{ "id": 132348, "name": "MCDONALD'S CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "McDonald's Corp. v. American Motorists Insurance", "decision_date": "2001-05-02", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201400\u20140566", "first_page": "972", "last_page": "990", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 972" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "24 F. Supp. 2d 851", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1626266 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854", "parenthetical": "applying Illinois law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/24/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5010576 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/339/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 3240666, 3237475, 3239917 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing cause of action for slander of title with respect to patent for a can opener" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/294/0601-02", "/ill-app/294/0601-03", "/ill-app/294/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 534", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3548160 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0534-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 1102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260336 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1104-05" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/1102-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3564153 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "983" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/136/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 Ill. App. 3d 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 456209 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "103" }, { "page": "103" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/291/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239742 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5384319 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886", "parenthetical": "noting that, although article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 12) provides that \"[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs,\" the court is not required to create a cause of action where none exists" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 792", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636949 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "explaining that an action to quiet title in property is an equitable proceeding in which a party seeks to remove a cloud upon his title to the property" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0792-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261376 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "noting that the act of maliciously recording a document that clouds one's title to real estate is actionable as slander of title" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "991 F. Supp. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 243112 ], "weight": 10, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1029" }, { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1033" }, { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/991/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 F.3d 1219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11341426 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/94/1219-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 F. Supp. 1167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7864236 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1175", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/585/1167-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 F.2d 959", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1736210 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "962", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/823/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "879 F.2d 272", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10531056 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "noting that the effect of the pretrial order is to supersede the pleadings" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/879/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777543 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592553 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203", "parenthetical": "supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980702 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. App. 3d 998", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 411683 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/312/0998-01" ] }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544408 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 C 6747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1506, "char_count": 45230, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3014979927747565e-07, "percentile": 0.6222196738110987 }, "sha256": "627710d3a8d12480c25f3274302f9b51d046b8d20b856d405c28c22c4c5a510e", "simhash": "1:bb9ffdf36b69d4b8", "word_count": 6871 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:50:01.734981+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MCDONALD\u2019S CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GEOMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal involves an insurance coverage dispute. Plaintiff-insured, McDonald\u2019s Corporation (McDonald\u2019s), appeals from an order of the circuit court of Du Page County granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-insurers, American Motorists Insurance Company, Century Indemnity Company & Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, and St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Company (collectively, insurers). The trial court determined that the advertiser\u2019s coverage part of the \u201cMedia Special Perils\u201d policies issued to McDonald\u2019s by insurers did not require insurers to indemnify McDonald\u2019s in the settlement of an underlying federal lawsuit alleging, inter alla, violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (765 ILCS 1065/1 et seq. (West 1994)). McDonald\u2019s also appeals from a trial court order denying its motion to compel discovery, an issue we discuss in the nonpublished portion of this opinion. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nThe parties are already familiar with the long and complex factual background of this case. Accordingly, we recite only those facts necessary for an understanding of the issues raised on appeal.