{ "id": 126336, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRENNIS D. JONES, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jones", "decision_date": "2001-05-11", "docket_number": "No. 3 \u2014 99\u20140919", "first_page": "236", "last_page": "244", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 236" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "477 U.S. 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203837 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/477/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 N.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "149 Ill. 2d 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5599591 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/149/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1326", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 910", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527751 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0910-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 881", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527785 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "740 N.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1026052 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 F. Supp. 2d 381", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 11237731 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "noting that Almendarez-Torres is the law until the Supreme Court overrules it" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/109/0381-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11503479 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 15, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "2362-63" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "2361" }, { "page": "488" }, { "page": "454" }, { "page": "2362" }, { "page": "496" }, { "page": "458" }, { "page": "2366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "704 N.E.2d 928", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931" }, { "page": "931" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" }, { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 1335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1339-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 777", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544478 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0777-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 1020", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" }, { "page": "1025" }, { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "167 Ill. 2d 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 222792 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" }, { "page": "405" }, { "page": "408" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/167/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 1246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "687" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 856, "char_count": 16589, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.158537150203275e-07, "percentile": 0.5834959876039105 }, "sha256": "e5ac4b9351a5f6035ae675472e72967a7675614284ec80c7dd715c2966324ce0", "simhash": "1:f028b9ad19c11f87", "word_count": 2709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:05:07.459628+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRENNIS D. JONES, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Trennis D. Jones, was convicted of unlawful possession of a look-alike substance with intent to distribute on public housing property (720 ILCS 570/404(b), 407(b)(3) (West 1998)). The substance was found in his pocket during a search incident to an arrest for trespassing on state-supported land (720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 5(a) (West 1998)). In this appeal, he claims that: (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging his arrest on probable cause grounds, (2) his conviction should be reduced to simple possession, and (3) the statute under which he was sentenced is unconstitutional. We affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nAt the defendant\u2019s bench trial, police officer Robert Badertscher testified that he was working in Joliet on May 12, 1999. At approximately 11:30 p.m., he heard four or five gunshots fired from a housing project known as the McKay Street Housing Authority. He was 1 to IV2 blocks away and immediately proceeded to the area. The entrance to the project was marked with \u201cno trespassing\u201d signs indicating that persons without a pass were subject to arrest. Badertscher entered and saw a group of 10 males, including the defendant, standing in a street. He said, \u201cstop, police,\u201d but the subjects scattered. The defendant initially walked away but then stopped on a sidewalk.\nBadertscher asked the defendant if he lived on the premises, and the defendant said \u201cno.\u201d During his testimony, Badertscher mentioned later asking the defendant if he had a pass. However, Badertscher\u2019s police report showed that he asked the defendant about his residence and about a pass at the same time. Defense counsel read that portion of the report on cross-examination, and Badertscher acknowledged that the questions \u201ccame together.\u201d The defendant\u2019s response to the compound inquiry was \u201cno.\u201d\nBadertscher described his subsequent actions toward the defendant as follows:\n\u201cAt that time we had several other subjects running [and] I made a decision in my mind that he was under arrest for trespassing on state-supported land. [In a] search incident to arrest I started to pat him down and searched his pockets, and in his right front pants pocket I retrieved three large clear plastic bags. In each bag there was several smaller clear plastic bags with a white rock-like substance inside of them.\u201d\nBadertscher later inventoried the evidence with David Stoddard, a police evidence technician. The small bags were individually wrapped ' packages containing a white rocklike substance. Two of the large bags contained 17 small bags each, and the remaining large bag contained 24 small bags.\nOfficer Stoddard testified and confirmed these numbers. He also said he tested the contents of approximately six small bags from each large bag and did not detect a controlled substance. The aggregate weight of the bags was 16.5 grams.\nRaymond Micou, a manager for the Joliet Housing Authority, testified that the defendant was arrested on property belonging to the authority.\nPolice officer David Jackson testified that he was an undercover investigator on the Metropolitan Area Narcotics Squad. He had participated in 100 to 200 seizures of controlled substances and personally made approximately 50 \u201ccontrolled buys\u201d of such substances. His job duties included daily interaction with confidential drug informants, and 90% to 95% of his work involved dealing with cocaine.