{ "id": 126385, "name": "CHICAGO AREA COUNCIL OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS et al., Respondents-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of America v. City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations", "decision_date": "2001-05-01", "docket_number": "No. 1 \u2014 99\u20143018", "first_page": "17", "last_page": "32", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 17" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "137 N.E.2d 371", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "9 Ill. 2d 233", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5319655 ], "year": 1956, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/9/0233-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 N.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "47 Ill. 2d 323", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2904218 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/47/0323-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 N.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. App. 3d 1005", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8500349 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/98/1005-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 N.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 Ill. App. 3d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3636562 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/134/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 1034", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"The doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "188 Ill. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 536023 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "\"The doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/188/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 508", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"In order to be granted an injunction, a plaintiff must have standing in the cause, which requires a showing of a clearly ascertainable right or interest that needs protection\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511326 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "469", "parenthetical": "\"In order to be granted an injunction, a plaintiff must have standing in the cause, which requires a showing of a clearly ascertainable right or interest that needs protection\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "438 F.2d 86", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2206384 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "African-American women had standing to sue under Title VII when employer told them it did not hire \"negro females\" even though there were no job openings at the time and plaintiffs were not actually seeking employment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/438/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 A.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 7859686 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "testers had standing to bring action under local ordinance prohibiting sex discrimination in employment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/683/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "455 U.S. 363", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11305645 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "testers had standing to bring suit for violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604(d) (1994)" }, { "parenthetical": "testers had standing to bring suit for violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604(d) (1994)" }, { "parenthetical": "testers had standing to bring suit for violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604(d) (1994)" }, { "page": "370, 373-74" }, { "page": "223, 225-26" }, { "page": "1119, 1121" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/455/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 F.3d 289", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11240735 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292-93" }, { "page": "294" }, { "page": "297-98" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/222/0289-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 N.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "14 Ill. App. 3d 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2687004 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" }, { "page": "752" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/14/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 U.S. 557", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1563831 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "2347" }, { "page": "573-75" }, { "page": "503-04" }, { "page": "2347-48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/515/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 640", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9414133 ], "weight": 36, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647-48" }, { "page": "562-63" }, { "page": "2451" }, { "page": "648-49" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "2451" }, { "page": "648" }, { "page": "563" }, { "page": "2451" }, { "page": "650" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "2452" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "2454" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "2454" }, { "page": "659" }, { "page": "569" }, { "page": "2457" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "570-71" }, { "page": "2458" }, { "page": "654-55" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "2454-55" }, { "page": "653" }, { "page": "566" }, { "page": "2453-54" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "570-71" }, { "page": "2458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0640-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1433, "char_count": 