\nAt the time of the events giving rise to the underlying federal litigation, McDonald\u2019s was a named insured under the advertiser\u2019s coverage part of a \u201cMedia Special Perils\u201d (MSP) policy issued by First National Insurance Company of America (Safeco). To secure additional protection, McDonald\u2019s also purchased excess insurance from insurers, with defendant-insurer American Motorists Insurance Company (AMICO) being the lead umbrella carrier. The purpose of the MSP policies was to insure McDonald\u2019s against the cost of defending lawsuits arising out of its advertising, publicity, or promotional activities and to indemnify McDonald\u2019s for the adverse judgments that may result from any such lawsuits. The AMICO policies contained \u201cbroad as primary\u201d endorsements. The \u201cbroad as primary\u201d endorsements provided that AMICO agreed to be bound by the terms of the underlying primary policy, notwithstanding any more restrictive terms in the excess policy. The AMICO policy listed Safeco as the primary carrier for the MSP policy. The remainder of the excess insurance policies indicated that they \u201cfollow form\u201d to the AMICO policy. In other words, coverage under the excess carriers was also provided on the same terms as the Safeco policy and was to be implicated once the underlying layers of coverage were exhausted. The instant dispute concerns the excess insurance policies. Safeco is not a party to this appeal.\nOn February 7, 1997, McDonald\u2019s filed a complaint against insurers in the circuit court of Du Page County. The second amended complaint consisted of six counts. Relevant here are those counts in which McDonald\u2019s sought a declaration that insurers were required to indemnify it for the settlement of a complaint filed in federal court and captioned as Thermodyne Food Service Products, Inc. v. McDonald\u2019s Corp., originally filed as No. 95 CV 0232 (D. Ind.), later transferred and redocketed as No. 95 C 6747 (N.D. Ill.) (Thermodyne litigation).\nThe Thermodyne litigation stemmed from the development of a product known as the \u201cThermodyne\u201d oven. The appeal of this product to McDonald\u2019s was its ability to heat frozen food to serving temperature and hold it for extended periods of time without affecting the quality or taste of the food. The technology used in the Thermodyne oven was developed principally by an engineer named Benno Liebermann. Liebermann developed this technology while he was the owner of a company called Advanced Food Technology, Inc. (AFTEC). Eventually, Vincent Tippman purchased a majority of the stock in AFTEC and formed Thermodyne Food Service Products, Inc. (Thermodyne). AFTEC researches and develops food service equipment, which Thermodyne then manufactures and markets. Liebermann refined the technology used in the Thermodyne oven while working for Tippman. As part of the purchase agreement for AFTEC, Liebermann executed a five-year employment contract with Tippman, which included a covenant not to compete. For a period of time, McDonald\u2019s worked with Thermodyne and AFTEC in developing products for McDonald\u2019s restaurants using the Thermodyne oven. McDonald\u2019s eventually purchased a Thermodyne oven. Shortly after the purchase, a representative from McDonald\u2019s told Tippman that McDonald\u2019s was no longer interested in the Thermodyne oven.\nLiebermann eventually became unhappy with his relationship with Tippman and resigned from Thermodyne. Liebermann began working for Beltec, a partnership between himself and OSI Industries, Inc. (OSI). OSI was a meat supplier for McDonald\u2019s. Thereafter, Beltec developed a product known as the \u201cTemperfect\u201d oven. Beltec licensed the right to manufacture the Temperfect oven to Taylor Company (Taylor), a division of Specialty Equipment Companies, Inc. (Specialty Equipment). Specialty Equipment was one of McDonald\u2019s equipment suppliers. Taylor began to manufacture the Temperfect oven for Me-Donald\u2019s use. Soon thereafter, McDonald\u2019s began developing products prepared using the Temperfect oven. Once the Temperfect oven was installed in a restaurant, representatives from other companies, including competitors of McDonald\u2019s, visited the restaurant to observe the Temperfect oven in use. McDonald\u2019s also showcased the Temperfect oven to owner-operators of its restaurants as well as various equipment and food suppliers. In addition, at McDonald\u2019s request, Taylor developed for distribution a specification sheet and a brochure for the Temperfect oven. The specification sheet stated that \u201cTHE INFORMATION SHOWN ON THIS SPECIFICATION SHEET IS FOR THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF LICENSEES OF MCDONALD\u2019S SYSTEMS, INC.\u201d\nEventually, Thermodyne and AFTEC (collectively, the Thermodyne plaintiffs) became aware of the development of the Temperfect oven. On July 20, 1995, the Thermodyne plaintiffs initiated their lawsuit in federal district court. The Thermodyne plaintiffs claimed that McDonald\u2019s and others misappropriated their trade secret to develop a competing product called the \u201cTemperfect\u201d oven. The Thermodyne plaintiffs alleged that McDonald\u2019s and the other named defendants \u201cengaged in a course of conduct designed to misappropriate [pjlaintiffs\u2019 employees, technology, and trade secrets.\u201d The complaint further alleged that \u201c[djefendants\u2019 promotion of the \u2018Temperfect Oven\u2019 exposed [pjlaintiffs\u2019 trade secrets to the market place.\u201d\nThe Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint consisted of eight counts, the following six of which were directed against McDonald\u2019s. Count I alleged violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1994)). Count II alleged a violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. Count III alleged unfair competition. Count IV alleged breach of confidence. Count V alleged interference with contractual relations. Count VIII alleged conspiracy. On McDonald\u2019s motion, the district court dismissed with prejudice counts I, III, and IV on the basis that they were preempted by the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. As the litigation progressed, the parties to the Thermodyne litigation prepared a \u201cFinal Pretrial Order\u201d pursuant to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P 16).\nThe Thermodyne plaintiffs also sought to recover for damages, unjust enrichment, exemplary damages, attorney fees, and a \u201creasonable royalty for [djefendants\u2019 past or future use of or profits from the sale of [pjlaintiffs\u2019 trade secret or the application thereof.\u201d In addition, attached to the final pretrial order was a \u201cStatement of Special Damages.\u201d Among other things, the Thermodyne plaintiffs alleged that they lost between $54.3 million and $97.9 million in lost profits as a result of \u201cMarket Opportunity Due To Uncertainty As To Ownership Of The Thermodyne Technology Plus Prejudgment Interest.