\nJackson was familiar with the housing project on McKay Street and testified that it was known for high drug and gang activity. He said the substance seized from the defendant was consistent with the appearance of cocaine. He also said the packaging of the substance was indicative of intent to distribute and that the defendant did not likely possess it for personal use.\nLeslie Stegel, the defendant\u2019s mother, testified that she lived in the housing project on McKay Street. She said the defendant lived with her, although his name was not on her lease.\nThe judge found the defendant guilty of possessing a look-alike substance with intent to distribute on public housing property. The offense was a Class 2 felony. See 720 ILCS 570/404(b), 407(b)(3) (West 1998). However, the defendant met the criteria of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) of the Unified Code of Corrections (the Code) (730 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 1\u20141 et seq. (West 1998)), which provides for mandatory Class X sentencing. The judge thus sentenced him to 11 years in prison as a Class X felon. The defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence, which was denied. He then filed this appeal.\nANALYSIS\nI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nThe defendant first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging his arrest on probable cause grounds. To prevail on this claim, he must show that (1) his counsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) he was prejudiced by the deficient representation. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526, 473 N.E.2d 1246, 1255 (1984). The prejudice component of this standard requires proof of a reasonable likelihood that a motion to quash the defendant\u2019s arrest would have been granted if his counsel had filed one. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 397, 405, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (1995).\nAn arrest is supported by probable cause if facts exist that would lead a reasonable person, standing in the arresting officer\u2019s shoes, to conclude that a crime has been committed and the defendant was the person who committed it. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 405, 657 N.E.2d at 1025. In the instant case, the defendant was arrested for trespassing on state-supported land. This crime occurs when someone (1) enters upon state-supported land, (2) after receiving notice that such entry is forbidden, and (3) thereby interferes with another person\u2019s lawful use and enjoyment of the land. 720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 5(a) (West 1998). The notice requirement is satisfied if the entrance to the land is posted with signs prohibiting unauthorized entry. 720 ILCS 5/21 \u2014 5(b) (West 1998).\nIn light of these principles, we conclude that the defendant has not established the prejudice required to sustain his ineffectiveness claim. Officer Badertscher testified that he encountered the defendant on public housing property at approximately 11:30 p.m. while investigating several gunshots. He initially saw the defendant standing with a group of persons who scattered when he identified himself and told them to stop. The entrance to the property was marked with \u201cno trespassing\u201d signs indicating that persons without a pass were subject to arrest. The gunshots obviously interfered with the residents\u2019 use and enjoyment of the property. Badertscher asked the defendant if he lived on the premises and had a pass, and the defendant said \u201cno.\u201d\nThese circumstances support a finding of probable cause to believe the defendant was trespassing on state-supported land. Accordingly, there is no reasonable likelihood that a motion to quash his arrest for a lack of probable cause would have been granted. His counsel\u2019s decision against filing such a motion did not constitute ineffective assistance.\nII. Reduction of Conviction\nThe defendant next claims that his conviction should be reduced from possession with intent to deliver to simple possession. He supports this claim by asserting that he only possessed a small quantity of the look-alike substance and that there was no indicia of drug selling.\nAlthough a reviewing court may \u201creduce the degree of the offense of which the appellant was convicted\u201d (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(3)), a court should only exercise this power when it finds an evidentiary weakness that causes grave concern about the reliability of the guilty verdict. See People v. Jones, 286 Ill. App. 3d 777, 783, 676 N.E.2d 1335, 1339-40 (1997). Intent to deliver drugs is necessarily proven by circumstantial evidence (People v. Morgan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1030, 704 N.E.2d 928, 931 (1998)), and the inference of such intent may be enhanced by the combination of drugs and the manner in which they are packaged (Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d at 408, 657 N.E.2d at 1027). In appropriate circumstances, the packaging alone may be sufficient evidence of intent to deliver. Morgan, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1030, 704 N.E.2d at 931.\nThe defendant was arrested in an area known for high drug activity. The evidence seized from him consisted of 58 small bags containing a white rocklike substance. These bags were packaged within three larger bags. Two of the large bags each contained 17 of the small bags. The remaining large bag contained 24 small bags. David Jackson, an undercover narcotics officer, testified that this manner of packaging was indicative of intent to distribute. Based on his experience, he believed the defendant did not likely possess the substance for personal use.\nIn light of this evidence, we are not convinced that a reduction of the defendant\u2019s conviction to simple possession is warranted.\nIII. Constitutionality of Sentencing Statute\nFinally, the defendant claims that the statute under which he was sentenced as a Class X felon is unconstitutional. The statute, section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) of the Code, reads:\n\u201cWhen a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted of any Class 2 or greater Class felonies in Illinois, and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, such defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender. This paragraph shall not apply unless (1) the first felony was committed after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977; and (2) the second felony was committed after conviction on the first; and (3) the third felony was committed after conviction on the second.\u201d 730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (West 1998).