35849, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.2489294078711253e-08, "percentile": 0.3301845011041184 }, "sha256": "ef20af1768a7536a51b786fd2350b265b236b3628135d37823a452285a9f3ad8", "simhash": "1:7d47b19cde5df1a7", "word_count": 5715 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:07.459628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CHICAGO AREA COUNCIL OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS et al., Respondents-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COUSINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nG. Keith Richardson filed a claim with the City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations (Commission) against defendant Chicago Area Council of Boy Scouts of America (CAC) under the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance (the Ordinance) (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014010 et seq. (1990)). Specifically, Richardson invoked section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030, alleging employment discrimination in hiring based on sexual orientation. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 (1990). The Commission issued an injunction against CAC and imposed a $100 fine. The injunction enjoined CAC from considering the sexual orientation of applicants for employment. Richardson was also awarded $500 in damages and attorney fees and costs in the amount of $335,748.12.\nCAC filed a writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Cook County. The court held that Richardson lacked standing to bring suit based on the Commission\u2019s finding that Richardson was not genuinely interested in accepting a position with CAC. Accordingly, the court vacated the Commission\u2019s award of damages and attorney fees. However, the court affirmed the injunction and fine by holding that the City of Chicago, independent of Richardson, prevailed in the action and that the Commission had authority to enjoin discriminatory action even though it had not formally initiated a complaint against CAC.\nOn appeal, CAC argues that the injunction and fine should be vacated because: (1) application of section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 violates CAC\u2019s first amendment rights of expressive association (U.S. Const., amend. I); (2) Richardson lacked standing to sue for employment discrimination; and (3) CAC\u2019s employment policy was exempt from the Ordinance under its express exceptions for religious organizations or bona fide occupational qualification. Richardson cross-appeals the trial court\u2019s ruling that he lacked standing as an employment tester.\nBACKGROUND\nRichardson filed an employment discrimination complaint with the Commission on May 21, 1992, alleging that CAC discriminated against him based on his sexual orientation. The Commission held an extensive hearing. The record reveals the following. The CAC is chartered by the Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts) and agrees to comply with the rules and regulations of the Boy Scouts. The Boy Scouts, in turn, are chartered by Congress:\n\u201c[T]o promote, through organization and cooperation with other agencies, the ability of boys to do things for themselves and others, to train them in Scoutcraft, to teach them patriotism, courage, self-reliance, and kindred virtues, using the methods which are now in common use by Boy Scouts.\u201d\nAccording to its mission statement:\n\u201cIt is the mission of the Boy Scouts of America to serve others by helping to instill values in young people and, in other ways, to prepare them to make ethical choices over their lifetime in achieving their full potential. The values we strive to instill are based on those found in the Scout Oath and Law:\nScout Oath\nOn my honor I will do my best To do my duty to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight.\nScout Law\nA Scout is:\nTrustworthy Obedient\nLoyal Cheerful\nHelpful Thrifty\nFriendly Brave\nCourteous Clean\nKind Reverent.\u201d\nAdult professional and volunteer leaders, as well as youth members, are required to take the Scout oath and follow Scout law.\nAs a youth, Richardson participated in Boy Scouts and achieved the highest rank of Eagle Scout. He became involved in various Scout leadership roles and attained honors. In his early 20s, Richardson acknowledged that he was gay and left Scouting. After college, he worked in restaurants or bars catering to the gay community that featured sexually explicit videos and live sex shows.\nFinding himself unemployed in the spring of 1992, Richardson came across an advertisement that sought contact from persons who had been Scouts and were gay. Richardson responded to the advertisement and spoke to a founder of the \u201cForgotten Scouts\u201d \u2014 a group that seeks to change the Boy Scouts\u2019 policy barring employment of homosexuals. A month before Richardson contacted CAC, he attended a meeting with a cofounder of Forgotten Scouts to persuade United Way to stop funding CAC unless CAC changed its policies concerning homosexuality.