\u201d\nMeanwhile, McDonald\u2019s attempted to tender the Thermodyne litigation to Safeco. Safeco denied coverage. However, McDonald\u2019s eventually reached a settlement with Safeco, and the insurer agreed to pay $725,000 of the $850,000 owed on its policy. Insurers, however, denied coverage, and McDonald\u2019s initiated the instant litigation. Thereafter, McDonald\u2019s settled the Thermodyne litigation for $25 million. The entire settlement was paid solely by McDonald\u2019s. At the time of settlement, the only theories pending against McDonald\u2019s with respect to the Thermodyne litigation were misappropriation of trade secrets (count II), interference with contractual relations (count V), and conspiracy (count VIII).\nOn December 17, 1998, insurers filed a motion for summary judgment in this insurance coverage litigation. Insurers argued that they did not have a duty to indemnify McDonald\u2019s in the Thermodyne litigation. Insurers explained that the MSP policies required a \u201ccausal connection\u201d between the commission of an offense covered by the policies (enumerated offense) and the content of McDonald\u2019s promotional activity. Here, insurers argue, there was no coverage because there was no \u201ccausal connection\u201d between the content of McDonald\u2019s promotional activity and the commission of an enumerated offense. The trial court denied insurers\u2019 motion without prejudice, and the parties proceeded with discovery.\nOn January 5, 2000, insurers filed a renewed motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted insurers\u2019 motion. The court concluded that, as a matter of law, there was no \u201ccausal connection\u201d between the content of McDonald\u2019s promotional activity and the commission of an enumerated offense. The trial court found that only count II, misappropriation of trade secrets, could arguably fall within the MSP policies. However, the court explained that the theft of the trade secret occurred before any promotion commenced. Accordingly, the promotion could not have caused the misappropriation of trade secrets. Thus, the court concluded that this offense was not committed \u201cwithin the four corners of the promotion.\u201d McDonald\u2019s now appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nAs a preliminary matter, we address insurers\u2019 joint motion to strike from McDonald\u2019s opening brief \u201cirrelevant and inadmissible material regarding the non-party primary insurance carrier\u2019s settlement.\u201d We ordered the motion as well as McDonald\u2019s objections thereto taken with the case. After careful consideration, we now deny insurers\u2019 motion.\nA. Duty to Indemnify\nMcDonald\u2019s argues that the trial court erred in granting insurers\u2019 renewed motion for summary judgment. According to McDonald\u2019s, while the trial court correctly began its analysis by examining the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, it was required to examine also the final pretrial order to determine exactly what transpired in the Thermodyne litigation. Looking beyond the labels of the amended complaint, McDonald\u2019s asserts, reveals that the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 most significant claim against McDonald\u2019s is a claim for \u201ccloud on title.\u201d According to McDonald\u2019s, this theory implicates the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that McDonald\u2019s had \u201cmisled the market into believing that Tippman was not the rightful owner of the technology in the Thermodyne oven by promoting the Temperfect oven as incorporating technology that was owned exclusively by McDonald\u2019s.\u201d McDonald\u2019s contends that the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory arose directly out of its promotion of the Temperfect oven. McDonald\u2019s further maintains that this \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory was actionable as an \u201cunfair competition\u201d claim or a \u201cslander of title\u201d claim.\nInsurers respond that the trial court properly granted their renewed motion for summary judgment. Examining the causes of action actually asserted by the Thermodyne plaintiffs reveals that there is no causal connection between the acquisition and use of technological trade secrets and McDonald\u2019s promotion of the Temperfect oven. McDonald\u2019s attempt to assert that the Thermodyne plaintiffs pursued a \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory is flawed because the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory was a damages theory, and the plain language of the MSP policies permits coverage only if an offense is caused by promotion, not if damages are caused by the promotion. Insurers finally contend that McDonald\u2019s improperly attempts to recast the Thermodyne litigation as one involving unfair competition or slander of title.\nIn appeals from summary judgment rulings, this court conducts a de nova review. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). Summary judgment is a drastic measure and should be granted only if the movant\u2019s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. American Reinsurance Co., 286 Ill. App. 3d 129, 133 (1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. International Insurance Co. v. Rollprint Packaging Products, Inc., 312 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1007 (2000). A reviewing court may affirm a trial court\u2019s ruling granting summary judgment on any grounds that appear in the record, regardless of whether the trial court relied on them. International Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1007. We further note that the construction of an insurance contract is a question of law, and an interpretation of an insurance contract provision is appropriate on a motion for summary judgment. International Insurance Co., 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1007.\nThis case involves whether insurers had a duty to indemnify McDonald\u2019s in the settlement of the Thermodyne litigation. The duty to indemnify is much narrower than the duty to defend. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 315 Ill. App. 3d 552, 559 (2000). Unlike the duty to defend, the duty to indemnify cannot be determined simply on the basis of whether the factual allegations of the underlying complaint potentially state a claim against the insurer. Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 203 (1991) (supplemental opinion on denial of rehearing). The duty to indemnify arises only when the facts alleged actually fall within the coverage of the policy at issue. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 398 (1993).