maintenance performed by licensed professionals. The case further suggests that if an owner has so delegated the duty in compliance with federal regulations, he cannot be held liable unless he knew or should have known of a defect or deficiency left unrepaired.\nHere, the undisputed facts indicate that the Aldridge defendants delegated all responsibility for investigation and repair of the fuel leak, the subsequent repair of the carburetor, and the annual inspection of Vultee to professionals licensed to perform such work. The undisputed facts also indicate that the repairs were documented in accord with FAA regulations. Plaintiff does not dispute the qualifications of Siedlecki, the aircraft mechanic who certified the plane as airworthy following the carburetor work. Neither does plaintiff point to any failure of the Aldridge defendants to act to remedy defects or deficiencies of which they had actual or constructive notice following such certification. Indeed, there is no indication that the Aldridge defendants even saw the aircraft in the three days between completion of the Vultee\u2019s final inspection and decedent\u2019s take-off for Oshkosh, Wisconsin.\nPlaintiffs reliance on Maloney v. Rath, 69 Cal. 2d 442, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1968), in support of its argument is misplaced. Maloney is a California case arising out of an automobile accident and addressing a provision of that state\u2019s vehicle code. The ruling in that case is irrelevant to the facts of the instant case involving an airplane crash, which addresses different and significantly more stringent federal regulation of aircraft.\nBecause there is no evidence that the Aldridge defendants were negligent in relying on properly certified FAA mechanics to perform the repair work, and there is no evidence the Aldridge defendants had actual or constructive knowledge of any defect in the Vultee subsequent to the FAA-mandated annual inspection, the Aldridge defendants cannot be held liable for the negligence, if any, of the mechanics. Section 434 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is an exception to the general rule that an employer is not fiable for the negligent acts of an independent contractor except where the employer orders or directs the acts causing the harm or retains control over the operative details of the contractor\u2019s work (Milz v. M.J. Meadows, Inc., 234 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1992)), and the exception does not apply under the undisputed facts of this case (see, e.g., Ingle v. Swish Manufacturing Southeast, 164 Ga. App. 469, 471, 297 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1982) (directed verdict for aircraft owner proper where aircraft was delivered to independent contractor for maintenance and repair and thus any negligence by independent contractor could not be imputed to owner)).\nAccordingly, the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Kenneth W Aldridge, KWA Leasing, and Utility Leasing is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019BRIEN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Kenneth C. Miller and Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.", "Kaplan Begy & Von Ohlen, of Chicago (Larry S. Kaplan and Tamara Dykstra Koury, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JEFFREY JARMUTH, Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Michael Garofalo, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENNETH W. ALDRIDGE, Indiv., et al., Defendants-Appellees (Covington Aircraft Engines, Inc., et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201499\u20144257\nOpinion filed March 30, 2001.\nMichael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Kenneth C. Miller and Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.\nKaplan Begy & Von Ohlen, of Chicago (Larry S. Kaplan and Tamara Dykstra Koury, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0690-01", "first_page_order": 708, "last_page_order": 713 }