\nOn May 1992, Richardson called CAC and asked to speak with CAC\u2019s public relations person. He spoke to Susan Teplinsky. He was told by the receptionist that Susan Teplinsky was CAC\u2019s spokesperson. Teplinsky prepared a memorandum, dated May 22, 1992, that summarized the conversation. Richardson testified that he did not disagree with the contents of the memorandum. The memorandum stated:\n\u201cI received a call this morning from Keith Richardson, leader of the local Forgotten Scouts. Much of our 15 minute conversation focused on whether or not the Chicago Area Council would break with national policy and endorse the inclusion of homosexuals in Scouting. I told him there was no way the CAC would ever break with national policy, based on current corporate culture and informal discussions with our board of directors.\nOur discussion was amicable and open. He asked if there was any value in our getting together, and I said I would be happy to request permission to meet with him, but added that I thought the outcome would have no bearing on our decision. In the interest of not wasting each other\u2019s time, we agreed not to meet.\n* * *\nKeith explained that in light of the Randall decision in California, the group will try to work new legal maneuvers. To begin, he is on his way to the human rights commission to file a grievance against us for not employing homosexuals.\u201d\nRegarding the conversation, Richardson testified as follows:\n\u201cA. [Richardson:] And then I asked her about employment.\nQ. Why don\u2019t you describe that aspect of the conversation, tell the Hearing Officer.\nA. I didn\u2019t know \u2014 no one from the Boy Scouts had ever told me officially they had a policy \u2014 existed in terms of employment one way or the other. So I asked her if there was a policy, would they give a job to a gay man, and her answer was there was no way the Boy Scouts of America was going to give a job to a homosexual.\u201d\nRichardson then filed a complaint with the Commission on May 21, 1992, alleging violation of section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030. Section 2 \u2014 160\u2014 030 states in pertinent part:\n\u201cNo person shall directly or indirectly discriminate against any individual in hiring *** because of the individual\u2019s *** sexual orientation ***.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 (1990).\nIn July 1992, Richardson appeared on a talk show and was identified as regional spokesperson for Forgotten Scouts.\nOn July 27, 1992, Richardson sent a letter to CAC indicating that he was gay and that he \u201cremaine[d] very interested in any job opening with the [CAC].\u201d He also attached a resume that stated the following under the heading \u201cOBJECTIVE\u201d:\n\u201cTo obtain a position with a non-profit organization where my abilities in the areas of organization, management, public relations and volunteer recruitment would be fully utilized.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nWhile the resume listed his Scouting experience, it omitted information relating to his prior work experience except to say that he generally worked in the \u201cFood & Beverage\u201d industry and was self-employed and oversaw the opening of a new business. The Commission characterized the letter as \u201can apparent attempt to cure a possible standing problem\u201d after CAC had already moved to dismiss Richardson\u2019s complaint.\nOn September 9, 1992, CAC\u2019s acting director of field service, Mark Frankart, responded with a letter and a copy of the Boy Scout\u2019s employment policy. The enclosed policy stated:\n\u201cBoy Scouts of America\u2019s mission is to prepare its youth members to make ethical choices over their lifetime consistent with the traditional family values expressed in the Scout Oath and Scout Law.\nBoy Scouts of America believes that homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath and Scout Law that a Scout be \u2018clean\u2019 and \u2018morally straight\u2019.\nIn the exercise of its constitutional right to bring the values of Scouting to its youth members, Boy Scouts of America will not employ known or avowed homosexuals as professional Scouters or in other capacities in which such employment would tend to interfere with its mission of reinforcing the values of the Scout Oath and Scout Law in young people.\u201d\nFrankart\u2019s letter stated that if Richardson was genuinely interested in applying for a position with CAC, he must supply a complete resume which included his employment history. Richardson never sent the requested information. The Commission found that Richardson was not genuinely interested in seeking a position with CAC and was merely posing as a \u201ctester\u201d to challenge the Boy Scouts\u2019 hiring policy.\nThe parties introduced evidence on the meaning of the words \u201cmorally straight\u201d and \u201cclean\u201d as those terms are used in the Scout oath and law. CAC\u2019s witnesses equated the words with heterosexuality, whereas Richardson\u2019s witnesses did not believe the words referred to sexual orientation in any way. The Commission determined that \u201cthe words of the Scout Oath and Scout Law take on different meanings for different people.\u201d\nAt the time of the Commission\u2019s decision, the Boy Scouts\u2019 employment policy concerning homosexuals stated:\n\u201cWith respect to positions limited to professional Scouters or, because of their close relationship to the mission of Scouting, positions limited to registered members of the [Boy Scouts of America], acceptance of the Declaration of Religious Principle, the Scout Oath and the Scout Law is required.\nAccordingly, in the exercise of their constitutional right to bring the values of Scouting to youth members, the Boy Scouts of America will not employ atheists, agnostics, known or avowed homosexuals, or other as professional Scouters or in other capacities in which such employment would tend to interfere with its mission of reinforcing the values of the Scout Oath and the Scout Law in young people.