\nIn accordance with the above principles, we must analyze the underlying complaint in light of the applicable policy provisions to determine whether the complaint actually falls within the coverage of the policy at issue. In federal litigation, the final pretrial order super-cedes the complaint. See, e.g., Ash v. Wallenmeyer, 879 F.2d 272, 274 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that the effect of the pretrial order is to supersede the pleadings); Ghandi v. Police Department, 823 F.2d 959, 962 (6th Cir. 1987) (same); Hoagburg v. Harrah\u2019s Marina Hotel Casino, 585 F. Supp. 1167, 1175 (D. N.J. 1984) (same). Therefore, in addition to examining the allegations of the underlying complaint, we will consider also the allegations as set forth in the final pretrial order. Moreover, we note that, at the time McDonald\u2019s settled the Thermodyne litigation, three counts were pending against it. Of those three counts, only count II, violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, is implicated here.\nOur analysis necessarily begins with the language of the insurance policies in dispute. Pursuant to the advertiser\u2019s coverage part of the MSP policies issued to McDonald\u2019s, insurers agreed:\n\u201c[t]o pay on behalf of the insured all loss and claim expense which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay because of liability imposed by law or assumed under contract as a result of one or more claims arising out of:\nA. any form of defamation or other tort related to disparagement or harm to the character, reputation or feelings of any natural person or organization, including but not limited to libel, slander, product disparagement, trade libel, infliction of emotional distress, outrage or outrageous conduct;\nB. any form of invasion, infringement or interference with rights of privacy or publicity, including but not limited to false light, public disclosure of private facts, intrusion and commercial appropriation of name or likeness;\nC. [i]nfringement of copyright, title, slogan, trademark, trade name, trade dress, service mark, service name, trade identity or patently]\nD. plagiarism, piracy, or misappropriation of ideas under implied contract;\nE. [u]nfair competition, including, but not limited to, dilution, deceptive trade practices, civil actions for consumer fraud, false advertising or misrepresentation in advertising, and claims under Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act or similar state statutes; committed in the utterance or dissemination of matter arising out of an occurrence during the policy term, regardless of when claim is made or suit is brought.\u201d\nThe policies define \u201cmatter\u201d as:\n[T]the content of advertising, publicity or promotion in any form including, but not limited to, the artistic, literary, printed, pictorial, statistical, musical, audio, audio-visual or dramatic content of such advertising, publicity or promotional material, and use of such matter by others with the permission of the Named Insured.\u201d\nThe policies define \u201coccurrence\u201d as:\n\u201c[T]he broadcast, telecast, cablecast, publication, distribution, display, or exhibition of advertising material, promotional material or publicity material by or within the permission of the Named Insured on its own behalf.\u201d\nThus, insurers have a duty to indemnify McDonald\u2019s if (1) the Thermodyne plaintiffs were pursuing one of the offenses enumerated in the policy; (2) the enumerated offense was committed in the content of advertising, publicity or promotion; and (3) the enumerated offense arose out of the publication of advertising, publicity, or promotional material.\nMcDonald\u2019s argues that the trial court erred in granting insurers\u2019 renewed motion for summary judgment. According to McDonald\u2019s, separate and apart from the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 allegations of misappropriation and use of trade secrets was their claim for \u201ccloud on title.\u201d McDonald\u2019s claims that it settled the Thermodyne litigation \u201cbecause it feared being hit with a runaway verdict for a claim *** for the cloud that its promotional activities had allegedly cast on [Tippman\u2019s] title to the technology incorporated in the Thermodyne oven.\u201d From this statement, McDonald\u2019s suggests that the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 claim for \u201ccloud on title\u201d was more than a theory of consequential damages. Looking beyond labels, McDonald\u2019s insists, reveals that the \u201ccloud on title\u201d claim was independently actionable as a claim for slander of title or unfair competition. McDonald\u2019s contends that under either of these theories there is a direct causal connection between the content of McDonald\u2019s promotion of the Tern-perfect oven and the commission of an enumerated offense.\nInsurers disagree. Insurers claim that, even if the \u201cmisappropriation of trade secrets\u201d cause of action constitutes an enumerated offense for purposes of the MSP policies, McDonald\u2019s is not entitled to coverage because there is no causal connection between McDonald\u2019s promotional activities and the misappropriation and use of the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 trade secrets. Insurers argue that, because McDonald\u2019s is unable to establish a causal connection between its promotional activities and the \u201cmisappropriation of trade secrets\u201d cause of action in the Thermodyne litigation, McDonald\u2019s improperly attempts to obtain coverage under the MSP polices by recasting the Thermodyne litigation as a lawsuit for \u201cslander on title\u201d or \u201cunfair competition\u201d claims. However, insurers argue that neither the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 underlying complaint nor the final pretrial order includes causes of action for unfair competition or slander of title. Moreover, insurers maintain, such causes of action would be legally impossible to bring under the circumstances. In any event, the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory upon which these two claims are based is solely a measure of damages flowing from the causes of action asserted against McDonald\u2019s. Consequently, McDonald\u2019s cannot meet the direct causal connection requirement because said requirement requires that the offense be caused by the promotion, not merely the damages.\nWe conclude that insurers were entitled to summary judgment because neither the allegations in the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint nor those in the pretrial order actually fall within the coverage of the policy. None of the allegations contained in these two pleadings constitute an enumerated offense. In any event, the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory was a damages theory, outside the reach of the coverage of the policy. Even assuming that the allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets constitutes an enumerated offense, McDonald\u2019s is unable to demonstrate that the misappropriation of trade secrets was caused by its promotional activities.