\nThe defendant bases his constitutional challenge on the holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court reviewed a New Jersey statute that provided for an extended prison term when the trial judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant acted with a purpose to intimidate because of, inter alla, racial bias. Apprendi argued that due process required the prosecution to allege the statutory enhancement factor in its indictment and prove the factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court agreed, holding that \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The Court\u2019s holding left an exception for recidivist legislation, which had previously been found constitutional in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998).\nIn discussing the Almendarez-Torres exception, the Court explained that prior convictions are acceptable sentencing enhancement factors because they \u201c[were] entered pursuant to proceedings with substantial procedural safeguards of their own.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 453, 120 S. Ct. at 2361. The Court also noted that Almendarez-Torres admitted the prior convictions upon which his sentence was enhanced. In light of these facts, the Court stated:\n\u201cBoth the certainty that procedural safeguards attached to any \u2018fact\u2019 of prior conviction, and the reality that Almendarez-Torres did not challenge the accuracy of that \u2018fact\u2019 in his case, mitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to determine a \u2018fact\u2019 increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the statutory range.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 454, 120 S. Ct. at 2362.\nThe Court further distinguished Almendarez-Torres by stating: \u201cWhereas recidivism \u2018does not relate to the commission of the offense\u2019 itself, [citation], New Jersey\u2019s biased purpose inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the \u2018commission of the offense.\u2019 \u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 458, 120 S. Ct. at 2366.\nAccording to the defendant, section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) violates the holding in Apprendi because it provides for a sentencing enhancement without requiring its triggering factors to be alleged in an indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Although section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) is a recidivist statute, the defendant asserts that his claim has merit because Almendarez-Torres was only \u201clukewarmly discussed\u201d in Apprendi. We are unpersuaded by this argument. See United States v. Powell, 109 F. Supp. 2d 381 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that Almendarez-Torres is the law until the Supreme Court overrules it).\nWe conclude that section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) does not violate the holding in Apprendi. The defendant\u2019s prior convictions are reliable sentencing enhancement factors because they were entered in proceedings where he received due process protections. Additionally, the record shows that he admitted his prior convictions and that the convictions did not relate to the instant offense. Each of the circumstances the Supreme Court recognized in Apprendi as justifying a recidivism exception exists in this case. Such circumstances \u201cmitigate constitutional concerns regarding [the] defendant\u2019s due process rights and jury trial guarantees.\u201d People v. Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 587, 740 N.E.2d 377, 386 (2000), appeal denied, No. 90628 (January 29, 2001). Accordingly, his sentence under section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) did not abrogate those rights. People v. Dixon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 881 (2001); People v. Givens, 319 Ill. App. 3d 910 (2001); Lathon, 317 Ill. App. 3d 573, 740 N.E.2d 377.\nAlternatively, the defendant contends that two of the triggering factors in section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) (the sequence of the prior offenses and the subject\u2019s age) are nonrecidivist in nature. In Dixon, this court rejected a similar attempt to bring the statute under the holding in Apprendi. The Appellate Court, Fourth District, did likewise in Givens. The operative subject matter of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) is recidivism. In our view, the ancillary components of the statute are sufficiently intertwined with recidivism, and sufficiently distinct from the elements of the instant offense, to fall under the exception recognized in Apprendi. We note that the statute upheld in Almendarez-Torres contained a sequence element (entering the United States where deportation has occurred after conviction for an aggravated felony). 8 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a7 1326(a), (b)(2) (1988). That element is ancillary to the mere fact of a prior conviction, yet it did not trouble the Supreme Court in AlmendarezTorres or Apprendi.\nThe defendant further claims that we should invalidate section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) under the Illinois Constitution. Aside from his Apprendibased arguments, he offers no reason why we should construe our constitution more strictly than the federal constitution on this matter. We see no reason to do so.\nFinally, the defendant claims that, aside from Apprendi, due process requires a sentencing judge to find the triggering factors of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8) by a heightened standard. He seems to propose the \u201cclear-and-convincing\u201d standard.\nSimilar claims were rejected in Givens and Lathon. Both courts found support for their holdings in People v. Williams, 149 Ill. 2d 467, 599 N.E.2d 913 (1992), where our supreme court held that eligibility for Class X sentencing does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant errantly asserts that \u201cthe Williams Court limited its analysis to . an interpretation of the language of section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8).\u201d The court also based its holding on due process cases like McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67, 106 S. Ct. 2411 (1986). We agree with the holdings in Givens, Lathon, and Williams that due process does not require a heightened standard of proof for section 5 \u2014 5\u20143(c)(8).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Will County circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Santiago A. Durango, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "Jeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Nancy Rink Carter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRENNIS D. JONES, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3 \u2014 99\u20140919\nOpinion filed May 11, 2001.\nSantiago A. Durango, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nJeff Tomczak, State\u2019s Attorney, of Joliet (John X. Breslin and Nancy Rink Carter, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0236-01", "first_page_order": 254, "last_page_order": 262 }