\u201d\nEvidence was introduced about professional Scouting employment positions. CAC hires about 35 professional \u201cScouters\u201d to assist volunteer leaders. The entry level professional Scouter, known as the district executive, works with volunteer leaders. The district executive also recruits, trains, and motivates volunteers while participating in Scouting functions. Scouting professionals adhere to the same Scouting law and oath as adult volunteers and wear a Scout leader\u2019s uniform to Scouting functions.\nThe Boy Scouts\u2019 director of personnel, William McLaughlin, described the application process for an entry level professional Scouter. After a local Scout executive reviews an applicant\u2019s resume and conducts a screening interview, the local council forwards the applications of viable candidates to the Boy Scouts\u2019 regional office. If the applicant is acceptable, he is then eligible for possible employment with the local council, subject to a probationary period.\nMcLaughlin did not describe the application process for nonprofessional personnel, however. In fact, the parties introduced very little evidence relating to nonprofessional positions. Mark Frankart, the director of field service at CAC, testified that CAC\u2019s policy against hiring homosexuals would not apply to \u201csupport personnel in the council office,\u201d such as accountants, computer support personnel, mail room workers and clerks who do not deal with the public. He also testified that he was only involved in the hiring of professional personnel.\nThe Commission issued its final order concerning liability and damages on February 26, 1996. The Commission found that CAC\u2019s employment policy violated the Ordinance and ordered the following injunctive relief:\n\u201cA. That the Respondent be enjoined from considering the sexual orientation of applicants for employment with the CAC; and\nB. That the Respondent be enjoined from publishing on its application, brochures or literature, which are distributed within the City of Chicago, any employment criteria which indicates a preference or limitation on the basis of sexual orientation.\u201d\nThe Commission rejected CAC\u2019s argument that application of section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 violated its first amendment rights of expressive association and speech, finding that opposition to homosexuality was not a significant, expressive goal of CAC. CAC was also fined $100 for violating section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030. Since the Commission found that Richardson was acting as an employment tester, it awarded only nominal damages of $500 for emotional injury. In a subsequent order, the Commission also awarded Richardson attorney fees and costs totalling $335,748.12.\nCAC filed petition for writ of certiorari with the circuit court. On August 12, 1999, the court found that Richardson lacked standing as an employment tester under section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 and on that basis vacated the Commission\u2019s award of attorney fees, costs and damages to Richardson. The court also held that, notwithstanding Richardson\u2019s lack of standing and the fact that the Commission never initiated a complaint against CAC, the City of Chicago, independent of Richardson, prevailed in the action and the Commission had power to enjoin CAC\u2019s employment policy. The court then affirmed the Commission\u2019s injunction against CAC as well as the $100 fine.\nCAC appeals and Richardson cross-appeals. We vacate the Commission\u2019s entire order, reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand with directions.\nANALYSIS\nI\nAll parties agree that the Commission\u2019s injunction is overly broad in light of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s recent decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 147 L. Ed. 2d 554, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000). CAC argues that Dale precludes the grant of any injunctive relief in this case while Richardson and City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations contend that the Commission\u2019s injunction should be modified to conform with Dale.\nThe facts in Dale are similar, although not analogous, to the facts in the instant case. Dale involved a volunteer assistant scoutmaster, James Dale, whose membership in the Boy Scouts was revoked because he was homosexual. Dale filed a complaint under New Jersey\u2019s public accommodations statute, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.\nThe case reached the United States Supreme Court, which held that application of the New Jersey law violated the Boy Scouts\u2019 first amendment rights. The Court initially recognized the importance of the right to expressive association under the first amendment. According to the Court:\n\u201cThis right is crucial in preventing the majority from imposing its views on groups that would rather express other, perhaps unpopular, ideas. ***\nThe forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group\u2019s freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group\u2019s ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 562-63, 120 S. Ct. at 2451.\nSince this first amendment case involved ultimate conclusions of law that were inseparable from findings of fact, the Court independently reviewed the factual record to guarantee that the lower court\u2019s judgment did not unlawfully intrude on free expression. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-49, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 563, 120 S. Ct. at 2451.\nThe Court then conducted a four-part analysis to determine whether the forced inclusion of Dale violated the Boy Scouts\u2019 first amendment rights. First, the Court determined that the Boy Scouts engaged in \u201cexpressive association,\u201d meaning that the group engaged in some form of expression, public or private. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 563, 120 S. Ct. at 2451. Quoting the Boy Scouts\u2019 mission statement, Scout oath and Scout law, the Court concluded that an association whose mission is to instill values in young people indisputably engages in expressive activity.\nSecond, the Court examined the nature of the Boy Scouts\u2019 views on homosexuality. The Court noted that the terms \u201cmorally straight\u201d and \u201cclean\u201d contained in the Scout oath and law were not self-defining. \u201cDifferent people would attribute to those terms very different meanings.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 650, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 564, 120 S. Ct. at 2452. However, the Court accepted the Boy Scouts\u2019 assertion that it did not want to promote homosexual conduct as a \u201cmorally straight\u201d and legitimate form of behavior. The Court also considered written evidence that supported the sincerity of the Boy Scouts\u2019 professed beliefs. A 1978 position statement indicated that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting were inappropriate. Similarly, a 1991 position statement expressed that homosexual conduct was inconsistent with being \u201cmorally straight\u201d and \u201cclean,\u201d and a 1993 statement declared that homosexuals did not provide a desirable role model for Scouts.\nThird, the Court found that Dale\u2019s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly burden the Boy Scouts\u2019 desire not to promote homosexuality as a legitimate form of behavior. The Court noted that Dale was open and honest about his sexual orientation and was part of a group of gay Scouts who were leaders in their community He was also copresident of a gay and lesbian organization and remains a gay rights activist. \u201cDale\u2019s presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 653, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 566, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.\nThe Court relied on its decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 132 L. Ed. 2d 487, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995), to further illustrate this point. In Hurley the Court held that the application of Massachusetts\u2019 public accommodations law to require the organizers of a private St. Patrick\u2019s Day parade to include an Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual group (GLIB) violated the parade organizers\u2019 first amendment rights. In Hurley the Court wrote:\n\u201cPetitioners disclaim any intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member of GLIB claims to have been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has approved to march. Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own parade unit carrying its own banner.\u201d Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 503, 115 S. Ct. at 2347.\nThe Court reasoned that the presence of the organized marchers behind a GLIB banner would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientation have as much claim to unqualified social acceptance as heterosexuals. The Court explained that the forced presence of GLIB in the parade violated the parade organizers\u2019 autonomy to choose the content of their own message under the first amendment. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573-75, 132 L. Ed. 2d at 503-04, 115 S. Ct. at 2347-48. Relying on Hurley, the Court in Dale found that Dale\u2019s presence would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scouts\u2019 choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its belief. Dale, 530 U.S. at 654, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 566, 120 S. Ct. at 2454.\nFinally, the Court weighed the state\u2019s interest in eliminating discrimination within public accommodations against the Boy Scouts\u2019 associational interest in freedom of expression. Emphasizing Dale\u2019s presence as a significant burden on the Boy Scouts\u2019 right to oppose homosexual conduct, the Court concluded that the state\u2019s interests did not \u201cjustify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts\u2019 rights to freedom of expressive association.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 659, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 569, 120 S. Ct. at 2457. The Court further indicated that increasing social acceptance of homosexuality was no argument for denying first amendment protection to those who refuse to accept these views:\n\u201c[P]ublic or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization\u2019s expression does not justify the State\u2019s effort to compel the organization to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization\u2019s expressive message.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 661, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 570-71, 120 S. Ct. at 2458.