\nSeveral courts have already determined that claims of trade secret misappropriation do not satisfy the causal connection requirement of \u201cadvertising injury\u201d policy language similar to the MSP policy here. See, e.g., Simply Fresh Fruit, Inc. v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1996); Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Realizing this, McDonald\u2019s argues that separate and apart from the misappropriation of trade secrets allegations, the Thermodyne plaintiffs also asserted a claim for \u201ccloud on title.\u201d\nThe Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint contains the following allegations:\n\u201c3. By way of introduction and synopsis, [p]laintiffs assert that [defendants have engaged in a course of conduct designed to misappropriate [plaintiffs\u2019 employees, technology, and trade secrets. *** [A]nd, [defendants\u2019 promotion of the \u2018Temperfect Oven\u2019 exposed [plaintiffs\u2019 trade secrets to the market place.\u201d\nThe complaint also asserted:\n\u201c62. Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their damages, any unjust enrichment to [defendants, exemplary damages, and attorneys\u2019 fees pursuant to 765 ILCS 1065/4\u20145.\n63. Additionally, [pjlaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable royalty for [defendants\u2019 past or future use of or profits from the sale of [plaintiffs\u2019 trade secret or the application thereof.\u201d\nAs refined in the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 brief submitted with the final pretrial order, the Thermodyne plaintiffs posited their theory of liability against McDonald\u2019s for misappropriation of trade secrets as follows:\n\u201cMcDonald\u2019s improperly acquired the Plaintiffs\u2019 trade secrets by representing to the Plaintiffs that it had an interest in viewing and testing Plaintiffs\u2019 Thermodyne oven and other systems in order to determine whether it would agree to purchase these ovens and other systems from the Plaintiffs for use in McDonald\u2019s restaurants or approve their use in its licensees\u2019 restaurants. McDonald\u2019s recognized the value and revolutionary potential of the Thermodyne to the fast food industry and conspired with [OSI] to misappropriate control over its future use and development.\nIn April, [sic] 1990, OSI, in collusion with McDonald\u2019s, entered into a partnership with Liebermann, Plaintiffs\u2019 key researcher and developer, to develop the Plaintiffs\u2019 technology and hired Liebermann as an employee of the partnership. Then, after test marketing various, products using the Plaintiffs\u2019 ovens, McDonald\u2019s insisted on purchasing an oven from the Plaintiffs on June 6, 1990, executed a Confidentiality Agreement for Liebermann personally on June 7, 1990, and then 5 days later informed the Plaintiffs\u2019 [sic] that it was putting the testing of Plaintiffs\u2019 ovens on hold. McDonald\u2019s immediately began working with OSI and Taylor to develop and manufacture an oven based on the Plaintiffs\u2019 technology. Following the execution of a Partnership Agreement on July 24, 1990, the partnership (Beltec) entered into a licensing agreement with Taylor for the manufacture of ovens based on Plaintiffs\u2019 technology to be sold to McDonald\u2019s. Also on July 24, 1990, Liebermann entered into a written Employment Agreement with Beltec, having resigned from AFTEC on July 18, 1990, breaching his contract with AFTEC. The first prototype Temperfect ovens manufactured later contained more modifications of the various interconnecting Thermodyne systems and component parts. McDonald\u2019s purchased the ovens manufactured by Taylor under license from Beltec and used the ovens in its restaurants and continues to do so.\u201d\nAlso part of the final pretrial order was a statement of special damages, including damages for lost profits \u201cas a result of reduction of market opportunity due to uncertainty as to ownership of the Thermodyne technology.\u201d\nBased on our review of the record, including the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint and the final pretrial order, we are unpersuaded by McDonald\u2019s argument that the Thermodyne plaintiffs stated a cause of action for \u201ccloud on title.\u201d McDonald\u2019s has not cited any cases recognizing such a cause of action in Illinois. Moreover, our independent research has not found any case in which a court in this state has recognized such a cause of action. Cf. American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bentley Builders, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 246, 252 (1999) (noting that the act of maliciously recording a document that clouds one\u2019s title to real estate is actionable as slander of title); Lakeview Trust & Savings Bank v. Estrada, 134 Ill. App. 3d 792, 811 (1985) (explaining that an action to quiet title in property is an equitable proceeding in which a party seeks to remove a cloud upon his title to the property). We will not strain to locate a cause of action that does not exist. See, e.g., Bart v. Board of Education, 256 Ill. App. 3d 880, 886 (1993) (noting that, although article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a7 12) provides that \u201c[e]very person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs,\u201d the court is not required to create a cause of action where none exists). We decline McDonald\u2019s invitation to create a cause of action for \u201ccloud on title.\u201d\nEven if Illinois recognized a cause of action for \u201ccloud on title,\u201d McDonald\u2019s argument is still unpersuasive. Coverage under the MSP policy is available only if the enumerated offense arose out of the publication of the advertising, publicity, or promotional material. The Thermodyne plaintiffs did not explicitly state a cause of action for \u201ccloud on title\u201d in their amended complaint. Going past the labels of the complaint, as McDonald\u2019s urges us to do, does not persuade us otherwise. We do not read the allegations made by the Thermodyne plaintiffs in either their underlying complaint or the final pretrial order as stating a cause of action for \u201ccloud on title.\u201d\nAs we discuss above, the final pretrial order does request special damages for lost profits as a result of \u201creduction of market opportunity due to uncertainty of ownership.