\nThe record in the instant case includes the same mission statement, Scout oath and Scout law relied upon by the Court in Dale to conclude that the organization engaged in expressive activity by seeking to inculcate values in youth. While the Supreme Court deferred to the Boy Scouts\u2019 assertion that homosexuality was inconsistent with the values embodied in the Scout oath and law, the Court also referred to the 1978, 1991 and 1993 position statements which bolstered the sincerity of the group\u2019s professed belief that homosexuality was inconsistent with scouting. Similarly, CAC here cites 1991 position statements that support its view that an avowed homosexual cannot be a Scout leader.\nLike the complainant in Dale, Richardson was open and honest about his sexual orientation when he contacted CAC for a job. The Commission determined that Richardson was a \u201ctester,\u201d an individual who was not genuinely interested in accepting a job with CAC, but simply posed as an applicant in order to gather evidence of discriminatory hiring practices. The Commission also found that Richardson publicly identified himself as a regional spokesperson for Forgotten Scouts, a group whose purpose is to demonstrate that the Boy Scouts\u2019 policy barring employment of homosexuals is \u201cwrong *** and should be changed.\u201d Richardson\u2019s presence in an expressive position as a role model or leader within Scouting would similarly compel CAC to broadcast to youth members and the world that homosexual conduct was a legitimate form of behavior. The city\u2019s interest in eradicating employment discrimination would not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts\u2019 rights to freedom of expressive association.\nLike the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dale, the trial court and Commission here found that CAC\u2019s ability to disseminate its message was not significantly affected by the forced inclusion of Richardson because: (1) opposition to homosexuality was not a central, expressive goal of the CAC; and (2) CAC discouraged its leaders from disseminating any views on sexual issues. Dale disagreed with the conclusion drawn from such findings. Dale, 530 U.S. at 654-55, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 567, 120 S. Ct. at 2454-55.\nOn appeal, Richardson also argues that Dale is distinguishable because Dale occupied an influential position as assistant scoutmaster; whereas, Richardson claims that he was applying for any job. Richardson further posits that his presence in a non-message-carrying position would not significantly burden CAC\u2019s expression and that a more narrowly tailored injunction would not abridge the constitutional concerns expressed in Dale.\nIf an injunction restrains the exercise of first amendment rights, it must be couched in terms that will accomplish constitutionally permitted objectives. Paschen Contractors, Inc. v. Burrell, 14 Ill. App. 3d 748, 752, 303 N.E.2d 246 (1973). The state may not broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. Paschen, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 752. Furthermore, an injunction\u2019s wording must conform to standards of specificity: the order must be complete in the details of its prohibition and the court\u2019s intent must be clearly and easily discernible. Paschen, 14 Ill. App. 3d at 752.\nIn the instant case, CAC contends in its brief that its employment policy only applies to \u201crole-model\u201d or communicative positions. At the hearing, Mark Frankart testified that the policy did not apply to \u201csupport personnel in the council office, people who would perform functions *** such as accounting or computer support personnel, possibly mail room or clerical functions where they would be employees, but really in no way related to deal with [CAC\u2019s] public.\u201d\nWe note that the Commission wrote in its final ruling on liability and damages that \u201cthe Complainant, a gay man, claims to have been denied employment as a Professional Scouter as a result of his sexual orientation.\u201d However, the Commission\u2019s findings were entered prior to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Dale and the Commission has made no specific factual finding as to whether Richardson was seeking a nonexpressive position that does not abridge the Dale decision. Also, the Commission has not made specific factual findings as to whether CAC \u201cdirectly or indirectly discriminate[s] against any individual in hiring *** because of the individual\u2019s *** sexual orientation\u201d regarding nonexpressive positions. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 (1990). The Court in Dale, while holding that Dale\u2019s presence as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly impair the Scout\u2019s first amendment right of expressive association, also wrote:\n\u201cThat is not to say than an expressive association can erect a shield against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its message.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 653, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 566, 120 S. Ct. at 2453-54.\nOn the one hand, because the findings made by the Commission that CAC discriminated against a person seeking employment based on sexual orientation makes no distinction between CAC\u2019s expressive and nonexpressive positions, we cannot say that Dale precludes the issuance of injunctive relief. However, on the other hand, without factual findings on the issue of whether CAC\u2019s policies discriminated against Richardson based on his sexual orientation regarding nonexpressive positions that do not abridge Dale, we cannot direct that a narrowly tailored injunction issue.\nAccordingly, we remand this cause to the Commission for further factual findings. In making further factual findings, the Commission may have additional evidence taken. Relative thereto, the Commission should designate a representative list of nonexpressive positions within CAC where the presence of a homosexual would not \u201cderogate from [CAC\u2019s] expressive message.