\u201d McDonald\u2019s also cites to several places in the record regarding testimony in relation to the so-called \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory. However, even reading these allegations in a light most favorable to McDonald\u2019s, as we must (see Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986)), we interpret the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory as a measure of damages arising out of the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 allegations that McDonald\u2019s misappropriated its trade secret. Indeed, a valid cause of action does not exist unless the plaintiff suffers both injury and damages. Stathis v. First Arlington National Bank, 226 Ill. App. 3d 47, 54 (1992). The \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory appears in the final pretrial order only as a measure of damages from the causes of action asserted by the Thermodyne plaintiffs against McDonald\u2019s. The references in the record to which McDonald\u2019s cites in support of its theory do not convince us that the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory was a separate claim apart from the allegations of misappropriation of trade secrets. Rather, we interpret these passages as a request for damages arising out of the misappropriation of the Thermodyne technology. Indeed, the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (765 ILCS 1065/1 et seq. (West 1994)), upon which the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 \u201cmisappropriation of trade secret\u201d complaint was premised, specifically permits the individual aggrieved to collect these types of damages. The statute provides:\n\u201c[A] person is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. Damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. If neither damages nor unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation are proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the court may award damages caused by misappropriation measured in terms of a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator\u2019s unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade secret.\u201d 765 ILCS 1065/4 (West 1994).\nThe Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 request for damages was a response to the statute.\nMcDonald\u2019s argument fails, then, because coverage is available under the MSP policies only if there is a direct causal connection between McDonald\u2019s promotional activities and an enumerated offense. The MSP policies do not afford coverage if the only causal connection is between an insured\u2019s promotional activities and the measure of damages asserted by an underlying plaintiff. In addition, as the insurers point out, if McDonald\u2019s view of the MSP policy language were adopted, \u201ccoverage would extend to virtually every misappropriation of trade secrets case since the product or equipment that is developed from wrongfully acquired trade secrets is typically advertised after the fact.\u201d\nAn argument similar to the one raised by McDonald\u2019s was considered in Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024 (N.D. Ill. 1998). In Winklevoss, the underlying plaintiff sued the insured, alleging, inter alla, misappropriation of a trade secret in violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. The underlying plaintiffs complaint alleged that the insured began marketing the misappropriated trade secret to the underlying plaintiffs existing and potential customers. Accordingly, the underlying plaintiff sought several types of damages, including damages for lost revenue, profits, and customers. The insured had purchased comprehensive general liability policies containing \u201cadvertising injury\u201d coverage. The insured tendered its defense to the insurer. The insurer refused to defend the insured in the underlying suit. The insured then sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer had a duty to defend it against a suit alleging violations of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act.\nOn the parties\u2019 cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the insurer\u2019s motion. Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1029. The court rejected the insured\u2019s argument that the trade secret violations were committed in the course of advertising, as required by the insurance policy. Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1033. The court assumed, for purposes of discussion, that the misappropriation of a trade secret was a covered offense under the \u201cadvertising injury\u201d provision of the insured\u2019s policy. Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1033. Nevertheless, the court concluded, there was no causal connection between the insured\u2019s promotional activity and the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets. Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1033. The court explained that the allegations of trade secret misappropriation took place long before any efforts to promote the competing product developed by the insured. Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1033.\nIn Winklevoss, the insured also argued that \u201cits promotional activities caused [the underlying plaintiff] harm\u2014lost revenue, profits, and customers\u2014satisfying the advertising injury requirement.\u201d Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1035. Likewise, the court rejected this argument on the basis that the insured \u201cfail[ed] to tie advertising activities to a covered offense.\u201d Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1035. The court further elaborated:\n\u201cFirst, what [the insured] portrays as injuries did not \u2018[arise] solely out of a covered offense \u2018committed in the course of advertising your goods, products, and services,\u2019 as [the insurer\u2019s] policy requires. To the extent [the underlying plaintiffs] profit, revenue, and customer losses arose solely out of [the insured\u2019s] trade secret misappropriation ***, the misappropriation was not *** committed \u2018in the course of advertising.\u2019 \u201d Winklevoss, 991 F. Supp. at 1035.\nLikewise, in this case, McDonald\u2019s fails to tie any promotional activity to an enumerated offense. The money lost due to \u201ccloud on title,\u201d i.e., uncertainty as to market place, arose out of McDonald\u2019s \u201ctrade secret misappropriation\u201d claim. The trial court properly ruled that this cause of action was not committed in the course of McDonald\u2019s advertising, publicity, or promotional materials.\nIn anticipation of our holding that Illinois does not recognize a cause of action for \u201ccloud on title\u201d McDonald\u2019s attempts to categorize the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory as one for \u201cunfair competition\u201d or \u201cslander of title.\u201d Both arguments fail.\nAn examination of the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint and the final pretrial order demonstrates that neither of these causes of action is explicitly or implicitly included. Insurers argue that, in any event, it was impossible for the Thermodyne plaintiffs to bring causes of action for slander of title or unfair competition. We agree.