\u201d Dale, 530 U.S. at 661, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 570-71, 120 S. Ct. at 2458. The Commission should also make a factual finding as to whether Richardson was seeking a nonexpressive position with CAC. A narrowly tailored injunction may issue if the Commission determines that: (1) Richardson was either seeking a nonexpressive position or was testing CAC\u2019s hiring practices relating to nonexpressive positions; and (2) CAC discriminated against Richardson regarding nonexpressive positions because of his sexual orientation.\nIn his cross-appeal, Richardson relies on the Seventh Circuit\u2019s decision in Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Security Services, Inc., 222 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2000), and contends that employment testers who experience discrimination when they apply for jobs have standing to sue under section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030. Kyles supports Richardson\u2019s contention.\nIn Kyles, two African-American women worked as employment testers for the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago. As a condition of their employment, the testers agreed to refuse any job offer extended to them. The testers both applied for a receptionist position and were paired with a white counterpart whose credentials were comparable or inferior to those of the testers. Although each of their white counterparts was offered the job, neither of the testers got past the initial interview. The testers sued defendant employer for race discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e (1994)), as well as section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1981 (1994)). Since the testers were not genuinely interested in working for defendant and would not have accepted employment had it been offered, the district court found that the testers did not suffer the type of personal, redressable injury that would satisfy the \u201ccase or controversy\u201d requirement of article III of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. III, \u00a7 2). Kyles, 222 F.3d at 292-93.\nThe Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that the testers had standing to sue for violations of Title VII. The court indicated that in order to establish standing under article III, a plaintiff must show that: (1) she has suffered an \u201cinjury in fact\u201d (concrete and particularized; not conjectural or hypothetical); (2) the injury is fairly traceable to defendant\u2019s challenged action; and (3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Kyles, 222 F.3d at 294.\nKyles first examined the statutory language of Title VII to determine whether employment testers suffered an \u201cinjury in fact.\u201d Title VII provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cIt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer\u2014\n(1) to fail or refuse to hire *** any individual *** because of such individual\u2019s race ***; or\n(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities *** because of such individual\u2019s race ***.\u201d 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 2000e \u2014 2(a) (1994).\nGuided by the Supreme Court\u2019s analysis in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214, 102 S. Ct. 1114 (1982) (testers had standing to bring suit for violations of the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. \u00a7 3604(d) (1994)), Kyles focused on similarities between the Fair Housing Act and Title VII. Kyles indicated that the following similarities signaled legislative intent to extend standing to the fullest extent permitted by article III:\n(1) both statutes took broad aim at discrimination;\n(2) they authorized individuals to bring suit for statutory violations and, in effect, act as \u201cprivate attorney generals\u201d; and\n(3) they permitted \u201cany individual\u201d aggrieved by a violation to file a charge and suit.\nKyles, 222 F.3d at 297-98. Kyles concluded that the employment testers had standing to sue under Title VII, even if they had not been harmed apart from the statutory violation, because the testers suffered an injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against.\nSection 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 in the instant case is functionally equivalent to Title VII. First, like Title VII, section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 takes a broad aim at discriminatory employment practices. The broad purpose of the Ordinance is to \u201cassure that all persons within its jurisdiction *** shall be protected in the enjoyment of civil rights.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014010 (1990). Second, like Title VII, section 2 \u2014 160\u2014 030 allows individuals to file claims for violations and thereby act as \u201cprivate attorney generals.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 (1990). Finally, the language of the Ordinance parallels Title VII by permitting \u201cany individual\u201d aggrieved by a violation to file a charge of discrimination. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 (1990). Thus, section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 creates a legal right, the denial of which would, in and of itself, give rise to the type of injury necessary to establish standing in the instant case. See also Molovinsky v. Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington, Inc., 683 A.2d 142 (D.C. 1996) (testers had standing to bring action under local ordinance prohibiting sex discrimination in employment); Lea v. Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971) (African-American women had standing to sue under Title VII when employer told them it did not hire \u201cnegro females\u201d even though there were no job openings at the time and plaintiffs were not actually seeking employment).\nIn the instant case, we reject the trial court\u2019s ruling that the Commission had authority to issue an injunction without formally initiating a complaint of its own. If Richardson lacks standing, the injunction cannot issue. Moran Transportation Corp. v. Stroger, 303 Ill. App. 3d 459, 469, 708 N.E.2d 508 (1999) (\u201cIn order to be granted an injunction, a plaintiff must have standing in the cause, which requires a showing of a clearly ascertainable right or interest that needs protection\u201d); Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 720 N.E.2d 1034 (1999) (\u201cThe doctrine of standing is designed to preclude persons who have no interest in a controversy from bringing suit\u201d).\nIn its order, the trial court found that \u201c[t]he City of Chicago, independent of the claims of Richardson, has prevailed in this action.\u201d However, the City of Chicago is not a party. It is the Commission that the Ordinance vests with specified authority. The Ordinance grants the Commission power to \u201cinitiate, receive and investigate complaints of alleged violations of Chapters 2 \u2014 160 and 5 \u2014 8 of the Municipal Code.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7 2 \u2014 120\u2014510(e) (1998). However, nothing in the Municipal Code indicates that the Commission can determine liability and order relief without the filing of a complaint, either by a party with standing or by the Commission itself. The cases that the trial court relied upon are inapposite because they simply relate to a governing authority\u2019s power to enact legislation: (1) that is reasonably necessary to execute a grant of power (People ex rel. Foreman v. Sojourners Motorcycle Club, Ltd., 134 Ill. App. 3d 448, 480 N.E.2d 840 (1985)); or (2) that bears a reasonable relationship to the general welfare of the community (Village of Carpentersville v. Fiala, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 425 N.E.2d 33 (1981); Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin, 47 Ill. 2d 323, 265 N.E.2d 640 (1970); Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956)). Unlike the above-cited cases in which government action based on specific legislation was challenged, here, there is no specific legislation that even grants the Commission authority to enforce section 2 \u2014 160\u2014030 independently without the filing of a complaint.\nCAC additionally posits that the trial court erred by failing to apply the bona fide occupational qualification exemption (Rules and Regulations Governing the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, the Chicago Fair Housing Ordinance, and the Chicago Commission on Human Relations Enabling Ordinance, Regulation 305.100 (1996)) and religious organization exemption (section 2 \u2014 160\u2014080). However, we deem it unnecessary to analyze and decide those issues in this appeal. For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the Commission\u2019s order in its entirety. We reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this cause with directions that the Commission conduct further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.\nVacated; reversed and remanded with directions.\nCAHILL, EJ., and McBRIDE, J., concur.\n\u201cIn the employment context, a \u2018tester\u2019 is an individual who, without intent to accept an offer of employment, poses as a job applicant in order to gather evidence of discriminatory hiring practices.\u201d Kyles, 222 F.3d at 291 n.1, citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 370, 373-74, 71 L. Ed. 2d 214, 223, 225-26, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1119, 1121 (1982).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COUSINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "John A. Ybarra, of Littler, Mendelsohn, P.C., of Chicago, and George A. Davidson and Carla A. Kerr, both of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, L.L.P., of New York, New York, for appellant.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Suzanne M. Loose, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), Charles H.R. Peters and William M. Aguiar, both of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, and Harvey A. Grossman, Lauren B. Raphael, and Pamela L. Sumners, all of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., both of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CHICAGO AREA COUNCIL OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS et al., Respondents-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 99\u20143018\nOpinion filed May 1, 2001.\nJohn A. Ybarra, of Littler, Mendelsohn, P.C., of Chicago, and George A. Davidson and Carla A. Kerr, both of Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, L.L.P., of New York, New York, for appellant.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Suzanne M. Loose, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), Charles H.R. Peters and William M. Aguiar, both of Schiff, Hardin & Waite, and Harvey A. Grossman, Lauren B. Raphael, and Pamela L. Sumners, all of Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc., both of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0017-01", "first_page_order": 35, "last_page_order": 50 }