\nWe first address McDonald\u2019s argument that the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 alleged claim for \u201ccloud on title\u201d was actionable as unfair competition. The Thermodyne plaintiffs originally asserted a cause of action for unfair competition as count III of their amended complaint. The district court granted McDonald\u2019s motion to dismiss count III, finding:\n\u201cCount II is a claim made under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act [citation]. The Act explicitly states that it \u2018is intended to displace conflicting tort, restitutionary, unfair competition, and other laws of this state providing remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret.\u2019 765 ILCS 1065/8(a). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has interpreted this provision of the Act to express Illinois\u2019 willingness to abolish all common law theories of misuse of secret information. [Citation.] In Counts III and IV of their amended complaint, plaintiffs allege common law claims for unfair competition and breach of confidence premised upon allegations of wrongful use of plaintiffs\u2019 confidential information. Because the court holds these claims to be preempted by the language set forth above in the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, Counts III and IV of the amended complaint are dismissed with prejudice.\u201d\nMcDonald\u2019s now claims that, despite the district judge\u2019s ruling, there remains a claim for unfair competition. McDonald\u2019s argument, however, is barred by the doctrine of judicial estoppel.\nThe doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that when a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, that party is estopped from assuming a contrary position in a subsequent legal proceeding. People v. Lawlor, 291 Ill. App. 3d 97, 103 (1997). For the doctrine to apply, (1) the party must have taken two positions, (2) the positions must have been taken in separate judicial proceedings, (3) the party must have intended the trier of fact to accept the truth of the facts alleged in support of the position, (4) the party must have succeeded in asserting the first position and received some benefit from it, and (5) the two positions must be inconsistent. Lawlor, 291 Ill. App. 3d at 103. The doctrine was developed to promote the truth and to prevent parties from deliberately shifting positions in separate legal proceedings. Giannini v. First National Bank, 136 Ill. App. 3d 971, 983 (1985).\nIn this case, all of the elements of judicial estoppel are present. First, McDonald\u2019s has taken two contrary positions. In the Thermodyne litigation, it successfully moved to have the underlying plaintiffs\u2019 cause of action for unfair competition dismissed for preemption. In this insurance coverage dispute, McDonald\u2019s argues that a count for unfair competition survived the dismissal. Second, McDonald\u2019s positions were taken in separate judicial proceedings. Third, there is no dispute that McDonald\u2019s intended the judge in the Thermodyne litigation to accept the truth of the facts alleged in support of its position. Fourth, McDonald\u2019s did not have to defend against an \u201cunfair competition\u201d cause of action. Thus, it received benefit from requesting the dismissal. Finally, McDonald\u2019s positions are inconsistent.\nMcDonald\u2019s argues, however, that the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory did not emerge until after the parties had finished briefing McDonald\u2019s motion to dismiss the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 unfair competition claim. Thus, McDonald\u2019s reasons, the district court judge could not have intended to dismiss an \u201cunfair competition\u201d claim premised on \u201ccloud on title.\u201d However, during oral argument on the insurers\u2019 renewed motion for summary judgment in this insurance coverage dispute, McDonald\u2019s admitted that the \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory, however inarticulate, was a theory developed by Tippman at the beginning of the case. More specifically, McDonald\u2019s attorney stated:\n\u201c[Plaintiff\u2019s damages expert], although he\u2019s not a lawyer, didn\u2019t come up with this theory. Mr. Tippman had this theory. Mr. Tippman testified that he had this theory at the beginning of the case. That [plaintiffs damages expert] articulated for everybody and sort of brought it out into the open so that McDonald\u2019s would realize what was coming, what was coming undone. It wasn\u2019t particularly well articulated before.\u201d\nAccordingly, McDonald\u2019s cannot now claim that this theory did not emerge until after the parties briefed this issue for the district court.\nMcDonald\u2019s also asserts that the district court judge\u2019s dismissal order was limited to unfair competition claims predicated on the use of \u201cconfidential information.\u201d McDonald\u2019s argues that the instant \u201ccloud on title\u201d claim is predicated on \u201cother types of \u2018unfair competition\u2019 not implicating the misuse of \u2018confidential information.\u2019 \u201d McDonald\u2019s argument is unpersuasive. As we discussed, at the time that McDonald\u2019s moved to dismiss the Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 unfair competition claim, it was aware of the so-called \u201ccloud on title\u201d claim. Thus, McDonald\u2019s position that its motion did not encompass all possible \u201cunfair competition\u201d claims is untenable.\nAlso unsuccessful is McDonald\u2019s attempt to shoehorn its \u201ccloud on title\u201d theory into a claim actionable as slander of title. \u201cSlander of title\u201d is the false and malicious publication, oral or written, of words which disparage an individual\u2019s title to property resulting in special damages. Ringier America, Inc. v. Enviro-Technics, Ltd., 284 Ill. App. 3d 1102, 1104-05 (1996). \u201cSlander of title\u201d claims usually arise in the context of real property (see Ringier America, 284 Ill. App. 3d 1102; La Salle National Bank v. Kissane, 163 Ill. App. 3d 534 (1987)). However, as McDonald\u2019s correctly notes, the tort has been expanded to encompass other types of ownership interests. See, e.g., Reliable Manufacturing Co. v. Vaughan Novelty Manufacturing Co., 294 Ill. App. 601 (1938) (recognizing cause of action for slander of title with respect to patent for a can opener). However, McDonald\u2019s does not cite to a case recognizing a cause of action for slander of title premised on a violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act. Moreover, our independent research has not located such a case.\nNevertheless, McDonald\u2019s notes that section 624 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that slander of title extends to \u201c[a]ny kind of legally protected interest in land, chattels or intangible things *** if the interest is transferable and therefore salable or otherwise capable of profitable disposal. It may be a patent right, a copyright or the right to use a trademark or trade name.\u201d Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 624, at 344 (1977). Although it does not purport to be a complete catalog of legally protected interests, the Restatement does not mention misappropriation of trade secrets. Restatement (Second) of Torts \u00a7 624, at 344 (1977).\nWe need not decide whether one may possess title to a trade secret. McDonald\u2019s allegations cannot survive because there is no explicit or implicit allegation that the content of McDonald\u2019s promotion contained a false misrepresentation. The Thermodyne plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint alleges that \u201cDefendants\u2019 promotion of the \u2018Tern-perfect Oven\u2019 exposed Plaintiffs\u2019 trade secrets to the market place.\u201d The special damages provision of the final pretrial order speaks of \u201cLost Profits *** As A Result of Market Opportunity due to Uncertainty As To Ownership of the Thermodyne Technology.\u201d These statements merely relate to confusion over the proper owner of the Thermodyne technology. These allegations do not claim that McDonald\u2019s statements were false.\nIn support of its claim, McDonald\u2019s cites to Pendleton v. Time, Inc., 339 Ill. App. 188 (1949). In Pendleton, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his complaint against the defendant, Time, Inc. The plaintiff was an artist who had painted the first portrait of Harry S. Truman. The plaintiff sued the defendant for publishing a later portrait of Truman with the caption, \u201cPresident sits for first portrait and considers result flattering.\u201d The article accompanying the portrait elaborated, \u201c 1 \u201cDuring all his years in public life Harry Truman never bothered to have his portrait painted. Recently, however, as President, he sat for Artist Jay Wesley Jacobs. The result, Truman\u2019s first portrait, is shown here.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Pendleton, 339 Ill. App. at 192. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, knowing the aforementioned statements to be false, nevertheless \u201cknowingly and maliciously published\u201d the article with the \u201c \u2018intent to injure the plaintiff and to detract and destroy his reputation as an artist.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Pendlelton, 339 Ill. App. at 193. The plaintiff further alleged that, as a direct consequence of the publication of these false statements, he \u201c \u2018lost all benefit and advantage accruing to him by reason of his having made and executed the first portrait of said Harry S. Truman.\u2019 \u201d Pendleton, 339 Ill. App. at 193. The Plaintiff also alleged that the defendant\u2019s statements made the defendant appear to have said an untruth and that the plaintiffs rights of reproduction of his portrait had been lessened and rendered of little or no value. The appellate court reversed. Pendleton, 339 Ill. App. at 196.\nMcDonald\u2019s reliance on Pendleton is misplaced. First, as insurers point out, it is unclear whether the Pendleton plaintiff was asserting a cause of action for slander of title because the court never explicitly mentions that cause of action. On a more fundamental level, Pendleton is distinguishable because it did not involve a trade secret. The plaintiff in Pendleton was seeking to protect his claim as the first artist to depict Harry Truman in a portrait. Further, the statement made by the defendant in Pendleton was a false statement because only one person could paint the first portrait of Truman.\nMcDonald\u2019s insists that summary judgment was improper at this state of the litigation because it could reasonably anticipate liability for a covered claim. See, e.g., Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 851, 854 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (applying Illinois law). We are unpersuaded by McDonald\u2019s argument, however, because McDonald\u2019s could not reasonably anticipate coverage for a cause of action that does not exist or that was legally impossible to bring under the circumstances.\nB. Discovery Issue\nThis issue is discussed in the nonpublished portion of this opinion.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County.\nAffirmed.\nRAPP and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GEOMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Alexander Dimitrief and Donna M. Welch, both of Kirkland & Ellis, of Chicago, Aldo E. Botti and Peter M. DeLongis, both of Botti, Marinaccio & DeLongis, Ltd., of Oak Brook, and Paul R. Taskier and Michael T. Sharkey, both of Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, of Washington, D.C., for appellant.", "Judith Fournie Helms and Todd S. Schenk, both of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Chicago, and Mary K. Cronin, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Wheaton, for appellee American Motorists Insurance Co.", "Steven C. Debboli, of Serpico, Novelle & Navigato, of Chicago, and Lawrence J. Bistany, of White & Williams, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for appellee Century Indemnity Company and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America.", "Jean M. Golden, Debra A. Martin-Sheridan, and Brian A. Schroeder, all of Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, of Chicago, for appellee St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MCDONALD\u2019S CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AMERICAN MOTORISTS INSURANCE COMPANY et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201400\u20140566\nOpinion filed May 2, 2001.\nRehearing denied May 31, 2001.\nAlexander Dimitrief and Donna M. Welch, both of Kirkland & Ellis, of Chicago, Aldo E. Botti and Peter M. DeLongis, both of Botti, Marinaccio & DeLongis, Ltd., of Oak Brook, and Paul R. Taskier and Michael T. Sharkey, both of Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, of Washington, D.C., for appellant.\nJudith Fournie Helms and Todd S. Schenk, both of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Chicago, and Mary K. Cronin, of Tressler, Soderstrom, Maloney & Priess, of Wheaton, for appellee American Motorists Insurance Co.\nSteven C. Debboli, of Serpico, Novelle & Navigato, of Chicago, and Lawrence J. Bistany, of White & Williams, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for appellee Century Indemnity Company and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America.\nJean M. Golden, Debra A. Martin-Sheridan, and Brian A. Schroeder, all of Cassiday, Schade & Gloor, of Chicago, for appellee St. Paul Surplus Lines Insurance Co." }, "file_name": "0972-01", "first_page_order": 990, "last_page_order": 1008 }